Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
K.P. Luther Babu vs J. Vijayarathnam And Anr. on 9 February, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(3)ALD509, 2004(2)ALT810
JUDGMENT P.S. Narayana, J.
1. Rev. K.P. Luther Babu, a Pastor of South Andhra Luthern Church, hereinafter in short referred to as "SALC" aggrieved by the judgments and decrees made in OS No. 101/98 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati and in AS No. 34/2001 on the file of III Additional District Judge Tirupati, had preferred the present Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter in short referred to as "Code", as against Rev. J. Vijayarathnam as 1st respondent and Rev. Ch. Rajarathnam, yet another Pastor of SALC, as 2nd respondent.
2. Sri M.S. Prasad, Counsel representing the appellant had pointed out that the following substantial questions of law arise for consideration in the present Second Appeal:
(a) When the action of the 1st defendant in transferring the 2nd defendant as Pastor of Gudur Parish is questioned as contrary to the subsisting injunction of the Civil Court and for want of authority is it necessary to make the South Andhra Luthern Church as parry defendant to the suit
(b) When the action of the 1st defendant in transferring the 2nd defendant as Pastor of Gudur Parish even after completion of 15 years as Pastor in violation of Resolution of the Executive Council Bearing No. 58/96 can it be said that the same is not a policy decision.
(c) Whether the Court below can ignore the statement of the plaintiff in the absence of any evidence by the 1st defendant that he did not request for transfer and the claim of the 1st defendant that the transfer was effected on the personal request of the plaintiff.
(d) Whether the lower Appellate Court can refuse to implead SALC on a proper application made without deciding that I A till the disposal of the first appeal, The learned Counsel after pointing out to the substantial questions of law specified supra had commented that when the 1st respondent/1st defendant was restrained by an order of a Civil Court from taking any policy decision and despite the same when the proceedings were made, the dismissal of the suit on the ground that SALC, a necessary party, was not impleaded in the suit definitely cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel also had made elaborate submissions relating to the different provisions of Constitution of SALC which are in fact the Bye-laws of SALC and had commented that the action of the 1st respondent in transferring the 2nd defendant as Pastor of Gudur Parish even after completion of 15 years as Pastor is definitely in violation of the resolution and hence at any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that it is not a policy decision and hence both the Courts had not appreciated this crucial aspect in proper perspective. The learned Counsel also pointed out that the subsequent event that by passage of time the 2nd respondent at present cannot be continued as a Pastor at all can be taken into consideration and even in this view of the matter, the appellant/ plaintiff is bound to succeed. The Counsel also would point out that even otherwise the appellant in A.S.No. 34/2001 on the file of in Additional District Judge, Tirupati had moved an application I.A. No. 994/2001 requesting to add SALC as a party, but however instead of allowing the said application, the appellate Court had observed that no reason was shown why SALC was not added as a party at the earliest stage in the suit. The learned Counsel also pointed out that this objection that the suit is bad for non-joinder of SALC as a necessary party had been neither specifically pleaded in the written statement nor an Issue was settled in this regard and hence dismissal of the suit on that ground definitely cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel also while elaborating his submissions further had drawn the attention of this Court to the proceedings dated 13-12-1995 and also 23-1-1998 and had submitted that these proceedings are against the Constitution of SALC and the Church Rubies and hence definitely not binding on the appellant/plaintiff. The learned Counsel also submitted that though O.S.No. 524/97 was subsequently dismissed as withdrawn, it is not in controversy that there was an injunction against the 1st defendant in the said suit on the file of Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati not to take any policy decision except disbursement of salaries and in view of the same, the impugned orders in the suit cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel also pointed out that the appellant filed I.A. No. 1151/ 2002 and I.A. No. 1703/2002 under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code to receive some documents as additional evidence and though these documents are material documents, the appellate Court even without referring to the nature of the documents observed that these documents will not in any way improve the case of the plaintiff and had dismissed the said applications and even in this view of the matter, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below arc liable to be set aside.
