Karnataka High Court
S.P. Sridhar vs Government Of Karnataka, Rep. By Its ... on 16 September, 2003
Equivalent citations: ILR2004KAR1521, 2004 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 509, (2004) 1 KCCR 75
Author: N.K. Patil
Bench: N.K. Patil
ORDER N.K. Patil, J.
1. The petitioners who are CL-1 licence holders assailing the legality and validity of the impugned Rules dated 30.6.2003 vide Annexure-G have presented these Writ Petitions. Further, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners fairly submitted that so far as prayers B and C are concerned, those two prayers may be dismissed as having become infructuous in view of the order passed by the Apex Court in (STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANR. v. K.V. AMARNATH AND ORS. Civil Petition No. 3610/1998 DD 30.8.03). The submissions made by the learned Counsel is placed on record. Prayers (b) &(c) are accordingly dismissed as having become infructuous.
2. Now, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners confines these petitions so far as prayer (a) is concerned as stated supra. These petitioners claiming to be CL-1 licencee challenged the constitutional validity of the rules notified in the official gazette dated 30.6.2003 vide Annexures A1 to A6, respectively thereby amending the Karnataka Excise (sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968, Karnataka Excise (Manufacture of Wine from Grapes) Rules, 1968, Karnataka Excise (Breweries) Rules, 1967, Karnataka Excise (Distillery and Warehouse) Rules, 1968, Karnataka Excise (Bottling of Liquor) Rules, 1967, Karnataka Excise (Excise Duties and Fees) Rules, 1968, whereby a state owned company (Karnataka State Beverages Corporation Ltd.,) is made "sole Distributor" in liquor trade. Further the case of the petitioners is that the system prevalent in the liquor trade is that the petitioner (CL-1 licencee) obtained transport permits from the Excise Department in respect of the products of the particular manufacturers and thereafter the petitioner sell the said products to a retailer (CL-2 licencee) and/or to a Bar (CL-9 licencee), and other retail licencees, and subsequently the product passess on to the consumers. The petitioners also have an option of getting their requirement from the distributor (CL-II licencee).
3. When things stood thus, on 13.9.1989, the Government of Karnataka on the ground that there is a leakage of excise revenue in the sale of seconds, that is, alleged non-duty paid liquors, amended the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquor) Rules, 1968 and other corresponding rules introducing the concept of sole distributorship in a Government owned company or agency, the Mysore Sales International Limited was specified as the Government owned agency. By the said amendments wholesaler was mandated to purchase his requirements only from the distributor licencees (Government owned agency) and thus he was prohibited from purchasing his requirements directly from the manufacturers. In pursuance of the draft notification issued by the respondents, the Association of the CL-1 licencees and other CL-1 licencee holders have filed the objections. The said objections filed by the associations and the other licencee holders have not been considered and the impugned notification was issued for amending the impugned rules. This is nothing but a devious back door method adopted by the Government and the said Rules affect the petitioners and the notice dated 13.6.2003 specifying the Karnataka State Breweries Corporation Limited as a state owned company also effected the petitioners and the petitioners, feeling aggrieved by the same had left with no other equally efficacious remedy, presented these Writ Petitions assailing the impugned notification as stated supra.
4. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the respondents without application of mind have issued the impugned notification and the same is contrary to the preamble of the Government Order dated 22.5.2003. Further, the Counsel appearing for the petitioners vehemently submitted that the company was constituted on 10.6.2003, and on the very next day they published the rule dated 11.6.2003 giving only just 14 days to file the objections and same was completed haphazardly on 25.6.2003 stating that the said rules will come into force with effect from 26.6.2003. Without considering the objections filed by the unions and some of the CL-1 licence holders the impugned notification has been issued and therefore the same is not at all sustainable, hence it is liable to be struck down. Further the respondents have failed to take into consideration the well settled principles of law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court. When the matter has been ceased by the Apex Court, the Government has got no powers to bring new amendments by-way of the Rules. Therefore they submitted that the impugned rules amended by the respondents is contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Excise Acts and Rules, hence the said amended rules may be struck down.
5. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, inter alia, contended and substantiated the impugned notification issued by the respondents. Further, the Counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently submitted that these petitioners have got no locus standi to present these Writ Petitions. He submitted that the rules have been amended in strict compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Excise Acts and Rules, after following the relevant procedures envisaged under the Acts and Rules and after considering the objections filed by the Union an other members, and no violation as such has been committed. The said rule has been amended after having placed the matter before the Chief Minister and taking into consideration the fact that similar Corporations have been established in the other States. Further, the learned Advocate General appearing for - R1 and 2 submitted that these petitioners have not at all filed any objections, and the question of considering the objections therefore, do not arise. In view of the well settled principles of law laid down by the Apex Court to the effect that nobody has got fundamental right to do the liquor business and once the policy decisions are taken by the Government having regard to the resolution and in the interest of the public, in general, the Courts will not interfere in the policy decisions taken by the Government authorities. To substantiate his submissions, he placed reliance on several judgments of the Apex Court, on the well settled principles of law laid down regarding nobody has got fundamental right to do the liquor business and in policy matters the courts should not interfere, etc. etc., Those judgments will be considered at the appropriate stage in the following paragraphs.
6. Learned Counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent, inter alia, has substantiated the impugned notifications and submitted that as on date no single complaint has been received. Further, on instructions, he submitted that these petitioners have obtained the licence of CL-1 but they are not doing the business. Further he submitted that these petitioners have no locus standi to file the Writ Petitions assailing the impugned amendment rules. To substantiate his submission he has filed a counter affidavit stating the revenue collections after establishment of new corporations as on 12.8.2003. He has specifically stated in paras 4 and 5 of additional affidavit and also placed reliance regarding the infrastructure provided by the corporation in paras 22 and 25 of the statement of objections filed by him. Therefore, he submitted that the Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners are liable to be dismissed with costs.
7. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners Sri M. Mahabaleshwar Goud, Sri R. Nagendra Naidu, Sri K. Sachindra Karanth and his colleagues and also the Senior Counsel representing Sri K. Sachindra Karanth, Sri G.S. Vishveshwara, learned Advocate General Sri A.N. Jayaram representing respondents 1 and 2 and Sri Ashok B. Hinchigeri, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.3 - the Corporation. After hearing them for a considerable length of time on more than three days and after perusal of the materials on record with the assistance of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and the contentions urged by the petitioners, the following questions arises for consideration.
(a) Whether the impugned amendment rules amended by the Government is in strict compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Excise Acts and Rules.
(b) Whether the respondents have considered the objections filed by the union of the petitioners' associations and other Cl-1 licencee holders.
(c) Whether this Court can interfere with the policy matters taken by the Government.
