Ishwar Pal Singh vs Punjab National Bank & Ors. on 24 February, 2020

[Cites 11, Cited by 2]

Delhi High Court

Ishwar Pal Singh vs Punjab National Bank & Ors. on 24 February, 2020

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 DEL 514

Bench: C.Hari Shankar

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

ISHWAR PAL SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through Mr. Ashok Bhalla, Adv.

versus

PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK & ORS. .... Respondents
Through Mr. Pranav Sharma, Adv.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR

% JUDGMENT
24.02.2020

1. The petitioner joined the Respondent No. 1-Bank (hereinafter
referred to as ―the Bank‖) on 29th December, 1980, and was promoted
as Manager on 13th January, 1990.

2. By a terse order, dated 5th December, 1995, the petitioner was
suspended from service. The order of suspension stated that a detailed
charge-sheet would follow.

3. Two questionnaires, in tabular format, were issued to the
petitioner, by the Bank, on 6th May, 1996 and 24th September, 1996,
seeking the petitioner's explanation regarding certain perceived
irregularities in the advancing, of credit facilities, to M/s Whats
Fashion. The petitioner submitted tentative responses to the said

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 1 of 81
communications, and also sought documents, to submit a more
detailed response.

4. On 26th November, 1997, the petitioner was issued a charge-
sheet, by the Zonal Manager of the Bank, who was his disciplinary
authority. The charge-sheet called upon the petitioner to submit a
statement of defence, thereto, within 15 days. The charge-sheet
contained a single Article of Charge against the petitioner, dealing
with credit facilities sanctioned in favour of Whats Fashions, on the
petitioner's recommendation. It was alleged, in the charge-sheet, that,
by the following facts/omissions, the petitioner had failed to conduct
proper pre-sanction appraisal, and to exercise post-sanction
controls/follow-up, thereby jeopardizing the interests of the Bank:

(i) Though Whats Fashion was a new borrower, and had
opened a Current Account, with the Bank, only on 14 th
December, 1994, the Confidential Report, from the previous
bankers of Whats Fashion, was not obtained.

(ii) Despite the fact that Whats Fashion was new to the
export business, no market reports, regarding its
integrity/capabilities/work, were obtained. Neither was
inspection of the books of Whats Fashion carried out, to verify
the correctness of the figures contained in its Balance Sheet.

(iii) Facilities were extended to Whats Fashion on the strength
of photo copies of orders, unauthenticated by the buyers.
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 2 of 81
(iv) No efforts were made to ascertain as to why the
guarantor, Krishan Lal Adlakha, was offering his property for
equitable mortgage, despite having no personal or business
connections with Whats Fashion.

(v) The title deeds of the immovable property, submitted by
Whats Fashion to the Bank, contained various irregularities.
There was no certification or mention of stamp duty. The
signatures of the Sub-Registrar, on the last page, were missing,
despite the Title Deeds purporting to be originals.

(vi) Though the Title Deeds were deposited on 30th
December, 1994, and facilities were sanctioned on 10th January,
1995, legal opinion was obtained only on 12th January, 1995.

(vii) The petitioner did not ensure timely sending of Letter of
Acknowledgement, and did not take due care to ensure receipt
Acknowledgement Due Card.

(viii) Despite legal opinion having been obtained by the Bank
to the said effect, the original copy of the Sale Deed,
documentary proof of physical possession of the property by the
owner and documents regarding the identity of the guarantor,
such as passport/ration card/identity card, were not sought by
the petitioner.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 3 of 81
(ix) The documents were executed on 14th January, 1995 and,
on the same day, packing credit of ₹ 10 lakhs was disbursed, by
crediting the entire proceeds to the current account of Whats
Fashion, without obtaining any proforma invoice/Bills/receipts.
Self cash withdrawals were allowed, thereby obviating the
possibility of ensuring or verifying any use of the funds.

(x) ₹ 10 lakhs were disbursed, by the petitioner, on 14 th
January, 1995, and ₹ 73,900/- was disbursed on 17th January,
1995, on the strength of photo copies of export orders, without
insisting on submission of the original signed export orders
from the buyers. This was contrary to the terms of the sanction.

(xi) Packing Credit No. 7/1995 (for ₹ 73,900/-) was allowed,
on 17th January, 1995, against a photo copy of the export order,
which contained alterations in the dates of shipment, despite a
dissenting note put up by the Officer, Loans. Out of the said
Packing Credit of ₹ 73,800/-, cash withdrawals of ₹ 70,000/-
were allowed, without verifying end-use.

(xii) Packing Credit No 5/95, against which the total
disbursement of ₹ 4,61,250/-, was made against Letter of Credit
of US $ 17,700, was allowed, without maintaining any margin.
In this case, too, substantial cash withdrawals were permitted,
without verification of in-use.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 4 of 81
(xiii) In respect FOBP (Foreign Outward Bills Purchased) No
1/95 for US $ 15,000, drawee-wise policy was not obtained, and
Confidential Report of the buyer was not taken.

(xiv) For FOBP No. 2/95, for US $ 6056, documents were
purchased despite discrepancies being pointed out by the
Foreign Exchange Office, on account of which the Foreign
Exchange is purchased the documents under reserve and
advised the Bank to obtain an indemnity from the party. No
such indemnity was, however, obtained.

(xv) Proceeds, in respect of purchase of export documents
under FOBP No. 1/95, 2/95 and 3/95 were allowed to be
withdrawn/utilised by the borrower, instead of adjusting
overdue Packing Credits.

(xvi) ECGC (Export Credit Guarantee Certificate), was not
obtained within the stipulated period.

(xvii) Inventory checking was not done. Details of unpaid
stocks were not called for.

These alleged infractions, it was observed, amounted to failure, on the
part of the petitioner, to discharge his duties with utmost devotion and
diligence and in ensuring that the Bank's interest was protected which,
in turn, constituted ‗misconduct', in terms of Regulation 3(1), read
with Regulation 24 of the PNB Officer Employees (Conduct)

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 5 of 81
Regulations, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as ―the Conduct
Regulations‖).

5. Conduct of disciplinary proceedings, in the Bank, is governed
by the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline &
Appeal) Regulations, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as ―the Discipline
and Appeal Regulations‖). Regulations 6 and 7 thereof, which
governed the conduct of disciplinary proceedings for imposition of
major penalties, read thus:
―6. PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING MAJOR
PENALTIES
(1) No order imposing any of the major penalties
specified in clauses (f), (g), (h), (i) and (j) of
Regulation 4 shall be made except after an enquiry is
held in accordance with this regulation.

(2) Whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the
opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the
truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour
against an officer employee, it may itself enquire into,
or appoint any other Public servant (herein after
referred to as the inquiring authority) to enquire into
the truth thereof.

Explanation: When the Disciplinary Authority itself
holds the inquiry in sub regulation (8) to sub regulation
(21) to the inquiring authority shall be construed as a
reference to Disciplinary Authority.

(3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the
Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite and distinct
charges on the basis of the allegations against the
officer employee and the articles of charge, together
with a statement of the allegations, on which they are
based, shall be communicated in writing to the officer
employee, who shall be required to submit within such
time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 6 of 81
(not exceeding 15 days), or within such extended time
as may be granted by the said Authority, a written
statement of his defence.

(4) On receipt of the written statement of the officer
employee, or if no such statement is received within
the time specified, an enquiry may be held by the
Disciplinary Authority itself, or if it considers it
necessary so to do appoint under Sub-regulation (2) an
Inquiring Authority for the purpose.

Provided that it may not be necessary to hold an
inquiry in respect of the articles of charge admitted by
the officer employee in his written statement but shall
be necessary to record its findings on each such charge.

(5) The disciplinary authority shall, where it is not
the inquiring authority, forward to the inquiring
authority

i) a copy of the articles of charges and
statements of imputations of misconduct or
misbehaviour;

ii) a copy of the written statement of
defence if any, submitted by the officer
employee:

iii) a list of documents by which and list of
witnesses by whom the articles of charge are
proposed to be substantiated,
iv) a copy of statements of the witnesses, if
any;

v) evidence proving the delivery of the
articles of charge under sub-regulation (3);

vi) a copy of the order appointing the
'presenting officer' in terms of sub-regulation (6)

(6) Where the Disciplinary Authority itself
enquiries or appoints an inquiring authority for holding

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 7 of 81
an inquiry, it may, by an order, appoint a public servant
to be known as the ‗Presenting Officer' to present on
its behalf the case in support of the articles of charge.

(7) The officer employee may take the assistance of
any other officer employee but may not engage a legal
practitioner for the purpose, unless the presenting
officer, appointed by the Disciplinary Authority is a
legal practitioner or the Disciplinary Authority, having
regard to the circumstances of the case so permits.

NOTE: The officer employee shall not take the
assistance of any other officer employee who has two
pending disciplinary cases on hand in which he has to
give assistance.

(8)(a) The Inquiring Authority shall by notice in
writing specify the day on which the officer employee
shall appear in person before the inquiring authority.

(b) On the date fixed by the Inquiring Authority, the
officer employee shall appear before the Inquiring
Authority at the time, place and date specified in the
notice.

(c) The Inquiring Authority shall ask the officer
employee whether he pleads guilty or has any defence
to make and if he pleads guilty to any of the articles of
charge, the Inquiring Authority shall record the plea,
sign the record and obtain the signature of the officer
employee concerned thereon.

(d) The Inquiring Authority shall return a
finding of guilt in respect of those articles of
charge to which the officer employee concerned
pleads guilty.
(9) If the officer employee does not plead guilty,
the Inquiring Authority shall adjourn the case to a later
date not exceeding 30 days or within such extended
time as may be granted by the Inquiring Authority

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 8 of 81
(10) (a) The Inquiring Authority shall, where the
officer employee does not admit all or any of the
articles of charge, furnish to such officer employee a
list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by
whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be proved.

(b) The Inquiring Authority shall also record an
order that the officer employee may for the purpose of
preparing his defence-
(i) inspect within five days of the order or
within such further time not exceeding five days
as the Inquiring Authority may allow, the
documents listed;

(ii) submit a list of documents and witnesses
that he wants for the inquiry:

(iii) be supplied with copies of statements of
witnesses, if any, recorded earlier and the
Inquiring Authority shall furnish such copies not
later than three days before the commencement
of the examination of the witnesses by the
Inquiring Authority:

(iv) give a notice within ten days of the order
or within such further time not exceeding ten
days as the Inquiring Authority may allow for
the discovery or production of the documents
referred to in item (ii).

NOTE: The relevancy of the documents and the
examination of the witnesses referred to in item (ii)
shall be given by the officer employee concerned.

(11) The Inquiring Authority shall, on receipt of the
notice for the discovery or production of the
documents, forward the same or copies thereof to the
authority in whose custody or possession the
documents are kept with a requisition for the
production of the documents, on such date as may be
specified.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 9 of 81
(12) On receipt of the requisition under sub-
regulation (11), the authority having the custody or
possession of the requisitioned documents, shall
arrange to produce the same before the Inquiring
Authority on the date, place and time specified in the
requisition;

Provided that the authority having the custody or
possession of the requisitioned documents may claim
privilege if the production of such documents will be
against the public interest or the interest of the bank. In
that event, it shall inform the Inquiring Authority
accordingly.

(13) On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and
documentary evidence by which the articles of charge
are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on
behalf of the Disciplinary Authority. The witnesses
produced by the Presenting Officer shall be examined
by the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined
by or on behalf of the officer employee. The Presenting
Officer shall be entitled to re-examine his witnesses on
any points on which they have been cross examined,
but not on a new matter, without the leave of the
Inquiring Authority. The Inquiring Authority may also
put such questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit.

(14) Before the close of the case, in support of the
charges, the Inquiring Authority may, in its discretion,
allow the Presenting Officer to produce evidence not
included in the charge sheet or may itself call for new
evidence or recall or re-examine any witness. In such
case the officer employee shall be given opportunity to
inspect the documentary evidence before it is taken on
record, or to cross-examine a witness, who has been so
summoned. The Inquiring Authority may also allow
the officer employee to produce new evidence, if it is
of the opinion that the production of such evidence, is
necessary in the interests of justice.

