Allahabad High Court
M/S Kanpur Texel(P) Limited vs Deputy Commissioner Of Income ... on 23 November, 2017
Bench: Bharati Sapru, Saumitra Dayal Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Court No. - 35 Case :- WRIT TAX No. - 812 of 2016 Petitioner :- M/S Kanpur Texel(P) Limited Respondent :- Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax-4,Kanpur And Another Counsel for Petitioner :- Suyash Agarwal Counsel for Respondent :- Csc(It),Praveen Kumar Hon'ble Bharati Sapru,J.
Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh, J.) Heard Shri Rakesh Ranjan Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Suyash Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for the department.
This writ petition has been filed against the initiation of reassessment proceedings for the Assessment Year 2009-10 under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), vide notice dated 23.03.2016. The petitioner is a company. It is a 100 percent Export Oriented Unit engaged in the manufacture of textile narrow woven fabrics, cords, laces, yarn etc. It also has a unit engaged in dyeing and processing yarn, narrow woven fabrics etc., on job work basis.
For the assessment year 2009-10, the petitioner filed its e-return of income disclosing total income Rs.24,18,597/-. Upon scrutiny assessment being made under Section 143 (3) of the Act, the income of the petitioner was assessed at Rs. 25,94,450, vide assessment order dated 28.12.2011.
During those assessment proceedings, various queries were made to the assessee amongst others with respect to the investment made in shares amounting to Rs.1.45 crores made through a broker Motilal Dhulichand (P) Ltd. and another investment made in the construction of a building at plot no. 12B Dada Nagar Kanpur amounting to Rs.55,42,976/-. The exact nature of queries is borne out from the order-sheet entries copies of which have been annexed along with the supplementary affidavit filed in these proceedings. Thus, vide order sheet entry dated 18.11.2011 the petitioner had been asked to reply and justify the investment in construction of a factory at 12 B Dada Nagar, Kanpur as also to produce the purchase deed of the said plot. Further, the petitioner had been required to file evidence to justify investment in share capital amounting to Rs.1.45 crores.
In reply to the aforesaid queries, the petitioner appears to have filed at least two replies dated 25.11.2011 and 30.11.2011. A perusal of those replies annexed to the writ petition brings out the fact that the assessee had explained to its Assessing Officer that it had made the investment of Rs. 55,42,926/- in the construction of the factory building at 12 B Dada Nagar, Kanpur . He had further furnished details of dates on which the said investment was made and different heads (such as architect's fees, payment to contractors, the expenditure made on the purchase of various construction material etc) against which such payment had been made. Further, item wise details were also furnished of the expenditure so made. A copy of the sale deed of the land in question was also attached to that reply.
Then, it was further explained that the petitioner had one bank account with the Canara Bank bearing number 1673261010373. All payments above described were stated to have been made from that account and were also stated to be verifiable from the bills and the bank statement of that bank account. Further, as to the investment in the share capital of Rs.1.45 crores, it was explained that the said investment had been made from the aforesaid bank account of the petitioner at the Canara Bank.
In its reply dated 30.11.2011 the petitioner further clarified that it had surplus available with it from profits earned in the present year as also the earlier years, in excess of Rs. 3.00 crores, which were sufficient to cover the amount of investment of Rs.1.45 crores in shape capital.
It then appears that the assessing officer did not make further queries in that regard and also he did not make any mention of the aforesaid queries and their replies in the assessment order dated 26.12.2011 for the assessment year 2009-10. Also, he did not make any addition to the income of the petitioner on that count. However, certain other additions were made. Those are not the subject-matter of the present writ petition.
Thereafter, an internal audit party of the income tax department appears to have raised some objection/s with reference to the assessment order dated 26.12.2011 whereafter, the reassessment notice was issued to the petitioner on 23.03.2016, to initiate the re-assessment proceedings against it for the Assessment Year 2009-10.
