Bombay High Court
M/S Aniket College Of Social Work vs Asstt.Provident Fund Commissioner on 11 August, 2017
Author: Rohit B. Deo
Bench: B.P. Dharmadhikari, Rohit B. Deo
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO.54 OF 2004
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.2493 OF 2003
M/s. Aniket College of Social Work
(Aniket Shikshan Sanstha, Dighori),
Desaiganj, Wadsa, District Gadchiroli,
through its Secretary. .... APPELLANT
VERSUS
1) Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner,
Sub-Regional Office, 132-A, Ridge Road,
Raje Raghuji Nagar, Nagpur.
2) Secretary, Social Welfare Department,
Mantralaya, Mumbai. .... RESPONDENTS
______________________________________________________________
Shri S.S. Ghate, Advocate for the appellant,
Shri R.S. Sundaram, Advocate for respondent No.1,
Shri A.S.Fulzele, Acting Government Pleader for respondent No.2.
______________________________________________________________
CORAM : B.P. DHARMADHIKARI AND
ROHIT B. DEO, JJ.
DATE OF RESERVING THE JUDGMENT
: 08-06-2017
DATE OF PRONOUNCING THE JUDGMENT : 11-08-2017
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JUDGMENT :(PER : ROHIT B. DEO, J.)
1. This letters patent appeal assails the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 08-12-2003 in Writ Petition 2493/2003 dismissing the writ petition and affirming the order and determination dated 04-01-2000 under Section 7-A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short "the Act") made by respondent 1.
2. FACTUAL MATRIX :-
2.1 The petitioner is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950.
The petitioner is an educational institution, which conducts courses of Bachelor of Social Work and Master of Social Work from a rented premises at Desaiganj Wadsa in Gadchiroli District. 2.1 Pursuant to an inspection and enquiry conducted by the Enforcement Officer appointed under Section 13(1) of the Act, the authority under the Act prima facie found the petitioner in default in remittance of provident fund, family pension fund and insurance fund contribution and administrative charges payable in accordance with ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 3 lpa54.04 the provisions of the Act, the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1951, the Employees' Family Pension Scheme, 1971 and the Employees' Deposit Linked Insurance Scheme, 1976. The petitioner having disputed the applicability of the Act, proceedings under Section 7-A of the Act were initiated, which culminated into order dated 04-01-2000.
2.3 The petitioner/employer sought a review of the said determination, as is envisaged under Section 7-B of the Act. By an order dated 28-11-2002, the application seeking review was summarily rejected by a reasoned order. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was not heard at the stage of rejection of the review application. 2.4 The petitioner/employer raised three contentions before the learned Single Judge. The first contention was that since the petitioner society indisputably employees less than 50 persons who work without the aid of power, the establishment is exempted under Section 16(1)
(a) of the Act. The second contention was that the establishment is also exempted in view of the provisions of Section 16(1)(b) of the Act and the third contention was that the application for review could not have been rejected without due notice and hearing. ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 :::
4 lpa54.04 2.5 Dealing with the first contention that employing less than 50 persons who work without the aid of power qualifies the petitioner society for exemption, the learned Single Judge held that even if electricity or power is used by an educational institution for lighting, cooling or heating, as the case may be, the work of teaching is with the aid of power. The learned Single Judge further held that on a true and faithful interpretation of the exemption provision, only establishments to which there is no power supply are exempted. The second contention was rejected by the learned Single Judge in view of the admitted position that at the relevant time the institution was not under the control of either the Central Government or State Government and the employees were not entitled to the benefits of any contributory fund or old age pension in accordance with any scheme or rule framed by the Central Government or the State Government, governing such benefits. The third contention that the order of rejection of review was in violation of the principles of natural justice, was rejected by the learned Single Judge holding that the requirement of notice would not apply where the application for review is summarily rejected under Section 7-B (3) of the Act. 2.6 During the pendency of appeal, the appellant has impleaded ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 5 lpa54.04 respondent-Secretary, Social Welfare Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai and has brought on record that with effect from 07-10-2006 the State Government has extended grant-in-aid to the appellant institution. The effort of the appellant is to demonstrate that at least from 07-10-2006 the appellant society is exempted from the provision of the Act in view of Section 16(1)(b) of the Act. 2.7. The contention that the establishment of the petitioner society is exempted in view of the provisions of Section 16(1)(a) raises an interesting and important question of interpretation of the expression "working without the aid of power" used in the said exemption provision. The learned Single Judge was of the view that on a true and faithful construction of exemption provision that the work shall have to be construed as work with the aid of power even if power is used only for the purpose of lighting, cooling or heating. The learned Single Judge has taken a view that exemption is available only to those establishments, which do not have power supply.
