Telangana High Court
Kodur Pedda Yella Reddy, vs Kodur Ram Reddy, on 2 September, 2024
Author: G.Radha Rani
Bench: G.Radha Rani
THE HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE G.RADHA RANI
SECOND APPEAL No.497 of 2005
JUDGMENT:
This second appeal is filed by the appellants-respondents- plaintiffs aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 01.02.2005 passed in A.S. No.22 of 2000 by the II-Additional District Judge, Mahabubnagar reversing the judgment and decree dated 21.02.2000 passed in O.S No.11 of 1994 by the Junior Civil Judge, Mahabubnagar, seeking the relief of declaration of title and consequential relief of perpetual injunction.
2. The appellants-plaintiffs filed the suit contending that the plaintiffs No.1 to 3 were the brothers and that their grandfather, by name, Papanna and the great grandfather of defendant No.1 were brothers. The father of defendant No.1, by name, Gopanna was the son of one Ramulu. The said Ramulu was the son of Pedda Venkanna, the younger brother of Papanna. The defendants were the son and wife of Gopanna. During the partition, the lands were divided and Gopanna sold the suit land in the year 1954 to the father of the plaintiffs under a private sale deed dated 11.05.1954. The plaintiffs were in possession of the said 2 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 land since then and were paying land revenue and their names were entered in the revenue records. The defendants were trying to disturb the possession of the plaintiffs taking advantage of the fact that the name of the 1st defendant's father was in column No.1 of the pahani. The plaintiffs No.4 to 6 were brought on record as legal representatives of the plaintiff No.1.
3. The defendants filed written statement denying any private sale. They contended that if any sale was effected, the same would have been incorporated in the khasra of 1954-55 and the name of the father of the plaintiffs would have been recorded as purchaser in the khasra pahani of 1954-55. They further contended that there was a ban of alienation of the lands under Section 47 of the Tenancy Act between 1954 and 1969 and if such permission was not taken, the sale was void. On the basis of a private document, the title could not be passed to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs could not sustain the suit for the relief of declaration and for the consequential relief of injunction. They also denied that they interfered with the possession of the plaintiffs on 30.12.1993 and 23.01.1994 and tried to evict the plaintiffs. They contended that there was no cause of action to file the suit and the plaintiffs had no locus standi and prayed to dismiss the suit. 3
Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005
4. Basing on the said pleadings, the trial court framed the issues as follows:
1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to be declared as owners and pattedars of plaint schedule land?
2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for perpetual injunction as prayed for?
3) To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled to?
5. PWs.1 to 3 were examined on behalf of the plaintiffs and Exs.A1 to A18 were marked. DWs.1 to 3 were examined on behalf of the defendants and Exs.B1 to B20 were marked.
6. On considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial court decreed the suit observing that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land for more than 40 years as such, they perfected their title by adverse possession. Since Section 47 of the Tenancy Act was subsequently deleted, no permission was required and the absence of the permission would not invalidate the sale. The plaintiffs were entitled for declaration as owners by virtue of either Ex.A1 or by virtue of adverse possession being in possession of more than the statutory period having perfected their title. 4
Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005
7. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the Junior Civil Judge, Mahabubnagar, the defendants preferred an appeal. The appeal was heard by the II-Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar and vide A.S. No.22 of 2000, the appeal was allowed setting aside the judgment of the trial court on 01.02.2005. The respondents-plaintiffs had not submitted their arguments in the first appellate court. On hearing the learned counsel for the appellants- defendants and on considering the matter on merits, the first appellate court passed the judgment observing that Ex.A1 was an unregistered document and there were discrepancies in the evidence of PWs.1 and 3 with regard to the consideration passed under Ex.A1. The oral evidence of the witnesses was contrary to the pleadings and the documentary evidence under Ex.A1. The plaintiffs had not invoked the benefit of Section 50(1)(B) of the A.P. Telangana Area (Tenancy and Agricultural) Lands Act, 1950 which provided for validation of agricultural lands on the basis of unregistered documents in between 10.06.1950 and 1961. The defendants disputed the signature of their father on Ex.A1 and filed Ex.B19 sale deed executed by their father in favour of DW.2. The signatures of Gopanna in Ex.A1 and Ex.B19 were totally different. The trial court observed the said fact, but glossed over it stating that the 5 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 signatures might have been changed due to passage of time. Ex.A1 was suspicious. Being an unregistered document, it could not be looked into as evidence of the sale transaction. The plaintiffs had not followed the procedure laid down under the Tenancy Act for validation of the private sale deed. Thus, the plaintiffs acquired no right over the suit schedule property under Ex.A1. No injunction could be granted against a true owner. Even in the documents marked as Exs.A2 and A3, the father of the 1st defendant was shown as pattedar. The defendants also filed adequate record of possession. The burden would lie upon the plaintiffs to establish their title in a declaratory suit. The findings of the trial court on the points of title and possession were unsustainable and reversed the judgment of the trial court.
