Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Recruit Constable (Driver) Mukesh ... vs Gnct Of Delhi on 12 September, 2011
Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi O.A.No. 1404/2011 This the 12th day of September, 2011 Honble Shri George Paracken, Member (J) Honble Dr. Veena Chhotray, Member (A) Recruit Constable (Driver) Mukesh Kumar Roll no.801106 s/o Sh. Mange Ram r/o Village & PO Ranila, District Bhiwani, Haryana. Applicant (By Advocate: Sh. Sourabh Ahuja) Versus 1. GNCT of Delhi Through Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, I.P.Estate M.S.O.Building, New Delhi. 2. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Establishment, Delhi, Through Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, I.P.Estate M.S.O.Building, New Delhi. Respondents (By Advocate: Sh. Amit Anand) O R D E R
Honble Shri George Paracken:
Applicants grievance is that in spite of the fact that he has revealed all the facts regarding his involvement and the later acquittal in the criminal case in the application form and the attestation form for selection as Constable Driver for which the direct recruitment has been held in the year 2009, the Screening Committee recommended for the cancellation of his candidature on the ground that he was not found suitable for Police service.
2. The facts of the case are that applicant was provisionally selected as Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police during the recruitment year 2009 subject to verification of his character and antecedents. As the applicant was involved in some criminal cases, he had disclosed those facts in his application as well as the attestation form. The district authorities of Bhiwani Haryana has also sent a report to the respondents regarding the aforesaid facts. Thereafter, his case was examined by the Screening Committee in the Police Headquarters to assess his suitability for the aforesaid post. Keeping in view of the nature of his involvement in his case, gravity of the offence, judgment of the Court, grounds of acquittal and also in view of the judgment on the subject by the Apex Court in DAD Vs. Sunil Kumar, (Civil Appeal No.13231/1996 arising out of SLP (C) No.5340/1996, [1996 (11) SCC 605]. The respondents proposed to cancel the candidature of the applicant and accordingly he was served with the Annexure A-1, show cause notice dated 16.8.2010. The relevant part of the said notice is as under:
On scrutiny of your application & attestation forms, it has been found that you had disclosed about your involvement in the aforesaid criminal cases in the relevant columns of the application as well as attestation forms.
Accordingly, your case was examined in detail by the Screening Committee constituted by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to assess your suitability for the post of Constable (Driver) in Delhi police keeping in view the nature of your involvement in the criminal case, gravity of the offence, the judgment of the court, the ground of acquittal and the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court of India dated 04.10.1996 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.5340 of 1996) DAD Vs. Sushil Kumar. On perusal of the contents of the FIRs and judgments of the court it has been revealed that the following FIRs were registered against you:-
FIR No.404/1996 u/s 61-114 Excise Act PS. Mohindergarh, Haryana dated 14.12.1996.
FIR No. 28/1998 u/s 379 IPC P.S. Baund Kalan, Distt. Bhiwani dated 13.03.1998.
FIR No.29/1998 u/s 279/336/353/332/ 147/148/149 IPC P.S. Baund Kalan, Dist. Bhiwani dated 13.03.1998.
FIR No.404/1996 u/s 61-1-14 of Excise Act PS. Mohindergarh, Haryana who stated that he was patrolling alongwith his staff. He received an secret information that three persons including you had gone to Rajasthan in a Maruti car to bring liquor for selling in Haryana. On this information, he formed a raiding party and made a Naka. The Maruti car was stopped and identities of the accused were disclosed. When the car was checked, four boxes of liquor mark Royal Touch were found. In this case, total 48 bottles were recovered.
The charge-sheet was filed against you and other accused persons in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi. The case property was not produced by the prosecution in the court which was required to be maintained as per police rules until the final orders of the court. The main witness i.e. ASI I.O. of the case was not examined by the prosecution. Hence, you and co-accused were acquitted of the charges vide judgment dated 26.02.2002.
FIR No.28/1998 u/s 379 IPC P.S. Baund Kalan, Dlistt. Bhiwani dated 13.03.1998 was registered on the complaint of one Sh.Surender Singh who stated that he had parked his jeep No.HR-19-6965 near Village Ranila. When he came back, he did not find the jeep.
In this case the jeep was recovered and charge-sheet against 07 accused persons including you were filed in the court of judicial Magistrate 1st class, Charkhi Dadri. During trial, the complainant of the case denied that the accused persons had stolen his vehicle. None of the prosecution withness deposed any incriminating fact. Hence, the court finally acquitted all the accused of the charges vide judgment dated 23.10.2009.