3. The Act provides for Provident Funds, Family Pension Funds and Deposit Linked Insurance Funds for employees in factories and other establishments and is a beneficial social welfare legislation, ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 6 lpa54.04 the object of which is to ensure health and other benefits to the employees as is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Provident Fund Commissioner vs. S.D. College reported in (1997) 1 SCC 241. Section 16 of the Act which falls for consideration in this appeal reads thus :
"16. Act not to apply to certain establishments - (1) This Act shall not apply -
(a) to any establishment registered under the Co-
operative Societies Act, 1912 (2 of 1912), or under any other law for the time being in force in any State relating to co- operative societies, employing less than fifty persons and working without the aid of power; or
(b) to any other establishment belonging to or under the control of the Central Government or a State Government and whose employees are entitled to the benefit of contributory Provident Fund or old age pension in accordance with any Scheme or rule framed by the Central Government or the State Government governing such benefits; or
(c) to any other establishment set up under any Central, Provincial or State Act and whose employees are entitled to the benefits of contributory provident fund or old age pension in accordance with any Scheme or rule framed under that Act governing such benefits.
(2) If the Central Government is of opinion that having regard to the financial position of any class of (establishments) or other circumstances of the case, it is necessary or expedient so to do, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification, exempt (whether prospectively or retrospectively,) that class of (establishments) from the operation of this Act for such period as may be specified in the notification."
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4. Shri Ghate, learned Counsel for the appellant would urge that the learned Single Judge felt in serious error in holding that the exemption shall be available only to those establishments who have not availed power supply. He would urge that the use of electricity to provide light or other amenities at the work place would not mean or imply that the work was with the aid of power. He would further urge that working with the aid of power necessarily implies that the work in the establishment is with the use of power and the use of power must have direct and proximate nexus to the work. Shri Ghate, learned Counsel has invited our attention to the following judgments, to which we shall advert at a later stage in the judgment.
(a) Gateway Auto Services, Bombay vs. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation and another reported in 1980 Mh.L.J. 339.
(b) M/s. Kalpana Kala Kendra, Kanpur vs. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Kanpur reported in 1985 LAB I C 763.
(c) Employees' State Insurance vs. Bhag Singh reported in 1988 LIC 1170.
(d) Esic, Bombay vs. Vyankatesh Cop. Processors Society Ltd. & another reported in 1993 (2) LLJ 394 ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 8 lpa54.04 Bombay.
(e) U.I.I. & others vs. Digamber Jain Secondary School reported in 2003 I CLR 233.
(f) Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. Sanatan Dharam Girls Secondary School and others reported in 2006 III CLR 1046.
(g) Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Employees' State Insurance Corporation reported in (2008) 3 SCC 247.
5. Per contra, Dr. R.S. Sundaram, learned Counsel for respondent 1 would urge that the act is a piece of beneficial social welfare legislation and must receive a liberal and purposive construction, which would advance the object thereof. Dr. R.S. Sundaram, learned Counsel would urge that a beneficial social welfare legislation must not be construed narrowly or technically and if two interpretations are possible, an interpretation, which would effectuate the legislative intent must be adopted. He would urge that the view of the learned Single Judge is in consonance with the rule of liberal interpretation of beneficial social welfare legislation. He would also urge that Section 16, which provides for exemption of certain establishments/classes of establishment from the provisions of ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 9 lpa54.04 the beneficial social welfare legislation, must be strictly construed.
6. The Act is indeed a piece of social welfare legislation and as is contended by the learned Counsel appearing for respondent 1, must receive a liberal construction, which would effectuate the intention of the legislature. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.D. Shetty v. Ceat Ltd., (2002)1 SCC 193 held in paragraph 12 thus :
""12. ... One must not lose sight of the fact that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and the provision of subsistence allowance made is intended to serve a definite purpose of sustaining the workman and his family members during the bad time when he is under suspension, pending inquiry. This provision is enacted with a view to ensure social welfare and security. Hence, such a beneficial piece of legislation has to be understood and construed in its proper and correct perspective so as to advance the legislative intention underlying its enactment rather than abolish it. Assuming two views are possible, the one, which is in tune with the legislative intention and furthers the same, should be preferred to the one which would frustrate it. ..."