In the reasons to believe supplied to the petitioner it is stated that subsequent to the completion of the assessment it came to the notice of the assessing authority that the assessee had made an investment of Rs.1.45 crores in shares through M/s Motilal Dulichand (P) Ltd. and that such investment had been made from the loan taken by it from Canara Bank. Similarly, it has been alleged that the assessee had invested an amount of Rs. 55,42,976/- in the building at 12B Dada Nagar Kanpur from funds drawn from the aforesaid bank loan and that building had been used for a non-business purpose. Apparently, because the petitioner did not claim depreciation thereon it has been reasoned that the petitioner has not treated it as a business asset.
Thereafter, it has been further noted that the total outstanding loan from Canara Bank, as on 31st March 2009 stood at Rs. 2,13,94,853/- as against opening balance of Rs.1,57,43409/-. Therefore, a reason to believe has been recorded that the income had escaped assessment to the extent of business expenditure has been allowed by way of interest paid to Canara Bank on the business loan (to the extent of amounts of Rs.1,45,00,000/- and Rs. 55,42,976/-).
The petitioner had raised an objection to the aforesaid 'reasons to believe'. Those have also been rejected by the assessing officer vide order dated 08.11.2016. Hence this writ petition. At present, the petitioner has raised three grounds of challenge.
In the first place, learned Senior Counsel Shri Rakesh Ranjan Agrawal, assisted by Shri Suyash Agrawal submits that during the assessment proceedings under section 143(3) of the Act for A.Y. 2009-10, the petitioner had made full and true disclosure of all material facts relevant to the 'reason to believe' subsequently recorded. The reassessment notice first issued on 23.03.2016 falls outside four years from the end of the Assessment Year 2009-10. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings are barred under the first proviso of Section 147 of the Act.
In his submission, once the entire primary and material facts were before the assessing officer with respect to the issue of utilization of business funds and the surplus funds available to the petitioner as also expenditure made by him, the condition precedent for application of bar under the proviso under Section 147 was satisfied. He relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of M/S Aci Oils Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Dy. CIT and another passed in Writ Tax No.576 of 2014 dated 29.10.2014 wherein it has been held as below:-
"In the present case, the reopening of the assessment has taken place beyond a period of four years of the end of the relevant assessment year, A.Y. 2007-08. The notice under Section 148 was issued on 31 March 2014. Under the proviso to Section 147, the jurisdictional requirement is that where a reopening of the assessment takes place beyond a period of four years after the expiry of the relevant assessment year, there should have been a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment, for that assessment year. In the present case, there is merit in the submission which has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the reasons which have been disclosed, in fact, would indicate that it is from a perusal of the assessment records that the Assessing Officer formed an opinion that income had escaped assessment."
(emphasis supplied) Then, it has further been submitted that a bare perusal of the order sheet entry and the reply furnished by the petitioner during the scrutiny of assessment proceedings also make it clear that not only the primary and material facts had been fully and truly disclosed by the petitioner in those proceedings, but the assessing officer had also applied his mind to the same. He first questioned the allowability of both investments i.e. Rs.1.45 crores in share capital as also the investment made in the construction of the building. The petitioner had given full and complete reply wherein, amongst others, it had also stated that the investment - be it in share capital or in the construction was made only though one/same bank account held with the Canara Bank bearing account number 1673261010373. The petitioner had also shown it had sufficient business surplus available with it.
In this background it has been submitted that no new or other material has come on record before the assessing officer after completion of the regular assessment proceedings that may lead to formation of a reason to believe that any part of the non-business investment has been made by the petitioner from its interest-bearing loans advanced by the Canara Bank. The assessing officer has merely looked into the self-same assessment record to reach a different belief occasioned solely by the audit objection raised by the internal audit party of the income tax department. Thus, it has been submitted that there is no information or material on record that may result in a reason to believe that any income had escaped assessment at its hands.