FIR No.29/1998u/s 279/336353/332/147/148/149 IPC P.S. Baund Kalan, Distt. Bhiwani dated 13.03.1998 was registered against you and same accused/persons of FIR No.28/1998 while driving the stolen jeep No. HR-19-6965. The case was registered on the complaint of an ASI of P.S. Baund Kalan who stated that the stolen jeep was being driven in rash and negligent manner. When he tried to stop the vehicle at a check post, they attempted to hit him. Ultimately, the vehicle overturned while giving a sharp turn and accused persons were arrested.
In this case, charge-sheet was filed against you and co-accused in the court of judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Charkhi Dadri. During the trial, the owner of the stolen vehicle (jeep) Sh. Surender Singh stated that he had no knowledge about the case as alleged by the prosecution. With regard to signatures in recovery/seizure memo of the vehicle, he stated that the police had obtained his signatures on blank papers. None of the prosecution winesses deposed any incriminating fact against any of the accused and their statements under section 313 Cr.P.C. were dispensed with. Finally, the court acquitted all the accused of the charges vide judgment dated 23.10.2009.
The case against you are of serious nature where you involved in the offences punishable u/s 61-1-14 of excise act, theft of a vehicle and recovery of the vehicle in your possession while driving the vehicle in rash and negligent manner endangering the human life, as evident from the FIRs and judgments of the cases. You may have been acquitted in criminal cases registered against you for variety of reasons but your involvements shows tendency to commit crime without fear or respect of law and such type of attitude render you unsuitable for appointment in a disciplined force like Delhi Police. Keeping in view of this, the Screening Committee has found you not suitable for the post of Constable (Driver) in Delhi Police.
3. The applicant submitted his Annexure A-6 reply dated 19.8.2010 explaining that he was acquitted in all the three cases mentioned in the show cause notice. With regard to FIR No.404/96 u/s 61-1-14 Excise Act dated 14.12.96, according to him, it was a false and fabricated case as liquor was allegedly planted on him but it was never produced in the Court. Similarly, the FIR No.28/98 u/s 379 IPC dated 13.3.98 was also completely false and fabricated as the complainant of the case himself has clearly denied that his vehicle was ever stolen. Again, as regards FIR No.29/98 of the same date is concerned, his submission was that the judgment in the case itself would reveal that the case was fabricated. His further submission was that when the first case was registered against him, he was just 15 years, 7 months and 20 days old and when the second and third cases were registered against him, he was 16 years 10 months and 17 days old and being a juvenile, he has the protection under Section 19(1) of the Juvenille Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 according to which notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of the said Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law. He has also submitted that the acquittal in the aforesaid cases were not on any technical are vague grounds but all the judgments in them are speaking ones and they have been delivered after fair trial. Moreover, none of the cases were of serious nature as alleged in the show cause notice.
4. However, the respondents vide Annexure A-2 impugned order dated 7.2.2011 cancelled his candidature on the ground that though he was acquitted in the criminal case registered against him for variety of reasons, yet his involvement in them show his tendency to commit crime without fear and respect for law and such type of attitude render himself unsuitable for appointment in a disciplined force like Delhi Police.
5. The applicants counsel Sh. Sourabh Ahuja has submitted that this case is squarely covered by a decision of Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in OA-1007/2007 - Satya Narayan Meena Vs. UOI and others decided on 23.10.2007. In the said order this Tribunal has analysed the provisions of the Section 19 of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 in detail and held that the record of conviction of a delinquent has to be removed after expiry of period of appeal as prescribed in the rules. Certainly, if the record of conviction has to be removed within the period of appeal or within a reasonable time, it would mean that the conviction of a juvenile would not come in his way in securing a government job. The relevant part of the said Order is as under:
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance examined the records of the case.