(15) When the case In support of the charges is
closed, the officer employee may be required to state
his defence, orally or in writing, as he may prefer. If

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 10 of 81
the defence is made orally it shall be recorded and the
officer employee shall be required to sign the record. In
either case a copy of the statement of defence shall be
given to the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed.

(16) The evidence on behalf of the officer employee
shall then be produced. The officer employee may
examine himself in his own behalf, if he so prefers.
The witnesses produced by the officer employee shall
then be examined by the officer employee and may be
cross-examined by the Presenting Officer. The officer
employee shall be entitled to re-examine any of his
witnesses on any points on which they have been
cross-examined, but not on any new matter without the
leave of the Inquiring Authority.

(17) The Inquiring Authority may, after the officer
employee closes his evidence, and shall, if the officer
employee has not got himself examined generally
question him on the circumstances appearing against
him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the
officer employee to explain any circumstances
appearing in the evidence against him.

(18) The Inquiring Authority may, after the completion
of the production of evidence, hear the Presenting
Officer, if any appointed, and the officer employee, or
permit them to file written briefs of their respective
cases within 15 days of the date of completion of the
production of evidence, if they so desire.

(19) If the officer employee does not submit the
written statement of defence referred to in sub-
regulation (3) on or before the date specified for the
purpose or does not appear in person, or through the
assisting officer or otherwise fails or refuses to comply
with any of the provisions of these regulations, the
inquiring authority may hold the inquiry ex-parte.

(20) Whenever any Inquiring Authority, after having
heard and recorded the whole or any part of the
evidence in an inquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 11 of 81
therein, and is succeeded by another Inquiring
Authority which has, and which exercises, such
jurisdiction, the Inquiring Authority so succeeding may
act on the evidence so recorded by its predecessor, or
partly recorded by its predecessor, and partly recorded
by itself;

Provided that if the succeeding Inquiring Authority is
of the opinion that further examination of any of the
witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is
necessary-in the interest of justice it may recall,
examine, cross-examine and re-examine any such
witnesses as herein before provided.

(21) (i) On the conclusion of the inquiry, the
Inquiring Authority shall prepare a report which shall
contain the following:

(a) a gist of the articles of charge and the
statement of the imputations of misconduct or
misbehaviour;

(b) a gist of the defence of the officer
employee in respect of each article of charge;

(d) the findings on each article of charge and
the reasons therefor.

Explanation-- If, in the opinion of the Inquiring
Authority, the proceedings of the inquiry establish any
article of charge different from the original article of
charge, it may record its findings on such article of
charge;

Provided that the findings on such article of charge
shall not be recorded unless the officer employee has
either admitted the facts on which such article of
charge is based or has had a reasonable opportunity of
defending himself against such article of charge.
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 12 of 81
(ii) The Inquiring Authority, where it is not itself
the Disciplinary Authority, shall forward to the
Disciplinary Authority the records of inquiry which
shall include--
(a) the report of the inquiry prepared by it
under clause (i);

(b) the written statement of defence, if any,
submitted by the officer employee referred to in
sub-regulation (15);

(d) written briefs referred to in sub-
regulation (18), if any; and

(e) the orders, if any, made by the
Disciplinary Authority and the Inquiring
Authority in regard to the inquiry.

7. Action on the inquiry report:

(1) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the
Inquiring Authority, may, for reasons to be recorded by
it in writing, remit the case to the Inquiring Authority
for fresh or further inquiry and report and the Inquiring
Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further
inquiry according to the provisions of Regulation 6 as
far as may be.

(2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees
with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any
article of charge, record its reasons for such
disagreement and record its own findings on such
charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the
purpose.

(3) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to
its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of
the opinion that any of the penalties specified in

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 13 of 81
Regulation 4 should be imposed on the officer
employee it shall, notwithstanding anything contained
in regulation-8, make an order imposing such penalty.

(4) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its
findings on or any of the articles of charge, is of the
opinion that no penalty is called for, it may pass an
order exonerating the officer employee concerned.‖

6. On receiving the aforesaid charge-sheet, the petitioner wrote, to
the Disciplinary Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‗the DA'), on
20th December, 1997 and 12th January, 1998, requesting that he be
furnished the list of documents and witnesses, whereby the
allegations, in the charge-sheet were proposed to be substantiated. It
was submitted that, owing to the non-supply of the list of documents
and witnesses, the petitioner was handicapped from inspecting the
documents required for his defence and, consequently, was not in a
position to submit his reply to the charge-sheet.

7. The petitioner also appealed, on 16th January, 1998, against the
letter, dated 5th December, 1995 supra, whereby he had been placed
under suspension.

8. Vide letter dated 2nd February, 1998, the Chief Manager of the
Bank responded to the petitioner's representation, dated 12th January,
1998 supra, informing the petitioner that the Discipline and Appeal
Regulations did not contemplate providing the petitioner with a list of
documents/witnesses, at that stage. The petitioner was, therefore,
advised to submit his reply, to the charge-sheet, on or before 15th
February, 1998. The petitioner was, nevertheless, permitted to visit the
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 14 of 81
office of the Bank and refer to the relevant record, for which purpose
he was directed to intimate the date of his visit to the Chief Manager,
Branch Office, Daryaganj, Delhi.

9. Vide letter, dated 7th March, 1998, the Chief Manager of the
Bank informed the appellant that his appeal, dated 16 th January, 1998,
against his suspension, had been rejected by, the Appellate Authority,
who had decided not to revoke the petitioner's suspension at that
stage.

10. On 16th June, 1998, the petitioner again represented, to the DA,
submitting that, despite his earlier representations, as well as personal
visits, undertaken by him, various documents (enumerated in the
letter) had not been provided to him for inspection. The DA was,
therefore, requested to direct the Branch to make the said documents
available for inspection by the petitioner, along with the seizure memo
of the CBI, relevant to the matter. The petitioner submitted that he was
in need of these documents, in order to submit his reply to the charge-
sheet.

11. The writ petition avers that, without responding to these
communications of the petitioner, the DA, vide Order dated 27th June,
1998, informed the petitioner that it had been decided to hold an
enquiry, against him, under the Discipline and Appeal Rules, on the
charges contained in the charge-sheet dated 26th November, 1997
supra. Accordingly, an Enquiry Officer (hereinafter referred to as
―EO‖) and a Presenting Officer (hereinafter referred to as ―PO‖) were

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 15 of 81
appointed. The PO was also directed, vide endorsement on the said
Order, to collect and supply the requisite documents, as per Regulation
6.5 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, to the EO immediately,
so that the EO could initiate enquiry proceedings without delay.

12. Enquiry proceedings commenced on 22nd August, 1998. The
record of proceedings, of the said date, may be reproduced thus:

―28.10.1998
10.30 A.M.
The following are present: -

1. N. R. Ohri - EO
2. H. N. Mangal - PO
3. I. P. Singh - CO

The proceedings could not be held on 14.10.98, as EO was on
leave on account of urgent personal work, notice of today's
enquiry was sent to CSO and PO.

EO to PO - Please submit the list of documents,
witnesses along with 2 sets of attested
photocopies of the management
documents.

PO - I submit the list of 40 management
documents and 3 management witnesses.

The list of documents and witnesses is
marked as Ex. M-1, the documents are
taken on record and marked as Ex. M-2
to M-45. One set of the documents along
with the list of witnesses and documents
has been provided to CSO and received
by him.

EO to PO - Do you want to inspect these documents?

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 16 of 81
CO Yes.

CO is advised to inspect the documents
at B/O Daryaganj. PO to arrange for
inspection on 29.10.98 at B/O Daryaganj
at 10.30 A. M. sharp. Proceedings will
now be held at B/O Daryaganj
tomorrow, both parties please note for
compliance.‖

13. On 10th April, 1999, the petitioner addressed a representation, to
the DA, complaining that
(i) the EO had, without due justification, disallowed certain
documents, which were mentioned/discussed in the report, of
the Investigating Officer (hereinafter referred to as ―IO‖),
whose report constituted the basis of institution of disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner,
(ii) certain documents, allowed by the EO, though supplied,
were not attested as being true copies of the original,
(iii) two of the documents, i.e., the copy of the passport and
the investigation report, were incomplete,
(iv) four documents, demanded by the petitioner, had been
disallowed, by the EO, in violation of Regulation 12 of the
Discipline and Appeal Regulations, which permitted
disallowing, only of those documents, as were claimed to be
privileged by the custodian thereof,
(v) certain documents, though allowed, could not be
provided on account of non-availability, and
(vi) certain documents, though allowed, were yet to be
supplied.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 17 of 81
The petitioner also complained of bias, on the part of the EO, which,
according to him was apparent from the manner in which the EO was
conducting the proceedings. Consequent on the above submissions,
the petitioner prayed that the enquiry be entrusted to the Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI), or to the Central Vigilance
Commission (CVC).

14. Vide communication dated 20th April, 1999, addressed by the
Chief Manager of the Zonal Office of the Bank, the petitioner was
informed that the above representation, dated 10 th April, 1999,
submitted by him, had been rejected by the DA.

15. The writ petition makes no reference to any further proceedings,
conducted by the EO, and draws attention, next, to the enquiry report,
dated 23rd July, 1999, submitted by the EO on the conclusion of
enquiry. The enquiry report noted that proceedings, in the enquiry
were conducted on 28th October, 1998; 29th October, 1998, 3rd
November, 1998, 26th November, 1998, 27th November, 1998, 24th
December, 1998, 4th January, 1999, 29th January, 1999, 5th February,
1999, 23rd February, 1999, 8th March, 1999, 16th March, 1999, 26th
March, 1999, 23rd April, 1999, 10th May, 1999, 14th May, 1999 and
21st May, 1999. It was further noted that a list of management
documents and witnesses was tendered by the PO, which was
exhibited as Exhibit M-1 and the list of defence documents, tendered
by the petitioner, was exhibited as Exhibit D-1. Documents, sought to
be relied upon by the management were exhibited as Exhibits M-2 to

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 18 of 81
M-41, and documents cited by the petitioner in his defence, were
exhibited as Exhibits D-2 to D-53.

16. The enquiry report refers, thereafter, in detail, to the oral and
documentary evidence available. It is observed, in the enquiry report,
that the bank produced two witnesses, namely MW-1 J.K. Mamtani,
Senior Manager (Credit), Zonal Office, Delhi and MW-2 S.P. Dixit,
who were examined, and cross examined. No witness was produced
by the petitioner, in his defence.

17. The enquiry report, thereafter, sub-divides the various
allegations, against the petitioner, thus :
―(a) The borrower was new to the bank and he had opened
the Currant Account on 14.12.1994. The Confidential Report
from his previous Banker was not obtained.

(b) That the borrower was also new to the export-
business. No market report was obtained with regard to
integrity/capabilities/worth. Further, inspection of books was
not carried out to verify the correctness of the figures given in
the Balance-Sheet.

(c) The request for facilities was considered on the
strength of photo-copies of the Orders which did not bear any
authentication from the buyers.

(d) No efforts were made to ascertain as to why Shri
Krishna Lai Adlakha, the alleged guarantor, having no
personal connection with the firms in offering his property for
equitable mortgage.

(e) The Title Deeds of the immovable property submitted
to the Bank was full of apparent irregularities, such as, there
was no mention or certification of stamp duty, no signatures
of sub-Registrar on the last page and instead it mentioned as
"Signed". Though the Title Deeds ware allegedly original,

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 19 of 81
this gave, enough reasons for suspicion, but Shri Singh failed
to notice the same.

(f) The Title Deeds were deposited on 30.12.1994, prior to
sanction of facilities, i.e on 10.01.1995. Legal opinion was
obtained only on 12.01.1995. He did not ensure timely
sending of letter of acknowledgement. Further, no care. was
taken upon non-receipt of acknowledgement due card,

(g) As per legal opinion, original copy of Sale Deed,
documentary proof of physical possession of the property by
the owner and about the identity of Shri Adlakha, i.e. Pass-
port/ration-card/identity card etc. were not obtained by him .

(h) The documents were executed on 14.01.1995.
Disbursement of Packing Credit of Rs.10 lac was made on the
same day by crediting the entire proceeds to firm's Current
A/c without obtaining any proforma Invoice/Bills/Receipts
and self-cash withdrawals were allowed and thus, end-use of
funds were rot ensured/verified . To quote :-

Date Cheque No. Amount (Rs.)

