Madhya Pradesh High Court
Vikas Pathak vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 23 August, 2017
W.P. No.19792/2015
1
23-08-2017
Shri Pawan Kawre, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri R.S. Dubey, learned counsel for respondent no.5.
Shri Piyush Jain, learned Panel Lawyer for respondents/State.
The petitioner before this Court, who is a Police Officer from State Police Services has filed the present petition being aggrieved by the order dated 07.08.2015, passed by State Government and order dated 02.12.2014, again passed by State Government (Under Secretary) by which a punishment of stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect has been inflicted upon the petitioner.
The facts as reflected in the Writ Petition reveals that the petitioner is an officer of State Police Services of 1995 Batch, he was posted at the relevant point of time at Damoh where the incident has allegedly taken place resulting into his punishment and a notice was issued to him on 17.09.2008 alleging that on 14.06.2008 he has abused and misbehaved one Shri Narayan Singh Thakur, Bureau Chief, Dainik Bhaskar, who was a resident of Damoh. The petitioner has further stated that the aforesaid notice was issued under the provisions of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, alleging violation of Conduct Rules, 1965 and Regulation 64 (11) of the Police Regulations. Along with the show-cause notice a preliminary W.P. No.19792/2015 2 enquiry report dated 14.06.2008 was also attached. The petitioner as stated in the Writ Petition in order to submit a proper reply, he requested the authority to furnish him certain documents and mention of the documents demanded by the petitioner finds place in his letter dated 04.10.2008. The petitioner has further stated that the son of the complainant was involved in a criminal case, which was registered against his son for offence under Sections 307 and 302 of IPC read with Section 3 (2) (v) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and only with a view to pressurize the petitioner a false complaint was made by a Journalist against the petitioner. The petitioner has further stated that some of the documents was supplied to the petitioner on 13.02.2009 and the petitioner again submitted a letter on 02.03.2009 requesting for as much as nine documents, they were not supplied to the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner requested the Director General of Police on 20.02.2009 to grant an opportunity of hearing and also informed that the son of the complainant is facing a criminal case for an offence under Section 307 and 302 of IPC. The petitioner requested for a regular enquiry in the alleged incident. A copy of explanation/representation of the petitioner to the Director General of Police dated 20.02.2009 is on record as Annexure P-3. The petitioner has further stated that the son of the complainant was declared as a proclaimed offender and a reward of Rs.2,500/- was also announced. In those circumstances, a false complaint was made against the petitioner.
W.P. No.19792/2015 3The petitioner once again on 12.05.2009 requested the Additional Inspector of General of Police demanding certain documents; however, he did not receive the documents as stated by the petitioner inspite of repeated letters of request. The petitioner's stand is that complete documents were not supplied to him though certain documents were supplied to him. The petitioner has further stated that finally inspite of there being a request to hold a regular departmental enquiry, a punishment order was passed inflicting a punishment of stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect. Thereafter, an appeal was preferred under Rule 23 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, and the same has also been dismissed.
The petitioner's contention is that the impugned order of punishment stands vitiated as it was alleged against the petitioner that he has called the complainant to a Police Station and has misbehaved with the complainant and unless and until the factum of calling the complainant to the Police Station was proved the question of punishing the petitioner does not arise; and therefore, the stand of the petitioner is that a regular departmental enquiry should have been conducted as demanded. The other ground raised by the petitioner is that the petitioner was not given complete documents which has prejudiced his defence; and therefore, the impugned orders are bad in law.
