Punjab-Haryana High Court
Om Parkash vs Inderawati And Ors. on 4 April, 2002
JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This is a revision petition directed against the order dated 24.11.2001 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sirsa allowing the application of the defendant-respondents filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, the Code) wherein a direction has been issued to the plaintiff-petitioner to pay the ad valorem court fee on the sale consideration of the two sale deeds namely No.420 dated 28.4.2000 and sale deed No. 395 dated 27.4.2000. Aggrieved by the order dated 24.11.2001, the plaintiff-petitioner has filed present revision petition.
2. Brief facts of the case necessary for deciding the issues raised in this revision petition are that a civil suit No. 530-C of 2000 was filed by he plaintiff-petitioner challenging the sale deeds on various grounds. A declaration was sought to the effect that the sale deed No. 420 dated 28.4.2000 made by defendant-respondent No. 1 in favour of defendant-respondent No. 2 regarding the part of the suit land is liable to be set aside as the same is result of mis-representation and concealment of facts. It was also prayed that the other sale deed No. 395 dated 27.4.2000 executed by defendant-respondent No. 1 in favour of defendant-respondent No. 3 in respect of other part of the suit land is also liable to be set aside as the same is the result of fraud, mis-representation and concealment of facts, Therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. The consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining defendant-respondents No. 2 and 3 from further alienating, selling or transferring the suit land or any part thereof to anyone on the basis of aforesaid sale deeds and from creating any type of bar, encumbrance or charge etc. in respect of the above said suit land in any manner or also restraining them from getting the mutation entered or sanctioned in their favour has also been sought. However, the plaintiff-petitioner has assessed the value of the suit at Rs. 200/- and affixed the court fee of Rs. 25/-. An application under Order VII Rule 11, of the Code was filed by the defendant-respondents seeking rejection of the plaint for affixing inadequate court fee and it was claimed that the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (for brevity, the Act) would be attracted and the plaintiff-petitioner is liable to pay ad valorem court fee on the value of the sale deed. The Civil Judge accepting the application directed that the plaintiff-petitioner to pay court fee ad valorem on the sale consideration of the sale deeds. The order passed by the Civil Judge reads as under:
"After hearing the rival contention of the both the Ld. counsel for the parties and perusal of record, it has been observed that in the present case plaintiff has challenged two sale deeds dated 28.4.2000 and 27.4.2000 as both the sale deeds were executed by the defendant No. 1 in favour of the defendants No. 2 & 3. The plea of the plaintiff is that defendant No. 1 had executed the above said sale deeds in favour of the defendants No. 1 & 3 because there was no legal necessity to alienate the suit property. In support of his arguments he has placed reliance on Gurjeewan Singh's case (Supra). It was a case where suit was filed by son for declaration challenging alienations made by the father on the ground of being without legal necessity and without consideration. The plaintiff being the member of the joint Hindu Family has a right to have transactions declared null and void, if they are not justified. It was, therefore, held that being so question of paying ad-valorem court fee on the sale price did not arise. For all intends and purposes the suit is for declaration and possession by way of consequential relief. But the recent view of our Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court is that challenge to validity of sale deed which is null and void being without legal necessity and consideration required to pay ad valorem court fee as per sale deed consideration in sale deed in Bagrawat's case (Supra). In this case Hon'ble High Court has also discussed Gurjeewan Singh's case. The same view has been taken by our Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ranjit Singh and other's case (supra). The above said authorities are squarely applicable on the facts of the present case."
3. I have heard Shri Kulwinder Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for the plaintiff/petitioner, who has argued that in view of the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Niranjan Kaur v. Nirbigan Kaur, (1982)84 P.L.R. 127 (F.B.), the order passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) is not sustainable. He has also argued that the consequential relief claimed by the plaintiff-petitioner is ancillary relief of challenging the sale deed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the plaintiff-petitioner is seeking substantive relief of declaration.
4. I have thoughtfully considered the submissions of the learned counsel and perused the record with his assistance. I am of the considered opinion that this revision petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. The provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act may be referred in order to ascertain the statutory intention in cases where a declaration for setting aside the sale deed has been sought. Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act reads as under:
"for a declaratory decree and consequential relief. - to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed."