14.01.95 964861 2 lac
17.1.95 964866 1 lac

(i) He allowed disbursement of Rs. 10 lac under four
Packing Credits No. 1/95 to 4/95 on 14.01.1995 and
Rs.73,900/- under Packing Credit No .7/95 on 17.01.1995 on
the strength of photo-copy of export-order without
taking/insisting on submission of original signed export order
from the buyer -in violation of sanction,

(j) Packing Credit No.7/95 was allowed against photo-
copy of the order with alterations in the dates of shipment
despite a dissenting note put up by Officer-Loans; Cash
withdrawals of Rs.70,000/- out of the Packing Credit of
Rs.73,800/- advanced were allowed and end-use were not
verified.

(k) PC No.5/55 under which total disbursement of Rs.4,61
,250/- was made against letter of Credit of US$.17 ,700/- was

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 20 of 81
allowed without maintaining any margin. Substantial, cash
withdrawals were permitted and and-use were not verified.

(l) For FOBP No.l/95, for US$. 50,000/- drawee-wise
Policy was not obtained and confidential Report of the Buyer
was not taken.

(m) FOBP No.2/95 for US$. 6,056/-, documents were
purchased despite discrepancies pointed out by Foreign
Exchange Office on account of which Foreign Exchange
Office purchased the documents under reserve and advised
the Branch to obtain an indemnity from the party which was
not obtained.

(n) that the proceeds in respect of purchase of export
documents under FOBP No.l/95, 2/95, and 3/95 were allowed
to be withdrawn/utilised by the borrower instead of adjusting
overdue PCs No.1/95, 2/95 and 4/95.

(o) ECGC Cover was not obtained within the stipulated
period.

(p) Inventory checking was not done and details of unpaid
stocks was not called for.‖

18. Having thus categorized the allegations, against the petitioner,
as contained in the charge-sheet dated 26th November, 1997, the
enquiry report proceeds to set out, in detail, the gist of the evidence,
led by the bank as well as the gist of the evidence led by the petitioner.
Thereafter, the EO has embarked on a detailed analysis of the
aforesaid evidence, in an itemized manner, resulting in the following
findings :
―FINDINGS :- In view of the above Assessment, my findings
are as under :-
Charges CHARGES CHRGES NOT
PROVED PARTLY PROVED PROVED

Charge - I CHARGE-1 CHARGE-1
a,b,c,d,f,h,I,j,l,m. g, k,n, and p e and o

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 21 of 81
Thus, the Article of Charge that Shri I.P. Singh
recommended for sanction of credit facilities in favour of M/s.
Whats Fashion without proper pre-sanction Appraisal,
disbursed the facilities in violation of bank's norms and failed
to exercise post-sanction control and follow-up; putting
bank's funds in jeopardy stands PROVED.‖

19. The aforesaid enquiry report, dated 23rd July, 1999, of the EO,
was forwarded, to the petitioner, by the DA, under cover of letter
dated 28th July, 1999, inviting his comments thereon.

20. The petitioner submitted his comments, in response to the
findings of the EO, as contained in the above enquiry report dated 23 rd
July, 1999, vide communication dated 21st August, 1999. No copy
thereof, has, however, been filed by the petitioner.

21. Vide order dated 23rd September, 1999, the suspension, of the
petitioner, was revoked. Consequent there, the petitioner rejoined
duties, with the Bank, on 23rd September, 1999.

22. Vide communication dated 30th September, 1999, the Manager
(DAC), Zonal Office, informed the petitioner that the Zonal Manager
of the Bank, in his capacity as DA of the petitioner, had decided to
impose, on the petitioner, the major penalty of ―reduction to three
stages lower in the time scale of pay for a period of three years with
further directions that he will not earn increments of pay during the
period of such reduction and on the expiry of such period the
reduction will have the effect of postponing the future increments of
his pay‖. The communication also enclosed a detailed order, dated 25 th
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 22 of 81
September, 1999, issued by the DA, in which the DA had examined,
in detail, the findings of the IO, and expressed his complete agreement
therewith.

23. The petitioner appealed, against the above order, dated 25 th
September, 1999, of the DA, vide appeal dated 13th November, 1999.

24. On the petitioner's appeal, the General Manager of the bank, as
Appellate Authority, passed a detailed order dated 24 th March, 2000,
wherein, after considering, seriatim, the various allegations against the
petitioner, the findings of the IO and decision of the DA thereon, the
following conclusion has been arrived at :
―6. I have examined the various points raised by Shri
Singh in his appeal along with records of the case. The
appellant has mainly submitted that he acted as per the
directions of his official superior and the Sanctioning
Authority was satisfied about the capacity, capability and
credit worthiness of borrower. The records reveal that there
were various lapses on the part of the appellant in discharging
of his duties as Manager (Loans). While there is merit in some
of the points raised by Shri Singh, there is no denying the fact
that as Manager (Loans), he cannot escape his responsibility
by taking defence that he was working under instructions of
the Chief Manager. Taking an overall view of the matter, in
my opinion, ends of justice would be met by imposing upon
Shri Singh major penalty of 'Reduction to one stage lower in
time scale of pay for one year with further directions that he
will not earn increments of pay during the period of such
reduction and on expiry of such period, the reduction will
have the effect of postponing the future increments of pay'
instead of the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority.
However; he will not be paid salary/wages for the period of
his suspension except the subsistence allowance paid/payable
to him.‖

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 23 of 81
25. The aforesaid order, dated 24th March, 2000, of the Appellate
Authority, was communicated, to the petitioner, by the Senior
Manager, (DAC), Zonal Office of the Bank, vide communication
dated 4th April, 2000.

26. The petitioner preferred a review petition, on 26th August, 2000,
to the Chairman and Managing Director (CMD) of the bank,
challenging the aforesaid order, dated 24th March, 2000, of the
Appellate Authority. Vide order dated 18th October, 2000,
communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 19th October, 2000,
the CMD rejected the review petition of the petitioner and confirmed
the appellate order dated 24th March, 2000.

27. Aggrieved and dissatisfied by the proceedings, initiated against
him, resulting in the imposition, on him, of the penalty of reduction to
one stage, lower in the time scale of pay for one year, without
increments during the period of reduction and with the effect of
postponing future increments of his pay, the petitioner has approached
this court, by way of the present writ petition, seeking issuance of a
writ of certiorari, quashing the order, dated 24th March, 2000, of the
Appellate Authority, as well as the entire proceedings, leading up to
the passing of the said order, starting with the charge-sheet dated 26th
November, 1997. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing of his
suspension, during the period 5th December, 1995 to 23rd September,
1999.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 24 of 81
Rival Submissions and Analysis

28. In order to avoid duplication, submissions of learned Counsel,
advanced orally in Court and tendered in writing, would be dealt with,
during the course of the findings that follow.

Scope of interference

28. It would be appropriate, at the outset, to analyse the scope of
interference, by a writ Court exercising powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, with disciplinary proceedings, and the
findings returned therein, or punishment imposed as a consequence
thereof.

29. There are authorities galore, which expound on the scope of
interference, by writ courts, with disciplinary proceedings, and orders
of punishment, passed by disciplinary authorities/appellate authorities.
We need search no further than the recent decision, of the Supreme
Court in State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj1, which encapsulates, by
reference to its earlier decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree
Rama Rao2, B.C. Chaturvedi v. U.O.I.3, U.O.I. v. H.C. Goel4, High
Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shashikant
S. Patil5, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand

1
2020 SCC OnLine SC 185
2
AIR 1963 SC 1723
3
(1995) 6 SCC 749
4
(1964) 4 SCR 781
5
(2000) 1 SCC 416

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 25 of 81
Nalwaya6, U.O.I. v. G. Gunayuthan7, Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayana8 and U.O.I. v. P. Gunasekaran9, practically all the
relevant indicia, which govern the exercise of the power of judicial
review, by writ courts, in such cases. Paras 7 to 11, 13 and 14 of the
report in N. Gangaraj1 deserve to be reproduced, in extenso, thus :
―7. We find that the interference in the order of
punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court
suffers from patent error. The power of judicial review is
confined to the decision-making process. The power of
judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on the
Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority.

8. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, a
three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court
is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is
concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under:

―7. ...The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is not
a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant: it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are
not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the
authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry
has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High
Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to

6
(2011) 4 SCC 584
7
(1997) 7 SCC 463
8
(1999) 5 SCC 762
9
(2015) 2 SCC 610

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 26 of 81
review the evidence and to arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence....‖

9. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, again, a three
Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial
review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the
manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the
court. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does
not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence
and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence.
It was held as under:

―12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is
made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that
the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure
that the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an
inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to
determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent
officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied
with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power
to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to
reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding
must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical
rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence
as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding.
When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary
authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer
is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power
of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. The
Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held
the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or
in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 27 of 81
inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by
the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If
the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable
person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal
may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and
mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the
facts of each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate
authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary
inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings
on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of
evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted
to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of
India v. H.C. Goel, this Court held at page 728 that if
the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence,
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
suffers from patent error on the face of the record or
based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be
issued.‖

10. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its
Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil, this Court held that
interference with the decision of departmental authorities is
permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation
of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory
regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
It was held as under:

―16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to
have approached the case as though it was an appeal
against the order of the administrative/disciplinary
authority of the High Court. Interference with the
decision of departmental authorities can be permitted,
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in
violation of the principles of natural justice or in
violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode
of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is
vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 28 of 81
and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the
authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or
capricious that no reasonable person could have
arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar
to the above. But we cannot overlook that the
departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary
Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the
facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The
settled legal position is that if there is some legal
evidence on which the findings can be based, then
adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a
matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ
petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.‖

11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya, this Court held that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic
enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is
possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been
fairly and properly held and the findings are based on
evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the
reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The
Court held as under:

―7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as
an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
another view is possible on the material on record. If
the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the
findings are based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the
findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts
will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in
departmental enquiries, except where such findings are
based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived
at such conclusion or finding, on the material on
record. Courts will however interfere with the findings
in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice
or statutory regulations have been violated or if the

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 29 of 81
order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or
based on extraneous considerations. (vide B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India - , Union of India v. G.
Gunayuthan - , and Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayana - , High Court of Judicature at
Bombay v. Shahsi Kant S Patil,.

xxx xxx xxx

13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran, this Court held that while reappreciating
evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority
in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the
parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in
the disciplinary proceedings:

―13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court shall not:

(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the
enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in
accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence
on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it
may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment
unless it shocks its conscience.‖

14. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent
relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad
Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 208,
wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority
records a finding that is not supported by any evidence
whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the
Writ Court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary
proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that
test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the
findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the
case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 30 of 81
finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been
interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies
in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the
evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The Inquiry
Officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding
that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.‖

30. From the above extracted passages, the following definitive
guiding principles may be said to emanate:

(i) A writ court, exercising power of judicial review over the
decision of the disciplinary or appellate authority, does not sit in
appeal over the said decisions.

(ii) The power of judicial review, vested in the writ court, is
confined to the decision making process. It is intended to
ensure that the aggrieved individual has received fair treatment
at the hands of the authorities below, and is not intended to
ensure that the conclusion of the authorities below is necessarily
correct in the eyes of the court.

(iii) The writ court is, therefore, required to determine,
essentially, whether

(a) the enquiry was held by a competent authority,
(b) the enquiry was held according to the procedure
prescribed in that regard and
(c) principles of natural justice were, or were not,
violated.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 31 of 81
(iv) So long as some evidence exists, on the basis of which
the disciplinary or appellate authorities have proceeded, and the
said evidence reasonably supports the conclusion arrived at by
the said authorities, the writ court would not review or reassess
the evidence and arrive at its independent finding thereon. At
the same time, the finding of the disciplinary/appellate authority
must be based on some evidence. If so, the adequacy,
sufficiency or even reliability of the evidence, is not open for
examination by the writ court.

(v) Technical stipulations, contained in the Evidence Act,
1872, and the standards of proof contemplated therein, do not
apply to disciplinary proceedings.