8. Aggrieved by the said judgment passed by the learned II-Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar in A.S. No.22 of 2000 dated 01.02.2005, the plaintiffs preferred this second appeal raising certain substantial questions of law.
9. This Court on 29.04.2005 admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:
6
Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005
(i) Whether the appellants are entitled to plead that they acquired title over the suit schedule property by adverse possession having pleaded that they purchased from the landlords?
(ii) Whether the lower court was right in not considering the records prepared under Section 6 of the A.P. Records of Rights Act?
(iii) Whether the permission under Section 47 of the A.P. Telangana Area Tenancy Act is required for the plaintiffs to purchase the suit schedule property from the landlords?
(iv) Whether there is any perversity in the judgments of the courts below?
10. Heard Sri B. Balaji, learned counsel representing Sri Upender Chakravarthy, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri M. Damodar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents.
Substantial Question of Law No.(i):
Whether the appellants are entitled to plead that they acquired title over the suit schedule property by adverse possession having pleaded that they purchased from the landlords?
11. As seen from the plaint, the plaintiffs contended that their father purchased the suit schedule property from the father of the 1st defendant for a sale consideration of Rs.490/- in the year 1954 under a private sale deed dated 11.05.1954. Since 1954-55, the name of the 7 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 father of the plaintiffs was recorded in the revenue records as possessor and 'Kungi' Kariddar and after the death of their father, they were in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property till the date of filing the suit without any objection and that they were in possession and enjoyment of the property for more than the statutory period. Thus, the plaintiffs were claiming their right over the property basing upon a private sale deed dated 11.05.1954 and not pleaded about any adverse possession. The plaintiffs did not claim title in the suit property on the strength of adverse possession. There were no pleadings or issue or evidence in the said regard to prove as to when their possession became adverse. The trial court without answering the issue No.1 first which was framed 'whether the plaintiffs are entitled to be declared as owners and pattedars of the plaint schedule property?', proceeded to answer issue No.2 'whether they were entitled for perpetual injunction?'. When the injunction was sought as a consequential relief to the suit for declaration of title, without answering the main issue with regard to the entitlement of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property in a suit for declaration of title, the trial court committed mistake in proceeding to answer the issue No.2 in the beginning. Even without any pleadings with regard to the adverse possession claimed by the plaintiffs or any 8 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 issue framed in the said regard, the trial court considering that the plaintiffs have perfected their title by way of adverse possession, is considered as an error apparent on the face of the record.
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Uttarakhand and another v. Mandir Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj1 held that:
"20. In our considered opinion, a case with which we are dealing here, the aforesaid material facts were necessarily to be pleaded to establish prima facie the legal right of the plaintiff in such type of suit property.
21. As mentioned above, since the plaint did not contain aforementioned pleadings, the suit was liable for rejection at the threshold. That apart, there was absolutely no evidence (documentary) adduced by the plaintiff to prove and establish his legal ownership rights over the temple and the land and nor did he adduce any documentary evidence to show his so-called "Mahantship" or "Managership", except making bald averments in the plaint running in four pages and that too with no material details set out above.
22. We are, therefore, really at a loss to understand as to how and on what basis such suit could be entertained much less decreed.
23. What was more a matter of serious concern is that the Trial Court proceeded to decree the plaintiff's suit by conferring an ownership of the Temple/land with a right of easement over the use of well to drink water from the well on the basis of their "adverse possession" over the suit property.
