Allahabad High Court
Bal Govind Sonkar And Vikram Singh ... vs State Of U.P. on 17 December, 2007
JUDGMENT S.S. Kulshrestha, J.
1. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called to be Code) has been brought for quashing the proceedings of complaint case No. 5969 of 1981 (new number 6039 of 1983/93), Ram Narayan Dixit v. DP. Singh and six Ors., under Sections 147, 342, 365, 367 IPC pending in the court of A.C.J.M.-I, Agra and also for quashing the order dated 10.10.2007 whereby non-bailable warrants were issued against the applicants.
2. It is said that the applicant No. 1 Sri Bal Govind Sonkar was posted in the year 1981 as Sub-Inspector, Firozabad (Dakshin), Agra and applicant No. 2 Sri Vikram Singh was in those days posted as Superintendent of Police (Rural Area) Agra. Sri Ashok Dixit, s/o Sri Ram Narayan Dixit (complainant) is having criminal history of about 60 cases and is the gang member. He was arrested by Police Hariparvat, Agra in a case under the U.P. Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act (hereinafter called to be the Act) and the applicants had nothing to do with the said arrest. However, in the complaint brought by Sri Ram Narayan Dixit seven police personnels including the applicants had been arraigned as the accused for the offences under Sections 147, 342, 365, 367 IPC with the allegations that on 24.8.1980 they lifted Sri Ashok Dixit for the purpose of killing him in a fake encounter. The complainant at the stage under Section 202 of the Code had examined the witnesses namely S/Sri Darshan Singh Sikarwar, Shiv Shankar @ Bhola, Sewa Ram Sharma, Om Prakash Dubey, chhavi ram Sharma, sevati Lal Sharma, Chhote Lal Tyagi, Ashok Dixit and Chhotey Lal. On the basis of their statements and other materials cognizance of the offences appears to have been taken by the learned Magistrate and the applicants and other persons named in the complaint were summoned. Applicants had put in their appearance and an application was moved on behalf of the applicant No. 2 for exempting his presence from the proceedings. Objections were filed on behalf of the complainant but that application is still lying undisposed of. Apart from other pleas it was contended that though Sri Ashok Dixit was detained by Police Hariparvat and the applicants had nothing to do with it. Alternatively this act was done by the police personnels in the discharge of their official duties and they are squarely protected under Section 197 of the Code. Agreeing with this proposition the learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint for the want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code but the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in criminal revision No. 529 of 1982 vide the order dated 5.8.1983 set aside the order passed by the learned A.C.J.M.-I, Agra holding it to be premature and directed the learned Magistrate to summon the General Diary from the concerned police station so as to make the ascertainment whether such an act of the police personnels was in the discharge of their official duties. Since then the matter is pending for decision including that of the application for exemption moved on behalf of the applicant No. 2. The learned Magistrate though several times issued reminders to Police Firozabad (North) and Police Jaitpur, Agra for furnishing the General Diary of the relevant dates but the same could not be furnished as having been weeded out and the issue of protection under Section 197 of the Code remained undecided. The General Diary of Police Station Hariparvat, Agra was not summoned though the detention under the Act pertained to that police station. Not only this the learned Magistrate rushed up to issue non-bailable warrants against the applicants. It is also said that Sri Ram Narayan Dixit expired in the year 2003 and so the proceedings ought to have been dismissed as abated.
3. Before proceeding to make the disposal of this case it may be mentioned that a period of 26 years has already elapsed and the matter is still hanging for the determination of the issues as to whether the proceedings of complaint case have been abated on the death of complainant and police personnels are protected under Section 197 of the Code or not. Postponing a decision on the applicability or otherwise would lead to the proceedings being dragged on in the trial court. In the given circumstances to avoid unnecessary prolongation of the trial, the legal issues of the sanction and abatement of the proceedings and sanction under Section 197 are taken up for final disposal.
4. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the applicants that the proceedings of the complaint case ought to have been terminated as having been abated on the death of complainant. It may be necessary to mention that from the application and the counter affidavit it is clear that after the death of Sri Ram Narayan Dixit, his son Sri Arun Dixit and thereafter Sri Ashok Dixit were permitted to do necessary Pairavi in the Gomplaint case. Such permission could be granted to the heirs of the complainant under Section 302 Cr.P.C. to continue the proceedings and it is no longer res-intigra as the same has been concluded by the Apex Court in the case of Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra . It was observed:
This case was being heard under Chapter XVIII which divides committal cases into two classes (a) those commenced on a police report and (b) other cases. The first kind is tried under the procedure laid down in Section 207 A. With that procedure we are not concerned. The other oases are tried under the procedure as laid down in the other provisions of Chapter XVIII. Section 208 of this Chapter provides that in any proceeding instituted otherwise than on police report the Magistrate shall "when the accused appears or is brought before him, proceed to hear the complainant (if any) and take in manner hereinafter provided all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution or on behalf of the accused, or as may be called for by the Magistrate". The Magistrate then hears evidence for the prosecution unless he makes an order of commitment and after recording the evidence and examining the accused (if necessary) frames a charge. He may, after hearing further evidence, which the accused may wish to produce, (unless for reasons to be recorded, the Magistrate deems it unnecessary to do so) either discharge the accused cancelling the charge or commit him to stand his trial before the Court of Session. There is no provision about the acquittal or discharge of the accused on the failure of the complainant to attend the court. This is not an omission but a deliberate departure from the Chapters on the trial of summons and warrant cases. In such trials, on the absence of the complainant, the accused is either acquitted or discharged. The intention appears to be that the Magistrate should proceed with the inquiry because had it not been so intended, the Code would have said what would happen if the complainant remains absent.
5. In the case of Rashida Kamaluddin Syed v. Shaikh Saheblal Mardan the Apex Court also observed:
From the above case law, in our opinion, it is clear that on the death of Shaikh Saheblal, the case did not abate. It was, therefore, open to the sons of the complainant to apply for continuation of proceedings against the accused persons. By granting such prayer, no illegality has been committed by the courts.
There is an additional reason as to why the order should not be interfered with at this stage. As we have already noted, the complainant died in November 1996, Immediately thereafter, the sons applied for impleadment allowing them to continue prosecution against the accused persons by the application dated 17.1.1997. The said application was allowed and permission was granted by an order dated 23.5.1997. The said order was never challenged by the appellants and it had become final. Name of the first respondent was entered on 4.5.2000. Thereafter witnesses were also examined. Insofar as application dated 4.8.2004 of the accused is concerned, it was under Section 239 of the Code which provides for discharge of the accused. The only ground put forward by the accused was that no prima facie case had been made out against them. In the light of above facts also, in our opinion, this is not a fit case to exercise discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Here in this case during the pendency of the proceedings, complainant died, his sons were permitted to continue the prosecution. Magistrate granted permission. That order, having not been challenged by the applicant, become final. Even otherwise there appears no illegality in the grant of permission. Proceedings of complaint case therefore, did not abate.
6. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the applicants that even if the allegations made in the complaint with regard to the arrest or detention of Sri Ashok Dixit, son of the complainant are accepted to be true on its face value, the alleged act or omission was done by the applicants while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties and no cognizance could be taken by the learned Magistrate except with the previous sanction of the State Government. It was argued that since no such sanction was obtained by the complainant, complaint case was not maintainable at law and was liable to be dismissed only on that ground. The learned Magistrate after taking into consideration the allegations made in the complaint dismissed the complaint as the same was not maintainable for the want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code. But the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in criminal revision set aside that order observing that the decision of the learned Magistrate was premature. He ought to have seen the entries in the General Diary whether they warrant the detention of the applicants in any of the offences or whether the lifting of Sri Ashok Dixit, the son of the complainant, was for the purpose as was alleged by the complainant. The learned Counsel for the complainant submitted that it was all premature act of the learned Magistrate even otherwise, the want of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code did not affect the jurisdiction of the court to proceed in the circumstances when there are allegations that "lifted for making his encounter". It may be one of the defences available to the accused and he can raise that defence at the appropriate stage. Further on this ground the proceedings of the complaint case ought not to have been held up and the accused could be tried. This submission made on behalf of the complainant cannot be accepted in view of the opening words of Section 197(1) of the Code and the object sought to be achieved by it, and the decisions of Supreme Court clearly indicate that a prosecution hit by that provision cannot be launched without the contemplated sanction. It is a condition precedent as it were, for a successful prosecution of a public servant when the provision is attracted. This plea of the applicants is required to be attended properly and cannot be deferred.