In this regard, reliance has been placed on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Arun Gupta Vs. Union of India reported in (2015) 371 ITR 394 (Allahabad), wherein in re-assessment proceedings arising under the Act, it had been held that for valid reasons to believe to arrive there must exist some material on the basis of which reasonable belief may arise. If there is no material for the formation of the belief, the jurisdiction to reassess may not arise. Para 20 of the judgment relied upon in this regard is quoted below:-
"It is settled law that the Assessing Officer having reasons to believe that there had been some omission or failure to disclose fully or truly all material facts necessary for the assessment must be based on some material facts which according to the Assessing Officer is based on some reasonable belief and which would have a material bearing on the question of under assessment. If there is no material for the formation of any belief or where the purported belief was nothing but a mere change of opinion, in that case, the Assessing Officer would have no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings u/s 147 and 148 of the Act. The Assessing Officer has the power to reopen the assessment where he has reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment but such re-assessment cannot be initiated on a mere change of opinion to merely re-examine an issue on the basis of information or material which was already available to the Assessing Officer at the time of the completion of the original assessment. Consequently, before taking any action, the Assessing Officer is required to substantiate his satisfaction with the reasons recorded by him."
(emphasis supplied) Then, reliance has also been placed on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Idea Cellular Ltd. V. Dy. CIT reported in [2008] 301 ITR 407 (Bombay) wherein it has been held that merely because the assessing officer may not express any opinion regarding any matter in the original assessment order, it cannot be said that he had not applied his mind through the entire material was placed by the petitioner before the assessing officer. The relevant portion of that judgment relied upon by the petitioner is quoted below:
"It was also sought to be contended that since the Assessing Officer had not expressed any opinion regarding this matter in his original assessment order, it could not be said that there was any change of opinion in this case. In our view, once all the material was before the Assessing Officer and he chose not to deal with the several contentions raised by the petitioner in his final assessment order, it cannot be said that he had not applied his mind when all material was placed by the petitioner before him."
(emphasis supplied) Responding to the above submissions, Shri Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for the department submits that the bar of the proviso of Section 147 would not apply because the petitioner had not made full and true disclosure during the assessment proceedings. In this regard, he has taken us through the reply as furnished by the petitioner in the regular assessment proceedings to submit that at no stage in the regular assessment proceedings did the petitioner submit that the investment in the construction of the building was made from the surplus available with him. However, he does not deny that in it's reply the petitioner had stated that the investment in share capital (Rs. 1.45 crores) had been made from such surplus.
The objection raised by the learned counsel for the revenue is that a specific reply had not been given by the assessee of having made the investment in construction of the building from such surplus and therefore, full and true disclosure had not been made by it. Therefore, it his submission that non-business investments had been made by the petitioner from the loans received by the petitioner from Canara Bank. Therefore, interest payment on such business loan proportionate to or referable to amounts spent on such investments is liable to be disallowed. The same has escaped assessment and the assessee is liable to tax thereon.
Having considered the arguments so advanced, we observe, it is first necessary to examine the nature and extent of disclosure made by the petitioner in the regular assessment proceedings with respect to the subject matter of 'reasons to believe' formed by the assessing authority to initiate reassessment proceedings. In this regard we notice, in it's replies dated 25.11.2011 and 30.11.2011 the assessee had categorically stated therein that (i) it had operated only one bank account with the Canara Bank and that it had no other bank account with any bank (ii) the entire investment made in the construction of the property was from the aforesaid bank account with Canara bank (iii) thereafter, as part of the same reply, the petitioner had also stated that it had made an investment of Rs.1.45 crores in share capital from that bank account.
If the petitioner had left its reply at that, without giving the details of the surplus, it may have been an arguable issue whether the disclosure of facts was full and true though even in that case the effect of the figures of business surplus available to the petitioner duly reflected in its books of account and audited results as also reflected in the income tax return would remain to be seen. However, in the facts of this case, besides the disclosure of facts contained in its books of account and audited results that itself amounted to a disclosure of facts, the petitioner had also been queried in this regard and it had specifically replied and stated as below:
"That the assessee has earned profits of Rs.1,20,01,834/- during the year, and has also shown a profit of Rs.1,01,63,293/- and 90,00,897/- for the assessment year 2008-09 which is indirectly credited in credit account, as the assessee has no other Bank account."