14. The Act of 2000 came into being for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent juveniles. The very introduction of the Act of 2000 would reveal that Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was enacted by the Parliament. Several provisions of the Constitution including clause (3) of article 15, clauses (e) and (f) of article 39, articles 45 and 47 also impose on the State a primary responsibility of ensuring that all the needs of children are met and that their basic human rights are fully protected. On 20th November, 1989 General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child wherein a set of standards to be adhered to by all State parties in securing the best interests of the child has been prescribed. The convention emphasizes social re-integration of child victims, to the extent possible, without resorting to judicial proceedings. The statement of Objects and Reasons of Act of 2000 would further reveal that under the Juvenile Act, 1986, much greater attention was required to be given to children in conflict with law or those in need of care and protection. It was specifically mentioned that the justice system as applicable for adults is not considered suitable for being applied to a juvenile or the child or any one on their behalf including the police, voluntary organizations, social workers, or parents and guardians, throughout the country and there was urgent need of creating adequate infrastructure necessary for the implementation of the proposed legislation with a larger involvement of informal systems specially the family, the voluntary organizations and the community. In the context aforesaid, number of proposals were made, some of which are enumerated below:
(a) to make the juvenile system meant for a juvenile or the child more appreciative of the developmental needs in comparison to criminal justice system as applicable to adults;
(b) to minimize the stigma and in keeping with the developmental needs of the juvenile or the child, to separate the Bill into two parts one for juveniles in conflict with law and the other for the juvenile or the child in need of care and protection;
(c) to provide for effective provisions and various alternatives for rehabilitation and social reintegration such as adoption, foster care, sponsorship and aftercare of abandoned, destitute, neglected and delinquent juvenile and child.
What clearly emerges from the Objects and Reasons of Act of 2000 is that judicial system has to be more appreciative of the developmental needs of children in comparison with the adults. The same is also to make effective provisions and various alternatives for rehabilitation and social integration and to minimize the stigma of a juvenile, for which purpose, the Bill is in two parts - one for juvenile in conflict with law, and another for juvenile in need of care and protection. In the background of Objects and Reasons of Act of 2000, relevant provisions of the Act need to be examined. Section 19 of Act of 2000, pertaining to removal of disqualification attaching to conviction, reads as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law (emphasis supplied).
(2) The Board shall make an order directing that the relevant records of such conviction shall be removed after the expiry of the period of appeal or a reasonable period as prescribed under the rules, as the case may be.
A careful reading of the Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2000 and Section 19 thereof, would make it abundantly clear that a juvenile in conflict with law has to be rehabilitated and the stigma of conviction has also to be minimized. It appears to us that if a juvenile having been dealt with under the Act of 2000 is unable to secure a Government job for the rest of his life, it would be neither his rehabilitation nor reduction in the stigma that may be attached to the conviction for an offence for which he might have been tried.
15. Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel representing the respondents would, however, contend that the Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2000 as also provisions as contained in Section 19 thereof, would not come to the rescue of the applicant, as what is relevant in obtaining a Government job and that too in a disciplined force, is the conduct and character of a candidate and not the consequence of a conviction that might have been provided under the Act of 2000. The learned counsel then refers to provisions contained in Section 12 of the Act of 1958 which are pari materia to sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 2000, and contends that while interpreting Section 12 of the Act of 1958, in the very context of obtaining a Government job, even on acquittal in a criminal case, the courts in the country have taken a view that what is relevant is conduct or character of a candidate. The learned counsel for his contention as noted above, relied upon two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration & Others Vs. Sushil Kumar, (1996) 11 SCC, 605 and Harichand Vs. Director of School Education, 2000 (1) SCT, Page 272, and a decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, in the matter of Naresh Kumar Meena Vs. Dy. Commissioner of Police & Another, decided on 17.5.2004.
16. The facts of Delhi Administration & Another vs. Sushil Kumar (supra) would reveal that Sushil Kumar had appeared for recruitment as constable in Delhi Police in 1989-90. He cleared written test and interview and was found physically fit. He was selected provisionally. On verification of character and antecedents it was found that he was not desirable person to be appointed and accordingly his name was rejected. Aggrieved, he successfully approached Central Administrative Tribunal which observed that he had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offences under sections 304, 324/34 and 324 IPC and, therefore, he could not be denied right of appointment to the post under the State. In an appeal preferred by the State, this view taken by the Tribunal was under challenge. The Honble Supreme Court observed that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable for a post under the State. On account of antecedent record, the appointing authority found Sh. Sushil Kumar not desirable to be appointed to a disciplined force and that view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. Tribunal was not justified in giving direction for re-consideration of his case. It was further observed that even though Shri Sushil Kumar was discharged or acquitted in the criminal offences, same has nothing to do with question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. (emphasis supplied). The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate. The appointing authority, therefore, rightly focused this aspect and rightly considered him not desirable to continue him in service.