8. Having regard to the factual and legal aspects of the matter, as rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General appearing for respondents 1 and 2, the background leading to the foundation of the impugned rules has started in the proceedings of the legislative assembly while replying to the discussion on the Budget presented by the Chief Minister (as also the Finance Minister) on 29.3.2003. While bemoaning the serious evasion of excise revenue, the Chief Minister said that the Government was contemplating the creation of the Beverages Corporation in order to take over the corrective steps to reduce the leakage of excise revenue. Further, he also reminded to the members that Karnataka should also adopt the stand taken by other states of the South in the field of liquor production and distribution. He regretted that the menace 'seconds' (non-duty paid liquor) entering the market clandestinely had to be dealt with effectively in order to improve the regulatory mechanism and to increase the excise revenue. Therefore, it is necessary to offer certain incentives in the duty levied and also use the principle that when the incidence of tax is lower, compliance will be greater. Accordingly, he has informed the house that the Government should also take steps to decrease the duty and destroy the incentive for evasion at the national level, successive Finance Ministers have increased the tax revenue by reducing the tax rate. He also pointed out to the members that there were already Beverage Corporations in other southern States and that Karnataka should also take similar steps. In view of the announcement on the floor of the house by the Chief Minister, a cabinet note was prepared on 24.5.2003. It was stated therein that in order to stop the sale of non-duty paid liquors (seconds), and to plug leakage of excise revenue, the Chief Minister on the floor of the house announced that a Beverages Corporation will be set up to channelise the sale of the liquor and the excise duty on liquors should be reduced in order to augment a aggregate recovery. Having these background, the Karnataka Beverages Limited was proposed to be set up with the Principal Secretary to the Finance Department as the Chairman, and the other Government officers as members. It was explained in the draft note that the objectives of the proposed Corporation would be, which included the procurement of all liquors required for the sale in the state from the state distilleries and sell the same to the directly to the wholesaler and retailer. It was further decided that the assets created by the MSIL over many years for dealing with the distribution of liquor may be transferred to the new corporations so as to equip it to undertake the task assigned to it even from the outset. Various other measures were suggested for tightening the regime relating to the production and distribution of liquor. The matter was placed before the cabinet and was duly approved on 29.5.2003. Therefore, the learned Advocate General submitted that it is impermissible to the petitioners to challenge the action leading to a change of policy in regard to the distribution of liquor in the state which was perceived as a necessary consequence to the considerable reduction of excise duty. That is a decision taken by the state after due deliberations and a full consideration of all relevant factors and after discussion in the legislature and in the public interest. By entrusting the source of distribution to one agency, the distribution of seconds can be more effectively controlled and the evasion made difficult to achieve. The Government is also considering the steps to impose severe penalties/punishment for violation of the rules, in order to put in place a regime which will deter violations with impurity. The whole series of steps constitute the new package, to deal with excise revenue. Further he pointed out that the State of Karnataka took a note that though the quantity of consumption of alcohol in the country and in the state had generally increased, the quantity shown as having released for consumption through legal channels remain merely static, and also taking into consideration the Tax Reforms Commission report regarding the scale evasion of excise duty. There was also the possibility of other southern states where the duty was lower, would lead to dumping of their products unlawfully in the state, thereby, depleting the excise revenue even further. Having regard to these considerations, the State Government took the decision not only to lower the rate of duty but also to introduce a more effective system to control over the distribution for liquor in the entire state. Further he submitted that having regard to the pronouncement of the Constitutional Bench in the case of Khoday Distilleries , it is not open to the petitioners to rely upon the decisions made in the case of P.N. JOSEPH as contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. The Apex Court in the said case has in particular held that the state cannot only create a monopoly either in itself or in an agency created by it for the manufacture, possession, sale and distribution of liquor but also adopt any mode of selling the licences for trade or business with a view to maximize its revenue so long as the method adopted is not discriminatory. When the creation of such monopoly has been consistently upheld by the Apex Court, the attempt to make it appear that the principles applicable to the procedures and sale of industrial alcohol also apply to intoxicating liquor, is totally misconceived and the reliance placed on Synthetic and Chemicals case is inappropriate. The petitioners are actuated by ulterior motives for the purpose of enjoying the benefits made available by the operation of the stay order and its continuation, when the matter was pending before the Apex Court. The submission placed by the Counsel appearing for the petitioners that when the matter has been ceased by the Apex Court, the respondents ought not to have taken such a hasty decision for bringing the new amendment, when there is a specific direction issued by this Court are not at all sustainable in view of the subsequent developments in the matters which are pending adjudication before this Court in these cases and the matters pending before the Apex Court in STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANR. v. K.V. AMARNATH AND ORS. (Supra), which has been disposed of by its order dated 13th August, 2003. Therefore, virtually, the prayer sought by these petitioners cannot survive for consideration. Further it is significant to note that as rightly pointed out by the Advocate General appearing for respondents 1 and 2 that when these petitioners have not chosen to file their objections when the draft notifications were issued, when they are offered ample opportunity to file the objections. Once, if they have not filed objections, the question of hearing them does not arise in view of the well settled principles of law laid down by the Apex Court in case of DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. STATE AND ORS. In the said case, the Apex Court held as follows:
"59. In the present cases there is no disputes that the purpose is a public purpose. The applicant had not filed objections on grounds personally applicable to him or to his land seeking exclusion from acquisition, and the objection in that behalf must be deemed to have been waived. Such a person cannot be allowed to file a Writ Petition seeking the quashing of Section 5A inquiry and Section 6 declaration on personal grounds if he had not filed objections. Points 4 and 5 are decided accordingly against the applicants." (underlining supplied by me)
9. In the instant case also the petitioners have not filed objections. The Apex Court held that the said persons cannot be allowed to file the Writ Petitions seeking quashing of Section 5-A requiring the principles laid down by the Apex Court, taking into consideration, directly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, there is no force or substance in the submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners that, the objections filed by the Associations and other Cl-1 licencees have not been considered. Hence, the said submission is liable to be rejected.
10. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of JAGADALE AND SONS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA followed the well settled principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of R.K. Garg, the Apex Court proceeded to observe as follows:
"What we said in that case in regard to legislation relating to economic matters must apply equally in regard to executive action in the field of economic activities, though the executive decision may not be placed on as high a pedestal as legislative judgment in so far as judicial deference is concerned. We must not forget that in complex economic matters every decision is necessary empirio and it is based on experimentation or what one may call 'trial' and "error method' and, therefore, its validity cannot be tested on any rigid 'a priori' considerations or on the application of any strait jacket formula. The Court must while adjudging the constitutional validity of an executive decision relating to economic matters, grant a certain measure of freedom or 'play' in the 'joints' to the executive. The problems of Government as pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Metropolis Theatre Company v. State of Chicago (1912) 57 L Ed 730 'are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of Government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercise, which can be declared void'. The Government, as was said in Permian Basic Area Rate cases (1968) 20 LED (2d) 312, is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical. The Court can interfere only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala-fide. It is against the background of these observations and keeping them in mind that we must now proceed to deal with the contention of the petitioners based on Article 14 of the Constitution"
The Division Bench of this Court in the above case also observed as follows:
"13. As to the nature of the liquor trade, this court observed in Sahyadri Wine Traders v. State of Karnataka:
"All kinds of rights to deal in intoxicants (which is also referred here as liquor) thus, basically belong to the State. By granting a licence to deal in liquor, a privilege is conferred on the licencee to deal in liquor to the extent permitted by the licence. A person, in possession of or dealing in any liquor without any licence from the State, indulges himself in an activity which he is not entitled in any manner and such a person, is deemed to exercise a privilege, which exclusively vest in the State. It is a grave misconduct, enormity of which requires severe deterrent to prevent repetition of such an activity by the said person and others"
XX XX XX This contention ignores the nature of a fundamental right. It is a right, which inheres every person in the Country and recognised by the Constitution; fundamental right cannot be created by a statute. A right or privilege created by the legislature or by a statute will be a statutory right; it cannot have the status of a fundamental right."
11. In the judgment it was clearly held that all kinds of rights to deal in intoxicants (which is also referred here as liquor) thus, basically belongs to the State. The contentions ignores the nature of fundamental right. Its right enhanced to every person in the country. The fundamental right cannot be created by a constitution or legislature. It is further held by the Division Bench of this Court as follows:
"Therefore, entrusting the sole 'distributorship' to a Governmental Company, by itself as a principle of law, cannot be held to be arbitrary; nor the policy behind it, as a major shift in the 'policy' which, only the State Legislature could evolve and effectuate".
12. Further to substantiate the submissions the Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of KHODAY DISTILLERIES LTD AND ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS , which is relevant, reads as follows:
"60, (c) Potable liquor as a beverage is an intoxicating and depressant drink which is dangerous and injurious to health and is, therefore, an article which is res extra commercium being inherently harmful. A citizen has, therefore, no fundamental right to do trade or business in liquor. Hence the trade or business in liquor can be completely prohibited.