Thus, we find the petitioner had given details of the surplus available being in excess of Rs.3 crores. It had also disclosed the source of that surplus being business profit for the previous years relevant to the Assessment Years 2009-10, 2008-09 and 2007-08. Reading the reply thus furnished by the petitioner in it's entirety, it is unambiguously clear that the primary and material facts disclosed by the petitioner at the stage of regular assessment proceedings were to the effect that it had surplus far in excess of the amount invested either by way of share capital or by way of investment in construction of a building. While recording the 'reason to believe' the petitioner's assessing authority did not doubt the correctness of those facts or disclosures as either untrue or incomplete.
Thus, merely, because the petitioner did not specifically state that it had made an investment in the property from such surplus, though at the same time it had stated that it had only one bank account and that it made all investments from the same bank account and that it had sufficient funds (in excess of Rs. 3 crores) available with it, much in excess of the total investment so made (Rs. 2 crores approximately), the objection raised by the learned counsel for the revenue loses its relevance. Once the petitioner had disclosed the availability of sufficient own funds to cover the investment amount, the allegation of utilization of business funds to make the investments could not arise or survive.
In any case, for the first proviso to Section 147 to apply, it was sufficient that the petitioner had made the disclosure of availability of sufficient own funds during the regular assessment proceedings. The correctness of that disclosure has not been doubted even at the stage of reason being recorded by the assessing authority to initiate reassessment proceedings inasmuch as it is not the case of the revenue that after completion of the regular assessment proceedings under section 143(3) of the Act, the assessing authority has come in possession of any material or information that the petitioner's stand as to amount of business surplus contained in its replies filed at original assessment stage was wrong or false. The correctness or completeness of that disclosure was not in doubt by the assessing authority at the stage of the reason being recorded by him.
In this light, we find all facts and material on which 'reason to believe' have now been recorded existed before the assessing authority during the regular assessment proceedings under section 143(3) of the Act. Thus a 'true' disclosure of all necessary primary and material facts had been made by the petitioner during those assessment proceedings. Then as to the completeness of disclosure of such facts, we find, in its reply dated 30.11.2011, the assessee had made plain the fact of it having operated only one bank account, of having sufficient credit balances in excess of Rs. 3.00 crore and; of having made all investments (especially investment in share capital) from that bank account. Thus, to our mind, the disclosure (of material facts pertaining to the two investments) made by the petitioner during regular assessment proceedings was both full and true. It was thereafter up to the assessing officer to form his view on such facts for purpose of making the assessment.
This Court in the case of Foramer France Vs. CIT reported in (2001) 247 ITR 436 (AII) has upheld as follows:-
"In our opinion, we have to see the law prevailing on the date of issue of the notice under Section 148, i.e., November 20, 1998. Admittedly, by that date, the new Section 147 has come into force and, hence, in our opinion, it is the new Section 147 which will apply to the facts of the present case. In the present case, there was admittedly no failure on the part of the assessee to make a return or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. Hence, the proviso to the new Section 147 squarely applies, and the impugned notices were barred by limitation mentioned in the proviso."
(emphasis supplied) The aforesaid judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court in CIT Vs. Foramer France reported in (2003) 264 ITR 566. To the same effect is the latter decision of this Court in the case of M/S Aci Oils Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Dy. C.I.T. and Another referred to above.
In that view of admitted fact and law as laid down by this Court noted above, we conclude the reassessment proceedings initiated against the petitioner for Assessment Year 2009-10 vide notice dated 23.03.2016 is wholly barred under the proviso to Section 147 of the Act.
