Punjab-Haryana High Court
Vikram Singh @ Vicky Walia vs State Of Punjab And Others on 19 December, 2025
LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and
LPA-1397-2019 (O&M)
-1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
1.
LPA-1395-2019 (O&M)
Vikram Singh @ Vicky Walia
....Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab and others
...Respondents
*****
2.
LPA-1397-2019 (O&M)
Jasbir Singh @ Jassa
....Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab and others
...Respondents
*****
Reserved on: 22.09.2025
Pronounced on : 19.12.2025
Uploaded on: 31.12.2025
Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced or the
full judgment is pronounced :Full Judgment
*****
CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHIT KAPOOR
*****
Present: Ms. Gursharan Kaur Mann, Senior Advocate, assisted by
Ms. Armandeep Kaur Sidhu, Advocate
Mr. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate
Mr. Anmol Jeevan Singh Gill, Advocate
Mr. Arshjot S. Moni, Advocate for the appellant(s).
Ms. Samdisha Kaur, AAG, Punjab.
Ms. Divya Sharma, Senior Panel Counsel,
for the applicant/respondent No.4-UOI.
*****
ROHIT KAPOOR, J.
"Every life deserves a certain amount of dignity, no matter how poor or damaged the shell that carries it." (Rick Bragg, American Journalist & Writer.) 1 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:34 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -2- "Mercy to the guilty, is cruelty to the innocent." (Adam Smith, Scottish economist and philosopher.) Infringement of rights of the Appellants under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, viz-a-viz, that of the victim and his family, requires adjudication in the present Appeals, which are being decided together by way of a common judgement.
Challenge Raised:
1. The Appellants have been held guilty of kidnapping and subsequently murdering a Sixteen year old young student, in a gruesome manner, since ransom was not paid. They approached the writ court under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India, by jointly filing CWP No.21274 of 2016, after rejection of their mercy petitions, on the ground of infringement of their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and prayer was made for commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment and for quashing of the death warrants. The learned Single Judge, vide its judgment dated 26.07.2019, has dismissed the petition, leading to filing of the above-mentioned individual appeals by the appellants, under clause X of the Letters Patent Act.
Factual Matrix:
2. The essential facts and chronology of events are extracted hereunder in a tabular form, for the ease of reference:
14.02.2005 Abhi Verma alias Harry, a boy aged 16 years was kidnapped. His father received a call from a kidnapper, demanding Rs. 50 lacs. The police authorities were informed and the three accused i.e. the appellants and Sonia, i.e. the wife of the appellant-Jasbir Singh, were 2 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -3- arrested. On the next day, the dead body of Abhi Verma was found in the fields. FIR No. 36 dated 14.02.2005 was registered under Sections 302, 364-A, 120-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code at P.S. City, Hoshiarpur, Punjab. 21.12.2006 The learned Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur, held all three accused as guilty under Sections 302, 364-A, 201 and 120-B of the Indian Penal code and inter alia awarded death sentence to them for the offences under Sections 302 and 364-A. 21.12.2006 to As per the appellants, they were kept in solitary 2009 confinement for the said period, and in 'quasi solitary confinement' even thereafter. They were also put in death cells after receipt of death warrants in the year 2012 and 2016, till such time the death warrants were ordered to be kept in abeyance.
30.05.2008 This Court confirmed the death sentence imposed on all the three accused, including the appellants in Murder Reference No.1 of 2007, while dismissing the appeal (Crl. Appeal No.105-DB of 2007) filed by them. 25.01.2010 In Criminal Appeal No.1396-97 of 2008, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of the appellants, however, the sentence of the co-accused Sonia was modified to that of life imprisonment. 20.04.2011 Review petition (Crl.) Nos.192-193 of 2011 filed by the appellants before the Supreme Court, were also dismissed.
02.05.2012 The appellants challenged the constitutionality of Section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code before the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 66 of 2012, which was withdrawn with liberty to approach the High Court. 15.09.2012 Death warrants for the execution of appellants on 05.10.2012, were issued by the learned Sessions Judge,
3 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -4- Hoshiarpur, which were received by the office of Superintendent Jails, Central Jail, Patiala on 25.09.2012. 17.09.2012 The appellants filed CWP-18956-2012 before this Court challenging the vires of Section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code with a prayer to commute the death sentence into life imprisonment. The said petition was dismissed on 03.10.2012, however the death warrants were stayed till 12.10.2012, in order to afford an opportunity to the appellants to file appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
11.10.2012 CWP-5429-2010 was filed before this Court by the appellant-Jasbir Singh and his wife, co-accused Sonia, for enforcement of their perceived right to have conjugal life and procreate within the jail premises. An order dated 11.10.2012 was passed in the petition, directing the Jail Authorities to receive the mercy petition of Jasbir Singh and forward the same to the addressee. The mercy petitions of both the appellants were sent by the Jail Superintendent, Patiala, to the Hon'ble President of India, which were received in the Secretariat of the President, on 18.10.2012.
12.10.2012 The appellants filed SLP (Crl.)8149-2012 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgment passed by this court in CWP No.18956 of 2012 wherein challenge was laid to Section 364-A IPC. Vide an interim order dated 12.10.2012, the Supreme Court stayed the execution of death warrants of the appellants. 26.11.2012 The Joint Secretary (Judicial), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, sent a letter to the Secretary, Department of Home Affairs and Justice, Government of Punjab with a direction to place the mercy petitions, before the Governor of Punjab, under Article 161 of the 4 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -5- Constitution of India.
08.02.2013 Pursuant thereto, the office of Superintendent Central Jail, Patiala submitted fresh mercy petitions of the appellants to the Governor of Punjab, through proper channel.
21.03.2013 Reminders were sent by the Ministry of Home Affairs to 12.08.2013 the Department of Home Affairs Punjab for a decision on 07.11.2013 the mercy petition by the Hon'ble Governor "without 05.02.2014 delay" and "on top priority". It was pointed out that 16.06.2014 despite lapse of about two years, no reply/decision has 15.09.2014 been furnished. It was warned that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a view that death penalty may be commuted to life imprisonment on account of delay in consideration of mercy petition. A request was made to convey decision of the Governor within a period of one month, else the case will be submitted before the President, without comments of the state.
27.02.2014 The appellants submitted an application before the jail authorities for permission to stay alone, stating that being on death row, they did not feel comfortable staying with others.