5. A perusal of clause (c) makes it obvious that whenever a suit has been filed for grant of declaratory decree or order wherein consequential relief is prayed then the court fee ad valorem is required to be paid. This provision has been subject mater of the decision of the Full Bench in Niranjan Kaur's case (supra). The view taken by the Full Bench is based on various judgments of the Supreme Court and other High Courts which reads as under:-
"Thus, what the Supreme Court has held in Shamsher Singh's case (supra is that in the suit by the plaintiffs for the declaration that the decree obtained by the mortgagee against their father was not binding on them, they were really asking either for setting aside the decree or for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree-hold from executing the decree against the mortgaged property as he was entitled to do so. This case is hardly helpful to the case of the plaintiff-petitioner as it is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case for the simple reason that herein the plaintiff-petitioner is a party to the document, which she is required to get cancelled because of the alleged fraud etc. A suit for declaration by a son or a member of a coparcenary under the Hindu Law will thus be on a different footing. In such a suit, the main relief will be that of a declaration and the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing the decree against the sons etc. will be just ancillary. This is further clear when reference has been made in Shamsher Singh's case (supra) to Vinayakrao v. Mankunwaribai, AIR 1943 Nagpur 70, wherein it was held that in a suit by the son for a declaration that the decree against his father does not effect his interests in the family property, consequential relief was involved and ad valorem Court-fee was necessary. On the other hand, there may be cases, where the declaration asked for is merely a suplusage and the so-called consequential relief is in reality an independent substantial relief. For instance, if a person sues for a declaration that the defendant is liable to pay him money due on a certain bond and also asks for recovery of the amount, or asks for a declaration that he is the owner of certain property and entitled to its possession and asks for possession of the property the reliefs for the recovery of the amount or for possession cannot properly be treated as consequential reliefs, which can be valued arbitrarily by the plaintiff under Section 7(iv)(c)."
6. It is well-settled that the Court in deciding the question of Court-fee should look into the allegations made in the plaint to find out what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. Thus, in each case, the Court has to find out the real relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. Where the main relief is that of the cancellation of the deed, and the declaration if any, is only a surplus age, the case would not be covered under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act, because in a suit under that clause, the main relief is that of a declaration and the consequential relief is just ancillary. In this respect, reference may again be made to Mt. Zeb-ul-Nisa's case (supra), wherein it has been observed as follows:-
"It seems obvious that the consequential relief referred to in Section 7(iv)(c) could not mean a substantive relief, the valuation of which is separately provided for in the Court-fees Act. If it were so held, a plaintiff could easily evade payment of the necessary Court-fee on the substantive relief by prefacing it with a declaration as to his rights. Every suit involves the establishment of certain rights of the plaintiff as a necessary preliminary to the grant of the relief claimed by him. But the addition of a prayer for a declaration as to such rights cannot convert a suit for a substantive relief into one for a declaratory decree where consequential relief is prayed for within the meaning of Section 7(iv)(c), Court-fees Act. It is significant that the valuation of the relief in cases falling within the scope of Section 7(iv)(c) is left to the plaintiff. This is presumably because the consequential relief contemplated by the section is some ancillary relief to which the plaintiff becomes entitled as a necessary result of the declaration, but for which no separate provision is made in the Act. The essence of the relief in such cases lies in the declaratory part and the consequential relief being merely an auxiliary equitable relief, its valuation seems to have been left to the plaintiff. The meaning of the expression consequential relief as used in Section 7(iv)(c), Court-fee Act, was recently considered by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (consisting of five Judges) in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal, 54 Allahabad 812, and it was held that the expression consequential relief means some relief, which would follow directly from the declaration given the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for anywhere in the act and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantial relief. It follows, therefore, that if the relief claimed in any case is found in reality to be tantamount to a substantial relief and not a mere consequential relief in the above sense, the plaintiff must pay Court-fee on the substantial relief."
7. If the principles laid down by the Full Bench are applied to the facts of the case in hand, no doubt is left that the suit is not only for declaration but also for consequential relief. The prayer made in the suit is that the sale deeds dated 28.4.2000 and 27.4.2000 may be set aside as the same have been the result of fraud, mis-representation and collusion. The consequential relief of permanent injunction has also been prayed restraining defendant-respondents No. 2 and 3 from alienating, selling or transferring the suit land or any art thereof to anyone on the basis of the aforesaid wrong, illegal and void sale deeds and many other consequential reliefs. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner on the Full Bench does not in any manner advance his case. On the contrary, the Full Bench laid down the principle that the Court should find out the substantive relief claimed without going into the form. Therefore, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed.
8. For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. How ever, I do not make any order as to costs.