(vi) The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts,
though the appellate authority has co-extensive power to re-
appreciate evidence, as well as interfere with the punishment
awarded. The writ court will not correct an error of fact of the
disciplinary authority, howsoever grave. The exercise of
assessment of facts and re-appreciation of evidence, has,
however, necessarily to stop at the stage of the appellate
authority. The writ court is required to forbear from doing so.

(vii) The writ court can, however, interfere where
r

(a) the Enquiry Officer is not competent to enquire
into the charges,

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 32 of 81
(b) the disciplinary authority is not competent to pass
the order of punishment,
(c) the disciplinary proceedings are not in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in that regard,
(d) the principles of natural justice have been violated,
(d) the decision(s) of the authorities below is/are
vitiated by extraneous considerations,
(e) the decisions of the authorities are arbitrary or
capricious, or
(f) the conclusions of the authorities below are such as
no reasonable person, conversant with the facts would
arrive at and are, consequently, perverse.

(viii) The writ court can interfere with the quantum of
punishment if it shocks the conscience of the court, applying the
principles of Wednesbury unreasonableness.

31. In Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tiwari10, the Supreme
Court held, additionally, that a writ court could interfere with the
decision of the disciplinary/appellate authority, where the decision(s)
were vitiated by non-application of mind, or were unreasoned. In the
said case, the Supreme Court held that the appellate authority had
―added insult to injury‖, by mechanically reproducing the findings of
the disciplinary authority, thereby evidencing non-application of mind
on its part.

10
(2017) 2 SCC 308

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 33 of 81
32. In respect of delinquent bank employees, a distinct
jurisprudence has developed, which may be reflected in the following
passages, from Chairman and Managing Director, United
Commercial Bank v. P. C. Kakkar11, Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank12
and State Bank of India v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde13:
―A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of
honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the
depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the
bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the
interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost
integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing
which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and
discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every
officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court
in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional
Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] it is no defence available to say that
there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the
officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline
of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon
each of its officers and officers acting and operating within
their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself
a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges
against the employee were not casual in nature and were
serious.‖
(P. C. Kakkar11, para 14)

―As noted above, the employee accepted that there was some
lapse on his part but he pleaded lack of criminal intent. A
bank employee deals with public money. The nature of his
work demands vigilance with the inbuilt requirement to act
carefully. Any carelessness invites action.‖
(Lalit Popli12, para 20)

―Confronted with the facts and the position of law, learned
counsel for the respondent submitted that leniency may be
shown to the respondent having regard to long years of

11
(2003) 4 SCC 364
12
(2003) 3 SCC 583
13
(2006) 7 SCC 212
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 34 of 81
service rendered by the respondent to the Bank. We are
unable to countenance such submission. As already said, the
respondent being a bank officer holds a position of trust
where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of
functioning and it would not be proper to deal with the matter
leniently. The respondent was a Manager of the Bank and it
needs to be emphasised that in the banking business absolute
devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be
preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank
officer so that the confidence of the public/depositors is not
impaired. It is for this reason that when a bank officer
commits misconduct, as in the present case, for his personal
ends and against the interest of the bank and the depositors,
he must be dealt with iron hands and he does not deserve to
be dealt with leniently.‖
(Ramesh Dinkar Punde13, para 21)

33. On the aspect of susceptibility, to disciplinary proceedings, to
attack in judicial review, on the ground of violation of the principles
of natural justice, whether contained in the applicable statutory
provisions, or at common law, a caveat has been entered, by a line of
authorities of the Supreme Court, the most well-known of which is,
probably, State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma14, which held that
perceived infraction of the principles of natural justice could be vitiate
disciplinary proceedings only if, as a consequence of such infraction,
prejudice was shown to have resulted to the delinquent officer.
Helpfully, for all of whom Article 141 of the Constitution of India
enjoins the duty to faithfully follow the law laid down by the Supreme
Court, State Bank of Patiala14 neatly sets out, in para 33 (of the
report), the principles enunciated therein, thus (even while clarifying
that the said principles were not meant to be exhaustive):

14
(1996) 3 SCC 364

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 35 of 81
―(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an
employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental
enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory
provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside
automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire
whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or
(b) whether it is procedural in character.

(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied
with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial
compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in
such a case.

(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the
position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for
affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the
delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking,
conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every
procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate
the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under
-- ―no notice‖, ―no opportunity‖ and ―no hearing‖ categories,
the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be
examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether
such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee
in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found
that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be
made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting
aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no
prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is
obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it
may be remembered that there may be certain procedural
provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose
violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not
insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the
body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision
expressly providing that after the evidence of the
employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an
opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given
case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in
spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The
prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need
be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of
prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 36 of 81
considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be
looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory
provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4)
hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same
aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct
principle.

(4) (a) In the case of a procedural provision which is
not of a mandatory character, the complaint of
violation has to be examined from the standpoint of
substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order
passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside
only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to
the delinquent employee.

(b) In the case of violation of a procedural
provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to
be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in
the interest of the person proceeded against or in
public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it
must be seen whether the delinquent officer has
waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his
conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the
order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground
of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found
that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived
it or that the provision could not be waived by him,
then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate
directions (include the setting aside of the order of
punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by
the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4
SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC
704] . The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of
prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called.

(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any
rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation
is to observe the principles of natural justice -- or, for that
matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the
very nature and impact of the order/action -- the Court or the
Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation
of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation
of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 37 of 81
judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between
―no opportunity‖ and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between
―no notice‖/―no hearing‖ and ―no fair hearing‖. (a) In the case
of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid
(one may call it ‗void' or a nullity if one chooses to). In such
cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to
take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance
with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter
case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi
alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of
prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to
see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the
delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing
and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the
said query. [It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does
not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which
behalf are laid down elsewhere.]

(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the
primary principle of natural justice) the
Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the
ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule,
viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no
failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them
in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before
them.

(7) There may be situations where the interests of State or
public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi
alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to
balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural
justice and arrive at an appropriate decision.‖

34. State Bank of Patiala14 continues to be followed, till as late as
Manisha Jaiprakash v. U.O.I.15.

15
(2019) 10 SCC 115

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 38 of 81
The statutory mandamus

35. In view of the legal position, enunciated hereinabove, it
becomes essential, at the outset, to examine the statutory position, as
contained in the Discipline and Appeal Regulations.

Nature of punishment - minor or major?

36. Before doing so, I deem it appropriate to deal, at the outset, with
a submission, advanced by Mr. Bhalla, to the effect that the
punishment, awarded to his client by the appellate authority, was a
―minor punishment‖. It was sought to be contended that the penalty,
which ultimately came to be awarded to the petitioner, was covered by
clause (e) of Regulation 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations,
which dealt with minor penalties. A bare reading of Regulation 4
makes it apparent that this submission is not correct. Clauses (a) to (d)
of Regulation 4 deal with ―Minor Penalties‖, whereas clauses (f) to (j)
deal with ―Major Penalties‖. Clause (e) covers ―reduction to a lower
stage in the time scale of pay for a period not exceeding 3 years,
without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting the Officers
pension‖, whereas clause (f) covers ―reduction to a lower stage in the
time scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to
whether or not the officer will earn increments of pay during the
period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period the
reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future
increments of his pay‖, and is made subject to clause (e). At a bare

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 39 of 81
glance, it becomes apparent that, where the reduction of pay is
―without cumulative effect‖, the penalty would be minor, whereas,
where the reduction of pay is with cumulative effect, the penalty
would be major. In the present case, the disciplinary authority awarded
the penalty of ―reduction to three stages lower in the time scale of pay
for a period of three years with further directions that he will not earn
increments of pay during the period of such reduction and on the
expiry of such period the reduction will have the effect of postponing
the future increments of his pay‖, whereas the appellate authority
reduced the penalty to ―reduction to one stage lower in the time scale
of pay for one year with further directions that you will not earn
increments of pay during the period of such reduction and on expiry of
such period the reduction will have the effect of postponing the future
increments of pay‖. By stipulating that the reduction in pay would
have the effect of postponing future increments of pay, the reduction
was, in either case, cumulative. Reduction of pay, to a lower time
scale, with cumulative effect, is, expressly, a ―major penalty‖, covered
by clause (f) of Regulation 4 of the Discipline and Appeal
Regulations. The number of stages by which the pay is reduced is
irrelevant. Irrespective of the number of stages, reduction of pay with
cumulative effect is, definitively and statutorily, a ―major penalty‖. No
doubt, reduction of pay by one stage in the time scale is a lesser
penalty than reduction by three stages in the time scale; in either case,
however, the penalty is major.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 40 of 81
37. Indeed, the appellate order, dated 4th April, 2000, itself states
that the modified punishment, as awarded by the appellate authority,
was a major penalty.

38. Mr. Bhalla is, therefore, not correct in asserting that his client
was, ultimately, awarded a minor penalty.

Compliance with Regulations 6 and 7 of the Discipline and Appeal
Regulations

39. Regulation 6 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations
conceives the following procedure, for imposing major penalties (to
the extent it impacts the case at hand):

(i) Sub-Regulation (1) completely prohibits imposition of
any major penalty, except after an enquiry, held in accordance
with Regulation 6.

(ii) The DA is required to communicate in writing, to the
officer/employee concerned, a charge-sheet, containing the
articles of charge against him, along with a statement of the
allegations on which they are based. [Sub-regulation (3)]

(iii) The employee is required to submit a written statement of
his defence, within 15 days of receipt of the charge-sheet, or
within such extended time as may be granted by the DA. [Sub-
Regulation (3)]

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 41 of 81
(iv) On receipt of such statement of defence, the DA may
either himself enquire into the allegations in the charge-sheet, or
may appoint an EO for the purpose. [Sub-regulation (4)]

(v) Where the DA appoints an EO, the DA shall forward, to
the EO, copies of the charge-sheet, and the written statement of
defence of the charged employee thereto, along with, inter alia,
a list of documents, and of witnesses, by which, and by whom,
the articles of charge were proposed to be substantiated, and a
copy of statements of the witnesses, if any. [Sub-Regulation (5)]

(vi) The DA is required to appoint a PO. [Sub-Regulation (6)]

(vii) The EO is required to fix the date and time of hearing,
and to inform the DA accordingly. On the said day, the EO is
required to ask the charged employee whether he pleads guilty
to any of the charges against him and is also required to return a
finding of guilt, in respect of those charges, to which the
employee pleads guilty. [Sub-Regulation (8)]

(viii) If the employee does not plead guilty, the EO has
mandatorily to adjourn the case by not more than 30 days. [Sub-
Regulation (9)]

(ix) In such a case, the IO shall furnish, to the employee, a list
of documents, and the list of witnesses, by which, and by
whom, respectively, the charges, against the employee, are

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 42 of 81
proposed to be proved. The IO is also required to record an
order that the employee may
(a) inspect the documents listed,
(b) submit a list of documents and witnesses, that he
desires for the enquiry,
(c) give a notice, for discovery or production of the
documents desired by the charged officer,

(x) On receipt of notice for discovery or production of
documents, the EO is required to forward the notice, or copies
thereof, to the authority in whose custody or possession the
documents are kept, with a requisition for production of the
documents, on a specified date. On receipt of such requisition,
the authority, having custody or possession over the
requisitioned documents, is required to arrange for production
of the documents before the EO on the specified date, place and
time, subject to the right, of such authority, to claim privilege,
in case production of the documents is against public interest or
the interest of the Bank. [Sub-regulations (11) and (12)]

(xi) On the date fixed for inquiry, the oral and documentary
evidence, against the charged office, is required to be produced
by or on behalf of the DA.