24. By no stretch of imagination, in our view, such a declaration of ownership over the suit property and right of easement over a well could be granted by the Trial Court in plaintiff's favour because even the plaintiff did not claim title in the suit property on the strength of "adverse possession". Neither there were any pleadings nor any issue 1 2017 (9) SCC 579 9 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 much less evidence to prove the adverse possession on land and for grant of any easementry right over the well. The Courts below should have seen that no declaration of ownership rights over the suit property could be granted to the plaintiff on the strength of "adverse possession"
(Gurdwara Sahib vs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala & Anr., (2014) 1 SCC 669)). The Courts below also should have seen that courts can grant only that relief which is claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint and such relief can be granted only on the pleadings but not beyond it. In other words, courts cannot travel beyond the pleadings for granting any relief. This principle is fully applied to the facts of this case against the plaintiff.
25. In our considered opinion, if the Trial Court committed several jurisdictional and legal errors by not applying any legal provisions and just on mere asking, decreed the suit, at least, the High Court (Division Bench) in its first appellate jurisdiction in an appeal filed by the defendants against the judgment of Trial Court should have taken note of relevant legal provisions applicable to the case and then decided the appeal accordingly."
13. Thus, the courts cannot travel beyond the pleadings for granting any relief. Learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohan Lal (deceased) through his LRs. Kachru and others v. Mira Abdul Gaffar and another2, wherein it was held that:
"3. The only question is whether the appellant is entitled to retain possession of the suit property. Two pleas have been raised by the appellant in defence. One is that having remained in possession from March 8, 1956, he has perfected his title by prescription. Secondly, he pleaded that he is entitled to retain his possession by operation of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, 'the Act').2
AIR 1996 SC 910 10 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005
4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., upto completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi nec clam nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant."
14. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Narasamma and others v. A. Krishnappa (dead) through Legal Representatives 3 on the aspect that claim of independent title and adverse possession simultaneously and from the same date amounts to taking contradictory pleas. The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and latter does not operate until the former is renounced. It was specifically held therein that:
"31. We also find that the reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellants in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur [(2019) 8 SCC 729] is also misplaced. The question which arose for consideration before the three Judge Bench was whether, a suit could be maintained for declaration of title and for permanent injunction seeking protection on a plea of adverse possession, or that it was an instrument of defence in a suit filed against such a person. In fact, if one may say, there was, for a long time a consistent view of the Court that the plea could only be of shield and not a sword. The judgment changed this legal position by opining that a plea to retain (supra) possession could be managed by the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. However, to 3 2020 (15) SCC 218 11 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 constitute such adverse possession, the three classic requirements, which need to co-exist were again emphasized, nec vi, i.e., adequate in continuity, nec clam, i.e., adequate in publicity and nec precario, i.e., adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge.
32. The question which confronts us is not the aforesaid, but whether simultaneously a plea can be taken of title and adverse possession, i.e., whether it would amount to taking contradictory pleas. In this behalf, we may refer to the four judgments cited by learned counsel for the respondent herein, which succinctly set forth the legal position.
33. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of India [(2004) 10 SCC 779] case, it has been clearly set out that a plaintiff filing a title over the property must specifically plead it. When such a plea of adverse possession is projected, it is inherent in the nature of it that someone else is the owner of the property. In that context, it was observed in para 12 that "....the pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the (supra) former is renounced"
34. The aforesaid judgment in turn relied upon the judgment in Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar [(1996) 1 SCC 639], which observed in para 4 as under:
"4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., upto completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant."
35. In order to establish adverse possession an inquiry is required to be made into the starting point of such adverse 12 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 possession and, thus, when the recorded owner got dispossessed would be crucial.
36. In the facts of the present case, this fact has not at all been proved. The possession of Smt. Narasamma, the wife of the defendant, is to be on account of consideration paid. Assuming that the transaction did not fructify into a sale deed for whatever reason, still the date when such possession becomes adverse would have to be set out. Thus, the plea of adverse possession is lacking in all material particulars.
37. The possession has to be in public and to the knowledge of the true owner as adverse, and this is necessary as a plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner. Thus, the law would not be readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out."