17. In Harichand (supra), the appellant was convicted of an offence under section 408 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-. In appeal, the Sessions Court upheld the conviction but set aside the sentence and directed release of applicant on probation under Section 4 (1) of the Act of 1958, on his entering bond for good conduct in the sum of Rs.5000/- and furnishing a surety for the like amount. The appellant was dismissed from Government service. He challenged his dismissal in High Court but without any favourable result. Thus, the appellant challenged the order of High Court in the Honble Supreme Court. The counsel representing appellant urged, on the basis of section 12 of the Act of 1958, that the appellant even though found guilty, would not suffer any disqualification, if any, attached to his conviction and therefore, he could not be removed from service. For his contention, he relied upon a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Aritha Chander Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1981 (Supp) SCC 17. While dealing with the plea of the counsel for the appellant, the Honble Supreme Court observed thus:
7. In our view Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act would apply only in respect of a disqualification that goes with a conviction under the law which provides for the offence and its punishment. That is the plain meaning of the words disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law therein. Where the law that provides for an offence and its punishment also stipulates a disqualification, a person convicted of the offence but released on probation does not by reason of Section 12 suffer the disqualification. It cannot be held that, by reason of Section 12, a conviction for an offence should not be taken into account for the purpose of dismissal of the person convicted from Government service.
In Naresh Kumar Meena (supra), the applicant therein was involved in an FIR punishable under section 3 read with Section 6 of the Rajasthan Examination Act and was ultimately admonished and was given benefit of section 3 of the Act of 1958. The applicant had applied for appointment to the post of Constable in Delhi Police but was not appointed in view of his involvement in case referred to above. His challenge to cancellation of his candidature before this Tribunal fizzled out on the basis of following observations:
Once the applicant had been held guilty of an offence and released giving him the benefit of doubt under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, he cannot claim a right to be posted keeping in view his antecedents. If the authorities felt that he is not a proper person to be so appointed, there is little scope for interference.
18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties as noted above. We are of the firm view that once the very Object of the Act of 2000 is to, inter-alia, rehabilitate the child in conflict with law and to minimise the stigma, and when a provision has been made by Legislature to achieve this object and further when there is a conscious distinction made between a juvenile and adult in conflict with law, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act of 1958 even though para material to sub section 1 of Section 19 of Act, of 2000, and the judicial precedents that have been cited by Mr.Luthra, would not be of much relevance. Once, a juvenile in conflict with law has necessarily to be dealt with under the provisions of Act of 2000, it is obvious that Act of 1958 would apply to adults.
19. We have gone through the statement of Objects and Reasons of 1958 and the same are only to release the Offenders on Probation for good conduct, instead of sentencing them to imprisonment. In several states, there were no separate probation laws and even in the States where there were number of laws they were not adequate to meet the present requirements. Meanwhile, there was increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender as useful and self reliant member of society without subjecting him to the deleterious effects of jail life. It is in this background that Central law on the subject came into being which may be uniformly applicable to all the states. The object of the Act was further to admonish in respect of certain specific acts and to empower Courts to release them on probation if they are found to be less than 21 years of age. The sole object of the Act of 1958, appears to be an endeavour to reform a person who is not a juvenile but below age of 21 years, with regard to some offence so as not to send him to jail where he may mix with hardened criminals and become menace to the society. The object of the Act, does not reflect rehabilitation of an offender.
19. Having seen different objects of the two Acts i.e. 1958 and 2000, it is now time to see if there is any material difference between Section 12 of the Act of 1958 and Act of 19 of 2000. Same read thus:
Section 12 of the Act of 1958 reads thus, 12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction.Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4 is subsequently sentenced for the original offence.
Section 19 of the Act of 2000, reads thus :
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law.
(2) The Board shall make an order directing that the relevant records of such conviction shall be removed after the expiry of the period of appeal or a reasonable period as prescribed under the rules, as the case may be.
Section 12 of the Act of 1958 and Section 19 (1) of the Act of 2000 do appear to be pari materia. There is, however, substantial difference between the two. There is no sub-section (2) in the Act of 1958, like sub-section (2) of section 19 of Act of 2000. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act of 2000 provides that record of conviction of a delinquent has to be removed after expiry of period of appeal or reasonable period as prescribed in the rules, as the case may be. Certainly, if the record of conviction has to be removed within the period of appeal or reasonable time, it would certainly mean that the conviction of a juvenile would not come in his way in securing a government job, as otherwise there was no question of removing the record as such.
