Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rahul Chourasia vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 November, 2014
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W.P. No.3087/2014
25/11/2014
Shri Kapil Patwardhan, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Piyush Jain, learned P.L. for the respondents/State.
Invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and assailing the order Annexure P/1 dated 11.11.2013 passed by the Director General of Police, Bhopal seeking direction to appoint him this petition has been filed.
2. It is pleaded that in the year 2013, the respondent issued an advertisement to fill-up the post of Constable (Driver). Being holder of a driving licence, he applied and was declared passed in the recruitment test through Professional Examination Board. After qualifying the written examination and merit he was subjected to physical endurance and measurement test. After interview, he was declared provisionally selected subject to character verification and also of antecedents. In the said report, it was disclosed by the petitioner that against him offence under Section 279 and 427 of the IPC has been registered by Police Station Kundipura, District Chhindwara wherein after settlement, he was acquitted dropping the proceedings in compromise. However, considering the said criminal antecedents, which may amount to moral turpitude Annexure P/1 ..2..
was passed denying appointment to the petitioner, which entails him to file this petition.
3. Respondents by filing their return has not disputed that the petitioner has applied to the post of Constable (Driver) in furtherance to the examination and he was selected in the written test. It is said that from the verification of the antecedents, he was found involved in a Criminal Case No.264/2010 registered for an offence under Sections 279 and 427 of the IPC. It is further said that the order of acquittal has been passed on the basis of settlement with the complainant. However, it cannot be said to be clean acquittal. Relying upon a judgment of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. vs. Mehar Singh 2013 (7) SCC 685 it is urged that looking to the said judgment the benefit as prayed cannot be derived by the petitioner. However, the order impugned (Annexure P/1) has rightly been passed.
4. After hearing learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties, first of all, the connotation regarding moral turpitude ought to be understood. Moral Turpitude means per Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edn.,2004) : Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. In the area of legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude - such as fraud or breach of trust..... Also termed moral ..3..
depravity..... Moral turpitude means, in general, shameful wickedness- so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest, good morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of the community. It has also been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which one person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people.
5. In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana 1996 (4) SCC 17 Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :-
"12. `Moral turpitude' is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity."
The aforesaid judgment in Pawan Kumar has been considered by this Court again in Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola and placed reliance on Baleshwar Singh v.
District Magistrate and Collector wherein it has been held as under :
"The expression `moral turpitude' is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of ..4..
the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellow men or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man."
In view of the above, it is evident that the moral turpitude means anything contrary to honesty, modesty or good morals. It means vileness and depravity. In-fact, the conviction of a person in crime involving moral turpitude impeaches his credibility on account of having found involved in shameful, wicked and base activities.
6. In the present case, the petitioner was found involved in an offence under Section 279 which relates to rash driving or riding on a public way and also of Section 427 which relates to mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees. In case of road ..5..
accident some loss of property is caused, in my considered opinion the said offence would not fall within the purview of moral turpitude. It is not an offence committed intentionally depriving the moral by a person but such an offence has been committed by virtue of an accident without having any mens rea in the mind. If such offence is coupled with other offence having mens rea certainly it may be distinguished from the arguments of the petitioner. In that view of the matter, in my considered opinion judgment of Mehar Singh (supra) relied upon by the respondent wherein offence were found involved under Section 143, 341, 323 in addition to the offence under Section 427 of the IPC and looking to the narration of that case wherein Mehar Singh alongwith others armed with iron chain, lathi, belts, danda, stones etc. stopped the bus on the road and rebuked the conductor of the bus was the facts dissimilar to the present case. In that view of the matter the judgment of Mehar Singh is distinguishable.
7. In view of the foregoing discussion and in the manner in which the incident took place to which the petitioner was chargesheeted for the offence under Section 279/427 of the IPC and acquitted by virtue of the settlement as permissible under Section 320(8) of the Cr.P.C. in my considered opinion the finding as ..6..
recorded in the order impugned to deprive the petitioner to grant appointment holding that for the said offence he was found guilty or moral turpitude cannot be sustained in law.
8. Consequently, the order impugned Annexure P/1 is hereby quashed. Respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment afresh ignoring the findings recorded in the order Annexure P/1. If he is otherwise found fit in character verification or antecedents, appropriate orders may be passed declaring the petitioner suitable for the post of Constable. The aforesaid exercise be completed by the respondents within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order.
9. Accordingly, the petition stands allowed and disposed of with the aforesaid observation.
C.c. as per rules.
(J.K. Maheshwari) Judge PK