02.09.2014 The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide judgment passed in Mohammad Arif Vs. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9SCC 737, directed to give an opportunity of open hearing to the death row convicts in their review petitions before the Supreme Court.
03.11.2014 An order was passed by the Principal Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, Government of Punjab that the mercy petitions were submitted before the Governor on 27.05.2014, however, it was noticed that as per the judgment passed by the Supreme Court on 09.07.2014 in Union of India Vs. Sriharan @ Murugan and others, 5 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -6- Writ Petition (Crl.)No.48 of 2014, the State Governments were restrained from exercising their powers of remission to life convicts. It was observed that in this situation case cannot be put up.
25.11.2014 A letter was written to the Principal Secretary Department of Home Affairs, Government of Punjab, by the MHA, clarifying that the judgment passed in Sriharan's case dealt with life convicts and not death row convicts and requested to consider the mercy petitions of the appellants under Article 161 of the Constitution of India.
15.01.2015 The Hon'ble Governor of Punjab, rejected the mercy petitions of the appellants.
21.08.2015 A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed Crl. Appeal No.824 of 2013, upholding the Constitutional validity of Section 364-A IPC. Stay on the execution as directed vide order dated 12.10.2012, was vacated.
22.01.2016 The rejection of the mercy petitions by the Governor 25.01.2016 was communicated to the appellants on 22.01.2016, after one year from the date the rejection order was passed. Fresh three page mercy petitions were thereafter prepared by the Jail Superintendent and sent to the Hon'ble President of India on 25.01.2016.
07.08.2016 The Hon'ble President rejected the mercy petitions of the 11.08.2016 appellants and the order was sent to the Department of 22.08.2016 Home Affairs on 11.08.2016 and the appellants were informed on 22.08.2016 27.08.2016 The appellants approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court seeking the right to be heard in open Court by relying upon the judgment in Mohd. Arif's case (supra) by way of an application for re-opening of their review petition, 6 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -7- vide Criminal M.P. Nos. 16673-76 of 2016 in Review Petition (Crl.) Nos. 192-193 of 2011 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1396-97 of 2008.
27.09.2016 The learned Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur issued death warrants, which were to be executed on 25.10.2016. The appellants were informed about the receipt of the warrants in Jail on 30.09.2016 and were sent to the fansi yard, since their mercy petitions stood rejected. 04.10.2016 The appellants filed CWP No. 21274 of 2016 before the Writ Court against the rejection of their mercy petition and for seeking commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment on the grounds mentioned therein. 18.10.2016 The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 18.10.2016, passed in the applications for re-opening the review, granted an interim stay on execution against the pending death warrants. The said applications were ultimately dismissed on 07.07.2017.
26.07.2019 The writ petition filed by the appellants was dismissed vide the impugned judgment and order dated 26.07.2019, which has been challenged separately by the appellants by filing the present appeals.
19.08.2019 Both the LPA's were dismissed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court by holding that the same are not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of 'Ram Kishan Fauji Vs. State of Haryana and others', (2017) 5 SCC 533. 09.12.2021 Crl. A. No.1596-97 of 2021 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.9650-51 of 2019, was allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by holding that while dealing with a writ petition based on the ground of delay in disposal of mercy petition or application for commutation, the Court 7 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -8- does not enter into the merits of the matter and the proceedings so initiated by way of writ petition are not connected with the earlier determination of guilt in regular proceedings. It was therefore, held that such proceedings would certainly be one where remedy by way of an intra court appeal, if the concerned rules or letters patent so permit, would be maintainable. With such observations the appeals were allowed and the matter was remitted back for fresh consideration by the Division Bench.
Findings of the learned Single Judge:
3. The learned Single Judge, after noticing the essential facts and rival contentions of the parties, considered the grounds of inordinate delay, solitary confinement, and procedural lapses, raised by the Appellants-Petitioners. On the question of delay, the period from 11.10.2012 till ultimate rejection of the mercy petitions, was not considered as inordinate or unreasonable delay, or attributable to the respondents. It was also held that filing of mercy petition is a matter of individual choice, which was not exercised by the appellants till issuance of interim directions on 11.10.2012.
4. As regards the aspect of solitary confinement, the learned Single Judge by placing reliance upon the reply dated 24.10.2016, wherein it was stated that the appellants were kept in an enclosure called '32 Chakkis' alongwith 34 other inmates, held that the appellants-
petitioners have failed to substantiate assertions in this regard. The 8 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -9- ground of procedural irregularities also do not find favour and it was held that after the dismissal of the review petitions, no judicial or administrative remedy was availed by the appellants other than challenging the vires of Section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, which was withdrawn on 02.05.2012 and it was only thereafter when the death warrants were issued on 15.09.2012. Similarly, the death warrants were issued on 27.09.2016, when no judicial or administrative proceedings were pending. Ultimately, the petition was dismissed with the following observations :
"A lot has been argued about the rights of the petitioners, however, there is not even a whisper as to how the cries of the victim have to be addressed as it is the victim alone who sets the wheel of justice moving by giving information to the State. Even if there is some delay in executing the judgments and orders of the competent Courts in such cases, that must not negate the consequences of the trial reached after recording the findings and after weighing the material on record including the gravity of the crime and the consequences to follow in a vibrant justice delivery system. The Court feels that it is under obligation not only to protect the rights of the petitioners alone but is under bounden duty to protect the rights of all, particularly the victim. If the Court maintains silence on the issue, then no forum is left for the victim to voice his grievance and would facilitate the perpetrator of the crime to chart out a route that defeats the purpose of trial. Such a course surely would culminate into defeat of the majesty of law.
9 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -10- In view of the above discussion, this Court does not find any merit in the instant petition and the same is, hereby, dismissed."
Arguments advanced on behalf of the Appellants:
5. Learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants at the very outset has assailed the correctness of the impugned judgement on the ground that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the issue pertaining to solitary confinement in the correct perspective, on the basis of the facts and materials placed on record. It is submitted that in the reply dated 24.10.2016, which has been relied upon by the learned Single Judge, wrong facts were placed before the Court and therefore the mother of Appellant-Vikram Singh filed an application CM-13575-2017 dated 20.09.2017, placing on record documents filed in CWP-16020-
2006, which clearly established that the appellants were kept in solitary confinement. In pursuance thereto, specific reply by way of affidavit dated 26.09.2017 was filed by the Superintendent Jails, Central Jail, Patiala, wherein the correct factual position regarding the appellants having been kept separately from other inmates till 2009, was admitted. However, the said admitted position was wrongly ignored by the learned single judge, by relying upon the earlier Reply.
