Delhi High Court
M/S Saptagiri Restaurant vs Airports Authority Of India on 9 October, 2014
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
Bench: Chief Justice, Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 9th October, 2014.
+ LPA No.681/2014, CMs No.16706/2014 (for stay) & 16707/2014
(for exemption)
M/S SAPTAGIRI RESTAURANT ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. J.K. Mittal, Mr. Rajveer Singh,
Ms. Divya Sharma and Mr. Rakesh
Mittal, Advs.
Versus
AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA ..... Respondent
Through: Ms. Anjana Gosain and Mr. Pradeep
Desodya, Advs.
AND
+ LPA No.682/2014, CMs No.16708/2014 (for stay) & 16709/2014
(for exemption)
M/S SAPTAGIRI RESTAURANT ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. J.K. Mittal, Mr. Rajveer Singh,
Ms. Divya Sharma and Mr. Rakesh
Mittal, Advs.
Versus
AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA ..... Respondent
Through: Ms. Anjana Gosain and Mr. Pradeep
Desodya, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
LPA Nos.681/2014 & 682/2014 Page 1 of 7
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. These intra court appeals have been listed post-lunch, on urgent mentioning by the counsel for the appellant. The appeals impugn the separate but similar orders, both dated 1st October, 2014, of the learned Single Judge of this Court of dismissal in limine of W.P.(C) Nos.6742/2014 & 6766/2014 respectively, preferred by the appellant.
2. The counsel for the respondent appears on advance notice. We have at the stage of admission only, heard the counsel for the appellant finally.
3. The writ petitions were filed impugning separate letters, both dated 11th April, 2014, of the respondent, giving 180 days notice to the appellant of termination of license granted to the appellant for operating a Snack Bar Counter in the Ground Floor Check-in area of Anna International Terminal Building (originally allotted) at Chennai Airport in W.P.(C) No.6742/2014 and license granted for operation of Snack Bar Counter in the Car Park area of Kamaraj Domestic Terminal Building (originally allotted) at Chennai Airport in W.P.(C) No.6766/2014, respectively. The writ petitions also sought the relief of restraining the respondent from interfering in the peaceful operation of the respective Snack Bars, for the residual period of LPA Nos.681/2014 & 682/2014 Page 2 of 7 licenses till 7th April, 2020 in W.P.(C) No.6742/2014 and till 15th March, 2016 in W.P.(C) No.6766/2014.
4. The learned Single Judge dismissed both the writ petitions on the ground that the licenses granted to the appellant, by their express terms, were terminable by 90 days notice and thus the prayer as sought for by the appellant, for being allowed to continue operation of the Snack Bars, cannot be granted. Liberty was however given to the appellant to seek other remedies, as available in law.
5. The counsel for the appellant before us is unable to controvert the aforesaid reason given by the learned Single Judge. His contention however is that the reason for termination of licenses given in the notices dated 11th April, 2014, of the area the Airport licensed to the appellant for Snack Bars falling in the area of the Master Concessionaire for development, operation and maintenance of food and beverage outlets at the said Airport since introduced, is incorrect. It is contended that upon renovation of the Airport and introduction of the system of Master Concessionaire, the appellant was made to surrender the original area of the Airport licensed to it and to shift to a new place in the new Airport, only after the new place so allocated to the appellant had been demarcated and at the time of which demarcation, the LPA Nos.681/2014 & 682/2014 Page 3 of 7 area of the Master Concessionaire was taken into consideration. It is argued that having made the appellant spend a considerable amount of money in setting up the Snack Bars at the new location, the action of the respondent of terminating the licenses, even though entitled under the terms thereof, prior to the agreed maximum term thereof, is arbitrary. Similarly, it is contended that though the term of the license with respect to the Snack Bar Counter in the car park area had expired but since the appellant owing to the renovation work was unable to operate the same, the respondent having thereafter for this reason extended the term of the license, cannot now renege.
6. Finding that the writ petitions impugning the notices dated 11 th April, 2014 were filed towards the end of September, 2014, we have enquired from the counsel for the appellant the reason for the delay till the last minute in approaching the Court and as to why the appellant is not disentitled to the relief on this ground alone.
7. The only explanation offered by the counsel for the appellant is that the appellant is a licensee of the respondent at several other Airports also and owing to such relationship, did not want to immediately rush to the Court and was making attempts at reconciliation and to make the respondent understand that the reason given for termination was erroneous. LPA Nos.681/2014 & 682/2014 Page 4 of 7
8. However, there are neither any pleadings to the said effect nor any document to support the same. Rather, what we find is that the appellant, after the notices dated 11th April, 2014 of termination of licenses, represented thereagainst for the first time vide letters dated 17th September, 2014 only. Even in the letters dated 17th September, 2014, we do not find mention of any earlier reply to the notices dated 11th April, 2014 or any earlier representation thereagainst. There is no reference therein also to any parlays which may have been held in the interregnum. The appellant did indeed approach the Court at the fag end of the notice period of 180 days and which in our opinion, disentitles the appellant for any discretionary relief on this ground as well.
9. The appellant, in the license agreements entered into with the respondent, having expressly agreed that the respondent may terminate the said license at any time with 90 days notice and without even assigning any reason, we are unable to find any error whatsoever in the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge. We may further refer to The Corporation of Calicut Vs. K. Sreenivasan (2002) 5 SCC 361 laying down that owing to Section 64 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, a licensee, if evicted, even though grounds for revocation of licence do not exist, or is forcefully LPA Nos.681/2014 & 682/2014 Page 5 of 7 evicted, his only remedy is to recover compensation from grantor and not to resume occupation. The same view was also taken by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Trivandrum Golf Club Vs. State of Kerala MANU/KE/0337/2010 and interim injunction against dispossession sought, declined. The Supreme Court, in appeal preferred thereagainst, vide judgment reported in (2010) 12 SCC 723, refused to interfere. We have also in Gesture Hotels and Food Pvt. Limited Vs. The New Delhi Municipal Council 210 (2014) DLT 359 following the same view held that no injunction against dispossession of a licensee can be granted. The appellant, for the said reason also is not entitled to the relief sought of continuation as a licensee.
10. We yet further find that it was a general term and condition of grant of such license that the disputes and differences arising therefrom and to which the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 did not apply, shall be referred to arbitration. We see no reason as to why the appellant should not be bound by the dispute resolution remedy to which it had agreed. We do not find the matters to be entailing any public law element, for this Court to, notwithstanding such contractual remedy, allow the writ jurisdiction to be invoked.
LPA Nos.681/2014 & 682/2014 Page 6 of 7
11. Thus, for the aforesaid additional reasons also, we are of the view that the appellant is not entitled to any relief. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. However, the appeals having been disposed of expeditiously, no costs.
12. On request of the counsel for the appellant, we clarify that notwithstanding the dismissal of these appeals, the appellant shall have the remedy of availing alternative remedy as granted by the learned Single Judge.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
CHIEF JUSTICE OCTOBER 09, 2014 'bs' LPA Nos.681/2014 & 682/2014 Page 7 of 7