3. Per contra, Sri Sridhar Reddy, Counsel representing the respondents at the outset had submitted that SALC is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and no doubt at present the said Act was repealed by the A.P. Societies Registration Act, 2001. The learned Counsel further submitted that when the proceedings of the 1st respondent/1st defendant had been questioned, he should have been impleaded in his official capacity and not in personal capacity and hence the suit as framed is definitely not maintainable in view of Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The learned Counsel no doubt in all fairness submitted that this question was not raised before the Courts below, but however since it is a pure question of law relating to the maintainability of the suit, the same can be raised at any time even in the Second Appeal. The learned Counsel also submitted that whether a particular decision is a policy decision or a mere administrative decision or one concerned with management, predominantly would be a question of fact and there is no acceptable material placed before the Courts below for arriving at a conclusion that it being a policy decision, the impugned orders made are in violation of an injunction which was operative as against the 1st respondent/1st defendant at the relevant point of time, and hence the Courts below had recorded correct findings in this regard. The learned Counsel also submitted that in the written statement specific plea was taken that the transfer of a Pastor from Parish to Parish for administrative reasons definitely is not a policy decision and it is absolutely the discretion vested in the Bishop-President. The learned Counsel also would maintain that when the proceedings of SALC as such are questioned before a Civil Court, it is surprising that how a suit can be maintained at all in the absence of the said SALC, a necessary party to the suit. The leaned Counsel pointed out that the subsequent event of the bar of age of the 2nd defendant will not ensure to the benefit of the appellant/plaintiff since the question that has to be decided is whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for in the present suit and nothing more. The Counsel would conclude that at any rate in the light of the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below, in the absence of a substantial question of law, such findings cannot be disturbed in the light of the limitations imposed on this Court under Section 100 of the Code.
4. Heard both the Counsel.
5. The appellant/plaintiff instituted the suit O.S. No. 101/98 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati praying for a declaration that the proceedings dated 13-12-1997 and 23-1-1998 are unjust, arbitrary and against the provisions of Constitution of SALC and also Church Rubies being null and void and not true valid and binding on the plaintiff and for consequential relief of permanent injunction against the defendants from in any way interfering with the plaintiffs service as Pastor, Gudur Parish and for costs of the suit. It was pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff has been working as a Pastor of Gudur Parish which is part and parcel of SALC having their office at East Mission compound, Tirupati and that the SALC has jurisdiction over Chittoor District, Cuddapah District and also Nellore District in Andhra Pradesh, Chengalput District in Tamil Nadu and city of Madras or any such other places as SALC may from time to time determination. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was appointed as Pastor for Gudur Parish as per Resolution No. 62/96 dated 16-8-1996. A Pastor will be the spiritual head of Parish who will be appointed at the call of Parish Council by the Executive Council. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff had assumed office as Pastor of Gudur Parish from 23-8-1996 onwards. The plaintiff had further pleaded in the plaint that previously the 2nd defendant worked as Pastor for 18 years. As per the norms of Church Rubies a Pastor cannot continue for more than 15 years in one Parish. In that connection, Resolution No. 58/96 dated 14-7-1996 was passed not to extend the office of the Pastor of the 2nd defendant and at Gudur. Accordingly there arose vacancy for the Gudur Parish and at the call of Gudur Parish the plaintiff was appointed as the Pastor. It was further pleaded that in the said circumstances the 2nd defendant had no right to continue as Pastor of Gudur Parish having worked continuously for a period of 15 years. The plaintiff further pleaded that the Pastor of a Parish can be elected or assigned. An elected Pastor will be for a duration of 15 years whereas in the case of assigned Pastor, no time limit had been prescribed. It was further pleaded that one Ambarapu Yohan and Ors. filed the suit O.S. No. 524/ 97 on the file of Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati for declaration that the 1st defendant's election as Bishop President along with two others was void and consequently for the relief of permanent injunction from in any way convening 45th regular convention or making any policy decision touching the organization of South Andhra Luthern Church detrimental to the legitimate rights of the members of the Church. The learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati in I.A. No. 1265/97 in O.S. No. 524/97 passed orders directing the 1st defendant and two others to maintain status quo and not to make any policy decisions or convention excepting drawing of monthly salaries. As against the same, the 1st defendant and others herein took the matter in revision to this Court in C.R.P. No. 41/98 and in C.M.P. No. 215/98 this Court passed the interim order: "While the convention to be held on 12-1-1998 shall go on, the result of the election would not be declared until further orders". Thus, excepting the convention to be convened, other aspects of the orders of the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati in O.S. No. 524/97 in I.A. No. 1265/97 dated 24-12-1997 were not interfered with. Thus the 1st defendant had no right to make any policy changes. But much against the said orders, the 1st defendant had been taking law into his hands by wilfully disobeying the lawful orders and had been passing orders of his choice detrimental to the interest and against the provisions of the Constitution of South Andhra Luthern Church.
