Madras High Court
The Management Of State Farms ... vs The Presiding Officer, Second Addl. ... on 1 August, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1997)ILLJ20MAD
ORDER
1. By consent W.P. 10673/87 was taken up for consideration, as the subject matter in this writ petition is the same as in all other writ petitions. These batch of cases relate to the Central State Farm. Melchanagam West Post, North Arcot District.
2. The contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a unit of the State Farm Corporation of India Limited, the Central Government Undertaking. It runs a model farm. All that it does is to maintain the farm by carrying out the agricultural operations and incidental functions. The main function of the petitioner is agricultural in nature. It produces quality seeds for being supplied to the state Governments. Only if there are left overs they are supplied to the local farmers. Thus the petitioner has no systematic activity producing goods or rendering service. Therefore it is not an industry as per Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appropriate Government is the Central Government under Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
3. The second respondent was employed as an agricultural worker in the farm of the petitioner. He was employed on daily wages basis. On January 20, 1981 the second respondent along with others abandoned the work. It tantamounted to a strike. On January 21, 1981 the petitioner informed the union that the purported strike was illegal and advised it to inform the workers to call off the strike. Even after the calling off the strike, the second respondent did not return for duty.
4. A dispute was raised, the talks held before the Labour Officer, Vellore failed. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour-I, Madras held further talks. A settlement dated April 27, 1981 was arrived at. As per the settlement, the categories of mates, pump operators and helpers could not be continued, as the higher officials seriously objected to the same. But, however, the management took back 23 employees even from that category, leaving out only 26. But with reference to others the matter was left to be decided later in another meeting. For nearly two years nothing happened thereafter. The second respondent raised an industrial dispute, as if the petitioner terminated his service. Finally the matter was referred to the Labour Court, the first respondent herein. The matter was taken up as I.D. 136/84. Apart from the second respondent, 32 others also raised their dispute against the petitioner. By a common award dated March 26, 1987, the first respondent held in favour of the second respondent and other employees. Hence the writ petition.
5. A counter has been filed in W.M.P. 15661/87 in support of the petition for vacating the stay. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that the petitioner suppressed the material facts within his personal knowledge and suggested false and wrong allegations with a view to force the second respondent to a wrongful submission. It is further stated that the purpose of State Farms in India are for improving agricultural sector on scientific basis providing jobs for the youths in villages. But the said object has not been achieved. It is mainly due to the desk bound bureaucratic officials and the principles of constitutional responsibility. Everything is calculated in terms of money and not to the human suffering. Even the law in favour of the suffering masses is misrepresented in favour of the bureaucratic machinery to safeguard their arbitrary and lawless acts. The counter refers to the gift of the machineries worth about Rs. 3 crores from Soviet Union to the management to change the feudal structure of this country and relieve the peasants of this country from strarving and go unemployed. Several lakhs of rupees are earned as profit in the farm. But due to mismanagement it started showing small or nil profits. Similar counter affidavits have been filed in other writ miscellaneous petitions also. But no counter filed with main writ petition.
6. The learned senior counsel Mr. Somayaji contended first that the petitioner firm is not an "industry" at all. Secondly he contended that even assuming that the petitioner firm is an industry there is no question of non employment with reference to the second respondent.
7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the second respondent Mr. P. V. Bakthavatchalam vehemently contended that the farm is an 'industry' and there was non employment. The award of the Labour Court is just and fair. Therefore there is no necessity for interference by this Court.
8. I will take up the first contention of the learned senior counsel Mr. Somayaji for consideration. The very name of the petitioner viz., Central State Farm, Melchangam suggests that it is an agricultural farm. It is not suggested that the said name has been given with mala fide object. The substance of evidence of M.W. 1, is as follows. The main motto is to produce quality seeds. The quality seeds are supplied by us to State Government. The left overs are supplied to local farms. There are 61 regular workers and 500 daily paid workers. There are different sections called Mechanical, Civil Engineering Works, Agricultural, Accounts, Administration and Security. In 1981-82 there were agricultural labourers, agricultural field men junior agri-assistants. On the mechanical side there were pump operators and helpers. There is no serious cross-examination on these aspects. Therefore the farm is mainly intended for the production of quality seeds for supplying to the farmers throughout the country, including local fanners. The main and predominant purpose of the farm is the production of high breed or quality seeds. Can it be said that the farm is carrying on industrial activity and not agricultural activity.
9. The learned senior counsel contended that the Industrial Disputes Act is not meant to cover or govern the agricultural activity. He brought to my notice the amendment Act 46/82 wherein the word 'industry' is redefined. After the amendments 2(j) will have sub-section 2(j)(1), which is as follows :
"any agricultural operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on in an integrated manner with any other activity being any such activity as is referred to in the foregoing provisions of this clause, and such other activity is the predominant one.
Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-clause, "agricultural operation" does not include any activity carried on in a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951)".
From this the intention of the legislature is indicated that the agricultural activities are not governed by the Industrial Disputes Act. Even though it is said that the said Amendment Act 46/82 has not come into force, it throws some light to understand the definition of 'Industry'.
10. In the case reported in Harinagar Cane Farm v. State of Bihar (1963-I-LLJ-692) the Supreme Court has observed as follows : at P. 695.
"In dealing with the present appeals, we do not propose to decide the large question as to whether all agriculture and operations connected with it are included within the definition of S. 2(j). As we have repeatedly emphasized, in dealing with industrial matters, industrial adjudication should refrain from enunciating any general principles or adopting any doctrinaire considerations. It is desirable that industrial adjudication should deal with problems as and when they arise and confine its decisions to the points which strictly arise on the pleadings between the parties.' In the very same Judgment, in another place, the learned Judges have observed as follows : at P. 696 "It has been urged by the respondent that this decision supports their argument that S. 2(j) includes all agriculture and agricultural operations, and in support of this proposition, they have invited our attention to the statement in the judgment delivered by chanderasekara Ayyar, J., where it is observed that the concept of industry in the ordinary non-technical sense applies even to agriculture, horticulture, pisciculture and so on and so forth. We are not impressed by this argument."