15. Thus, the plaintiffs would need to specifically prove as to from which date their possession became hostile, the starting point of such adverse possession and as to when the true owner was dispossessed and as to when the true owner had knowledge that the possession of the plaintiffs became adverse to him so as to defeat his rights. There should be clear and cogent evidence in the said regard. But, the plaintiffs failed to adduce any evidence on the plea of adverse possession. As such, the plaintiffs are not entitled to plead that they acquired title over the suit schedule property by adverse possession. Ex.A2 is the certified copy of the pahani for the year 1955-56, Ex.A3 is the certified copy of the pahani for the year 1972-73, Ex.A4 is the certified copy of the pahani for 1991-92 and Exs.A16 to 18 are the certified copies of the pahanies 13 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 for the year 1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97. These documents also would not disclose continuity of possession. The documents under Exs.A16 to A18 are pertaining to the years subsequent to filing of the suit. Thus, the plaintiffs failed to plead and prove that their possession is adequate in continuity, adequate in publicity and adverse to their competitor in denial of his title and to his knowledge. As such, the substantial question of law No.(i) is answered accordingly holding that the appellants are not entitled to plead that they acquired title over the suit schedule property by adverse possession having pleaded that they purchased the same under a private sale deed dated 11.05.1954. Substantial Question of Law No.(ii):
Whether the lower court was right in not considering the records prepared under Section 6 of the A.P. Records of Rights Act?
16. As seen from the order of the trial court, the entries in the pahanies for the year 1992-93 and 1993-94 would indicate the names of both the parties and the plaintiffs filed a petition before the Mandal Revenue Officer for holding an enquiry and the MRO, after holding the enquiry, ordered for rectification of wrong entries in the pahanies for the years 1992-93 and 1993-94 wherein the defendants' names as well as the plaintiffs' names were incorporated as cultivators. Against the order 14 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 of the MRO, the defendants preferred an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer. The RDO dismissed the same and against the order of the RDO, the defendants preferred a revision before the Joint Collector and the Joint Collector inturn remanded the said case to the MRO for fresh enquiry observing that due notice should be given to the defendants and the said enquiry was pending before the MRO. Ex.B20 is the certified copy of the remand order of the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar dated 17.04.1999. Thus, the orders of the revenue authorities had not attained finality to consider as to who was in possession of the suit schedule property.
17. The first appellate court observed that in Ex.A2, the name of the father of the defendant No.1 was shown as pattedar. The pahani under Ex.A3 was of the year 1972-73. There was no document of possession in between Ex.A1, A2 and A3. Even in Ex.A3, the first defendant's father was shown as Pattedar. The plaintiffs name was shown only for the year 1991-92 pahani. Thus, the documents exhibit the inconsistent and defective record of the plaintiffs' possession. The cist receipts filed by the plaintiffs commenced from the year 1988. On the other hand, the defendants also filed earlier cist receipts. The 15 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 defendants also filed adequate record of possession. Admittedly, the entries in revenue records are not proof of possession of title.
18. It was a settled proposition of law that revenue records are only entries for the purpose of realizing tax. Mutation in the records neither create or extinguish the title nor does they have any presumptive value on title. All it does is entitle the person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the land revenue in question.
19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India and others v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others 4 held that:
"15. It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff.
16. The High Court, we notice, has taken the view that once the evidence is let in by both the parties, the question of burden of proof pales into insignificance and the evidence let in by both the parties is required to be appreciated by the court in order to record its findings in respect of each of the issues that may ultimately determine the fate of the suit. The High Court has also proceeded on the basis that initial burden would always be upon the plaintiff to establish its case but if the evidence let in by defendants in support of their case probabalises the case set up by the plaintiff, such evidence cannot be ignored and kept out of consideration.
17. At the outset, let us examine the legal position with regard to whom the burden of proof lies in a suit for declaration of title and possession. This Court in Maran Mar 4 (2014) 2 SCC 269 16 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira [AIR1959 SC 31] observed that:
20. "...in a suit for declaration if the plaintiffs are to succeed, they must do so on the strength of their own title."
18. In Nagar Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh [(1995) 3 SCC 426], this Court held as under:
"The onus to prove title to the property in question was on the plaintiff. In a suit for ejectment based on title it was incumbent on the part of the court of appeal first to record a finding on the claim of title to the suit land made on behalf of the plaintiff. The court is bound to enquire or investigate that question first before going into any other question that may arise in a suit."
19. The legal position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not. We are of the view that even if the title set up by the defendants is found against, in the absence of establishment of plaintiff's own title, plaintiff must be non-suited."
20. Ex.A1 being an unregistered document cannot be looked into as evidencing the sale transaction and this Court does not find any error in the judgment of the lower appellate court in disregarding the said document and in considering that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title over the suit schedule property.