Then, it also cannot be lost sight that not only did the petitioner make a full and true disclosure of primary facts in the course of the regular assessment proceedings but that disclosure had been made in response to specific queries made by the assessing officer, in essence, doubting the genuineness of the claim of investment made by the petitioner in share capital and also construction of the building. He specifically required the petitioner to substantiate the claim and disclose the source of that investment. To that extent, the petitioner's assessing authority was cognizant of and had applied his mind to the issue. Then, on its part, the petitioner not only gave the break up investment so made but also gave further details of the same with a date wise schedule of the investment made as also the channel through which those investments were made - being its solitary bank account with the Canara Bank together with disclosure of funds/surplus available to cover the investment made by it. Admittedly, no other material exists nor has any new material being brought on record by the department to doubt the correctness of the claim so made by the assessee during the assessment proceedings. The assessing officer was required to record his 'reason to believe' on the basis of material already existing on record. That requirement necessarily involved both, the existence of 'reason' required to be recorded in writing as to the 'belief' entertained that certain income had escaped assessment.
It may be worthwhile to revisit the law relevant to this issue arising in the present case. As early as 1961 the Supreme Court had in the case of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. Vs. ITO reported in (1961) 91 ITR 91 (SC) held that the duty of the assessee extended to disclosure of primary and material facts and that duty did not extend to disclosure of an inferential fact. This principle enunciated almost six decades ago has withstood the test of time and remains relevant and applicable despite repeated legislative changes to the Act.
Then as to the meaning to be given to the phrase 'reason to believe' appearing in section 147 of the Act, it is seen, the same was examined in a similar context by the Supreme Court in Ganga Saran and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. ITO (1981) reported in 130 ITR 1 (SC) wherein it was held as below:-
"It is well settled as a result of several decisions of this Court that two distinct conditions must be satisfied before the Income Tax Officer can assume jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 147 (a). First, he must have reason to believe that the income of the assessee has escaped assessment and secondly, he must have reason to believe that such escapement is by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. If either of these conditions is not fulfilled, the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer would be without jurisdiction. The important words under Section 147 (a) are "has reason to believe" and these words are stronger than the words "is satisfied". The belief entertained by the Income Tax Officer must not be arbitrary or irrational. It must be reasonable or in other words, it must be based on reasons which are relevant and material. The Court, of course, cannot investigate the adequacy or sufficiency of the reasons which have weighed with the Income Tax Officer in coming to the belief, but the Court can certainly examine whether the reasons are relevant and have a bearing on the matters in regard to which he is required to entertain the belief before he can issue notice under Section 147 (a). It there is no rational and intelligible nexus between the reasons and the belief, so that, for such reasons, no one properly instructed on facts and law could reasonably entertain the belief, the conclusion would be inescapable that the Income Tax Officer could not have reason to believe that any part of the income of the assessee had escaped assessment and such escapement was by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts and the notice issued by him would be liable to he struck down as invalid."
(emphasis supplied) Also, as to the nature of belief required to pre-exist to vest jurisdiction in the assessing authority, the Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Nath Singh Vs. Appellate Assistant CIT reported in (1971) 82 ITR 147 (SC) held below:-
"In our judgment, the law laid down by this court in the above case is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. There can be no manner of doubt that the words "reason to believe" suggests that the belief must be that of an honest and reasonable person based upon reasonable grounds and that the Income-tax Officer may act on direct or circumstantial evidence but not on mere suspicion, gossip or rumor. The Income-tax Officer would be acting without jurisdiction if the reason for his belief that the conditions are satisfied does not exist or is not material or relevant to the belief required by the section. The court can always examine this aspect though the declaration or sufficiency of the reasons for the belief cannot be investigated by the court."
(emphasis supplied) Then in CIT Vs. Kelvinator of India reported in (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC), in the context of similar reassessment proceedings, the Supreme Court while upholding the full bench decision of the Delhi High Court held as below:-
"On going through the changes, quoted above, made to Section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, re-opening could be done under above two conditions and fulfillment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a back assessment, but in Section 147 of the Act [with effect from 1st April 1989], they are given a go-by and only one condition has remained, viz., where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to re- open the assessment. Therefore, post-1st April, 1989, power to re-open is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words "reason to believe" failing which, we are afraid, Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to re-open assessments on the basis of "mere change of opinion", which cannot be per se reason to re-open. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to re-assess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to re-assess. But re-assessment has to be based on fulfillment of certain pre-condition and if the concept of "change of opinion" is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of re-opening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of "change of opinion" as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, Assessing Officer has power to re-open, provided there is "tangible material" to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief."
