Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
U. Rai Arya vs Union Of India on 18 February, 2015
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH O.A. No. 908/2014 Reserved on : 29.01.2015 Pronounced on : 18.02.2015 HONBLE MR. G. GEORGE PARACKEN, MEMBER (J) U. Rai Arya, S/o Late Shri Govind Prasad, R/o 3H-64, Nehru Nagar, Ghaziabad. .. Applicant (By Advocate: Ms. S. Janani) Versus 1. Union of India Through Secretary, Department of Telecommunication, Sanchar Bhawan, Patel Chowk, 20, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-1. 2. Chief General Manager Telecom. Rajasthan Telecom Circle, Jaipur-302008. .. Respondents (By Advocate : Shri Manjeet Singh Reen for R-1 and Shri Sarfaraz Khan for R-2) ORDER
This Original Application has been filed by the Applicant aggrieved by the Order of the Respondent No.1 dated 07.11.2012 rejecting his request for payment of 18% interest p.a. for the delayed payments on all retrial benefits including pension, gratuity, commuted value of pension, leave encashment etc. He has also sought a direction to the Respondents to pay arrears of pay during the suspension period amounting to Rs.44,368/- along with interest @ 18% p.a.
2. The facts in the case are that the Applicant was initially appointed as an Engineering Supervisor, Telephones in Delhi Telephones, Delhi in May, 1967. Thereafter, he was promoted as SDO (E) in the year 1980. While he was working in the said capacity, a criminal case was registered against him and he was placed under suspension. The Special Judge, CBI, Jaipur convicted him vide order dated 24.06.1993. Consequently, he was imposed with a penalty of removal from service on 23.06.1994. In normal course, his date of retirement on superannuation was 30.06.1994. The applicant was, therefore, denied the retirement benefits. However, the Honble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur acquitted him in the criminal case vide its judgment dated 07.12.2006 holding that he was falsely implicated in the criminal case. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced as under:
20. In view of what has been discussed above, it can be safely stated that the accused has been successful to satisfactorily rebut the presumption arising against him under Section 4(1) of the Act. It appears that PW1 T. C. Deothia got the trap arranged to give a went to his annoyance and prevent the appellant in pronouncing the order which had finally been prepared by the appellant by which two grade increments of the decoy T.C. Deothia were stopped. Also viewed in this perspective the defence version appears to be plausible, reasonable and logical that the accused accepted the money under the impression that PW1 T. C. Deothia was returning the money which was earlier advanced to him.
21. For the reasons discussed above, the conviction of the accused is bad and cannot be maintained.
22. In the result, the appeal of the appellant Ulfat Rai Arya is allowed. His conviction and sentence under Section 161 IPC and Section 5(l)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act are set aside and he is acquitted. He is already on bail and need not surrender. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled.
3. Pursuant to the aforesaid judgment, the Respondent, vide its order dated 17.04.2007, set aside the order of his removal from service and vide the subsequent order dated 23.07.2007, the period of his suspension was regularised and treated it as period spent on duty for all purposes. By another order dated 17.08.2007, the Respondent deemed the Applicant as retired from service on 30.06.1994. Thereafter, he was paid his leave encashment, gratuity and pension vide letter dated 01.02.2008. However, when the Respondents did not accede to his request to grant him interest on the delayed payment of retrial benefits, he had earlier approached this Tribunal vide O.A. No.4088/2010 seeking a direction to the respondents to pay him interest on the delayed payments of retrial dues. The said O.A. was disposed of by this Tribunal on 25.01.2011 directing the respondent to consider his representation and to take appropriate decision in accordance with rules. Thereafter, the Respondent, vide its letter dated 20.09.2011, granted interest only on delayed payment of gratuity and passed no orders regarding interest on other dues. He has, therefore, filed MA No.292/2012 in the aforesaid O.A. claiming interest on the other dues also. The said MA was disposed of by this Tribunal, vide order dated 18.07.2012, with a direction to the Respondents to consider the same and to pass appropriate orders. When the Respondents did not comply the aforesaid orders, the Applicant filed Contempt Petition No. 754/2012 on 28.09.2012. On receipt of notice in the said petition, the respondents passed the impugned order dated 07.11.2012 denying him the payment of interest on the delayed payment of commuted value of pension and leave encashment on the ground that it is not permissible under the rules. According to the applicant, the aforesaid stand taken by the Respondents is not sustainable as the same is in violation of provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Further, he has stated that it was the clear finding of the Honble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur that the applicant was falsely implicated in the criminal case. Therefore, his removal from service is ab initio void and he is entitled for all the benefits on the date of his retirement.