7. Coming to the facts of this case, the question is whether the applicants were acting in their official capacity while the alleged offence was committed or was performing a duty in their capacity as a police officers which led to the offence complained of. From the allegations made in the complaint, this fact itself is ascertainable that Sri Ashok Dixit, the son of the complainant was detained by Police Hariparvat, Agra under the Act. His detention was also challenged in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 7236/1980 in this Court. In the meantime he was let off on bail and the petition was dismissed as infructuous. Such detention of the applicants in a case at P.S. Hariparvat would itself falsify the suspicion so raised by the complainant with regard to the lifting of his son Sri Ashok Dixit for the purpose of killing. The grievance of the complainant that his son Sri Ashok Dixit was booked by the police and chosen to have encounter is unfounded. Such detention of Sri Ashok Dixit at the same time cannot be said to be malafide as he is history-sheeter. As many as 60 cases are pending against him. Some of the cases may be referred as under:
(1) Case Crime No. 436/69 under Sections 452/323 IPC (2) Case Crime No. 433/70 under Section 392 IPC (3) Case Crime No. 378/70 under Sections 395/397 IPC (4) Case Crime No. 434/71 under Section 147/148/324 IPC (5) Case Crime No. 374/72 under Section 308 IPC 6. Case Crime No. 436/69 192/73380/427/504 IPC (7) Case Crime No. 337/73 under Sections 332/353/420 IPC (8) Case Crime No. 338/73 under Section 342 IPC (9) Case Crime No. 261/73 under Sections 147/323 IPC (10) Case Crime No. 478/74 under Sections 147/323/342 IPC (11) Case Crime No. 528/74 under Sections 147/148/323/324 IPC (12) Case Crime No. 1/75 under Sections 147/323/426 IPC (13)Case Crime No. 145/75 under Sections 147/452/307 IPC (14) Case Crime No. 399/75 under Section 379 IPC (15) Case Crime No. 421/75 under Sections 36(4) 143 DIR (16) Case Crime No. 422/75 under Sections 147/224/225/353/336 IPC (17) Case Crime No. 561/75 under Section 380 IPC (18) Case Crime No. 241/77 under Sections 452/427 IPC (19) Case Crime No. 619/77 under Sections 147/332/323/452 IPC (20)Case Crime No. 9/78 under Sections 452/332/504 IPC (21)Case Crime No. 236/78 under Section 302 IPC (22) Case Crime No. 540/80 under Section 307 IPC (23)Case Crime No. 391/80 under Section 307 IPC (24) Case Crime No. 420/81 under Section 302 IPC (25) Case Crime No. 94/82 under Sections 147/149/307 IPC (26) Case Crime No. 79/82 under Sections 147/307 IPC (27) Case Crime No. 290/82 under Sections 3 U.P. Acta Activities (28)Case Crime No. 34/83 under Section 302 IPC (29) Case Crime No. 607/85 under Section 392 IPC (30) Case Crime No. 351 /86 under Sections 147/148149/307/302/120 B IPC (31) Case Crime No. 528/86 under Sections 147/323/504/325 IPC (32) Case Crime No. 97/86 under Section 3 Gangster Act (33)Case Crime No. 35/86 under Section 2/3 Goonda Act (34) Case Crime No. 146/88 under Section 2/3 Gangster Act (35)Case Crime No. 155/88 under Sections 147/148/149/452/307 IPC (36) Case Crime No. 107/89 under Sections 384 IPC (37) Case Crime No. 1273/89 under Sections 307/302/120 IPC (38) Case Crime No. 301/90 under Section 384 IPC (39) Case Crime No. 1804/92 under Section 3 U.P. Goonda Act (40)Case Crime No. 145/93 under Sections 147/323 IPC (41)Case Crime No. 384/86 under Sections 224/225/353 IPC (42) Case Crime No. 13/86 under Sections 394/379 IPC (43) Case Crime No. 208/87 under Section 307 IPC (44) Case Crime No. 221/87 under Section 2/3 Gangster Act (45) Case Crime No. 205/93 under Sections 3/25 Arms Act (46) Case Crime No. 201/93 under Sections 307/342/323/504 IPC (47) Case Crime No. 412/93 under Section 3 U.P. Goonda Act (48) Case Crime No. 230/02 under Sections 147/148/149/307/120 IPC (49)Case Crime No. Nil/02 under Section 2/3 N.S.A. (50) Case Crime No. 67/03 under Section 396 IPC (51)Case Crime No. 174/03 under Section 307 IPC (52) Case Crime No. 134/03 under Section 307 IPC (53) NCR-64/06 under Sections 352/504/506 IPC (54)Case Crime No. 131/07 under Section 110GCRPC(55) Case Crime No. 617/07 under Sections 147/148/149/307 IPC (56) Case Crime No. 619/07 under Sections 25 Arms Act (57) Case Crime No. 627/07 under Section 2/3 Gangster Act (58) Case Crime No. 641/07 under Section 3(2) N.S.A.