6. It was further pleaded that the 1st defendant's election even in according to him was for a period of six months ending by 15-1-1998. As such he could not continue further as the Bishop President. Further, the transfer of Pastors who are meant for religious activities is within the frame work of the Executive Council and as such the 1st defendant had no right to transfer any Pastor. It was further pleaded that unless and otherwise there is an immediate call by the Parish, the question of transfer does not arise at all. The plaintiff further pleaded that the defendant cannot be transferred or appointed to Gudur Parish inasmuch as he had already continued for more than 15 years as per Church Rubies. In the said circumstances, the 2nd defendant had no legal right to be transferred to Gudur Parish as it is much against the Constitution of SALC and also the Church Rubies. The plaintiff also pleaded that the 1st defendant had no right to make any policy decisions in view of the orders of the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati in I.A. No. 1265/ 1997 in O.S. No. 524/97 dated 24-12-1997. It was pleaded that while matters stood thus, the 1st defendant passed orders on 30-12-1997 subsequent to the injunction orders granted by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Tirupati alleging as though at the request of the plaintiff he was transferred from St. Paul Peters Church, Gudur and was temporarily assigned Nellore Town Parish in the place of the 2nd defendant with effect from 1-1-1998. The plaintiff never made any request to the 1st defendant for his transfer. The plaintiff had been in service from 23-8-1996 only at Gudur Parish. In pursuance of the letter dated 30-12-1997, the 1st defendant again issued proceedings on 23-1-1998 addressed to the 2nd defendant and sent a copy of the same to the plaintiff with the assistance of the police from interfering with the affairs of St. Paul Peters Church, Gudur and the said proceedings of the 1st defendant dated 30-12-1997 and 23-1-1998 are null and void. It was further pleaded that the said proceedings of the 1st defendant dated 30-12-1997 and 23-1-1998 are unjust, illegal and arbitrary and ultra vires of the provisions of Constitution of SALC and also Church Rubies and as such the same are not true, valid and binding on the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff had been continuing his service as Pastor of Gudur Parish even as on the date of the suit. In view of threatening calls, the plaintiff had been obliged to file the present suit for declaration that the said proceedings dated 30-12-1997 and 23-1-1998 are collusive, illegal, unjust, arbitrary and ultra vires and also against the provisions of the Constitution of SALC and Church Rubies being unconstitutional and void and consequently for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from in any way interfering with the office of the Pastor of Gudur Parish.
7. The plaintiff further pleaded that he was appointed as Pastor of the Gudur Church by the orders sale deed 16-8-1996 and he took charge on 16-8-1996. The plaintiff had been continuing the office even to this day in Gudur Parish. The plaintiff further pleaded that the 2nd defendant worked as Pastor for more than 15 years for Gudur Parish and until a call is given by the Gudur Parish Council his service cannot be transferred. It was also pleaded that the 2nd defendant is closely associated with the 1st defendant and due to their closeness the defendants in collusion with each other issued proceedings on 30-12-1997 and 23-1-1998 by threatening from proceeding with the service of the Pastor for St. Paul Peters Church, Gudur.