4. The learned counsel for the applicant also relied upon the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of S.K. Dua Vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2008) 3 SCC 44, wherein it was held that if there is no specific rule or order providing for interest, relief can be claimed on the basis of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India because retirement benefits are not a bounty. The relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced as under:
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be partly allowed. It is not in dispute by and between the parties that the appellant retired from service on 30-6-1998. It is also undisputed that at the time of retirement from service, the appellant had completed more than three decades in Government Service. Obviously, therefore, he was entitled to retiral benefits in accordance with law. True it is that certain charge-sheets/show cause notices were issued against him and the appellant was called upon to show cause why disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated against him. It is, however, the case of the appellant that all those actions had been taken at the instance of Mr. Quraishi against whom serious allegations of malpractices and misconduct had been levelled by the appellant which resulted in removal of Mr. Quraishi from the post of Secretary, Irrigation. The said Mr. Quraishi then became Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister. Immediately thereafter charge-sheets were issued to the appellant and proceedings were initiated against him. The fact remains that proceedings were finally dropped and all retiral benefits were extended to the appellant. But it also cannot be denied that those benefits were given to the appellant after four years.
14. In the circumstances, prima facie, we are of the view that the grievance voiced by the appellant appears to be well founded that he would be entitled to interest on such benefits. If there are statutory rules occupying the field, the appellant could claim payment of interest relying on such Rules. If there are administrative instructions, guidelines or norms prescribed for the purpose, the appellant may claim benefit of interest on that basis. But even in absence of statutory rules, administrative instructions or guidelines, an employee can claim interest under Part III of the Constitution relying on Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, that retiral benefits are not in the nature of bounty is, in our opinion, well founded and needs no authority in support thereof. In that view of the matter, in our considered opinion, the High Court was not right in dismissing the petition in limine even without issuing notice to the respondents.
5. The Respondents in their reply have not disputed the facts stated by the Applicant in this OA. They have also admitted that the Honble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur, vide judgment dated 07.12.2006, set aside the conviction and acquitted him. Accordingly, they have also set aside his dismissal order on 17.04.2007 and he was allowed to retire on attaining the age of superannuation on 30.06.1994. Consequently, he was paid all the dues, viz., salaries for the suspension period, gratuity, leave encashment and also the Engineering Graduate increment arrears etc. However, while paying the retrial dues, he was not paid any interest which he had claimed vide his representation dated 16.09.2009. However, on the direction of the Tribunal dated 25.01.2011 in O.A. No.4088/2010 (supra), an amount of Rs.65,407/- was paid to him as interest on delayed payment of DCRG under the provisions laid down in Govt. of India decision (1) under Rule 68 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. They have also stated that, vide order dated 07.11.2012, the applicant was informed that no interest is payable on delayed payment of commuted value of pension and leave encashment as per rules. They have also stated that they had withheld those benefits due to pendency of criminal case against him and they were released on his acquittal from the criminal case.
6. The learned counsel for the respondents has also relied upon the judgment of the Honble High Court of Delhi in the case of Ram Avtar Yadav Vs. Directorate of Education and Another, 2013 LawSuit (Del) 731 in support of his contention. The relevant part of the said judgment reads as under:
4. A reading of the aforesaid order shows that petitioner has not been completely exonerated. The ethics in the action of the petitioner was found to be lacking. Considering the fact that the petitioner had however in the meanwhile retired and some of his retiral benefits which have been claimed in the present petition were withheld, the disciplinary authority has held that the fact that retiring without a part of retiral benefits itself is a punishment besides the issue of trauma being suffered by the petitioner. The disciplinary authority accordingly did not impose any further penalty against the petitioner.
