Calcutta High Court
Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs State Of West Bengal And Ors. on 27 June, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2002(4)CHN708, [2001(91)FLR1203], (2002)ILLJ224CAL
Author: D.K. Seth
Bench: D.K. Seth
JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 7th of January, 2000 by which the enquiry was held to be invalid. He has also challenged the order dated 27th March, 2001 by which the interim relief was granted.
2. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he does not want to use any affidavit. The writ petition may be disposed of on the basis of the materials available before the court.
3. I have gone through the order dated 7th January, 2000 relating to the invalidity of the domestic enquiry. The scope and ambit of such a proceeding is confined to the irregularity in the proceeding itself. The Tribunal is not supposed to enter into the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal unless such finding is not justified. In the present case, the Tribunal appears to have entered into the merits of the case as an original fact finding authority. It has come to its own finding of belief and disbelief, which it cannot do. It should nave confined itself within the scope and ambit of the enquiry with regard to the validity of the domestic enquiry and the justification of the action.
4. The extent of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to interfere with the domestic enquiry was initially very limited. Domestic enquiry was held to be the prerogative of the management. But gradually the concept started developing. In Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1952) LAC 490, laid down four conditions which made the managerial action vulnerable. These conditions were adopted by the Supreme Court with slight modification in Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1958(1) LLJ 260 (SC). It was laid down that the power of the management in respect of its internal administration and discipline is not unlimited; it can be interfered with in course of industrial adjudication in order to justify the action and to grant appropriate relief. But, however, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not that of an appellate court [Bisra Stone Lime Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, 1970(1) LLJ 626 (S.C.)]. The Tribunal can interfere only in cases of (i) want of good faith; (ii) victimisation or unfair labour practice; (iii) basic error of management or violation of principles of natural justice; and (iv) baseless or perverse findings. The decision in Indian Iron & Steel Co, Ltd. (supra) was elaborated and clarified in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
5. This position changed with the insertion of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 1971 w.e.f. 15.12.1971. It empowered the Tribunal to be satisfied with regard to the justification of the action. In interpreting the same, the Apex Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Management, 1973 (1) LLJ 278(SC), had held that the Tribunal can re-apprise the evidence in the domestic enquiry in order to satisfy itself that the misconduct alleged against the workman is established. The limitation imposed in Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (supra) was thus stretched to the arena of reappraisal of evidence. Its application however, confines to a case based on valid enquiry. But in cases of 'invalid enquiry' and 'no-enquiry' the Tribunal is entitled to exercise its original jurisdiction with regard to the merit and justifiability of the action.
6. But that re-appraisal cannot be that of either the original or of an appellate court but of a revisional court. Or in other words it is clothed with the additional power of re-appraisal of evidence with a revisional courts' outlook. The satisfaction is that of a court scrutinising that of an employer to justify the action. On such re-appraisal it has to satisfy itself that on such evidence the action could be justified. There remains a thin distinction in the exercise of such jurisdiction. In the name of re-appraisal it cannot weigh the evidence in the same manner as an original or appellate court when the enquiry is found to have been held validly. It can do so in a case of 'invalid-enquiry' or 'no-enquiry'. It can do so when the enquiry is held to be invalid and employer address evidence before the Tribunal to establish the charges. Examination of justification of the action is a little different exercise than taking a fresh action. In such a case an action has been taken by the disciplinary authority. The materials on which the disciplinary authority has taken the action are to be examined. While examining such materials it can re-apprise the same. But the scope of re-appraisal of such material is limited to the purpose of satisfying itself whether the action taken could be justified or not. It cannot assume the jurisdiction either of the original court or the appellate court. The Tribunal has to bear in mind the thin distinction between an original decision and an examination for satisfaction about justification.
7. In the circumstances, the order dated 7th January, 2000 is hereby quashed. The Tribunal shall re-hear and decide the question afresh having regard to the scope and ambit within which the Tribunal can decide such question and having regard to the different decisions that might be cited by the parties. All points are kept open.
8. So far as the order dated 27th March, 2001 Mr. Dutta has relied on certain decisions which are not necessary. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a decision in the case of Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. T.G. Alexander, reported in 1998(2) CLR 407. In the said decision it was held that the expression "recovery of money" under Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act does not include wages or back wages payable to a worker. He has also relied upon the decision in the case of Reliance Silicones(India) Ltd. and Anr. v. Industrial Tribunal, Thane and Anr., reported in 1999 L.L.R. 1080. In the said decision it was held that so far as back wages are concerned, the same is hit by the mischief of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act. Thus the Bombay High Court has given two contradictory decisions in two cases. Whereas Mr. Dutt has relied upon a decision in the case of Association of Engineering Workers v. Automobile Products of India and Ors., reported in 1993 II C. L. R. 865, where the "recovery of money" under Section 22 was also applied to a proceeding before the Industrial Court. Thus, there being different decisions, I prefer to follow the two decisions, namely, Association of Engineering Workers (supra) and Reliance Silicones (India) Ltd. (supra).
9. So far as Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act is concerned, it refers to the "recovery of money" which is unqualified to that extent. It is very difficult to exclude the "recovery of money" which is back wages. But so far as payment of current wages cannot be termed as "recovery of money". Therefore, the same cannot be hit by the mischief of Section 22 but as soon it become back wages, it is for the period which is not current it is definitely hit by Section 22 since it becomes the "recovery of money," though it is wages.
10. In the present case, the petitioner had made an application after he had superannuated and the Labour Court had allowed interim relief to the extent of the period from the date of reference till superannuation which again is in the nature, tends to be the back wages. The petitioner cannot claim any wages after he had superannuated. Had the application been made before superannuation, the question would have been otherwise. An application having been made after superannuation becomes an application for "recovery of money" within the meaning of Section 22. Interim relief, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be granted. In that view of the matter, the order dated 27th March, 2001 passed by the learned 4th Industrial Tribunal is hereby quashed.
11. This writ petition is thus disposed of.
12. However, before porting with the records, this court will expect that the Labour Court shall dispose of the matter expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date of communication of this order. However, Mr. Dutt's client will not take any unnecessary adjournment.
13. There will be no order as to costs.
Xerox certified copy of this order, if applied, be supplied within seven days.