On the contrary a detailed and exhaustive reply has been filed by the State Government and it has been stated that on W.P. No.19792/2015 4 14.06.2008 the petitioner has called one Narayan Singh Thakur to a Police Station and he has misbehaved with Narayan Singh Thakur and a complaint was lodged by Narayan Singh Thakur before the Superintendent of Police, Damoh. The Superintendent of Police, Damoh on 14.06.2008 itself conducted a preliminary enquiry and the enquiry report is also on record dated 14.06.2008. Reply has also been filed by the respondent no.5. Respondent no.5 has also stated that after following the prescribed procedure the State Government has passed the order of punishment. The aforesaid reply was filed by the person who was conducting preliminary enquiry. In the reply filed by other respondents it has been stated that Bureau Chief of Dainik Bhaskar Shri Narayan Singh Thakur has alleged that the petitioner has abused and misbehaved with him and on account of the same a notice was issued under the provisions of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules for inflicting a minor punishment and as a minor punishment was required to be inflicted ,the question of holding the detailed regular departmental enquiry as provided in the Rule-14 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, doesn't arise. The respondents have also stated that the petitioner did not file any reply to the show-cause notice on merits and therefore, they have proceeded against the petitioner ex-parte and thereafter they have also referred the matter to the Public Service Commission and the Madhya Pradesh Public Service W.P. No.19792/2015 5 Commission has given concurrence on 27.10.2014 and thereafter they have passed the impugned order of punishment against which the appeal has been dismissed. The respondents have also stated that the scope of interference in the matter of imposition of punishment is quite limited. It has been stated that the procedure adopted by the respondents is neither perverse nor they have violated any statutory provision as contained under the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules. The respondents have prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition.
Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.
The matter is being disposed of at motion hearing stage itself with consent of the parties.
Undisputedly, the petitioner before this Court is an Officer of State Police Services of the year 1995 batch. The incident relates to the period when he was posted at Damoh, one Shri Narayan Singh Thakur, the Bureau Chief, Dainik Bhaskar submitted a complaint on 14/6/2008 alleging misbehaviour on the part of the petitioner and the documents on record reflect which have been filed by the respondents, to be more specific, by Shri T.K. Vidhyarthi, Superintendent of Police that on 14/6/2008 in the evening a report was submitted by Shri Narayan Singh Thakur, Bureau Chief Dainik Bhaskar alleging that at 6:30 P.M. the petitioner has misbehaved with him. The documents further establishes that the complaint was looked into. The statement of W.P. No.19792/2015 6 the complainant was recorded on 14/6/2008 itself and a report again on the same day, i.e. in the night was forwarded by the Addl. Superintendent of Police, T.K.Vidhyarthi to the Superintendent of Police on 14/6/2008 itself. Meaning thereby within few hours the machinery has concluded that the petitioner has allegedly committed misconduct by abusing and misbehaving with the Bureau Chief of a newspaper. This Court has never seen such a prompt action on the part of the police force. Cases relating to murder dacoity, rape etc. take lot of time to conclude the investigation and in the present case on the basis of allegation that the petitioner has misbehaved with some journalist, the preliminary enquiry was conducted on the same day within few hours and the officer who has conducted the preliminary enquiry has held the petitioner guilty. The version of the petitioner was totally ignored by the officer who conducted the preliminary enquiry in respect of the complaint made by the Bureau Chief of the newspaper, and he was held guilty in the preliminary enquiry. Such type of report is certainly violative of principles of natural justice and fair-play. The respondent/State thereafter based upon the preliminary enquiry which was concluded in few hours for the reasons best known to the enquiry officer and the then the Superintendent of Police, issued a show notice to the petitioner on 17/9/2008 alleging that he has misbehaved and abused one Shri Narayan Singh Thakur, the Bureau Chief, Dainik Bhaskar and thus committed violation of Conduct Rules, 1965 & W.P. No.19792/2015 7 Regulations 64(11) of Police Regulations. The petitioner as established from the documents on record demanded various documents, but undisputedly all documents demanded by the petitioner were never supplied to him. The undisputed facts also reveal that the petitioner did ask for a regular enquiry and no regular enquiry was held by the disciplinary authority as requested by the petitioner. The respondents based upon the fact finding preliminary enquiry report have established that the petitioner has used abusive words and has called the Bureau Chief, Dainik Bhaskar to the Police Station for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes at Damoh. The factum of misbehavior could not have been proved without proving it in a departmental enquiry after recording the statement of witnesses especially when the petitioner has denied the incident in toto. However, based upon a fact finding enquiry which was concluded in few hours, the respondents have held the petitioner guilty of the alleged misconduct. Another important aspect of the case is that the petitioner was posted at the relevant point of time at Damoh as a Police Officer and a criminal case for offences under Sections 307 & 302 of Indian Penal Code read with 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was pending against the son of the Bureau Chief (Journalist). A reward was also announced by the Police and it appears that in order to pressurize the police authorities, the so called complaint was lodged by the journalist. The unholy W.P. No.19792/2015 8 haste shown by the Department in concluding the preliminary enquiry speaks volumes about the procedure which is prevalent in the police department. The police authorities take enormous time to conclude investigations against criminals, but against their own officer, who is an extraordinary outstanding officer of the State of Madhya Pradesh the preliminary enquiry holding him guilty was concluded in view hours.