8. The defendants filed written statement in detail disputing the allegations. It was further pleaded that the transfer of a Pastor from one Parish to the other Parish on administrative reasons is not a policy decision and such discretion is vested with Bishop President and there is no question of violation of any policy as such. It was further pleaded that the 1st defendant is interested in the smooth religious administration and as a Bishop he has no likes and dislikes and he had no personal interest in the 2nd defendant, and denied the plaint allegations. It was pleaded that it is unfortunate that the plaintiff had chosen to mention other civil suits that are pending between rival groups of SALC which is not the concern of the plaintiff as a Pastor. This Court had permitted holding of Annual Convention (election) as scheduled and that issue had nothing to do with the present scope of the suit. As on the date of filing of the present suit and prior to it or later to it, the plaintiff was not working as a Pastor at Gudur and he is liable for contempt of Court for filing false affidavit. Previously he had obeyed the transfer orders of the previous Bishop when he was transferred from Kalichedu to Gudur on 16-8-1996 and he sent a joining report to Bishop President on 19-8-1996 and hence he is now estopped from questioning the transfer orders that occasioned because of the various developments created by the plaintiff at Gudur Parish. It was pleaded that the Bishop-President is not only the Head of the Pastors working in 44 Parishes, but he has also the prerogative and religious administrative right to bring harmony, undertaking and religious development amongst the Pastor community. The Bishop President has to transfer Pastors on the request of respective Parishes and also on his own after receiving adverse reports and also on exigencies and special circumstances which are religious internal administrative matters as transfer of a Pastor from one Parish to another Parish cannot be dubbed as a policy matter and the transfer of Temporary Assigned Pastor (plaintiff) from Gudur to Nellore is not a policy.
9. At para 14 of the written statement, the chronological events were pleaded as hereunder:
A. On 16-8-1996 the then Bishop-President has transferred plaintiff from Kalichedu Parish to Gudur Parish.
B. Plaintiff sent joining report to Bishop-President on 19-8-1996 (admitting the powers of Bishop-President to transfer a Pastor from one Parish to another Parish).
C. At Gudur faction developed because of plaintiff which led to filing of a Civil Suit by plaintiff supporting faction group in O.S.No. 248/97 and that group injunction petition was dismissed on 22-12-1997.
D. On 1-10-1997, the 1st defendant has advised plaintiff to keep away from factions to maintain the dignity of a Pastor who is a religious servant.
E. Subsequently, Gudur Parish election was ordered to be conducted but two groups fought with each other going to Courts and by unlawfully removing valid Gudur Parish voters and in spite of best efforts of 1st defendant both went to Court because of plaintiff only who has encouraged one group.
F. The 1st defendant sent for the plaintiff by his letter dated 19-12-1997 and had a personal dialogue and later, on Administrative grounds and to keep Gudur P.C.C. elections amicably, transferred plaintiff from Gudur to Nellore and in the same proceedings dated 30-12-1997 ordered 2nd defendant to take charge at Gudur from Nellore Parish.
G. By virtue of the proceedings of 1st defendant dated 30-12-1997 which is self-explanatory, the 2nd defendant assumed/took charge as Pastor at Gudur Parish on 1-1-1998.
H. Hence from 1-14998, the plaintiff was not the Pastor of Gudur Parish and on 15-1-1998, 1st defendant addressed a letter to 2nd defendant as Pastor of Gudur Parish.
I. On 23-1-1998, the 1st defendant has appointed 2nd defendant to act as Special Officer as there was no elected P.C.C. at Gudur due to stalemate created by plaintiff and from 23-1-1998, the 2nd defendant was acting as Parish-Priest and Special Officer also of Gudur Parish which is a Religious Administrative Order not connected to any policy.
J. The 2nd defendant is functioning as Gudur Parish Priest from 1-1-1998 and he was continuously discharging his Religious and Administrative factions which is established by the Acquittance (Salary Disbursements) Register signed for January and February, 1998 months; Church support collecting made by 2nd defendant as Pastor and Special Officer from 26-1-1998 to 28-2-1998; Bantiam Ceremony performed by 2nd defendant on 8-2-1998 at Gudur Parish as Parish Priest and offerings and Announcements Register duly signed by him from 18-1-1998 to 1-3-1998 clearly and clinchingly established the continuous functioning of the 2nd defendant right from 1-1-1998 till 1-3-1998 and as such the present suit has become infructuous as plaintiff was not working as Pastor of Gudur Parish from 1-1-1998 onwards. This suit is filed on 2-2-1998 and the false nature of the affidavit allegations of plaintiff are thus exposed by documents.