6. It is submitted further that records would reveal, that even thereafter the appellants were kept in 'quasi' solitary confinement in violation of the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration and others, (1978) 4 SCC 494 and in death cells after the receipt of the death warrants in the years 2012 and 2016. It 10 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -11- is argued that the learned Single Judge has contradicted himself in suggesting that at most the appellants were kept in 'statutory segregation', despite their being no statutory basis for the same.
7. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Batra (supra), to contend that the operation of Section 30 (2) of the Prisons Act 1894 (in short 'Prisons Act'), would only come into play, once all judicial and constitutional remedies are over, i.e. after the rejection of the mercy petition. It is, therefore, submitted that in view of the undisputed position that the appellants were kept in solitary confinement, in an illegal manner, that itself is a ground for commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment.
8. The second argument put forth by learned senior counsel is, that there was an unreasonable and inordinate delay of 05 years and 04 months (20.4.2011 to 11.08.2016) in deciding the mercy petitions. It is contended that the delay can be divided into five sections, wherein in the first instance, the time period from rejection of review i.e. 20.04.2011 to sending of mercy petitions 11.10.2012, is to be counted as delay due to inaction of the respondents. The time period from 11.10.2012 to 08.02.2013 is also to be blamed upon the State of Punjab, as the mercy petitions were wrongly sent to the President, instead of the Governor. The period from 08.02.2013 to 15.01.2016 is also attributed to the respondents on the ground that the State Government did not take any action on the mercy petitions, despite multiple reminders from the MHA, with ultimatums. Further delay was caused by the State Government by misinterpreting the interim orders of the Supreme Court, which restrained 11 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -12- the State Government from exercising remission powers for life convicts, which had no bearing upon the pending mercy petition of the appellants, who were death row convicts. It is also submitted that delay of about one year from the date of rejection of the mercy petition by the Governor on 15.01.2015 to the date when the appellants were informed about the same on 22.01.2016, is also to be blamed on the executive. Lastly, the period from 25.01.2016 to 08.08.2016, for deciding the mercy petitions submitted before the Hon'ble President of India, is also alleged to have not been explained.
9. It has been urged that the rules of the Ministry of Home Affairs (in short 'MHA'), cast a specific duty upon the Superintendent Jails, that after receipt of intimation of dismissal by the Supreme Court of the Appeal or Application for Special Leave to Appeal, the convict is to be informed forthwith, regarding his option of filing a mercy petition, which is then required to be submitted in writing within seven days of such intimation. It is submitted that undisputedly there was non- compliance of the relevant rules besides the fact that the directions of the Supreme Court in the case of Shatrughan Chauhan and another vs. Union of India and others (2014) 3 SCC, regarding providing legal aid for preparation of mercy petition, were not followed, leading to the delay in filing of mercy petitions.
10. It is contended that pendency of challenge to Section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code cannot be held against the appellants, as it is evident that at no point was there a stay on processing of the mercy petitions by this Court or by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the 12 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -13- respondents themselves did not halt the processing of the mercy petitions on this ground, despite being fully aware of the same. Various judgments have been cited to contend that delay in deciding the mercy petition is a valid ground for commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment.
11. The third submission of the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants is that the gravity of the offence is not relevant in post mercy proceedings. She relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan's case (supra) wherein it was held in paragraph No.64 that the gravity of the crime is irrelevant to such proceedings. Our attention has also been invited to other supervening factors like the long period of incarceration, medical ailments and mental torture being suffered by the appellants and their good behaviour etc.
12. Lastly, the learned senior counsel has pointed out the alleged procedural irregularities, to contend that the same would also be relevant for considering the relief sought. It is submitted that the impugned judgment completely ignores the violation caused to the rights of the appellants by non-adherence to relevant rules framed by the MHA and the law on determination of mercy petitions. It is submitted that the appellants were made to sign on mercy petitions thrice, that is in 2012, 2013 and 2016, without any legal aid and in contravention to the instructions of the MHA, which require that the same mercy petitions must be forwarded after perusal and determination by the Governor. It is argued that the learned Single Judge has wrongly rejected the procedural impropriety of issuance of death warrants without exhaustion of legal 13 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -14- remedies, despite death warrants having been issued twice in 2012 and 2016, without determination of the mercy petition and thereafter the review petitions of the appellants.
13. Reliance has been placed on the judgements in Sher Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 344, Triveniben vs. State of Gujrat, (1989) 1 SCC 678, Shatrughan Chauhan supra, Ajay Kumar Pal vs. Union of India (2015) 2 SCC 478, Haja Moideen vs. Government of India and Others, 1989 SCC OnLine Mad 345, B.A. Umesh Versus Union Of India & Ors. (2022) SCC online SC 1052, Gurusami Naicker vs. the State of Tamil Nadu (1984) SCC Online Mad 452, Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) vs. Union of India and others (2015) SCC Online All 143, Sonu Sardar vs. Union of India , (2017) SCC Online Del 8928 and Jagdish vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2020) 14 SCC 156, in support of the above arguments. Submissions on behalf of the State of Punjab:
14. Learned Assistant Advocate General, Punjab, while referring to the reply by way of affidavit of the Superintendent, Central Jail, Patiala, has contended that the appellants were admitted to the Patiala Jail after conviction on 21.12.2006 and were confined in Enclosure '32 Chakkis', along with other inmates. Before 2009 they were kept in the jail according to Para No. 468(3) and Para No.767(1) of the Punjab Jail Manual, 1996 (in short "Jail Manual"), according to which the condemned petitioners were permitted to occupy courtyard of their cell for half an hour each morning and evening, although only one prisoner at a time was allowed to do so. It is further submitted that the prisoners 14 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -15- were allowed such interviews and other communications with their relatives, friends and advisors as permitted under Para 468(3) of the Punjab Jail Manual. It is the further submission of the learned State counsel that after 2009 the appellants were not kept isolated from other fellow inmates and were performing their daily routine and were also playing outdoor games with the other inmates within the enclosure of 32 Chakkis. Our attention was drawn to the application dated 27.02.2014 whereby the appellants had themselves sought permission to live alone in the cell, on the ground that due to awarding of death sentence, they do not want to stay with anybody else. It is thus argued that the ground regarding solitary confinement cannot be pressed by the appellants and at best they were kept under 'statutory segregation' as per the Prisons Act and Jail Manual.