In the considered opinion of this Court as the imputation of misconduct has been proved against the petitioner without holding a departmental enquiry without following the principles of natural justice and fair-play, the action of the respondents is certainly bad in law and the impugned order passed by the respondents, dated 02.12.2014 deserves to be quashed and is accordingly quashed. Another important aspect of the case is that the petitioner kept on demanding documents and kept on denying the incident; however, the respondents proceeded ex-parte against the petitioner. This also reflects that the respondents have violated the principles of natural justice and fair play and also have violated the procedure prescribed under the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965. In the considered opinion of this Court the impugned order, dated 02.12.2014 and the order rejecting the appeal, dated 07.08.2015 are bad in law and are hereby quashed. The present case reflects that the respondents have not only violated the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 but have W.P. No.19792/2015 9 also violated the basic principles of natural justice and fair play.
In India there is no statute which prescribes the minimum procedure which administrative agencies or quasi judicial bodies must follow while taking decisions which affect the rights of the individuals. Nonetheless, they are bound by the principles of natural justice. The principles of natural justice signify the basic minimum fair procedure which must be followed while exercising decision making powers. Natural justice forms the very backbone of a civilized society.
The wheels regarding the application of principles of natural justice to administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings started turning from 1963 when the House of Lords in the United Kingdom delivered the landmark and oft-quoted judgment of Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2. An order for dismissal of a Constable was quashed because he was not provided any opportunity to defend his actions. Presently, in our country, the principles of natural justice are applicable in totality to administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings. This is consistent and in line with the rapidly increasing role, functions and jurisdiction of such bodies in a welfare state like ours.
The below-mentioned passages by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uma Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. AIR 2009 SC 2375 exhaustively explain natural justice and deserve to be quoted in full in the context of the current dispute:
"6. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of W.P. No.19792/2015 10 natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.
7. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants' defence.
8. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play.....
10. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a W.P. No.19792/2015 11 judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice.
12. Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on the subject. The most important of them is the Board of Education v. Rice (1911 AC 179:80 LJKB 796), where Lord Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows:
"Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or offices of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose usually be of an administrative kind, but sometimes, it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not and that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial....The Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a Court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from the determination either upon law or upon fact. But if the Court is satisfied either that the Board have not acted judicially in the way I have described, or have not determined the question which they are required by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorari".
13. Lord Wright also emphasized from the same decision the observation of the Lord Chancellor that the Board can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view". To the same effect are the observations of Earl of Selbourne, LO in Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works (1985 (10) AC 229:54 LJMC 81), where the learned and noble Lord Chancellor observed as follows:
"No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an W.P. No.19792/2015 12 opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice".
14. Lord Selbourne also added that the essence of justice consisted in requiring that all parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very important rule of natural justice contained in the oft-quoted phrase 'justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done'.
15. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.
16. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura (1855(2) Macg. 1.8, Lord Cranworth defined it as 'universal justice'. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen (1877-78(3) App.Case 614, 623 JC) Sir Robort P. Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy council, used the phrase 'the requirements of substantial justice', while in Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead District Board of Works (1884-85(10) App.Case W.P. No.19792/2015 13 229, 240), Earl of Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase 'the substantial requirement of justice'. In Vionet v. Barrett (1885(55) LJRD 39, 41), Lord Esher, MR defined natural justice as 'the natural sense of what is right and wrong'. While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health (1890 (24) QBD 712), Lord Fasher, M.R. instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionet's case (supra) chose to define natural justice as 'fundamental justice'. In Ridge v. Baldwin (1963(1) WB 569, 578), Harman LJ, in the Court of Appeal countered natural justice with 'fair-play in action' a phrase favoured by Bhagawati, J. in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978 (2) SCR 621). In re R.N. (An Infant) (1967 (2) B 617, 530), Lord Parker, CJ, preferred to describe natural justice as 'a duty to act fairly'. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secretary to State for Environment (1976 WLR 1255) Lord Russell of Willowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as 'a fair crack of the whip' while Geoffrey Lane, LJ. In Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex Parte Hosenball (1977 (1) WLR 766) preferred the homely phrase 'common fairness'.