It was further pleaded in the written statement that the plaintiff has no right to be posted to Gudur Parish permanently and it is against Church Rules and precedents and equity and common law. The plaintiff is now set up by one group who have lost at District Munsif Court, Gudur and hence the plaintiff has not come to Court with clean hands. Ultimately dismissal of the suit had been prayed for by the defendants.
10. On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the Court of first instance settled the following Issues:
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration?
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction?
3. To what relief?
The evidence of P.W,1 and D.W,1, the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant in the suit had been recorded and Exs.A-1 to A-18, Exs.B-1 to B-27 were marked. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati after taking into consideration all the aspects had arrived at a conclusion that the declaration prayed for in the suit definitely cannot be granted in the absence of SALC which is a necessary party. The learned Judge also had discussed in detail about Ex.A-13 -certified copy of order in I.A. No. 1265/97 in O.S. No. 524/97 on the file of Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati and had arrived at a conclusion that whether transfer of the plaintiff from Gudur to Nellore is a ' policy decision or not is a question of fact and in the absence of sufficient evidence, no relief can be granted in favour of the plaintiff on the strength of an interim order granted in the said suit specified supra. Ultimately the learned Junior Civil Judge dismissed the suit and aggrieved by the same, A.S. No. 101/98 was preferred on the file of III Additional District Judge, Tirupati and at Para-4 the appellate Court had framed the Point "Whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to declaration and permanent injunction as prayed for?" for consideration and ultimately confirmed the said findings recorded by the Court of first instance. No doubt, the appellant moved I.A. No. 994/ 2001 to implead SALC as a party, and also two other applications I.A. No. 1151/2002 and I.A. No. 1703/2002 under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code for reception of additional evidence. The appellate Court had recorded certain reasons why such applications cannot be permitted at the appellate stage and ultimately had dismissed the Appeal. Aggrieved by the same, the present Second Appeal had been preferred.
11. The main contention which was advanced with all seriousness is that by virtue of Ex.A-13, the 1st defendant was restrained from taking any policy decision and hence the impugned order definitely would fall under policy decision and thus even on the principle of applying doctrine of comity, orders granted by the competent Courts are to be respected and hence the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to the relief. No doubt, in this context Exs.A-15 and A-16 also had been referred to and elaborate submissions were made in this regard. No doubt, the respondents/defendants had taken a specific stand even in the written statement that a mere transfer of this nature definitely does not fall under the expression "policy decision".
12. It is difficult to precisely define the expression "policy decision" and equally so, the expression "public policy" as held in Lachoo Mat v. Radhey Shyam, and P. Rathinam: Nagbhusan Patnaik v. Union of India, . It is no doubt true that in the present context, this Court is not concerned with "public policy", but is concerned only with words "policy" and "policy decision". The Chambers English Dictionary, New Edition, defines "policy" as:
"a course of action, especially one based on some declared or respected principle, a system of administration guided more by interest than by principle; the art of Government statecraft; dexterity of management ........"
The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines "policy" as hereunder;
"a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a Government, party, business or individual; the Government's controversial economic policies............"
West's Legal Thesaurus defines "policy" as hereunder:
"1. The general principles by which an organization is guided and managed (public policy). Guidelines, goals, platform, approach, tenets, creed, beliefs, directions, scheme, habit, tactic, style, management, design, strategy, line, polity, proposal, protocol.........."
Wharton's Law Lexicon defines "policy" as hereunder:
"the general principles by which a Government is guided in its management of public affairs, or the legislature in its measures........."
Black's Law Dictionary, sixth edition, defines "policy" as hereunder:
"The general principles by which a Government is guided in its management of public affairs, or the Legislature in its measures.
..................
This term, as applied to a law, ordinance, or rule of law, denotes its general purpose or tendency considered as directed to the welfare or prosperity of the State or community.................."