(xii) Thereafter, the management witnesses (i.e., the witnesses
of the Bank), produced by the PO, are required to be examined
by the PO, whereafter the charged officer would be afforded an
opportunity of cross-examination. [Sub-regulation (13)]

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 43 of 81
(xii) Once the case of the management is closed, the charged
officer may be required to submit his written statement of
defence. [Sub-Regulation (15)]

(xiii) Thereafter, the defence evidence is permitted to be
produced. The CO is permitted to cross-examine himself, if he
so desires, and produce his defence witnesses, whose cross-
examination would be permitted to the PO. [Sub-Regulation
(16)]

(xiv) Once production of evidence is thus completed, the EO is
required to hear the PO and the CO, or permit them to file
written briefs within fifteen days. [Sub-Regulation (18)]

(xv) On conclusion of the inquiry, the EO is required to
submit his inquiry report, and to forward a copy thereof to the
DA, with the records of the case. [Sub-Regulation (21)]

40. Regulation 7 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations deals
with the action to be taken on the aforesaid inquiry report. The DA is
empowered, under the said Regulation, either (i) to remit the case to
the EO for a fresh or further inquiry, or, (ii) if he disagrees with the
findings of EO, record his reasons for such disagreement as well as his
own finding on charge/charges concerned, or (iii) having regard to his
findings, pass an order imposing penalty on the Charged Officer or, in
the alternative, exonerating the officer concerned.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 44 of 81
41. The procedure, as contemplated by Regulations 6 and 7 of the
Discipline and Appeal Regulations, therefore, envisages submission,
by the charged officer, of his written statement of defence, consequent
on receipt of the charge-sheet. It is only after such written statement
of defence is filed by the charged officer, that copies of the charge-
sheet, the written statement of defence of the charged officer and a list
of the documents and witnesses, by which, and by whom, the articles
of charge were proposed to be substantiated, are forwarded, by the
DA, to the EO.

42. Even at that stage, the charged officer does not receive the list
of documents of witnesses, sought to be relied upon by the
management, let alone copies of such documents. Once the EO
receives, from the DA, copies of the charge-sheet, the written
statement of defence of charged officer and, a list of documents and
witnesses on which the management proposes to rely, and copies of
statement of the witnesses, if any, and the PO has been appointed, the
EO is required to fix a date and time of hearing. On the said date, the
charged officer is given an opportunity to plead, or not, guilty. It is
only in the event that the charged officer does not plead guilty that, in
respect of the charges, regarding which the charged officer does not
plead guilty, the EO is required to furnish, to the charged officer, a list
of management documents and management witnesses. At that stage,
the EO is required to permit the charged officer to inspect the list of
documents and to submit a list of documents and witnesses that he, i.e.
the charged officer, desires, for the inquiry. Once such list of

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 45 of 81
documents is furnished by the charged officer, the EO has to issue a
notice for discovery or production thereof. The said notice is required
to be forwarded, to the authority, in whose custody or possession the
document is kept, who has to arrange for production the document
before the EO on the specified date, place and time, subject to his right
to claim prevail age. Thereafter, on the date fixed for inquiry, oral and
documentary evidence, on which the management proposes to rely, is
required to be produced before the EO, setting into motion the
exercise of examination, cross-examination and re-examination of the
witnesses.

43. The procedure followed in the present case, prior to
commencement of the recording of evidence, by the EO, of the MWs,
is thus set out, on the very first page of the enquiry report, dated 23rd
July, 1999, submitted by the EO:
―The preliminary hearing in the matter was held on
22.08.1998 wherein the officers of appointment of Enquiry
Officer and Presenting Officer were marked as Exhibit E-1
and E-3. The Charge sheet dated 26.1197 was marked as Ex.
E-2. The Charged Officer was questioned about the admission
of the charges and he confirmed having received the charge
sheet and denied all the charges as contained therein. As such,
the Presenting Officer was advised to present the case on
behalf of the management in Order to substantiate the
charges. The enquiry proceedings were held on 28.10.98,
29.10.98, 3.11.98, 26.11.98, 27.11.98, 24.12.98,
4.1.99,29.1.99,5.2.99,23.2.99,8.3.99,16.3.99,26.3.99, 23.4.99,
10.5.99,14.5.99 and 21.5.99. The Presenting Officer produced
list of management documents and witnesses. The same was
taken on record and marked as Ex. M-1 and the documents
contained therein were marked as M-2 to M-41. The Charged
Officer was given the opportunity to inspect his documents
from the original and he confirmed having done so on record.
The defence gave a list of defence documents which was

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 46 of 81
taken on record as D-1. After examining the relevancy of the
documents, the defence documents were taken on record from
D-2 to D-53. The consent letter and appointment letter of DR
was marked as D-54. Subsequently, additional defence
documents were submitted by the defence. The same were
taken on record and were marked s D-55 and D-62.‖

44. The above passage as extracted from the enquiry report makes it
apparent that the EO, in the procedure adopted by him for conducting
the inquiry against the petitioner, acted in accordance with regulations
6 and 7 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations.

Competence of the Zonal Manager to issue the charge-sheet and of the
General Manager to act as appellate authority

45. A preliminary objection, to the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against his client was taken, by Mr. Bhalla, by contending
that the aforesaid charge-sheet, dated 26th November, 1997, was issued
by an incompetent authority. The proceedings, before the authorities
below, do not disclose any objection, having been taken, by the
petitioner, to the competence, of the Zonal Manager, to issue the
charge-sheet to the petitioner. Even otherwise, the objection of Mr.
Bhalla, in this regard, misses the wood for the trees. The charge-sheet
was issued by the Zonal Manager, as DA. Mr. Bhalla does not dispute
the fact that the Zonal Manager was competent to issue the charge-
sheet. He is objection is that the Zonal Manager, who issued the
charge-sheet, was of the rank of General Manager, whereas the
charge-sheet ought to have been issued, to the petitioner, by the Zonal
Manager in the rank of Assistant General Manager, or Deputy General
Manager. In other words, the objection of Mr. Bhalla appears to be

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 47 of 81
that the officer, who issued the charge-sheet was superior in rank to
the officer who was competent to do so. The specific contention to this
effect, as advanced in para 6 of the written submissions, filed by the
petitioner, reads thus:
―That the charge sheet was void ab initio as it was issued by
the Zonal Manager in the rank of General Manager, whereas,
as per Schedule of Discipline Appeal Regulations, the charge
sheet could have been issued to the petitioner only by the
Zonal Manager in the rank of Assistant General Manager/Dy.
General Manager.‖

A bare glance at the charge-sheet, dated 26th November, 1997, reveals
that it was issued by the ―Zonal Manager‖. Once the charge-sheet was
issued by the Zonal Manager, and, in his written submissions, the
petitioner acknowledges the fact that the Zonal Manager was
competent to issue the charge-sheet, and in the absence of any such
objection having been taken in the proceedings before the authorities
below, I am not inclined to decapitate the proceedings ab initio, as
Mr. Bhalla would desire, solely on the ground that the Zonal Manager
was not sufficiently junior in rank. It is not the case, of Mr. Bhalla,
that the disciplinary authority, i.e. the Zonal Manager, who issued the
charge-sheet, was either equal, or subordinate, in rank, to his client,
i.e. the delinquent officer. Besides, in response to this submission, as
contained in the Grounds in the writ petition, the Bank has, in its
counter-affidavit, pointed out that the Zonal Manager, in the Delhi
zone, happened to be of the rank of General Manager, and, as the
Zonal Manager was the designated Disciplinary Authority, he issued
the charge-sheet. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that
the issuance of the charge-sheet, to the petitioner, by the Zonal

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 48 of 81
Manager, cannot be said to be vitiated merely because the Zonal
Manager, of the Delhi Zone, happened to be of the rank of General
Manager.

46. Objection, to the jurisdiction of the General Manager of the
Bank to act as Appellate Authority, has also been taken, in the written
submissions of the petitioner, on the ground that the disciplinary
authority, and the appellate authority, were of the same rank, i.e., both
were of the rank of General Manager. Though, hypertechnically
viewed, this submission may appear attractive, on a holistic
appreciation of the factual and legal position, it fails to impress. The
Discipline and Appeal Regulations, admittedly, designated the Zonal
Manager as the DA, and the General Manager as the Appellate
Authority. In the present case, admittedly, the charge-sheet was issued
by the Zonal Manager, and the appellate order was issued by the
General Manager. The Bank is justified in contending, in its counter-
affidavit, that, therefore, it acted in accordance with the mandate of the
Regulations. It has further been explained, in this regard, that the
disciplinary authority was at the zonal level, and the appellate
authority was at the Head Office level. Be that as it may, once the
officers, who discharge their functions as DA, and appellate authority,
qua the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner, were of the ranks
stipulated in the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, the objection, of
the petitioner, amounts to mere hair-splitting. Be it noted, in this
connection, that the petitioner has not chosen to call, into question, the
legality of any of the provisions of the Discipline and Appeal
Regulations, and remains, therefore, bound thereby.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 49 of 81
47. Besides, the appeal, dated 13th November, 1999, of the
petitioner, was itself addressed to the ―General Manager (Admn)‖,
referring to him as Appellate Authority. It cannot, therefore, lie in the
mouth of the petitioner to contend, at this stage, that the General
Manager was not competent to function as appellate authority.

48. The objection, of the petitioner, to the competence, of the
General Manager, to have functioned as Appellate Authority is also,
therefore, in my view, without merit.

Re. furnishing of documents and list of witnesses

49. Mr. Bhalla drew my attention to the letter, dated 12th January,
1998, addressed, by his client, to the DA, complaining that, till then,
his client had not been furnished the list of documents and witnesses,
as a result whereof inspection of the documents, and submission of
reply to the charge-sheet at been prejudiced. To this, the Bank
responded, on 2nd February, 1998, that there was no provision, in the
applicable Regulations, requiring supply, to the petitioner, of the list
of documents and witnesses at that stage of the disciplinary
proceedings. In view of the regulatory regime, chalked out by
Regulation 6 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, the response,
of the Bank, was perfectly in order. Regulation 6 contemplates
furnishing of the list of documents and list of witnesses only in sub-
Regulation (10)(a) thereof, after sub-Regulations (2) to (9) of
Regulation 6 stand exhausted and worked out. The procedure

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 50 of 81
envisaged by Regulation 6 contemplates service, by the DA, on the
delinquent employee, of the charge-sheet, submission of written
statement, by the employee, by way of response thereto, and
appointment of EO by the DDA, to enquire into the charges against
the employee, and it is only at that stage that the DA forwards, to the
EO, a copy of the charge-sheet, the written statement of defence, the
list of documents and list of witnesses, by which the articles of charge
were proposed to be substantiated, and copies of the statements of the
witnesses, if any. The EO so appointed, has, thereafter, to fix a date
for appearance, before him, of the charged officer, on which date the
charged officer either pleads guilty to the charges against him, or not
guilty thereto. Where the charged officer pleads not guilty, the EO is
required, under Sub-Regulation (10)(a) of Regulation 6, to furnish, to
the charged officer, the list of documents and list of witnesses. The
Bank was, therefore, perfectly correct in stating, in its letter dated 2nd
February, 1998, addressed to the petitioner, that the applicable
Regulations did not contemplate supplying, to the petitioner, the list of
documents/witnesses at that stage of the proceedings, i.e., before
submission, by the petitioner, of his written statement of defence. The
grievance, voiced by Mr. Bhalla on this score is, therefore, devoid of
substance.

50. Mr. Bhalla has also invited my attention to the communication,
dated 16th June, 1998, addressed, by the petitioner, to the DA,
consequent on receipt of the charge-sheet, wherein various documents
have been cited, of which inspection was sought by the petitioner. Mr.
Bhalla contends that the said documents were required, by his client,

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 51 of 81
for his defence, to the charges against him, which was seriously
prejudiced as a result of the failure, on the part of the Bank, to make
the said documents available to him. Answering this submission, Mr.
Arun Birbal, appearing for the Bank, draws my attention to the Note,
below Sub-Regulation (10) of Regulation 6 of the Discipline and
Appeal Regulations, which requires the charged officer to indicate the
relevancy of the documents sought by him for his defence. Mr. Birbal
submits that the petitioner, while seeking inspection of a whole host of
documents, never indicated the relevancy thereof. Having perused the
Note below Regulation 6(10) of the Discipline and Appeal
Regulations, it is obvious that the submission of Mr. Birbal merits
acceptance. The communication, dated 16th June, 1998, from the
petitioner to the DA, does not indicate as to how the documents, of
which the petitioner was seeking inspection, were relevant for the
petitioner's defence. Indeed, this aspect has not been clarified, by the
petitioner, even in the writ petition. Mr. Bhalla, during arguments in
Court, too, has advanced no submissions regarding the relevancy of
the said documents, or the manner in which his client was prejudiced,
as a result of non-furnishing thereof.