15. It is submitted that the appellants were kept in the death cells only after receiving their death warrants on 30.09.2016. After the stay of the death warrants by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 24.10.2016, they were again allowed to live like other fellow inmates. It is further submitted that as regards the issue of delay regarding mercy petition, the appellants submitted various applications regarding pendency of their review before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the mercy petition was submitted by them on 11.10.2012 and the same was sent to the Hon'ble President of India, through the jail authority, in compliance with the directions passed by this Court, without any delay. It is contended that the appellants laid challenge to Section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code, firstly before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and thereafter before the
15 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -16- High Court, which consumed considerable time and the same cannot be blamed upon the State authorities.
16. Learned counsel for the State has submits that in compliance with the order passed by this court on 13.08.2025, whereby the State was directed to file necessary affidavit with regard to the behavior and conduct of the appellants in jail, as also regarding their medical condition, affidavit dated 22.08.2025 has been filed alongwith the report of the Medical Board dated 20.08.2025.
17. It is pointed out that as per the report of Medical Board comprising of three Doctors of Rajendra Hospital, Patiala, who examined the appellants on 18.08.2025 at Central Jail, Patiala, the mental status of the appellants was normal on all parameters and they did not have any psychiatric illness. As regards the conduct of the appellant-Jasbir Singh, it was pointed out that a mobile phone was recovered from him on 24.12.2012 and consequently an FIR No.425 dated 28.12.2012 under Section 52(A) of the Prisons Act, was registered at Police Station, Tiripuri, Patiala and he was convicted and sentenced in the case on 21.02.2014 by the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patiala and has already undergone the sentence imposed upon him. Apart from the above, it is stated in the affidavit that the overall conduct of the appellant- Jasbir Singh is 'Very Good' inside the jail premises. Similarly a mobile phone was recovered from the appellant-Vikram Singh @ Vicky Walia and FIR No.205 dated 17.07.2021 was registered under Section 52(A) of the Prisons Act, was registered at Police Station, Tiripuri, Patiala, however, he was acquitted in the case by the court of Judicial Magistrate 16 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -17- First Class, Patiala vide judgment dated 25.07.2023. Excepting the above incident, the conduct of the appellant Vikram Singh @ Vicky Walia is also stated to be 'Very Good' in the jail premises. Submissions on behalf of Union of India:
18. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.4-
Union of Indiahas vehemently argued that none of the grounds raised by the Appellants have been substantiated and it is contended that the order passed by the learned single judge, does not warrant any interference.
19. As regards the ground of delay, its contended that the same is not made out inasmuch as the first mercy petition was sent to the Hon'ble President of India, in pursuance to the order dated 11.10.2012 passed in CWP No.5429 of 2010, filed by the appellant-Jasbir Singh and his wife co-accused Sonia, wherein they had sought enforcement of their perceived right to have conjugal rights and for procreating within the jail premises. Our attention is drawn to the order dated 11.10.2012 (Annexure R-III/T) which would show that the learned counsel for the appellant-Jasbir Singh had made a specific submission that as per her instructions, the said appellant had drafted the mercy petition for submission to the Hon'ble President of India and sought directions from the Court to the Jail authorities to accept it for onward transmission to the competent authority. In view of the prayer made, this court directed the Superintendent, Central Jail, Patiala to receive the mercy petition of the appellant-Jasbir Singh and forward the same to the addressee on 11.10.2012 itself. It is thus argued that the mercy petition of the appellants was addressed to the Hon'ble President of India on their own 17 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -18- accord, and the MHA, without any delay informed the Government of Punjab to place the same before the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution of India on 26.11.2012. After rejection of the mercy petitions by the Governor, the mercy petitions were put up before the Hon'ble President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution of India on 03.02.2016, which was rejected on 08.08.2016 and the decision in this regard was conveyed to the State Government by the Ministry of Home Affairs on 11.08.2016. It is thus argued that there was no delay in the disposal of the mercy petitions, as claimed by the appellants. It is further contended that during the majority of the period, starting from 11.10.2012 till 21.08.2015, the death sentence had been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 824 of 2013, wherein the constitutional validity of Section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code had been challenged by the appellants. In such circumstances, the appellants cannot claim delay in disposal of the mercy petitions. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Triveniben (supra) wherein it has been held that the only thing to be taken into consideration is whether the State was guilty of dilatory conduct and whether the delay was for no reason at all. However, despite delay being a significant factor, it by itself cannot render the execution unconstitutional. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shatrughan Chauhan (supra) was also cited to contend that though delay in execution of death sentence would be a ground for commutation of the same into life imprisonment, however, the said delay ought not to have been caused at the instance of the accused.
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20. As regards to second ground pertaining to solitary confinement, it is urged that the appellants had themselves requested to be kept alone as is apparent from the applications dated 27.02.2014 and, therefore, they cannot be allowed to plead the same as a ground for seeking commutation of death sentence.
21. Controverting the third ground of long period of incarceration raised by the appellants to challenge the execution of the death sentence, it is argued that it already stands clarified in the case of Triveniben's case (supra) that a prisoner condemned to be executed is kept in custody to keep him safe and protected with the purpose that he may be available for execution of sentence. Such a prisoner is not serving a rigorous imprisonment or simple imprisonment. It is urged that the court has to maintain a balance by keeping in mind that the appellants have committed a heinous crime of murdering an innocent sixteen year old boy, after kidnapping him for ransom.
22. Lastly, it is argued in the alternative, that even if this court accepts the plea of commutation of the death sentence to that of the life imprisonment, the same should for remainder of the life of the appellants. Learned counsel has cited the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Chander Vs. Krishan Lal, (2001) 4 SCC 458, in support of her contention. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon a recent decision passed by the Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of Sheik Meeran Vs. State of Tamilnadu and others, dated 27.11.2024 in CWP No.29565 of 2024 wherein, though the Hon'ble President of India commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, 19 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -20- however, the same was made subject to the condition that the prisoner shall remain in prison for the remainder of his natural life and there shall be no remission of the term of imprisonment.