21. This Court in W.P. No.6453 of 2015 dated 27.12.2023 also observed that the respondent No.3 therein i.e. Tahsildar, Mahabubnagar 17 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 Mandal, Mahabubnagar District mutated the names of the unofficial respondents therein i.e. plaintiffs herein in the revenue record i.e. on 02.03.2005 as per the decree passed in O.S. No.11 of 1994 dated 21.02.2000. Admittedly, as on the date of making the revenue entries by respondent No.3 therein, the said judgment and decree passed in O.S. No.11 of 1994 dated 21.02.2000 was set aside by the lower appellate court in A.S. No.22 of 2000 dated 01.02.2005. Hence, the impugned proceedings issued by the MRO dated 02.03.2005 is considered as contrary to the decree of the lower appellate court and this Court set aside the revenue records made by the respondent No.3 and observed that if any revenue entries were made pursuant to the said order, the same were subject to the outcome of the Second Appeal No.497 of 2005. Thus, the revenue records were no way useful in deciding the title of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property and they were not entitled for the relief of declaration of title basing upon the revenue entries. The substantial question of law No.(ii) is answered accordingly. Substantial Question of Law No.(iii):
Whether the permission under Section 47 of the A.P. Telangana Area Tenancy Act is required for the plaintiffs to purchase the suit schedule property from the landlords?18
Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005
22. The defendants have taken the plea in their written statement stating that under Section 47 of the Tenancy Act, the vendor has to obtain permission for alienation of land as there was a ban on alienation of lands in between 1954 and 1961. As the plaintiffs alleged that they purchased the land under a private sale deed dated 11.05.1954, such permission was required. Without the said permission, the same was void.
23. The trial court set aside the said plea taken by the defendants observing that Section 47 of the Tenancy Act was subsequently deleted, as such, it does not require any permission and in the absence of the said permission it would not invalidate the sale. However, the lower appellate court observed that the plaintiffs had not followed the procedure laid down under the Tenancy Act for validation of private sale deed and as such, they acquire no rights over the suit schedule property under Ex.A1.
24. The learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs relied upon a Division Bench judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in C.V. 19 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005 Narayan Reddy v. Katanguru Raghava Reddy and another 5 , wherein it was held that:
"Therefore, viewed from any angle, it is quite manifest that the alienee or transferee who has been in possession under an agreement of sale entered into at a time when Section 47 of the Tenancy Act was in force will be entitled to sue for specific performance and is not deprived of his right under Section 53-A of the T.P. Act to protect his possession, on payment of balance of consideration, without the necessity of obtaining any permission since S.47 stood deleted either on or from 24-1-1971 or even any time posterior to the deletion of Sec.47, retention of Section 50-B notwithstanding. The contention that the alienation or transfer of land and consequential possession thereof in favour of alienee or transferee under agreement of sale entered into during the subsistence of Sec.47, is not legal and valid either because of want of permission under Section 47 or because of want of subsequent validation under Section 50-B and therefore, the alienee or transferee is not entitled to invoke Section 53-A of the T.P. Act and to sue for specific performance and consequently such land must be included in the holding of both the transferor and transferee, has no substance."
25. Thus, permission is not required for the appellants-plaintiffs under Section 47 of A.P. Telangana Area (Tenancy) Act to purchase the property under Ex.A1. The substantial question of law No.(iii) is answered in favour of the appellants-plaintiffs. Substantial Question of law No.(iv):
Whether there is any perversity in the judgments of the courts below?5
AIR 1980 AP 89 20 Dr.GRR, J SA No.497 of 2005
26. This Court does not find any perversity in the judgment of the lower appellate court in casting the burden of proof or in appreciating the evidence on record or in drawing inference from the proved facts or in applying the law. On considering all the aspects only, the lower appellate court rightly reversed the judgment of the trial court. As such, this Court does not find any necessity to interfere with the judgment of the lower appellate court.
27. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree dated 01.02.2005 passed in A.S. No.22 of 2000 by the II-Additional District Judge, Mahabubnagar in reversing the judgment and decree dated 21.04.2000 passed in O.S No.11 of 1994 by the Junior Civil Judge, Mahabubnagar. No order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending in this appeal, if any shall stand closed.
_____________________ Dr. G. RADHA RANI, J September 02, 2024 KTL