20. In the context of the distinction between two Acts, the judicial precedents relied upon by Mr. Luthra, have to be analyzed. In so far as judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration Vs. Sushil Kumar (supra) is concerned, it was not a case where Sushil Kumar may have been dealt with under the provisions of either of the two Acts mentioned above. It was a simple case where having successfully competed for the post of constable, the department on verification had found that he was involved in a case under sections 304, 324/34 read with section 324 of IPC, wherein even though he was acquitted, but the concerned authorities had found him not a fit person to be appointed on the post of Constable. Honble Supreme Court observed that it is the conduct and character of a person seeking appointment to service, which is relevant and not the result of a criminal case. As mentioned above, there was no discussion in this case with regard to the effect of provisions as contained in Section 12 of the Act of 1958 or Section 19 of the Act of 2000. In Harichand vs. Director of School Education (supra), it was indeed a case where, Harichand was removed from service on account of involvement in a case under section 408 of IPC, and even though sentenced, in first instance, he was given benefit of section 4 of the Act of 1958. In this case, however, Honble Supreme Court observed that Section 12 would apply only in respect of disqualification that goes with the conviction in the law which provides for the offence and its punishment. The plain meaning of word disqualification if any, would be attaching to conviction of an offence, under such law. Under the provisions of the Act of 1958, disqualification as interpreted by the Honble Supreme Court is attaching a conviction for an offence under law as made under the Act of 1958. The position is not so insofar as the Act of 2000 is concerned. There is no provision in the Act of 1958 which may suggest that conviction will not be a disqualification for securing a Government job, whereas under the Act of 2000, keeping in view the Objects and Reasons of the Act and sub-section (2) of Section 19 thereof, it has to be held that conviction would not debar a juvenile from securing a Government job. As mentioned above, one of the main objects of the Act of 2000 is to rehabilitate a juvenile in conflict with law and reduce the stigma of conviction. Further, sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the said Act would clinch the issue beyond any pale of controversy. We are of the considered opinion that if the record of conviction of juvenile has to be removed, and that too within the period of limitation or within a reasonable time which shall not be more than six months to a year, after his conviction the same could be only with the object that the conviction of a delinquent would not come in his way in securing a government job. Any other interpretation of sub section 2 of Section 19 of the Act of 2000 would not only run counter to the Object and Reasons of Act of 2000 but also plain and simple interpretation of sub section 2 of Section 19 of Act of 2000. The judicial precedents relied upon by Mr. Luthra, referred to above, are distinguishable and would not apply to a case of the juvenile, who has been dealt with under the provisions of the Act of 2000. Insofar as the judgment of this Tribunal in Naresh Kumar Meena (supra) is concerned, it adopts similar reasons as given by the two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court as mentioned above.
21. Before we may part with this order, we would like to mention that the nation and the society owe a duty to rehabilitate those who might have fallen on bad ways at some weak moment of their lives. If reformed, the stigma of conviction, particularly when it may be for an offence which is petty, should not continue unabated for the rest of the life of a person. It is not unknown that when reformed, either because of reformatory measures that may be taken or when ones own conscious may guide one to completely change his ways, some people not only follow the ordinary guidelines or principles as settled by the society, but become totally pious and excel in all walks of life. It would be a travesty of justice if the law and the society may not give any chance to such people to come into main stream and contribute in advancement of the nation. We are, in the present case, however, concerned only with those to whom the law consciously would like to rehabilitate. We are of the considered view that the Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2000 read with Section 19 thereof would clearly suggest the intention of the Legislature in not debarring a juvenile for securing a Government job for the rest of his life. We may only further mention that in the present case, the applicant was involved in three petty cases of theft twelve years prior when he was selected on the post of constable and was given in supervision to his father. It would be too iniquitous and unjust not to rehabilitate a juvenile who was of tender years at the time of the crime and may not be himself knowing what he was doing was wrong.
22. For the reasons as mentioned above, we quash the order, Annexure A-1 dated 6.12.2006 cancelling the candidature of the applicant and in consequence thereof direct the respondents to consider appointing him on the post of Constable, which has been kept vacant on the dint of the orders passed by the Honble High Court, as continued by this Tribunal till date. In the facts and circumstances of the case, costs of the litigation are made easy.