Consideration:
23. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material available on record with their able assistance.
24. The seminal question that falls for our consideration is that whether the sentence of death awarded to the appellants is liable to be commuted to life imprisonment in the facts and circumstances of the case?
Legal Position:
25. Over the years, various grounds and supervening factors have come to be recognized as events/circumstances which may be considered by Constitutional Courts, for commuting death sentence to life imprisonment, even after exhaustion of all judicial remedies and rejection of mercy petitions under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India. The underlying principle for intervention is that the fundamental right under Article 21, does not get extinguished even after a convict has been condemned to death and if the basic right of human dignity, as recognized under Article 21 is infringed, before the execution of such convicts, the same may be considered as a ground for commuting the death sentence.
26. The following supervening factors have been broadly recognized as grounds on which a death sentence may be commuted:-
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(i) An inordinate and unreasonable delay in deciding the mercy petition under Article 161 and 72 of the Constitution of India.
(ii) Mental illness or mental infirmity of the condemned prisoners or condemned prisoner.
(iii) Long duration of illegal solitary confinement.
(iv) Procedural irregularities in processing mercy petition.
(v) Non-communication or late communication of the decision regarding rejection of mercy petition.
(vi) Subsequent events/circumstances after rejection of mercy petition like change in physical health, advanced age, and/or any circumstance making execution unjust or inhuman.
(vii) Right to dignified life till execution.
27. The above-mentioned grounds are not exhaustive, and there may be other factors which may weigh with a Constitutional Court, while deciding a petition under Article 32/226 of the Constitution of India. Solitary Confinement:
28. The system of solitary confinement started in the 18th Century in the United States at the Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia. It was based on the ideology that a prisoner would be saved from public humiliation and while living in isolation with the Bible, he would repent for his actions; and gradually, reform. In India, during the British rule, solitary confinement was embodied in the concept of cellular prisons constructed in 1896 in Andaman and Nicobar Island that were known with the notorious name of 'Kala Paani'. It was constructed for the dual purposes of breaking the spirit of the political prisoners and for 21 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -22- accommodating the large number of them who flooded the limited jails on the mainland. The imprisonment in these cellular prisons was the most severe form of punishment with several inmates committing suicide and dying due to unhealthy conditions.
29. The provision for solitary confinement continues under Indian laws, although not specifically defined under any statute. Under Section 11 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (in short "BNS") (earlier Section 73 of I.P.C.) a person convicted of an offence, for which the court has power to sentence him to rigorous imprisonment, may be ordered to be kept in solitary confinement for any portion or portions of the imprisonment to which he is sentenced, not exceeding 3 months in the whole, according to the time scale provided therein. Under Section 12 of the BNS (earlier Section 74 of I.P.C.) it is provided that solitary confinement cannot exceed 14 days at a time. Intervals between periods of confinement must be at least equal to the duration of the confinement. For sentences exceeding three months, solitary confinement cannot exceed seven days per month with equal intervals between periods. The Prisons Act also provides for solitary confinement, and the Jails Manual contains specific provisions for condemned prisoners. The relevant provisions of the Prisons Act and the Jails Manual, are extracted hereunder for the facility of reference:-
"CHAPTER V DISCIPLINE OF PRISONERS xxx xxxxxx
29. Solitary confinement.--No cell shall be used for solitary confinement unless it is furnished with the means of enabling the prisoner to communicate at any time with an officer of the prison, and immediately on his arrival in the prison after sentence, be every prisoner so confined in a cell for more than twenty-four 22 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -23- hours, whether as a punishment or otherwise, shall be visited at least once a day by the Medical Officer or Medical Subordinate.
30. Prisoners under sentence of death.--(1) Every prisoner under sentence of death shall, immediately on his arrival in the prison after sentence, be searched by, or by order of, the Jailor and all articles shall be taken from him which the Jailor deems it dangerous or inexpedient to leave in his possession. (2) Every such prisoner shall be confined in a cell apart from all other prisoners, and shall be placed by day and by night under the charge of a guard."
THE PUNJAB JAIL MANUAL, 1996 Chapter XXIX Prisoners Condemned to Death "758 Prisoners under sentence of death.
(1) Xxx.... Xxx.... Xxx....
(2) Every such prisoner shall be confined in a cell apart
from all other prisoners, and shall be placed by day and by night under the charge of a guard."
"767 (1) A condemned prisoner should (unless there are any special reasons against it, which reasons should be recorded by the Superintendent in his journal), be permitted to occupy the court-yard of his cell for half an hour each morning and evening, but only one such prisoner at a time should be allowed to do so."
30. The vires of Section 30 (2) of the Prisons Act was challenged before the Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Batra (supra). Although, the provision was held to be intra vires, however, it was inter alia held that the so-called statutory segregation is only permissible after exhaustion of all remedies of a condemned prisoner. The provisions of 23 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -24- the Punjab Jail Manual were held inhuman and in violation of the rights of a condemned prisoner. It was inter alia observed as under:-
"107. The hard core of such confinement is (a) seclusion of the prisoner, (b) from sight of other prisoners, and
(c) from communication with other prisoners. To see a fellow being is a solace to the soul. Communication with one's own kind is a balm to the aching spirit. Denial of both, with complete segregation superimposed, is the journey to insanity. To test whether a certain type of segregation is, in Indian terms, solitary confinement, we have merely to verify whether interdict on sight and communication with other prisoners is imposed. It is no use providing view of or conversation with jail visitors, jail officers or stray relations. The crux of the matter is communication with other prisoners in full view. Bed fellows in misery have heart loads to unload and real conversation between them has a healing effect. Now that we have an Indian conceptualisation of solitary confinement in the Prison Manual itself, lexical exercises, decisional erudition from other countries and lagomachic niceties with reference to law dictionaries are supererogatory. Even the backward psychiatry of the Jail Manual considers continuation of such confinement as "likely to prove injurious to mind or body" or even prone to make the person "permanently unfit to undergo such confinement" [vide para 512(7) and (9) of the Jail Manual].