11. Another case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is reported in Arooran Sugars Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (1970-II-LLJ-249) wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if the agricultural activity cannot be dissociated from the industrial activity and the main activity is industrial activity then the entire establishment will come under the purview of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judge has observed as follows : atp 255 "The nature of the interrelated activities in the present case clearly show that there is no scope for dissociating the agricultural activity in the farm from the main activity carried on in the factory. On the other hand, both are only different units of a single integrated business activity, which is an industry."
12. From the indication given by the Supreme Court and the Judgment of this Court, it is seen that if agricultural activity is independently carried on and the predominant activity is the same, then the activity cannot be termed as an 'Industrial activity'.
13. At this juncture the learned counsel for the respondent cited the well known judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Rajappa (1978-I-LLJ-349) (Bangalore Water Supply Case). He has stated that the three tests mentioned in the Judgment are squarely applicable to the activity carried on in the farm. But, in my view, the tests are applied to find out whether an activity carried on in a particular establishment is an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the tests cannot be applied to an agricultural activity. Even in an agricultural farm the production is there, the Cooperation of employer and employee is also there, commercial activity is also there, but the distinction has to be made between the commercial activity and the industrial activity. When the predominant activity is agricultural activity, then the tests cannot be applied. Even in the said judgment, there are some indications to exclude agricultural activity. In para 160 III (a) the learned judges have observed as follows :
"(a) The consequences are (i) professions, (ii) clubs, (iii) educational institutions (iv) co-operatives, (v) research institutes (vi) charitable projects and (vii) other kindered adventures if they fulfil the triple tests listed in I (supra), cannot be exempted from the scope of section 2(j).
(b) A restricted category of professions, clubs, co-operatives and even gurukulas and little research labs, may qualify for exemption if in simple ventures substantially, and going by the dominant nature criterion sub-stantively, no employees are entertained but in minimal matters marginal employees are hired without destroying the non employee character of the unit."
The exclusion of agricultural activity not only in the said paragraph but the entire judgment is an indication that the judgment does not relate to agricultural activity at all.
14. After considering the decisions and the evidence and hearing the arguments, I am of the view that the petitioner farm cannot be termed as an industry.
15. The next question that has to be considered is whether there was non employment of the second respondent. Even though I need not go into the question since it has been argued at length, it is proper that I should express my opinion on this aspect also.
16. The employee including the second respondent raised a dispute with reference to nine demands as is seen in the settlement dated April 27, 1981. The demands Nos. 4 and 9 are relevant. They are as follows :
"4. Filling up of vacant posts :
The Management agree that other things remaining the same and without undermining the rules and regulations in force relating to recruitment, qualified persons from among the workmen will be considered for filling up of vacant posts by the management.
9. Re-employment of workers :
The representatives of the unions demanded that employment should be given to all the 800 workmen who have been stopped by the management consequent on the strike by the workmen. The management have stated that 100 workmen are already employed in the farms. However, taking into account the drought situation prevailing in the area thanks to failure of the monsoon, the management agree to employ such of those workmen who are members of the Employees, Provident Fund Scheme in a phased manner depending upon their requirement and exigencies, however, in order to see that all the 400 and odd workmen are employed in such a phased manner before the end of September, 1981."
17. In para 10 of the settlement, there is reference to the second respondent and other employees of his category. They have decided that the management was strong in holding that the categories of Mates, Pump Operators and Helpers cannot be continued any further as per the orders issued by their higher ups in Delhi. With reference to them it is stated at the end of the said paragraph that parties agreed to have further discussion on this issue alone in a subsequent meeting to be arranged by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madras. In Ex. M4 dated August 1982 which is the letter of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour Madras 6 the office bearers of the different unions show a categorical statement that their demands have been settled except filling up of certain posts.
18. We have seen earlier that filling up of posts is Demand No. 4. Re-employment of workers including the second respondent and others is covered by Demand No. 9. Therefore the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that all the demands, including demand No. 9 have been settled once for all and therefore no further industrial dispute can be raised But the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the present dispute will come under the category of filling up of certain posts for which in paragraph 10 there is a reference to the meeting to be convened. There was no meeting subsequent to the meeting held on August 9, 1982. Therefore the reference to the filling up of posts in the settlement dated August 9, 1982 contained in Ex. M4 relates to the present dispute. I am not able to agree with the same. As we have seen already, filling up of certain posts is entirely a different demand No. 4. The present dispute is in Demand No. 9. Hence it cannot be said to be covered by Demand No. 4. I am of the opinion that the reference to the filling up of posts etc, would apply only to Demand No. 4 and not to Demand No. 9. Hence I am of the view that the second respondent cannot raise any industrial dispute after to having settled the same as found in Ex. M2 and M4.
19. Another contention raised by the counsel for the respondent is that it is not open to the petitioner to blow hot and cold at the same time of settlement April 27, 1981 the petitioner did not raise any objection with reference to the settlement and thereby accepted the farm to be an industry. I am not in a position to agree with the same. In the subsequent proceeding when the second respondent and others raised an industrial dispute, the petitioner has specifically taken the plea that the farm is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the counter they have set out the same. But unfortunately the first respondent has not discussed this vital question. In the writ petition also the petitioner has stated this as the main ground of attack against the award of the first respondent. Therefore I feel that the petitioner is not prevented from raising this vital question.
20. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the petitioner is not an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence the writ petitions deserve to be allowed and accordingly they are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.