8. Criminal activities on the part of Sri Ashok Dixit could be noticed by the police and he was lodged at P.S Hariparvat, Agra. After getting the release of Sri Ashok Dixit, his his father brought this complaint, which appears to have been brought for oblique motives of harassing, pressurizing and thereby blackmailing the police personnel. Such complaint cannot be used to take vengeance. A note of this fact may be taken that the state police have to perform a difficult and delicate task, particularly in view of the deteriorating law and order situation, communal riots, political turmoil, student unrest, terrorist activities and among others the increasing number of underworld and armed gangs and criminals. Many hard-core criminals like extremists, terrorists, drug paddlers, smugglers who have organised gangs, have taken strong roots in the society. If for taking effective steps the police officers have to face criminal cases brought by the complainant, they would be demoralised. It is however, controverted by the learned Counsel for the opposite party complainant that Sri Ashok Dixit had been booked in several cases for political reasons. As many as 60 cases including of heinous crimes have been referred against him. For curbing his criminal activities if police personnels are questioned, in the ultimate analysis the society would suffer. To deal such a situation and it is all the more so, in view of the expectation of the society police has to deal with the criminals in an efficient and effective manner and bring them to books, who are involved in the crime. The crime can not however be worst than the decease.
9. Even if it is assumed to be an offence committed during the course of the performance of the official duties by the applicants it would attract provision of Section 197 of the Code. In the case of Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar , the Apex Court observed as under:
... There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty, if the answer to his question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case.
...'Official' according to dictionary, means pertaining to an office, and official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. Use of the expression, 'official duty' implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The Section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty.
... It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty, if the answer to his question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant....
10. The Supreme Court in the case of State of HP. v. M.P. Gupta (2004) 2 SCC 394 : AIR 2004 SC 730 observed as under
It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the Section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a public officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not attracted. If, on facts, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to be official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed.
The act, complained of, in particular when the detained Sri Ashok Dixit was also released on bail in the offence for which was detained at police station Hariparvat, is directly concerned with their official duties, then sanction would be necessary. Mere suspicion of the complainant that his son was detained by police for encounter would not be the ground for bypassing the protection as provided under Section 197(1) of the Code. The act of the police personnels so complained, can only be said to have been done in the discharge of their official duty, as they arrested and detained Sri Ashok Dixit in anti social activities. The proceedings of complaint case cannot go on and would be without jurisdiction for the want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code. In Madhavrao Scendhia and Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandraji Rao Angre and Ors. J.T. 1988(1) SC 79 it was held by the Apex Court that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482 of the Code, it is also to take into consideration any special features which appear in particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Here for the want of sanction prosecution cannot take place, and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue. In the given circumstances, the application is well merited.
Application is allowed and the proceeding of complaint case are hereby quashed.