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
220. The explanation to sub-clause (8) makes it clear that he is not wholly segregated from other prisoners in that he is not removed from the sight of other prisoners and he is entitled to have his meals in association with one or more
24 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -25- other prisoners. Even such separate confinement cannot exceed three months. Cellular confinement secludes a prisoner from communication with other prisoners but not from the sight of other prisoners. However, para 847 of the Punjab Jail Manual and the provisions which follow, which prescribe detailed instructions as to how a condemned prisoner is to be kept, if literally enforced, would keep such prisoner totally out of bounds i.e. beyond sight and sound. Neither separate confinement nor cellular confinement would be as tortuous or horrendous as confinement of a condemned prisoner. Sub-section (2) of Section 30 merely provides for confinement of a prisoner under sentence of death in a cell apart from other prisoners and he is to be placed by day and night under the charge of a guard. Such confinement can neither be cellular confinement nor separate confinement and in any event it cannot be solitary confinement. In our opinion, sub-section (2) of Section 30 does not empower the jail authorities in the garb of confining a prisoner under sentence of death, in a cell apart from all other prisoners, to impose solitary confinement on him. Even jail- discipline inhibits solitary confinement as a measure of jail punishment. It completely negatives any suggestion that because a prisoner is under sentence of death therefore, and by reason of that consideration alone, the jail authorities can impose upon him additional and separate punishment of solitary confinement. They have no power to add to the punishment imposed by the Court which additional punishment could have been imposed by the Court itself but has in fact been not so imposed. Upon a true construction, sub-section (2) of Section 30 does not empower a prison authority to impose solitary confinement upon a prisoner under sentence of death.
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223. The expression "prisoner under sentence of death" in the context of sub-section (2) of Section 30 can only mean the prisoner whose sentence of death has become final, conclusive and indefeasible which cannot be annulled or voided by any judicial or constitutional procedure. In other words, it must be a sentence which the authority charged with the duty to execute and carry out must proceed to carry out without intervention from any outside authority.
In a slightly different context in State of Maharashtra v. Sindhi alias Raman (1975) 1 SCC 647 it was said that the trial of an accused person under sentence of death does not conclude with the termination of the proceedings in the Court of Session because of the reason that the sentence of death passed by the Sessions Court is subject to confirmation by the High Court. A trial cannot be deemed to have concluded till an executable sentence is passed by a competent court. In the context of Section 303 of the Penal Code, 1860 it was said in Shaik Abdul Azeez v. State of Karnataka (1977) 2 SCC 485 that an accused cannot be under sentence of imprisonment for life at the time of commission of the second murder unless he is actually undergoing such a sentence or there is legally extant a judicially final sentence which he is bound to serve without the requirement of a separate order to breathe life into the sentence which was otherwise dead on account of remission under Section 401 CrPC Therefore, the prisoner can be said to be under the sentence of death only when the death sentence is beyond judicial scrutiny and would be operative without any intervention from any other authority. Till then the person who is awarded capital punishment cannot be said to be a prisoner under sentence of death in the context of Section 30, sub-section (2). This interpretative process would, we hope, to a great extent 26 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -27- relieve the torment and torture implicit in sub-section (2) of Section 30, reducing the period of such confinement to a short duration."
31. The Supreme Court in the case of Kishore Singh Ravinder Dev vs. State of Rajasthan, (1981) 1 SCC 503, held that keeping the petitioners therein in separate solitary rooms for periods from 8 months to 11 months are long enough to be regarded as barbarous, keeping in view the directions in Sunil Batra's case.
32. In the case of Ajay Kumar Pal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that in light of the law enunciated in Sunil Batra's case, the petitioner could not have been 'segregated' till his mercy petition was disposed of. It is only after such disposal that he could be said to be under a finally executable death sentence. The delay of 3 years and 10 months to deal with the mercy petition alongwith the fact of illegal solitary confinement was held to be a transgression of the right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and the death sentence was commuted and substituted with sentence of life imprisonment.
33. The decision in Sunil Batra's case was subsequently relied upon in Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR)'s case (supra), Dharam Pal vs. State of Haryana, 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 7878, Sonu Sardars' case (supra), Pradeep Yashwant Kokadevs. Union of India and Others, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom. 1390, Union of India v. Dharam Pal, (2019) 15 SCC 388, and B.A. Umesh vs. Union Of India & Ors.'s case (supra), to hold that such illegal 'segregation or solitary confinement' would tantamount to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
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34. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Triveniben (supra) considered the conflicting opinions in T.V.
Vatheeswaran Vs. State of T. N., (1983) 2 SCC 68; Sher Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 344 and observations in the case of Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala Vs. State of Maharashtra (1985) 1 SCC
278. In T. V. Vatheeswaran's case a two judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that two years' delay in execution of the sentence after the judgment of the trial Court will entitle the condemned prisoner to ask for commutation of sentence of death to imprisonment for life. In Sher Singh's case a three Judges' Bench held that a condemned prisoner has a right of fair procedure at all stages, trial, sentence and incarceration but delay alone is not good enough for commutation and two years rule could not be laid down in cases of delay. It was held that there are several other factors which must be taken into account while considering the question as to whether the death sentence should be vacated. In Javed's case it was observed that the condemned man who had suffered more than two years and nine months and was repenting and there was nothing adverse against him in the jail records, then the said period which would be weighing heavily on his mind, will entitle him for commutation of sentence of death in to imprisonment for life.
35. While considering the conflicting views, it was inter alia held that while undue and prolonged delay in deciding a mercy petition, would entitle the convicted person to approach the constitutional courts, however, only the delay attributable to the executive, can be considered and delay attributable to the convict or time taken in the judicial process, 28 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -29- cannot be taken into account. Some relevant observations are reproduced as under:
"23. So far as our conclusions are concerned we had delivered our order on October 11, 1988 and we had reserved the reasons to be given later. Accordingly in light of the discussions above our conclusion as recorded in our order dated October 11, 1988, is reproduced below:
Undue long delay in execution of the sentence of death will entitle the condemned person to approach this court under article 32 but this court will only examine the nature of delay caused and circumstances that ensued after sentence was finally confirmed by the judicial process and will have no jurisdiction to reopen the conclusions reached by the court while finally maintaining the sentence of death. This court, however, may consider the question of inordinate delay in the light of all circumstances of the case to decide whether the execution of sentence should be carried out or should be altered into imprisonment for life. No fixed period of delay could be held to make the sentence of death inexecutable and to this extent the decision in Vatheeswaran case cannot be said to lay down the correct law and therefore to that extent stands overruled.
Xxx... Xxx... Xxx...
