Supreme Court of India
Biswanath Prasad Singh vs State Of Bihar on 8 September, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1994CRILJ242, 1994SUPP(3)SCC97
Bench: B.P. Jeevan Reddy, S.P. Bharucha
ORDER
1. This appeal is preferred against an order of the Patna High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant-accused, seeking to have the criminal proceedings launched against him quashed on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. The appellant was working as a Depot Manager under the Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union at Sitamarhi, in the State of Bihar. On verification, it was found that fertiliser worth Rs. 1,15,000/-was short. The appellant was suspended pending enquiry into the allegations on 2-7-1977. In the year 1978, he was dismissed from service and the provident fund and gratuity due to him was also forfeited. Mr. A.P. Srivastava, learned Counsel, states that the said dismissal has become final and that in fact the appellant has crossed the age of superannuation even by the year 1989 when the present special leave petition was filed.
2. Besides the disciplinary proceedings, criminal proceedings were also launched against the appellant under Section 408 and other offences. The F.I.R. in that behalf was issued on 10-12-1977. It is stated that he surrendered in Court in January, 1978 and was enlarged on bail. Be that as it may, the charge-sheet was filed on February 9, 1983 after a lapse of more than 5 years. Thereafter, the prosecution evidence was adduced and charges framed by the Court on 25th April, 1989-another 6 years. The charges were framed under Sections 408 and 428, I.P.C. and Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. It is at this stage that the appellant approached the Patna High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings.
3. When the writ petition was placed before the Bench, it called upon the appellant to produce the entire order sheet from the beginning to the date of the filing of the writ petition. Another adjournment was granted for the purpose. Thereafter, the writ petition was dismissed on the next date of hearing-i.e., 25-7-1989. Soon after the dismissal of the writ petition in the High Court, the appellant approached this Court by way of this special leave petition on 23rd October, 1989. Though leave was granted in this special leave petition, it does not appear that stay of further proceedings was granted.
4. The situation today is that the prosecution has closed its case and the accused-appellant called upon to enter upon his defence. The question is whether in the above circumstances, we should quash the criminal proceedings on the ground that the right to speedy trial inhering in the accused is infringed.
5. It is true that the charges against the appellant relate to misappropriation of public funds. In such a case, we should take a more stricter view as indicated in the Constitution Bench decision in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, . But there are certain circumstances in this case which induce us to interfere in the matter. The most glaring one is that even though the F.I.R. was issued on 10th December, 1977, the charge-sheet was filed only on 9th February, 1983, i.e., after a lapse of 5 years. No explanation is forthcoming for this extraordinary delay. May be, this being a case of misappropriation of public funds, the investigation may have taken a longer time but it cannot certainly take more than five years, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Added to the said circumstance is the fact that even though there was no stay in this Special Leave Petition/ Criminal Appeal, the case has not progressed much as stated above. Moreover, the appellant has been dismissed from service on these very allegations. His provident fund and gratuity amounts have been forfeited and he has crossed the age of superannuation. Calling upon him now to enter upon defence, after 16 years, in all the facts and circumstances of the case, is bound to cause prejudice to him.
6. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the appellant's right to speedy trial has been infringed in this case and for that reason, the prosecution launched against the appellant is liable to be quashed and is quashed herewith. The appeal is accordingly allowed.