XXX XXX XXX
(e) For the same reason, the State can create a monopoly either in itself or in the agency created by it for the manufacture, possession, sale and distribution of the liquor as a beverage and also sell the licences to the citizens for the said purpose by charging fees. This can be done under Article 19(6) or even otherwise".
13. In the case of KHODAY DISTILLERIES LTD v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS., in para 11, Which is relevant reads as follows:
"11. A distributor licence, therefore, is only licence to deal in liquor by sale and purchase of liquor. This activity is not something different from what is contemplated under the Act itself or in respect of which the rule-making authority has been delegated to the state under Section 71. The mere fact that a monopoly of distributor licence is sought to be created, does not take the licence outside the ambit of the Act. The Act itself provides that the number of licences can be regulated by the State. If the State chooses to regulate licences by providing that the licence shall be granted only to a company owned by the State, it cannot be said that such a licence is something which is outside the purview of the Act or the rule-making authority of the State under the Act."
14. In the case of GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. v. DEOKAR'S DISTILLERY which is relevant reads as follows:
"31. The legal (sic liquor) licensee does not have fundamental right to deal in liquor. Under Entry 8 Lit II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and thereby under Sections 49 and 143(2)(u) of the Prohibition Act, the State has the exclusive right/ privilege in respect of potable liquor and the State, in our opinion, can charge any reasonable expenses or even consideration for permitting such activity by grant of licence and that the respondents ought to comply with all reasonable orders, as undertaken by them while obtaining the licence. This factor, the High court has not appreciated. Once the liquor licencee has undertaken to abide by all reasonable orders under the Prohibition Act while obtaining the licence, they cannot wriggle out of the contractual liability voluntarily incurred by them."
15. In all these cases, it is a well settled principles of law that has been laid down by the Apex Court that nobody has got the fundamental right in liquor business. Further regarding interference in the policy matters taken by the State Government, the Advocate General has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of G.B. MAHAJAN AND ORS. v. THE JALAGAON MUNICIPAL COUNCIL AND ORS. , which is relevant reads as follows:
"14.............. There is, no doubt, a degree of public accountability in all Government Enterprises. But, the present question is one of the extent and scope of judicial review over such matters. With the expansion of the State's presence in the field of trade and commerce and of the range of economic and commercial enterprises of Government and its instrumentalities there is an increasing dimension to Government concern for stimulating efficiency,, keeping costs down, improved management methods, prevention of time and cost over-runs in projects, balancing of costs against time-scales, quality control, cost benefit ratios etc. In search of these values it might become necessary to adopt appropriate techniques of management of projects with concomitant economic expendiencies, these are essentially matters of economic policy which lack adjudicative disposition, unless they violate constitutional or legal limits on power or have demonstrable pejorative environmental implications or amount to clear abuse of power. This again is the judicial recognition of administrator's right to trial and error, as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of authority.
XXX XXX XXX In regard to Courts and policy we might recall the following words of a learned author:
"The Courts are kept out of the lush field of administrative policy, except when policy is inconsistent with the express or implied provisions of a statute which creates the power to which the policy relates or when a decision made in purported exercise of a power is such that a repository of the power, acting reasonably and in good faith, could not have made it".
16. The relevant portion in the case of TATA CELLULAR v. UNION OF INDIA (1994) 6 SCC 651, is extracted below:
"70........
Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation...........
72. Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment proclaimed:
"Judicial review' is a great weapon in the hands of the Judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficial power".
Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in their work Judicial Review (1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say:
"If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a mere obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher judiciary of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the Law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in Butcher v. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18.3.1991.".........
Therefore, it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfillment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under:
i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it.
ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.
iii) Procedural impropriety."