51. Prejudice, as has been noted hereinabove, has been held, by the
Supreme Court, to be the gold standard, by which the sustainability of
the arguments, regarding violation of the prescribed procedure for
conducting of the disciplinary proceedings, is required to be gauged.
Apart from the fact that no specific prejudice, to the petitioner
defence, has been demonstrated to have resulted, as a consequence of
non-furnishing of the documents cited in the communication dated

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 52 of 81
16th June, 1998 supra, the Enquiry Report of the EO, too, does not
indicate that the petitioner raised any such grievance during the
enquiry proceedings. I am not inclined, therefore, to accept the
submission, of Mr. Bhalla, that the enquiry proceedings were vitiated
on account of non-supply, to the petitioner, of documents necessary
for the petitioner's defence.

52. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was any procedural
infraction, on the part of the EO, in conducting the inquiry
proceedings, against the petitioner, vis-à-vis the procedure specified in
the Discipline and Appeal Regulations.

On merits

53. On the merits of the findings of the authorities below, Mr.
Bhalla has placed reliance on Regulation 3 of the Conduct
Regulations, to contend that, where the employee of the Bank was
acting as per the directions of his superior, it could not be alleged that
the employee had acted otherwise than on the basis of his best
judgment. He has also placed reliance, in this context, on Regulation
24. Mr. Bhalla has also sought to contend that the orders of the
disciplinary and appellate authorities were unreasoned.

54. It has already been noticed, earlier in this judgment, that the
circumstances, in which a writ court would interfere with the findings
of the EO, the DA, or the Appellate Authority, are extremely limited.
The writ court does not sit as a court of appeal over the said findings.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 53 of 81
It is only where the findings are perverse, in that no reasonable person,
acquainted with the facts, would arrive at the said findings, or are
returned without examining the evidence before the EO, or the DA,
that the writ court can interfere. On findings of fact, the DA is the final
authority. Absent ―legal perversity‖, howsoever erroneous the findings
of fact may appear, the writ court is legally circumscribed from
interfering therewith. It may be reiterated that it is only where the
error transgresses the boundaries of mere error, into the realm of
perversity, that the writ court would be concerned. These, however,
are only some of the indicia, to be borne in mind by the writ court,
while exercising judicial review over the findings of the DA.

55. Keeping the above principles in mind, a comparative
assessment of the various charges, against the petitioner, vis-à-vis the
findings of the EO and the DA thereon, reveals the following picture:

Allegation Finding of EO Finding of DA

(a) What Fashion was a new  Ex. M-2 indicated that  It was a matter of record
customer. Confidential Current Account was that no report was
Report, from the previous opened, by What obtained from Syndicate
banker, was not obtained. Fashion, with the Bank Bank, as required by the
on 14thDecember, guidelines of the Bank.
1994, and loan
application was  The contention, of the
submitted on 16th petitioner, that What
December, 1994 (Ex. Fashion was not availing
M-3). any credit facility, and as
such, confidential Report
 Ex. M-4 and Ex. B-4 was obtained, was not
indicated that tenable.
Syndicate Bank was
the earlier banker of
What Fashion.

 No Confidential

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 54 of 81
Report had been
obtained from
Syndicate Bank.

 Petitioner's contention
that responsibility to
obtain Confidential
Reports was of Mr B.
B. Gandhi, was not
acceptable, as he had
visited the party along
with the petitioner.

 Hence, the charge was
proved.

(b) Despite being the new  It was evident, from  It was a matter of record
borrower, no market Ex. M-9, that no that no market report, of
report, regarding the market report had been What Fashion had been
integrity/capability/work, obtained, regarding the obtained, as the column
of What Fashion, was integrity/capability/wo in the Confidential
obtained. Inspection of rk of What Fashion, as Report of What Fashion,
the books of What the column, regarding to this effect, had not
Fashion was also not the Market Report, been filled up, and had
carried out, to verify the was left blank therein. been left blank.
correctness of the figures
in the balance sheet.  The reliance, by the  Regarding inspection of
petitioner, on the books, the contention, of
Confidential Report, the petitioner, that the
dated 30th December, columns, relating to the
1994, of What figures in the Balance
Fashion, sent to the Sheet, had been duly
Zonal Office, was not filled in, in the
relevant, as the said Confidential Report
Confidential Report originally sent to the
did not form part of Zonal Office, was not
the documents tenable, as the market
pertaining to the report of the guarantor
recommendations, by had been reflected in
the petitioner, for place of What Fashion
sanction of credit and its proprietor.
facilities to What
Fashion.

 The petitioner had
admitted being a
signatory to the said
Confidential Report.

 The petitioner had also
failed to comply with

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 55 of 81
the guidelines, of the
Bank, as contained in
Ex. M-17.

 The difference, in Ex.
M-4, under the head
‗Assets and Liabilities'
in the Capital Account
and investment of the
Proprietor of What
Fashion, in the same
document, indicated
that inspection of the
Books of What
Fashion had not been
carried out, to verify
the correctness of the
figures given in the
Balance Sheet. The
difference in figures
was clear, and was not
disputed by the
petitioner.

 The contention, of the
petitioner, that
verification of the
Books of What
Fashion ought to have
been done by V. B.
Gandhi, was not
tenable, as the
petitioner had not refer
to any evidence,
indicating that he had
brought this fact to the
notice of Mr. Gandhi,
who had advised him
to ignore the same.

 The allegation was,
therefore, proved.

(c) The request for facilities  It was clear, from Ex.  It was a matter of record
was considered on the M-14, that the that the request for grant
strength of photo copies facilities, which was of facilities was
of orders, which were not sanctioned, were based considered on the
authenticated by the on photo copies of strength of photo copies
buyers. Orders, which were of the orders which did
not authenticated by not bear any
the buyers. authentication from the
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 56 of 81
 As per Ex. M-24, buyers against bank
advance to be granted rules.
against a firm order,
and genuineness of the  The contention, of the
order was required to petitioner, that the
be verified. authentication was
obtained, is contrary to
 The petitioner sought the record as the same
to contend that the had not been signed by
orders were fax the buyers but had been
messages, and thus, stamped by the borrower.
there was no need for
authentication thereon
by the buyers, as the
fax messages
themselves had been
authenticated/signed
by the buyers, for
which purpose the
reference was made to
Ex. D-24 and D-25.
However, perusal of
the said exhibits did
not show that they
were signed by the
buyer. Rather, Ex. D-
24 was stamped by
Joginder Singh Sethi,
the proprietor of What
Fashion.

 The petitioner's
contention was not,
therefore, accepted. It
was important for the
petitioner, as per the
guidelines of the Bank,
to determine the
genuineness of the
Orders.

 The petitioner's
submission that the
matter had earlier been
referred to the Zonal
Office, which had
examined the
documentation, was
not supported by any
documentary evidence.
In any event, the
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 57 of 81
petitioner, as Manager
(Loans), had
necessarily to look into
the aspect of having
confirmed orders on
record, duly
authenticated, and to
satisfy itself about the
genuineness of the
orders. Verification of
the genuineness of the
orders was also
essential, as the Bank
had to ensure that the
goods were exported
to the buyer as per
street specifications
laid down by the
buyer, for compliance
by the exporter, i.e.
What Fashion.

 Ex. M-33 revealed that
the Bank had pointed
out that there were
discrepancies as per
the terms and
conditions of the photo
copies of the Order is
submitted, in
compliance, therewith,
by What Fashion.

(d) No efforts were made to  The management had  The contention of the
ascertain as to why Shri been able prove the petitioner, that no
Krishna Lal Adlakha, the said charge, by oral evidence had been
alleged guarantor, despite evidence of MW-1, produced by the
having no personal who stated that it was management, to support,
connection with the essential to know this that he was required to
firms, offered his feature. find out the relationship
property for equitable between the guarantor
mortgage.  The petitioner sought and borrower, is not
to contend that there tenable.
were no guidelines, in
support of the said  The liability of the
allegation. guarantor was co-
existence with that of the
 O-50, Chapter-IX(g) borrower and no person
page-9, made it clear would take pecuniary
that all formalities obligation of others
were required to be unless he had some kind

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 58 of 81
completed in order to of relationship or
prove the intention consideration with the
relating to the borrower.
documents of title.
 Therefore, it was
 Thus, the intention of incumbent upon the
the guarantor to petitioner to find out the
deposit the title deeds relationship between the
had essentially to be borrower and the
gathered. guarantor.

 Hence, the contention
of the petitioner was
not maintainable and
the charge was proved.

(e) The title deeds of the  The management had
immoveable property substantiated the said
submitted to the Bank charge through the oral
were full of apparent evidence of MW-4 and
irregularities. There was by way of Ex-M-14,
no certification of stamp- which highlighted the
duty, no signatures of discrepancies.
sub-Registrar on the last
page and instead it  The petitioner
mentioned as ―Signed‖. contested the said
Though the title deeds charges, on the basis
were allegedly original, of opinion given by
this provided enough the legal advisors,
reasons for suspicion, but exhibited as Ex. M-23
the petitioner failed to and Ex-D-19.
notice the same.
 Perusal of the said two
documents confirmed
that the original sale
deed was deposited
with the Bank and the
same was genuine.

 The charge, therefore,
was not proved.

(f) The title deeds were  Ex-M-10 indicated  It is evident that the
deposited in the Bank on that the title deed was advance has been made
30.12.1994, prior to the deposited on subsequent to the date on
sanction of facilities i.e. 30.12.1994. which the equitable
on 10.01.1995 and legal mortgage has been
opinion was obtained  Ex-M-12 and Ex-M-23 created which is contrary
only on 12.01.1995. clearly proved that to the Bank's guidelines.
The petitioner failed to facilities were
send the sanctioned on  Acknowledgement card
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 59 of 81
acknowledgement letter 10.01.1995 and legal was sent on 11.2.95 i.e.
in time and no care was opinion was obtained after one month and it
taken by him in regard to on 12.10.1995 was not ensured that the
the non-receipt of respectively. AD card has been
‗acknowledgment due received back.
card'.  Petitioner submitted
that he had submitted  Had the CSO followed
the title deed to the up the matter as per
Loans Department on Bank's guidelines, the
30.12.2014 to prepare factual position would
a loan proposal of M/s have come to notice
Whats Fashion. much earlier.

 An important
document like title
deed could not be kept
loose and unentered in
the relevant document
register.

 Petitioner also
submitted that he was
not aware of any rule
which prohibited the
acceptance of such
title deeds for being
kept in safe custody,
and that the legal
opinion was obtained
in time and before
disbursement.

 In this case, the
advance had been
made subsequent to
the date on which the
equitable mortgage
had been created,
which was not in
accordance with Ex-
M-19 and O-50,
Chapter-11(7) -
Clause 8(b).

 Deposition of MW-1
clearly proved that
letter of
acknowledgement was
sent on 11.02.1995
(MEX-21), exactly
after one month of

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 60 of 81
sanction of loan.
 On perusal of Ex-M-
22, it is clear that
Chapter-IX (page 9)
categorically stated
under sub-clause (g),
that acknowledgment
should be sent to the
customer via
registered post and the
postal
acknowledgment
should be duly
scrutinized.

 Having not followed
the matter pertaining
to the
acknowledgement and
sending the same after
one month, does not
confirm the spirit of
procedural guidelines.

(g) As per legal opinion,  Ex-M-23 clearly  The petitioner had failed
original copy of sale indicated the legal to ensure identification of
deed, documentary proof opinion obtained in Sh. Adlakha, guarantor
of physical possession of this regard. suggested by Bank's
the property and identity advocate.
documents i.e.  Petitioner, on the other
passport/ration card etc. hand, relied on Ex-M-  The petitioner prepared
of Sh. Adlakha, were not 23 and O-19, which the CR of Sh. Adlakha,
obtained. proved that original but it had come to notice
copy of the sale deed that he never stayed at
was deposited in the the said address.
Bank.

 Fact of physical
possession of the
property, was
established by Ex-D-3
and M-10.