6. Counsel for applicant has also relied upon the judgment of High Court of Delhi in WP (C) No.3566/2010 Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. Vs. Jai Prakash. In the said case, the respondents had filed original application before this Tribunal against depriving him of his employment in Delhi Police on the ground that in his application filed before the authorities, he disclosed his involvement in a criminal case under Section 32/33 of the Forest Act, 1927 read with Section 379 IPC. The Screening Committee constituted by the Commissioner of Police examined the gravity of the offence against him and relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Govt. of NCT of Delhi Vs. Sushil Kumar, 1996 (11) SCC 605 decided to cancel his candidature. Respondents therein challenged the aforesaid decision of the Delhi Police before this Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the Delhi Police cancelling the candidature on the ground that the same was done without proper application of mind and remitted the case back to the respondents so that appropriate orders are passed giving appointment to the applicant to the post of SI (Exe.). The High Court upheld the aforesaid order and thereafter the respondents have complied with the same.
7. Counsel for applicant has also relied upon the Standing Order No.371/2009 wherein the guidelines regarding concealment of information/declaration at the time of filling up application/attestation forms have been given. The relevant part of the said guidelines reads as under:
(e) As per Section 19 (1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act shall not suffer any disqualification on account of conviction in an offence under the said law.
8. The applicant has also furnished the list of 15 similarly placed Constable who have been allowed to join Delhi Police on the consideration that they were juvenile during their involvement in the criminal case.
9. The respondents had filed the reply reiterating their position stating in their impugned show cause notice as well as the order of cancellation of the candidature of the applicant dated 16.8.2010 and 17.2.2011 respectively. They have also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sunil Kumar (supra) wherein it has been held that though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant in the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof.
10. Counsel for respondents has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Delhi Administration through its Chief Secretary and others vs. Sushil Kumar, 1996 (11) SCC 605, according to which what is important is not the outcome in the criminal case but the conduct and character of the candidate. He has also relied upon the orders of the Coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in OA-1642/2009 Mahesh Dahiya Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. decided on 21.4.2010, OA-4301/2010 Surender Chahar Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. decided on 24.5.2011 and OA No.362/2011 Gulab Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police decided on 5.8.2011. All those cases have been dismissed based on the aforesaid judgment in Sushil Kumars case (supra). He has also relied upon SO No.398/2010 regarding the Policy for deciding cases of candidates provisionally selected in Delhi Police involved in criminal cases facing trial or acquitted, wherein it has been held as under:
As per Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 a juvenile who has come in conflict with law and has been dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, he/she shall not suffer any disqualification on account of conviction in an offence under the said law.
However, if a candidate who was a juvenile in conflict with law and who does not disclose such information in the Attestation Form or in both the Application as well as Attestation Form, his/her candidature will be cancelled on account of concealment.
11. We have heard the learned counsel for the applicant and the learned counsel for the respondents. In our considered view, this OA is covered in all respects by the Order of the Coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in Satya Narayan Meenas case (supra). It is an admitted fact that the applicants involvement in the criminal case was when he was a juvenile. It is also an admitted fact that he was acquitted in all the three cases charged against him. In terms of the Section 19 of the Act of 2000 itself, a juvenile shall not suffer any disqualification attached with the conviction of offence under such law. Further, according to Section 20 of the Act of 2000, all proceedings in respect of Juvenile pending in any Court on the date on which the said Act comes into force in that area shall be continued in that Court as if the said Act has not been passed and if the Court finds that juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such findings and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in that respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act. In this case there was no occasion for invoking the aforesaid Section 20 of the Act, as the applicant has already been acquitted in all the criminal cases registered against him. Therefore, in our view, the involvement of the applicant as a juvenile particularly when he has been acquitted in all those cases should not have been considered as a reason for cancelling his candidature.
12. Accordingly, this OA is allowed. Consequently, the impugned Annexure A-2 order of the respondents dated 17.2.2011 whereby the candidature of the applicant was cancelled is quashed and set aside. Further, the respondents are directed to appoint the applicant to the post of Constable (Driver) subject to fulfillment of other eligibility conditions and codal formalities w.e.f. the date from which his batchmates have been appointed with all consequential benefits such as seniority, notional fixation of pay, promotion etc. except back wages. The aforesaid directions shall be carried out within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.
( Dr. Veena Chhotray ) ( George Paracken )
Member (A) Member (J)
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