17. How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is 'nemo judex in causa sua' or 'nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua' as stated in (1605) 12 Co.Rep.114 that is, 'no man shall be a judge in his own cause'. Coke used the form 'aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars' (Co.Litt. 1418), that is, 'no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party'. The form 'nemo potest esse simul actor et judex', that is, 'no one can be at once suitor and judge' is also at times used. The second rule is 'audi alteram partem', that is, 'hear the other side'. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form W.P. No.19792/2015 14 'audietur at altera pars' is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely 'qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram actquam licet dixerit, haud acquum facerit' that is, 'he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right' (See Bosewell's case (1605) 6 Co.Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in other words, as it is now expressed, 'justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done'.
What is known as 'useless formality theory' has received consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1999(6) SCC 237). It was observed as under:
"Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we would like to state that case relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of 'real substance' or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed (See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn: (1971)2 All ER 1278, HL) (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University: (1971) 2 All ER 89; Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority: (1980) 2 All ER 368, CA) and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R v. Ealing Magistrates' Court, ex p. Fannaran (1996 (8) Admn. LR 351, 358) (See de Smith, Suppl. P.89 (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be 'demonstrable beyond doubt' that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMohan (1987 (1) All ER 1118, CA) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant (1959 NZLR 1014) however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is 'real likelihood-not certainty- of prejudice'. On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn. 1996. pp.271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been W.P. No.19792/2015 15 different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66, HL), Megarry, J. in John v. Rees (1969 (2) All ER 274) stating that there are always 'open and shut cases' and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the 'useless formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that 'convenience and justice are often not on speaking term'. More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the 'useless formality theory' in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p. Cotton (1990 IRLR 344) by giving six reasons (see also his article 'Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?' 1991 PL. p.64). A detailed and emphatic criticism of the 'useless formality theory' has been made much earlier in 'Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL.pp.27-63) contending that Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn. 1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. P.596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn. 1994, pp.526-530) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a 'real likelihood' of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their 'discretion', refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in W.P. No.19792/2015 16 State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (1996 (3) SCC 364), Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. (1996 (5) SCC 460) that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the 'useless formality theory' and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as the case before us, 'admitted and indisputable' facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed by Chinnappa Reddy, J."
Natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice."
With regard to the disputed nature of the useless formality test as discussed in the M.C. Mehta case (see supra), it is important to note that in the instant petition, the petitioner has been punished without following the principles of natural justice and fair-play.
The principles of natural justice are firmly grounded in Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before law and equal protection of law. Through the process of interpretation, procedural safeguards have been read into Article 14 by the Courts. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Union, AIR 1991 SC 101, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "the W.P. No.19792/2015 17 audi alteram partem rule, in essence, enforce the equality clause in Art 14 and it is applicable not only to quasi-judicial bodies but also to administrative order adversely affecting the party in question unless the rule has been excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule." Not giving any hearing results in decisions which are arbitrary in nature. Arbitrariness and equality are antithesis of each other. Similarly under Article 21 of the Constitution, no person can be deprived of his life or liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Audi alteram partem forms a part of the procedural due process under the Indian Constitution. Procedure established by law must be just, fair and reasonable and not oppressive, unreasonable or arbitrary.
The present case reflects a very sorry state of affair in respect of functioning of the Home Department while dealing with their own officers. A bright and upright officer who was doing his duties, making all possible attempts to arrest the criminal as stated in the writ petition has been punished on an unsubstantiated allegation of a Journalist. His carrier is at stake on account of the punishment order and such type of action against the Police Officer in the manner and matter adopted in the present case demoralizes the moral of the Police Force. The net result is that the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 02.12.2014 (Annexure P-18) and order dated 07.08.2015 (Annexure P-25) are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be W.P. No.19792/2015 18 entitled for all consequential benefits including seniority, promotion, back-wages etc. etc. With the aforesaid, the writ petition stands allowed.
(S.C. SHARMA) Judge rv