 Relying on the legal
opinion attained in this
regard, the contention
of the petitioner, with
regard to the
genuineness of the sale
deed, was accepted.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 61 of 81
 Submission in regard
to identification of Sh.
KL Adlakha was not
accepted as the CR of
the guarantor (M-10)
had been prepared and
signed by the
petitioner himself.

 It had been confirmed
that the documents to
identify Sh. Adlakha,
were not obtained, and
it was incumbent upon
the petitioner to ensure
such identification.

 To the extent of failure
to obtain proper
identity proof of Sh.
Adlakha, therefore, the
allegation stood
proved.

(h) Despite documents  The management had  The contention of the
executed on 14.01.1995, placed its reliance on petitioner, that there was
disbursement of packing Ex-M-27, M-14 and no stipulation regarding
credit of Rs. 10 lac was guidelines as disbursement of PC in
made on the same day by contained in Ex-M-24 phases was not tenable,
crediting the entire along with deposition as before release of such
proceeds, without, of MW-1. a huge amount, he failed
obtaining any proforma to verify, whether the
invoice/bills and  The petitioner party had adequate
verifying end use of contended that the capacity to execute four
funds. orders were to be orders at one stage.
executed during the
month of
January/February,
1995, and any delay
would have caused
failure in execution of
the export orders.

 It is evident from Ex-
M-24 (Chapter No.5,
Page-7(18), that the
disbursement has to be
in stages.

 The contention of the
petitioner that it was
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 62 of 81
the duty of the other
department to verify
the end-use of funds, is
not maintainable in
view of the deposition
made by MW-1.

(i) Disbursement of Rs. 10  The management has  It was a matter of record
lac under four packing placed reliance on Ex- that disbursement was
credit No. 1/95 to 4/95 on M-24, M-24, (Clause made on the basis of
14.01.1995 and of Rs. 14 to 21), MEX-38, photocopies of the
73,900/- under Packing M-218 and the oral orders.
credit No. 7/95 on deposition of MW-1.
17.01.1995, was done on  The contention of the
the strength of photo  Petitioner contends petitioner that the
copy of export order. that this charge is computerized fax
absolutely incorrect messages could contain
because computerized signatures etc. was not
fax messages were on tenable.
record as Ex-D-50.
 One of the reasons for
 It was the petitioner's rejection, the ECGC, the
contention that the claim, was that the orders
correct date of PCL against which PC
7/95 is 19.9.1995 and advances had been
not 17.01.1995. granted were not
confirmed orders, and
 On examination, the were not
contention of the authenticated/signed by
petitioner was found the buyer.
not to be maintainable,
as fax messages were
not covered under the
clause.

 Perusal of M-12, i.e.
the sanction letter
categorically stated
that PC was to be
opened against each
LC/confirmed order.

 The contention, of the
petitioner, that the
genuineness was
approved because
advance payment was
received, could not be
accepted as receiving
of advance payment,
was no substitute for
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 63 of 81
the requirement of
obtaining original
orders.

 Perusal of Ex-D-24
and D-25 did not show
that the same had been
authenticated by the
buyer.

 M-28 also revealed
that the Loans Officer
had categorically
pointed out the expiry
of the order under
reference, but the
petitioner had still
allowed the PC to be
availed.

(j) Packing credit No. 7/95  Regarding PC No. 7/95,
was allowed against it was specifically
photo copy of the order mentioned that the date
with alteration in the of shipment had elapsed
dates of shipment, Same findings as of (i) on 15.3.95 and that the
despite, a dissenting note letter on record was not
put up by the Officer- from the buyer but from
Loans. A cash withdrawal the borrower.
of Rs. 70,000 out of
Packing Credit of Rs.
73,800 was allowed and
end-use was not verified.
(k) Disbursement of  The allegation, on  The end use of the funds
Rs. 4,61,250/- under PC facts, stood established so credited in the Current
No. 5/95, was allowed by Ex-M-29. Account had not been
without maintaining any verified and the amount
margin and substantial  According to the of PC was released and
cash withdrawals were petitioner, 25% margin no margin was
permitted without was duly maintained maintained.
verifying the end-use. as the LC was for
Rs.6,20,000,
approximately and
amount disbursed was
Rs. 4,61,250.

 As regards
withdrawals, the
petitioner had
submitted that he was
not concerned. As
regard end-use, the

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 64 of 81
petitioner contended
that the same stood
verified from the fact
that the shipment was
duly made and
documents were sent
for collection under
FOBP No. 3/95 dated
3.4.95.

 The contention of the
petitioner regarding
maintenance of proper
margin was found, on
verification, to be
tenable.

 The contention of the
petitioner, with regard
to allowing substantial
cash withdrawals,
without verifying end
use, is not
maintainable. MW-1,
had confirmed in his
oral deposition, that
end-use had to be
verified by the Loans
Department.

 Ex-M-29 indicated
that inventories were
not checked at regular
intervals.

 The allegation,
therefore, stood proved
to the extent of failure,
on the petitioner's
part, regarding cash
withdrawals and
verification of end-use.

(l) For FOBP No. 1/95, for  Petitioner has based its  As regards the contention
USD 50,000, drawee- case on Ex-M-31, of the petitioner that the
wise policy was not which was signed by ECBC was obtained by
obtained and confidential the petitioner. the party, it is a matter of
report of the buyer was record that in case of
not taken.  Petitioner contended, FOBP 1/95 for USD
per contra, that the 15,000 drawee-policy
Bank had lodged its and also CR of the buyer

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 65 of 81
claim to the ECGC were not obtained, in
vide Ex-M-36 and that contravention of the
the claim was rejected terms of sanction.
on 09.04.1997, vide
Ex-M-38.

 Perusal of Ex-M-38
made it clear that the
same related to PC's
granted on 14.1.95 and
19.5.95, whereas the
PC under reference
was granted on
22.02.1995 and as
such was not subject
matter covered under
Ex-M-38.

 Ex-M-14 indicated
that drawee-wise
policy was not
obtained and CR of the
buyer was not
obtained, and in view
of this, contention of
the petitioner was not
tenable.

(m) FOBP No. 2/95 for USD  The Bank relied on
6056, was purchased Ex-M-32, the voucher
despite discrepancies for FOBP 2/95 signed
indicated by the Foreign by the petitioner, Ex-
Exchange Office. M-33, vide which FEO
has pointed out certain
discrepancies and
advised the Branch to
obtain indemnity from
the party.

 The petitioner
contends that FOBP
2/95 was purchased in
due course and
proceeds thereof were
received in due course
on 12.12.1995.

 After perusing Ex-M-
32, it is evident that
the petitioner had
signed the said

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 66 of 81
voucher and that the
FEO had pointed out
certain discrepancies
to the Branch on
20.03.1995.

 These discrepancies
should have been take
note of by the Branch
at the time of
forwarding the
documents to FEO,
which they drastically
failed.

 The Branch had
definitely put the
Bank's funds at stake
by not obtaining
indemnity from the
party as suggested by
the FEO vide Ex-M-
38.

(n) That the proceeds in  The petitioner has tried  The proceeds in respect
respect of purchase of to justify his stand, by of purchase of FOBP No.
export documents under stating that FOBP No. 1/95 and 2/95 were
FOBP No. 1/95, 2/95 and 1/95 for USD 15,000 allowed to be withdrawn
3/95 were allowed to be was purchased on by the borrower instead
utilized by the borrower 22.02.1995, by of adjusting overdue
instead of adjusting creating a FOBP entry packing credit, thereby
overdue against PC No. of Rs. 4.65 lac. putting Bank's funds into
1/95, 2/95 and 4/95. jeopardy.
 Petitioner contended
that the terms of
sanction, provided that
FOBP proceeds will be
first utilized towards
adjustment of relative
packing credit
accounts.

 Ex-M-25, para no.5,
clearly indicated that
packing credit
advances are required
to be adjusted by
proceeds of relative
export bills.

 On examining the

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 67 of 81
sanction letter, it is
clear that FOBP
proceeds will be first
utilized towards
adjusting relative
packing credit, and in
view thereof, the
contention of the
petitioner is not
tenable.

 However, in regard,
FOBP 3/95, petitioner
cannot be held
responsible for the
same, as he was on
leave.

(o) ECGC cover was not  The management
obtained within the relied on Ex-M-14 and
stipulated period. on the other hand,
petitioner relied on D-
6, D-7, D-8, 9 and 10,
which alleges to prove
that ECGC cover was
duly obtained.

 Perusal of the defence
exhibits indicated that
the policy was duly
obtained by the party
under which the Bank
had also preferred the
claim.

 The charge, therefore,
was not proved.

(p) Inventory was not  According to the
checked and details of petitioner, various
unpaid stocks not called officials of the Branch
for. checked the inventory,
and it was the
responsibility of the
checking officers.

 After examining the
documents, it was
apparent that the
inventories were not
regularly checked and
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 68 of 81
the aspect of unpaid
stocks was also not
looked into.

 Petitioner relied on
Ex-M-14, M-32 (a,b&
c), M-38, D-19, D-33,
D-38 and D-39 etc., in
this regard.

 The contention of the
petitioner had due
weightage and
therefore he cannot be
held wholly
responsible for the
entire loss amounting
to Rs. 19.53 lac.

56. The above tabular analysis of the allegations against the
petitioner, the observations of the EO, and the findings of the DA
thereon, reveal that, for each and every allegation, the EO and the DA
have, each, examined the evidence, perused the exhibits, and, after
reference thereto, arrived at their conclusions, item- and allegation-
wise. The findings of the DA, though much more brief than those of
the IO, have also examined each aspect of the allegations against the
petitioner, seriatim. The Enquiry Report reveals, further, that, before
embarking on his own observations and conclusions, regarding the
ingredients of the charge against the petitioner, the EO has set out, in
detail, the depositions of the witnesses, the particulars of the evidence
and, separately, the gist of the submissions of the Bank and of the
petitioner. The DA, too, has set out, in the impugned order, dated 25th
September, 1999, all the submissions, of the petitioner, in response to
the Enquiry Report, and has dealt with the submissions on merits.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 69 of 81
Clearly, there has been complete, and thorough, application of mind,
both by the EO as well as by the DA.

57. The Order, dated 24th March, 2000, of the appellate authority
also sets out, in para 5, the various submissions of the petitioner, in the
appeal, seriatim. Thereafter, the appellate authority, after observing
that the main submission of the petitioner was that he had acted as per
the directions of his official superior, and to the satisfaction of the
sanctioning authority, regarding the capacity, capability and
creditworthiness of Whats Fashion, goes on to observe that the record
revealed, nevertheless, lapses, on the part of the petitioner, in
discharge of his duties as Manager (Loans). The Appellate authority
has held that, even if, on some of the points, there was merit in the
submissions of the petitioner, the petitioner could not escape his
responsibility, by claiming to have acted under the instructions of the
Chief Manager. Following thereon, the appellate authority has, on
taking an overall view of the matter, opined that the ends of justice
would be met by imposition, on the petitioner, of the major penalty of
reduction to one stage lower in the time scale of pay, for one year,
with cumulative effect. This reveals, additionally, that the Appellate
Authority independently applied his mind to the merits of the case of
the petitioner, and exercised his discretion in reducing the punishment,
as originally awarded by the DA.

58. Due care, caution and circumspection has been accorded, to the
case of the petitioner, as well as to the submissions advanced by him
in defence to the allegations against him, by the EO, the DA and the

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 70 of 81
appellate authority, and, in my view, the petitioner could not hope for
anything better. The Supreme Court has, in the judgments already
cited hereinabove, specifically held that the degree of care and
caution, required to be exercised by an official of a Bank, as a person
who holds public monies in trust in fudiciary capacity, is much higher
than that required to be exercised by other government officials. It is
expected, of an official of a bank, especially of a managerial stature,
that he takes all precautions to ensure that the affairs of the bank or
conducted in such a manner as to minimise losses and maximise
returns and, thereby, secure the monies of the investing public, which
the bank holds in trust. Commercial - rather, financial - prudence has
necessarily to guide the exercise of discretion, of every official of the
Bank. Want of due care, by a Bank official, is itself a serious lapse,
actionable at law by recourse to disciplinary proceedings, irrespective
of whether, as a consequence thereof, actual loss has, or has not,
resulted.