Thus, the expression "policy" may be understood as a scheme of governance. Policy decision in relation to SALC may be understood as a decision of the governing body in relation to a particular occupation falling under the head of policy to be uniformly administered and implemented. It is no doubt true that many a time, it would be very difficult to draw a clear dividing line between policy decisions, mere administrative decisions or managerial decisions. Policy decisions and the scope of judicial review in the realm of administrative law had been dealt with by the Apex Court in Union of India v. International Trading Company, 2003 (4) Supreme 114 and in State of Orissa v. Mangalam Timber Products Limited, 2003 (8) Supreme 65. In N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, 2003 (6) Supreme 572, though policy decision was not defined, decision to undertake a project was held to be a policy decision. No doubt, there are several decided cases of public policy of Government and interference by Courts, but in the present case, this Court is concerned with transfer of a Pastor in private administration i.e., SALC. It is no doubt true that transfers also may be governed by transfer policies or rules or regulations regulating the field in public administration. There may be certain policies regulating the same and certain policy decisions in relation thereto taken by the respective Societies registered under the Societies Registration Act or in other relevant law or the private administration as well. This aspect is to be proved being a question of fact especially when there is a specific denial in the written statement. Fixing the period of service of a Pastor at a particular place in uniformity may fall under the expression "policy decision". But, it being a question of fact, the appellant/plaintiff should discharge his burden by establishing by a plea and evidence that even a transfer of this nature in the present set of facts does fall under the expression "policy decision" in the context of the said factual background. No attempt was made by the appellant/plaintiff to discharge this burden and in the absence of the same, concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below cannot be found fault in any way in this regard.
13. As referred to supra, SALC is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860, which no doubt had been repealed in the State of Andhra Pradesh by the A.P. Societies Registration Act 2001. The Constitution of SALC styled as Constitution" in fact are the Bye-laws of the said Society. The details relating to the administration of SALC may not be very relevant for the present purpose.
14. The next question which was elaborately argued is the ground of dismissal of the suit that SALC, a necessary party, was not impleaded in the suit as a party. As can be seen from the nature of the relief itself here cannot be any doubt or controversy that SALC is a necessary party. It is no doubt true that an attempt was made to implead SALC as a party at the Appellate stage. If this is the only defect to be cured, the case of the appellant could have been considered. But it is also pertinent to note that under Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act 1860, which is no doubt repealed by subsequent Legislation referred to supra, it was specified that every Society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman or Principal Secretary or Trustee as shall be determined by the Rules and Regulations of the Society and in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the Governing Body for the occasion, and the proviso specifies that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society, to sue the President or Chairman, or Principal Secretary or the Trustees thereof, if on application to the Governing Body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant. It is needless to say that the 1st respondent/1st defendant was not sued in his official capacity, but was sued only in his personal capacity. It is no doubt true that this plea was not specifically taken. But, when the necessary parties for making an effective adjudication of the dispute in controversy had not been impleaded at all, it is needless to say that such suit would definitely result in dismissal only. Hence, in this view of the matter, especially in the light of the findings recorded in detail from Paras 6 to 13 by the appellate Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that such concurrent findings deserve no disturbance at the stage of Second Appeal. Definitely defects of this nature in the institution of the suit are not formal defects which can be cured and are vital defects which should necessarily result in the dismissal of the suit only. Even otherwise, on facts too, this Court is of the opinion that the appellant/ plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the suit. The appellate Court also had arrived at the correct conclusion in negativing the applications for reception of additional evidence since in the light of the nature off the controversy, those are not going to improve the case of the appellant/ plaintiff in any way.
15. Viewed from any angle, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Second Appeal is devoid of merits and accordingly the same shall stand dismissed. No costs.
16. Heard Sri M.S. Prasad, learned Counsel representing the appellant and Sri P. Sridhar Reddy, learned Counsel representing the respondents.
17. Sri M.S. Prasad, learned Counsel representing the appellant, at this stage had made a request that the appellant herein has been continuing as Pastor by virtue of an interim order granted by the Court of first instance, the Appellate Court and the Second Appellate Court as well during the pendency of the litigation and ' intends to take this matter to the Apex Court. The other questions, which had been already answered while disposing of the Second Appeal, need not be repeated again.
18. Sri P. Sridhar Reddy, with all vehemence had opposed the said request.
19. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, the judgment and decree of this Court is kept in abeyance for a period of two months only. However, it is made clear that no further extension would be/ granted.