75. As between funeral fire and mental worry, it is the latter which is more devastating, for, funeral fire burns only the dead body while the mental body burns the living one.
This mental torment may become acute when the judicial verdict is finally set against the accused. Earlier to it, there is every reason for him to hope for acquittal. That hope is extinguished after the final verdict. If therefore, there is inordinate delay in execution, the condemned prisoner is entitled to come to the court requesting to examine whether 29 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -30- it is just and fair to allow the sentence of death to be executed."
36. The Supreme Court in the case of Shatrughan Chauhan (supra), while relying upon the majority view in Triveniben's case (supra), disagreed with the contentions on behalf of the Union of India that inordinate delay in itself cannot render the execution unconstitutional. It was held as under:
"48. Accordingly, if there is undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in execution due to pendency of mercy petitions or the executive as well as the constitutional authorities have failed to take note of/consider the relevant aspects, this Court is well within its powers under Article 32 to hear the grievance of the convict and commute the death sentence into life imprisonment on this ground alone however, only after satisfying that the delay was not caused at the instance of the accused himself. To this extent, the jurisprudence has developed in the light of the mandate given in our Constitution as well as various Universal Declarations and directions issued by the United Nations."
37. In a recent decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra & Ors Vs Pradeep Yashwant Kokade & Anr., 2024 SCC Online SC 3662, after considering various decisions pertaining to delay, obsereved as under:
"42. We hold that:- (i) Undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in execution of the sentence of death will entitle the convict to approach this Court under Article 32. However, this Court will only examine the nature of the delay caused and circumstances that ensued after the judicial process finally confirmed the sentence and will have no jurisdiction 30 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -31- to reopen the conclusions reached by the Court while finally maintaining the sentence of death. This Court however, may consider the question of inordinate delay in the light of all circumstances of the case to decide whether the execution of sentence should be carried out or should be commuted to imprisonment for life;
(ii) Keeping a convict in suspense while considering his mercy petitions by the Governor or the President for an inordinately long time will certainly cause agony to him/her.
It creates adverse physical conditions and psychological stress on the convict. Therefore, this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 32 read with Article 21 of the Constitution, must consider the effect of inordinate delay in disposal of the clemency petition by the highest Constitutional authorities and cannot excuse the agonising delay caused only on the basis of the gravity of the crime;
(iii) It is well established that Article 21 of the Constitution does not end with the pronouncement of the sentence but extends to the stage of execution of that sentence. An inordinate delay in the execution of the sentence of death has a dehumanising effect on the accused. An inordinate and unexplained delay caused by circumstances beyond the prisoners' control mandates the commutation of a death sentence;
(iv) The above principles will also apply to a case where there is a long and unexplained delay on the part of the Sessions Court in issuing the warrant of execution in accordance with Section 413 or Section 414 of CrPC. After the order of rejection of mercy petitions is communicated to a convict, the sword of Damocles cannot be kept hanging on him for an inordinately long time. This can be very agonising, both mentally and physically. Such inordinate delay will violate his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. In such a case, this Court will be justified in commuting the death penalty into life imprisonment 31 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -32-
(v) No hard and fast rule can be laid down as regards the length of delay, which can be said to be inordinate. It all depends on the facts of the case. The terms "undue" or "inordinate" cannot be interpreted by applying the rules of mathematics. The Courts, in such cases, deal with human issues and the effect of the delay on individual convicts. What delay is inordinate must depend on the facts of the case;
(vi) A convict can invoke even the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the event there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in the execution of the death sentence, post confirmation of the sentence. The same principles will be applied by the High Court, which are summarised above; and,
(vii) It is the duty of the Executive to promptly process the mercy petitions invoking Articles 72 or 161 of the Constitution and forward the petitions along with requisite documents to the concerned constitutional functionary without undue delay."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has passed several Operative Directions in paragraph 43 of the judgement, to ensure that in future mercy petitions are decided in a timely and proper manner. The same are not being reproduced for the sake of brevity. Procedural Irregularities/Lapses:
38. In the case of Epuru Sudhakar vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2006) 8 SCC 161, the following grounds were culled out, for laying challenge to the order of the President or the Governor:-
"34. The position, therefore, is undeniable that judicial review of the order of the President or the Governor under Article 72 or Article 161, as the case may be, is
32 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -33- available and their orders can be impugned on the following grounds:
(a) that the order has been passed without application of mind;
(b) that the order is mala fide;
(c) that the order has been passed on extraneous or
wholly irrelevant considerations;
(d) that relevant materials have been kept out of
consideration;
(e) that the order suffers from arbitrariness."
Applications of the Principles to the facts of the case:
39. As regards the question of solitary confinement is concerned, perusal of the documents placed on record with CM-13575-
2017, would clearly show that the appellants were kept in illegal solitary confinement from the period starting from 21.12.2006 till 2009.
40. Records reveal that a counter affidavit was filed in CWP- 16020-2006, which was placed on record vide CM-13575-2017, wherein it was specifically mentioned that there are seven condemned prisoners in Central Jail, Patiala, which included the appellants, and they were kept in separate cells as per para 758(2) of the Punjab Jail Manual.
41. The argument of the respondents that the same was upon the request made by the appellants themselves, is incorrect since the alleged applications are dated 27.02.2014 and are not pertaining to the period from 2006 to 2009, during which the appellants were placed under illegal solitary confinement.
42. We find merit in the submission of the appellants that the learned Single Judge has wrongly relied upon the earlier reply dated 33 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -34- 24.10.2016, wherein it was wrongly stated that the appellants were kept in the enclosure '32 chakkis' along with 34 other inmates. To counter the wrong assertions, CM-13575-2017 was filed on 20.09.2017, wherein the above-mentioned documents filed in CWP-16020-2006 were attached. It was in this context that a fresh affidavit dated 26.09.2017 of Mr. Rajan Kapoor, PPS, Superintendent, Central Jail, Patiala was filed, wherein it was categorically admitted that 'before 2009', they were kept in the jail according to para No.468(3) and 767(1) of the Punjab Jail Manual. It was further stated that after 2009, the appellants have 'not been kept isolated from other fellow inmates', and 'after 2009', they were performing their daily routine and were also playing outdoor games along with other inmates within the enclosure '32 chakkis'. It was clarified that keeping in view para No.598 and 758 of the Punjab Jail Manual, they were kept 'separate' from other fellow prisoners for the purpose of security and well-being.