17. In the case of BALCO EMPLOYEES UNION v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. , which is relevant, reads as follows:
"46. It is evident from the above that it is neither within the domain of the courts nor the scope of the judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be evolved. Nor are our courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a petitioner merely because it has been urged that a different policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or more logical.
47. Process of dis-investment is a policy decision involving complex economic factors. The courts have consistently refrained from interfering with economic decisions as it has been recognised that economic expediencies lack adjudicatiye disposition and unless the economic decision, based on economic expediencies, is demonstrated to be so violative of constitutional or legal limits on owner or so adherent to reason, that the courts would decline to interfere. In matters relating to economic issues, the Government has, while taking a decision, right to "trial and error" as long as both Trial and error are bona fide and within limits of authority. There is no case made out by the petitioner that the decision to disinvest in BALCO is in any way capricious, arbitrary, illegal or uninformed. Even though the workers may have interest in the manner in which the Company is conducting its business, in a much as its policy decision may have a impact on the workers rights, nevertheless it is an incidence of service for an employee to accept a decision of the employer which has been honestly taken and which is not contrary to law. Even a government servant, having the protection of not only Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution but also of Article 311, has no absolute right to remain in service. For example, apart from cases of disciplinary action, the services of government servants can be terminated if posts are abolished. If such employee cannot make a grievance based on Part III of the Constitution or Article 311 then it cannot stand to reason that like the petitioners, non-government employees working in a company which by reason of judicial pronouncement may be regarded as a State for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution, can claim a superior or a better right than a government servant and impugn its change of status. In taking of a policy decision in economic matters at length, the principles of natural justice have no role to play. While it is expected of a responsible employer to take all aspects into consideration including welfare of the labour before taking any policy decision that, by itself, will not entitle the employees to demand a right of hearing or consultation prior to the taking of the decision."
18. If these well settled principles of law laid down by the Apex Court as referred above is considered, this Court cannot exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and interfere with the policy decisions taken by the Government to have uniformity and in order to take corrective steps to release the liquor (non-duty paid liquors) (second) to reduce leakage of excise revenue and after following the mandatory provisions of the excise Acts and Rules, I do not find any error and illegality on the face of the records. Therefore, the Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners are liable to be dismissed.
19. Further, yet another reason for which these Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners are liable to be dismissed as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for 3rd respondent that, the 3rd respondent -Corporation has been functioning effectively shouldering the responsibilities ever-since its partnership with the Slate Corporation and is not created overnight. The allegation that the 3rd respondent has no expertise in dealing with the liquor has got no substance. Further, from the statement of objection filed by the 3rd respondent that, as on the date of filing the objections on 27.7.2003, the State Corporation has a staff strength of about 100 employees and has set up as many as 22 sales depots which have already become functional. It has a state of art IT support linking all its depots for on line operations. It has drawn competent personnel from different sources. Therefore, the 3rd respondent is competent and capable of handling the distribution of liquor. The 3rd respondent has already done a good progress and it has achieved a turn over of Rs. 147.11 crores between 9th July and 9th August, 2003 and the government is earning excise revenue of Rs. 106 crores in the month of July 2003. During the corresponding month of the previous year, the Government revenue collection was only Rs. 55 crores. Thus, the revenue collected is up by Rs. 51 crores on the introduction of the amendment rules after creation of the 3rd respondent Corporation. If these facts and figures as enumerated by the 3rd respondent in the statement of objection by filing additional affidavit, is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the said corporation is capable of handling the distribution of liquor as rightly pointed by the learned Counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent that as on date, there is no complaint as such on this issue and he has assured to the Court that all the steps will be taken to see that the distribution will be uniformly maintained without giving room to any licencee holders to place the defects. Therefore, in the interest of the public in general and having regard to the fact that the government after having considered all the consequences, had taken a decision, I do not find any good grounds and justification to interfere with the impugned amendment rules.
19. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above and having regard to the material facts of the case, as stated supra, I do not find any justification to interfere with the impugned notification issued by the respondents. Accordingly, the Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, they are dismissed.