Legal Document View

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

- Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc - ...
Upgrade to Premium
[Cites 6, Cited by 1]

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State vs Shrawan Kumar on 22 March, 2017

Author: Vijay Bishnoi

Bench: Vijay Bishnoi

     HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                      JODHPUR
              S.B.Crml Leave To Appeal No. 50 / 2015
State of Rajasthan
                                                       ----Appellant
                                 Versus
Shrawan Kumar S/o Om Prakash,
By caste Nayak, resident of Foosewala,
P.S. Ghadsana, District. Sri Ganganagar
                                                    ----Respondent
_____________________________________________________
For Appellant(s)     :   Mr. J.P. Bhardwaj, P.P.
For Respondent(s) :      Mr. N.L. Joshi
_____________________________________________________
            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOI

Order 22/03/2017 The matter comes up for consideration of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act with a prayer for condoning the delay of 11 days in filing this leave to appeal. No reply to the application has been filed on behalf of the respondent.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed. Delay in filing this leave to appeal is condoned.

With the consent of the parties, the matter is finally heard. This leave to appeal has been filed by the State being aggrieved with the judgment dated 10.10.2014 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Anoopgarh Camp Gharsana, District Sri Ganganagar (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial court') in Sessions Case No. 16/2011, whereby the trial court has acquitted (2 of 3) [CRLLA-50/2015] the accused respondent from the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC. The learned trial court has taken into consideration the evidence produced by the prosecution in detail and found that though the prosecutrix PW-6 in her statement has stated that her date of birth is 01.02.1993 and as per the mark-sheet of the 10th Class, she was 17 years and 9 months on the date of incident but the said mark-sheet was not exhibited before the trial court. The trial court has taken into consideration the fact that in her statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. the age of the prosecutrix was recorded as 19 years. The trial court has also taken into consideration the medical examination report of the prosecutrix, wherein the doctor has opined that her age is 18 to 20 years. The said documents were prepared about 3 to 4 months after the incident. On the basis of the said peace of evidence, the trial court has observed that the prosecution has failed to prove the fact that on the date of the incident the prosecutrix was less than 18 years. The trial court has further observed that from the statement of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses and the documents exhibited by the defence, it is clear that the prosecutrix went to Bikaner to meet the accused as per her free will and from Bikaner she and accused went to Ramgarh where they had stayed for about three months. The trial court has observed that the prosecutrix in her statement has not stated that she was threatened by the accused or he has forcibly committed rape upon her. She has simply stated that the accused was indulged in intercourse with her. The trial court has observed that from the (3 of 3) [CRLLA-50/2015] defence documents produced on behalf of the accused, the relation between the prosecutrix and him are established and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that relation between the prosecutrix and the accused were not consensual. The trial court has also discussed the prosecution evidence and has concluded that from the evidence of the prosecutrix and the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the charges against the accused-respondent for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. After observing this, the trial court has acquitted the accused appellant for the aforesaid offences by giving benefit of doubt.

After hearing the learned Public Prosecutor and after carefully scrutinizing the record of the case, I do not find any illegality in the judgment passed by the trial court. Hence, no case for grant of leave is made out.

This leave to appeal is dismissed.

(VIJAY BISHNOI)J. Taruna