(emphasis supplied) In the instant case, we find that though it is not a case of change of opinion, yet, in the first place, the Assessing Officer has initiated the reassessment proceedings on the basis of the self-same material that he had examined during regular assessment proceedings under section 143(3) of the Act. Second, he has merely recorded his belief that the income had escaped assessment - solely on the basis of his observation that there was an outstanding business loan against the petitioner with the Canara Bank.
However, the said belief has been entertained in ignorance of the other fact existing on the same record as to the existence of a surplus of nearly Rupees three crores arising from petitioner's business operations. The assessee had disclosed that the investment in question had been made from such business surplus. There is neither any material nor any reason to doubt the existence of this fact, the assessing officer could not have closed his eyes to the same and only looked at the business loan outstanding against him. A belief thus drawn cannot be held to be founded or based or supported with reason.
In such a case, as held by an earlier division bench of this Court in the case of Arun Gupta (supra) the material must be shown to be something concrete on the basis of which the reason to believe may arise. We find, in the instant case, there does not appear to exist any tangible material acting which the petitioner's assessing authority may have treated as a 'direct or circumstantial' evidence to form a bona fide 'reason' relevant to the 'belief' of any income having escaped the assessment at the hands of the petitioner.
Besides the fact that the material that has been relied upon by the petitioner's assessing authority had already been examined in the course of regular assessment proceedings, even if the same material were to be looked into again the same had to be looked into in entirety. The petitioner's assessing authority could not have taken a blinkered view of the same and he could not have chosen to overlook part of that material to draw a 'belief' or to 'reason' that some income had escaped assessment. He ought to have examined the reply of the assessee submitted in the course of regular assessment proceedings also, wherein it had specifically stated that the petitioner had operated only one bank account and that it had sufficient profits available to it to justify the investments made by it.
Had that part of the reply been also taken note of, the petitioner's assessing authority could not have formed a 'reason' in support of the 'belief' that income had escaped assessment at the hands of the petitioner because there is no 'tangible material' existing to doubt or disprove the petitioner's reply that it made the investments from its profits and not from loan taken by it from Canara Bank. In absence of such 'tangible material' no 'reason to believe' could arise of escapement on that count.
Then, apparently, an audit objection was raised as to the procedure followed in the assessment proceedings. The nature of the audit objection itself has not been spelled out by the revenue either in the 'reason to believe' or in the counter affidavit filed in this petition. Nevertheless, assuming the same to be an objection with respect to the matter on which the 'reason to believe' had eventually been recorded, the same cannot substitute the requirement of law that the assessing officer must record his 'reason to believe' that any income has escaped assessment at the hands of the petitioner.
Lastly, learned counsel for the revenue has sought to place reliance on the contents of paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit wherein certain figures have been referred too, to allege that the surplus as claimed by the petitioner did not exist. Neither such figures have been mentioned nor they have been considered for the 'reason to believe' recorded by the Assessing Officer. The revenue, therefore, cannot be allowed to improve its case by adverting to material which was not before the Assessing Officer at the stage of recording the reasons to believe and which that officer had not considered by choosing to rely on the same in the counter affidavit.
Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons we find that the reassessment proceedings initiated against the petitioner for the Assessment Year 2009-10 are barred on two counts i.e. for non-compliance of the first proviso of Section 147; also no tangible material exists in support of the belief recorded by the Assessing Officer that income had escaped assessment. Consequently, 'reason' (to be formed by the assessing authority) that is a sine-qua-non as to the 'belief' of escapement has also to be held to be lacking or non-existent as unless there exists 'tangible material' no 'reason' may arise at all.
Therefore, the jurisdictional requirement of section 147 has not been shown to exist or established. The reassessment proceedings initiated against the petitioner for Assessment Year 2009-10 vide notice dated 23.03.2016 are quashed.
The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.
Order Date:- 23.11.2017 Lbm/-