5. Counsel for the petitioner does not dispute that the order dated 14.7.2010 is not an outright exoneration of the petitioner, and it is also not disputed on behalf of the petitioner that this order dated 14.7.2010 became final as it was not challenged further. Once the order dated 14.7.2010 becomes final as the same was not challenged, and the petitioner is held guilty of certain minor misconduct, and the petitioner having accepted the findings, there would therefore be valid reasons for the department not to pay the retiral benefits which were claimed in the petition till the time the departmental proceedings were pending. I may state that the judgments of the Supreme Court which direct payment of interest for delay in payment of retiral benefits are those judgments where the department has no valid reasons to withhold the release of the retirement dues, however, where there are sufficient reasons including of the department proceedings going on, the department has very much a right to retain the retiral benefits. This is because whereas a charged officer may be acquitted, on the other hand he may also suffer the extreme penalty of removal from services, and in which latter case no retiral benefits would be paid to such an employee who has been removed from service. Therefore, pendency of the departmental proceedings, and the fact that ultimately the petitioner was not completely exonerated gives a sufficient ground to the department to withhold the retirement dues, and therefore since withholding is not contumacious but was for a reason, no interest can be paid for the delay caused due to the pendency of the departmental proceedings.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to place reliance upon a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Govt. Of NCT of Delhi Vs. Nand Lal Singh to argue the proposition that in case of delay in releasing of retiral benefits interest should be paid. There is no quarrel to this proposition of law, however, the issue is not of release of benefits simplicitor but the issue is of withholding of the retiral benefits for the reason of departmental proceedings which were pending, and which is not an issue which has been dealt with in the judgment in the case of Nand Lal Singh (supra).
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also sought to place reliance upon the judgment in the case of J.S. Arora Vs. UOI and Ors. 1984 (6) DRJ 211, and its para 4, which holds that on an entitlement to promotion after exoneration from enquiry the promotee is entitled to all consequential benefits arising as a result of promotion, however, even this judgment does not help the petitioner because this judgment does not concern itself with a situation where there is withholding of retiral dues for a legitimate cause.
8. In view of the above, there is no reason for grant of interest. So far as the second relief of automatic extension/re-employment of the petitioner is concerned, it could not be disputed on behalf of the petitioner that the entitlement to such re-employment would only have been if the petitioner was totally exonerated in the enquiry, and which is not the factual position in the present case, and thus this second relief of re-employment and the consequential monetary benefits also cannot be granted.
9. No other issue is pressed on behalf of the petitioner although certain other grounds were also taken up in the petition.
10. In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
7. I have heard Ms. S. Janani, the learned counsel for the Applicant and Shri Manjeet Singh Reen, the learned counsel for Respondent No.1 and Shri Sarfaraz Khan, the learned counsel for Respondent No.2. I have also perused the pleadings on record. It is seen that the applicant was due for retirement on superannuation on 30.06.1994 but before a week from that date, the respondents imposed upon him penalty of removal from service on 23.06.1994 on the basis of his conviction by the Special Judge, CBI, Jaipur. The Honble High Court of Rajasthan acquitted him in that case after having found that he was falsely implicated in the criminal case by the PW1, T.C. Deothia who got the trap arranged. Thereafter, the respondents reinstated him in service and allowed him to retire on superannuation. But financial loss, harassment and humiliation suffered by the Applicant were immense. When he was entitled to get his retirement benefits immediately after his superannuation on 30.06.1994, he actually got them only on 01.02.2008. The only way to compensate for the loss suffered by him is to pay him the interest. The respondents have paid him the interest on DCRG, as there is a specific rule by the respondents to pay interest if there was delay in payment of DCRG. However, there is no rules framed by the respondents to pay interest on the other retirement dues. Just because the Respondents have no rules for payment of interest on the other retirement benefits, the employee cannot be made to suffer. In such circumstances, as held by the Apex Court in the case of S.K. Dua (supra), the Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India would apply because the retirement benefits are not a bounty. The judgment of the Honble High Court of Delhi in the case of Ram Avtar Yadav has no application in this case as it is evident from it that the petitioner therein was not completely exonerated.
8. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, I allow this O.A. and direct the respondents to give the applicant interest @ 9% on all dues which would have been otherwise admissible to him had he been allowed to retire on superannuation on 30.06.1994 itself. They shall also pay the difference of salary and allowances for the suspension period with 9% interest, if not paid already. The respondents shall calculate the interest payable on each of the items separately and furnish the calculation sheets to the Applicant for his verification. The aforesaid directions shall be complied with, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.
(G. George Paracken) Member (J) /Jyoti/