43. We are therefore of the opinion that it stands duly established that the appellants, were illegally kept under solitary confinement for the afore-mentioned period in violation of the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Batra's case, before the exhaustion of their judicial remedies.
44. Applying the settled principles of law regarding delay in the process of deciding the mercy petitions, in the facts of the instant case, we find that after the rejection of the review petitions of the appellants by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 20.04.2011, they were not informed about the right to file mercy petitions, nor any legal aid was provided, in 34 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -35- violation of the guidelines of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the directions in the case of Shatrugan Chauhans' case (supra), leading to a delay of more than one year and four months in filing of the mercy petitions on 11.10.2012 as per the directions of this Court. The instructions of the MHA which are a part of the judgement in Shatrughans case (supra), have been quoted by the learned Single Judge, partially. What has been ignored is that the said instructions were to be read in conjunction with 'Instructions relating to the duties of Superintendent of Jails in connection with petitions for mercy from or on behalf of convicts under sentence of death'. Instruction II reads as under:-
"On receipt of the intimation of the dismissal by the Supreme Court of the appeal or the application for special leave to appeal to it lodged by or on behalf of the convict, in case the convict concerned has made no previous petition for mercy, the Jail Superintendent shall forthwith inform him (the convict) that if he desires to submit a petition for mercy it should be submitted in writing within seven days of the date of such intimation."
45. Further the respondent authorities, despite being aware of the MHA guidelines in this regard, failed to examine that the mercy petitions were to be submitted in the first instance, before the Hon'ble Governor of Punjab, which was ultimately done as per the advice of the MHA on 08.02.2013 and the said delay between 11.10.2012 to 08.02.2013 is also attributable to the respondents. After the submission of the fresh mercy petitions, an inordinate and unreasonable period of almost two years was taken, before the mercy petitions were ultimately 35 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -36- rejected on 15.01.2015. Even after the rejection of the mercy petition, the decision was communicated after the lapse of more than one year, which shows the apathy of the State Authorities to the condition of the appellants, for whom each day would inflict mental torment, to know about the fate of their life, which was hanging in balance.
46. Undisputedly, repeated communications were sent from the MHA to the State Authorities to expedite the process and they were even made aware that such delay could lead to commutation of death sentence as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Despite such warnings and requests, no action was taken by the State Authorities, without any plausible reasons or explanations. After the rejection in January 2015, the ADGP, (Prisons), Punjab communicated the decisions to the Jail Superintendent on 22.01.2016, after a gap of one year, which is again attributable to the State. The file was put up before the Hon'ble Governor belatedly, and the directions of the Supreme Court were misinterpreted, for which the state authorities alone are to blame.
47. Although the appellants have also taken exception to the time consumed thereafter, i.e. till final communication of rejection of their mercy petition by the President of India, however, keeping in view the time period involved, we do not find the same to be inordinate or unreasonable.
48. We are therefore of the considered opinion that a total period of more than four years (20.04.2011 to 11.10.2012, 08.02.2013 to 15.01.2015, 16.01.2015 to 22.01.2016) of unreasonable and unexplained 36 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -37- delay in deciding the mercy petitions, is attributable to the respondent- State.
49. We are in agreement with the submissions made on behalf of the appellants that at no point there was any stay by any Court of Law, on the processing of the mercy petition and to the contrary the process continued with the explicit knowledge about challenge to the vires of Section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, contentions of the respondents attributing delay to the Appellants on this account, cannot be accepted.
50. Additionally, the appellants have claimed that there were procedural irregularities, which would be one of the supervening factors that would be required to be considered. Records reveal that some of the procedural lapses stand established, keeping in view the MHA guidelines and directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and would thus be one of the additional supervening factors, that would be considered while deciding the appellants plea.
51. Although the psychiatric condition of the appellants has been stated to be normal by the Board of doctors, who examined the appellants in pursuance to the directions of this Court, however, the medical record appended with the applications filed by the appellants would show, that as per the medical certificate issued by the Senior Medical Officer, Central Jail Hospital, Patiala, the appellant-Vikram Singh is suffering from hyperthyroidism, which is affecting his heart rhythm and both eye balls, resulting in medical complications. He has also been diagnosed to be suffering from varicocele of testis, for which surgery was advised.
37 of 39 ::: Downloaded on - 02-01-2026 22:50:35 ::: LPA-1395-2019 (O&M) and LPA-1397-2019 (O&M) -38- However, the same was pending due to lack of control of hyperthyroidism. As per the medical record of the appellant-Jasbir Singh, he is stated to be suffering from palpitations and other ailments like lower back and shoulder pain etc. However, more than the said physical ailments, what would definitely be a relevant consideration, is the mental torture that the appellants have undergone, while waiting for their end.
Conclusion:
52. In view of the settled legal position, it is clear that constitutional courts while deciding petitions for commutation of death sentence on the ground of infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, have to take into consideration the overall facts and circumstances, on a case to case basis. As held in the case of Triveniben (supra), the delay before the culmination of the judicial process cannot be taken into consideration and the Court cannot go behind the order of conviction. The gravity of the crime and extraordinary cruelty involved therein cannot be considered, while examining the plea of the appellants.
The supervening circumstances which are to be taken into consideration, have been enunciated hereinabove.
53. Keeping the same in mind and our findings on the grounds raised by the appellants, we draw the following conclusions:
(i) the appellants have been illegally subjected to illegal solitary confinement at least from December, 2006 till 2009;
(ii) there has been unreasonable and unexplained delay of more than four years in deciding their mercy petitions;
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(iii) the appellants have already been incarcerated for a period of more than twenty years, living in the shadow of death;
(iv) all the supervening factors discussed above, have resulted in infringement of the rights of the appellants under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
54. Taking all the said factors cumulatively, we are inclined to allow the present appeals in part, and modify the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge to the extent that the death sentence awarded to the appellants shall be commuted and shall be substituted with a sentence of imprisonment for life, for the remainder of their natural lives, and they shall not be entitled to any commutation or premature release under any statute or rules made for the purposes for grant of commutation and remissions.
55. The pending application(s), if any, shall stands disposed of accordingly.
( ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA ) ( ROHIT KAPOOR )
JUDGE JUDGE
19/12/2025
dinesh/raj
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether Reportable : Yes
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