59. In my view, therefore, the grievance, of the petitioner, regarding
the punishment awarded to him, as reduced by the appellate authority
and, later, confirmed by the reviewing authority, is without substance.
If anything, the petitioner has been treated with leniency, considering
that he was an official of the Bank, holding a responsible position of
Manager (Loans), at the time. This Court is, in fact, entirely unable to
fathom how the petitioner can at all claim to be aggrieved by the
punishment ultimately awarded to him. This writ petition, on the face
of it, appears merely to be by way of a second - rather, a fourth - bite
at the cherry.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 71 of 81
Re. suspension

60. The prayer, of the petitioner, for setting aside the suspension, of
the petitioner, from 5th December, 1995 to 23rd September, 1999 is
also, in my view, devoid of substance. Regulation 12(1)(a) of the
Discipline and Appeal Regulations empowers the Bank to place an
employee under suspension, ―where a disciplinary proceeding against
him is contemplated or is pending‖. The order, dated 5 th December,
1995, placing the petitioner under suspension, specifically stated that a
detailed charge-sheet would follow. No doubt, the formal charge-
sheet, claim to be issued, to the petitioner, on 26 th November, 1997;
prior thereto, however, the petitioner was given an opportunity to
explain the perceived lapses on his part, for which purpose, in less
than six months from the petitioner having been placed on suspension,
a tabular questionnaire was issued, to the petitioner, on 6 th May, 1996.
On finding the petitioner's explanation, to the said allegations, to be
unsatisfactory, a formal charge-sheet was issued, to the petitioner on
26th November, 1997.

61. It cannot, therefore, reasonably be contended that the
suspension, of the petitioner, was not in contemplation of disciplinary
proceedings. The order, dated 5th December, 1995, expressly stated
that a formal charge-sheet would follow. This, in my opinion, was
more than sufficient to serve as a recital that the suspension was in
contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. A formal charge-sheet did,
actually, follow the order of suspension, and the suspension order,
thereby, stood vindicated.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 72 of 81
62. Mr. Bhalla has also contended that the petitioner was selectively
suspended. He submits that other officers who were equally, if not
more, culpable, in extending financial accommodation to Whats
Fashion, were not so suspended. Such selective suspension, he
submits, is impermissible in law, and would serve to vitiate the
suspension of the petitioner itself. He relies, in this context, on the
decision of the Supreme Court in In re. T. V. Choudhary16.

63. This submission, unfortunately, does not merit acceptance, for
various reasons.

64. Firstly, it cannot be said that, in respect of the facilities
extended to Whats Fashion, the role played by all the officers was
identical. Selective suspension may constitute a ground for
interference by a court; that, however, would be in a situation in which
more than one officer play identical roles in the alleged transgression,
in that it is impossible to distinguish between the role played by one
officer and the role played by another. In such a situation, it may be
possible to argue that selective suspension of one, or more of such
identically situated officers, violates Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India. Even in such a case, however, the relief - if it
may be called that - which, ordinarily, a Court could grant, would be
to direct suspension of the other officers, who are identically situated.
That, however, would throw up, in turn, several competing
considerations, including the locus standi of the suspended officer to

16
(1987) 3 SCC 258

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 73 of 81
seek suspension of other officers. Ordinarily, even if such an order
were to be passed, it would have to be in the presence of the other
identically situated officers, after giving them due opportunity of
representation. No such situation, obviously, arises in the present case.
The petitioner has, as it were, merely tossed, into the air, an argument
that the Senior Manager, the Chief Manager and other officers who
were also responsible, to one extent or the other, in extending of
financial accommodation to Whats Fashion, never had to suffer the
ignominy of suspension. As to whether the role played by the
petitioner was identical to that played by the Senior Manager, the
Chief Manager, and other officers, in the entire imbroglio, is
anybody's guess. This Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, is hopelessly incapacitated from returning
a finding in that regard, especially on the basis of the material that the
petitioner has deigned to place on record.

65. Secondly, it is, by now, an elemental truism that Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution of India do not contemplate negative equality.
One need only refer, in this context, to the following passage from
Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer17, followed, recently, in P.
Singaravelan v. District Collector, Tiruppur18:
―It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the
Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud,
even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases.
The said provision does not envisage negative equality but
has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly
situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit
inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer

17
(2013) 14 SCC 81
18
2019 SCC OnLine SC 1641
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 74 of 81
any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a
wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be
perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in
illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or
court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has
been committed in favour of an individual or a group of
individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial
forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or
superior court for repeating or multiplying the same
irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong
order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular
party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the
basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14
cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make
functioning of administration impossible. (Vide Chandigarh
Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [(1995) 1 SCC 745 : AIR 1995 SC
705] , Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(2005) 9
SCC 164 : AIR 2005 SC 565] , K.K. Bhalla v. State of
M.P. [(2006) 3 SCC 581 : AIR 2006 SC 898] and Fuljit
Kaur v. State of Punjab [(2010) 11 SCC 455 : AIR 2010 SC
1937] .)‖
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The petitioner can, therefore, succeed in his attempt at eviscerating his
suspension, from service, only by demonstrating that the suspension
was itself illegal, or unjustified, and not by piggybacking on the fact
of non-suspension of other officers. No sustainable case, warranting
any finding, by this Court, holding the suspension, of the petitioner,
to be unjustified has, in my view, been made out.

66. Thirdly, whether to place an officer under suspension, or not, is
a decision which is complex, and involves several competing - and,
on occasion, conflicting - considerations. The nature of the act
committed, the role played by the officer therein, vis-à-vis other
officers who may be involved in the commission of the said act, the
degree of culpability of the officer, the consequences that have ensued
W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 75 of 81
as a result of the commission of the act, the necessity of keeping the
officer outside the regular administrative maelstrom, for any period of
time, whether before, or during the disciplinary proceedings, seen in
the light of the propensity of the officer to interfere with the
investigative, or the disciplinary, process - these are all factors,
themselves illustrative, rather than exhaustive, which must inform the
decision of whether to suspend, or not to suspend, a concerned officer.
The prejudice that would result to the administration, were the officer
to be allowed to discharge his duties in normal course, has to be
weighed, in the balance, against the prejudice caused to the officer, as
a result of not being allowed to perform his duties, and suffer the
undeniable ignominy of suspension. Any decision, by the
administrative authority, to suspend, en bloc, all the officers, who may
have played any role in the commission of the act concerned, may
itself be perilously pregnable to challenge as arbitrary and vitiated by
insufficient application of mind. It cannot, therefore, ordinarily lie in
the mouth of an officer, who has been suspended, to complain, in a
challenge, before a judicial authority, against the order of suspension,
that other officers, similarly situated, had not been suspended.

67. Mr. Bhalla has placed reliance, in support of his submission, on
In re. T. V. Choudhary16. This decision, in my view, does not
advance the cause of the petitioner. The order, of the Supreme Court,
was passed on an application, by T. V. Chaudhary, to recall the earlier
orders, passed by the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition. In
the course of its judgment, the Supreme Court referred to an earlier

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 76 of 81
order, passed by it, on 5th May, 1986, in the proceedings, in which the
following observations were to be found:
―It is somewhat surprising that the petitioner alone should
have been placed under suspension by the State Government
pending contemplated departmental enquiry under Rule 13 of
the A. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1963 and not the other two officers T. V. Chaudhary
and S. M. Rao Choudhary, the then Managing Director who
appears are equally culpable.

... We are afraid, if the State Government does not
pass any order placing the other officers under suspension it
may become necessary for the court to revoke the suspension
of the petitioner at the next hearing.‖

It needs no involved legal analysis, to note, even at first glance, that
the above observations of the Supreme Court, do not constitute
declaration of the law, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India,
to the effect that the non-suspension of all other officers who may be
involved, to any extent, in the act, for commission whereof a
particular officer may have been suspended, would invariably entitle
the suspended officer to seek quashing of his suspension. At best, they
sound a note of warning to the administration. Significantly, these
observations, too, have been made in the face of a positive finding that
the two officers, who were not suspended, were ―equally culpable‖.
This Court, in the present case, is unable to return any positive finding
that the Senior Manager, or the Chief Manager, of the Bank, were
―equally culpable‖, vis-à-vis the petitioner, in extending of financial
accommodation to Whats Fashion.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 77 of 81
68. Mr. Bhalla has also placed reliance on the well-known decision
of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. U.O.I.19, to
contend that the suspension of the petitioner, having continued for a
period in excess of three months, stood vitiated, ipso facto, thereby.
There can be no manner of doubt that, in Ajay Kumar Choudhary19, a
clear, and unequivocal, direction, was issued, by the Supreme Court,
to the effect that ―the currency of a suspension order should not
extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of
charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent
officer/employee‖. Was, however, this enunciation, in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary19, intended to be declaratory of the law, within the
meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, so as to apply to
all suspensions, before, during , and after the said enunciation? In the
opinion of this Court, the answer, to this poser, has necessarily to be
in the negative.

69. On a plain reading of the judgment, it appears that the Supreme
Court, while prescribing that orders of suspension should not continue
beyond the period of three months, in Ajay Kumar Choudhary19, did
not intend the prescription to be declaratory of the law, within the
meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. This impression is
fortified by a reading of para 21 of the report in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary19, which may be reproduced, to advantage, thus:
―We, therefore, direct that the currency of a suspension order
should not extend beyond three months if within this period
the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the
delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of

19
(2015) 7 SCC 291

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 78 of 81
charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be
passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in
hand, the Government is free to transfer the person concerned
to any department in any of its offices within or outside the
State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may
have and which he may misuse for obstructing the
investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit
him from contacting any person, or handling records and
documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence.
We think this will adequately safeguard the universally
recognised principle of human dignity and the right to a
speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the
Government in the prosecution. We recognise that the
previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash
proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to
their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the
period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law,
and would not be contrary to the interests of justice.
Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance
Commission that pending a criminal investigation,
departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands
superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.‖

(Emphasis supplied)

In my opinion, the very opening words of para-21 of the report in
Ajay Kumar Choudhary19 act as a sufficient marker to indicate that
the said decision cannot be used as a guillotine, to decapitate, as it
were, all earlier orders of suspension, rendered at any time in the past,
ad infinitum, which continued for a period of more than three months.
The Supreme Court has taken care to quell, pre-emptorily as it were,
any possibility of such an interpretation being accorded to its
directives, as contained in para-21 of the report (as extracted
hereinabove), by clothing the enunciation in the form of a direction,
rather than a declaration of the law as it always was.

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 79 of 81
70. The period of suspension of the petitioner, having commenced
on 5th December, 1995, and come to an end on 7th March, 1998, a
decade and a half before Ajay Kumar Choudhary19, I am of the
opinion that the petitioner cannot seek invalidation, by this Court, of
his suspension, to the extent it continued beyond the period of three
months, reckoned from 5th December, 1995. The reliance, by Mr.
Bhalla, on Ajay Kumar Choudhary19 is, therefore, in my opinion,
misplaced.

71. Ajay Kumar Choudhary19 was, in fact, considered, by the
Supreme Court, recently, in State of Tamil Nadu v. Promod Kumar20.
Without going into detail, into the actual issue in controversy in the
said case, it is relevant to note that, though the respondent, before the
Supreme Court, have been placed under suspension for six years, and
had invoked Ajay Kumar Choudhary19, on the basis whereof the High
Court had declared the suspension to be illegal, the Supreme Court, in
appeal at the instance of the State, did not affirm the view of the High
Court, but merely held that further continuance of the suspension was
unwarranted.

72. In conjunction with the above, it has to be borne in mind that
the appeal, of the petitioner, against his order of suspension, was
rejected, by the Chief Manager of the Bank , on 7 th March, 1998, and
the petitioner did not choose, at that stage, to challenge the order of
rejection before any appropriate forum.

20
(2018) 17 SCC 677

W.P. (C) 2018/2003 Page 80 of 81
73. The challenge, by the petitioner, to his suspension, from
service, therefore, fails.

Conclusion

74. Resultantly, I am of the opinion that the prayer, in the present
writ petition, is devoid of merit. No occasion arises for this Court
either to interfere with the punishment ultimately awarded to the
petitioner, or with his placement, under suspension, for the period
from 5th December, 1995 to 23rd September, 1999.

75. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed, with no orders as to
costs.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

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