7. It is equally well settled that any provision, which provides for exemption from beneficial social welfare legislation must be construed strictly. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nathi Devi v. Radha ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 10 lpa54.04 Devi Gupta (2005) 2 SCC 271, observes thus :
"19. The Delhi Rent Control Act primarily is a legislation meant for protection of tenants from their eviction from the tenanted premises. Section 14 occurring in Chapter III of the Act provides for control of eviction of tenants. It puts an embargo as regards recovery of possession of any premises at the instance of the landlord unless the Controller satisfies himself as regards existence of any of the grounds specifically referred to in the proviso appended thereto. Clause (e) appended to the proviso enables a landlord to file a suit for eviction on the ground that the premises let out for residential purposes are required bona fide by him for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. An embargo has been placed on a transferee landlord to recover possession from the tenant by sub-section (6) of Section 14 of the Act which is in the following terms:
"14. (6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub-section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition."
21. Sections 14-A to 14-D carve out an exception to Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The said provisions envisage recovery of immediate possession of the tenanted premises by
(i) the members of armed forces, (ii) the Central Government and Delhi Administration employees who have retired or who would be retiring, and (iii) where the landlord is a widow. All the aforementioned provisions refer to the immediate necessity of the landlord.
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22. The provisions contained in Sections 14-A to 14-D being in the nature of exception to the main provision, they must be construed strictly.
23. Where the statute provides for an exemption from the rigours of a beneficial statute for tenants, the landlord with a view to obtain immediate possession thereof must plead and prove the requirements envisaged therein. In other words the conditions precedent contained therein must be complied with."
8. In Lalappa Lingappa and others vs. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. reported in AIR 1981 SC 852 while propounding that while interpreting a social welfare legislation, the Court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to caution that when language is plain and unambiguous, the same must be given effect to whatever may be the consequences. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court read thus :
"13. In constructing a social welfare legislation, the court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction; if a Section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfills the policy of the Act, and is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed. When, however, the language is plain and unambiguous, as here, we must give effect to it whatever may be the consequences, for, in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the legislature and not for the courts to consider. The argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 12 lpa54.04 statute is obscure and there are two methods of construction. In their anxiety to advance beneficent purpose of legislation, the courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none."
9. Shri Ghate, learned Counsel relies on paragraph 22 of the judgment in Gateway Auto Services, Bombay vs. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation and another, 1980 Mh.L.J.
330. However, the learned Single Judge has only referred to the submissions of the employer and to a judgment of the Madras High Court, which was pressed in service to contend that the manufacturing process could not be said to be with the aid of power. The learned Single Judge observes that the facts in Madras High Court were altogether different and the principles laid down would be inapplicable to the facts before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 22 observes thus :
"22. Mr. Damania then strongly relied upon the judgment reported in V. Mohammed Haneef & Co. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation Madras to show that no manufacturing process is carried on at the appellant's premises. In this judgment the question that fell for consideration before the Madras High Court was as to whether could it be said that the manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power merely because the water is utilized in the process lifted by power from a well before it is taken through channels or pipes to the tannery ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 13 lpa54.04 premises. The question before the Madras High Curt was as to whether the manufacturing process is tannery premises is being carried on with the aid of power. The requirement of the definition is not that power must be used in any part of the premises where the process is carried on. The essential postulates that power must be used in aid of the manufacturing process. The pumping of water has little to do with the manufacturing process. The pumping of water by power is not incidental to the tannery process carried on with the tannery premises. The main activity must be connected or must be identical part of the activities which is carried on with the aid of power. I have gone through the entire judgment and I find that the facts of our case are altogether different from the facts of that case. I, therefore, do not see that the principles laid down in this judgment are applicable to the present case. Admittedly in the case before me the power is used in order to drive compressors which supply compressed air for operating service hosts oil spray guns, in lubrication service and for supply of petrol. The activities of such services are directly with the aid of power and they are not with manual labour."
10. Shri Ghate, learned Counsel also relies on a judgment of the learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in M/s. Kalpana Kala Kendra, Kanpur vs. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Kanpur, 1985 LAB.I.C. 763. The learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court was considering whether the employment is a factory as defined in Section 2(12) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court has held that unless the use of electric power is a integral part of the ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 14 lpa54.04 manufacturing process, it cannot be said that the manufacture is with the aid of power. Shri Ghate, learned Counsel has also relied on a Division Bench Judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Employees' State Insurance v. Bhag Singh, 1988 LIC 1170 and in particular to paragraph 14 thereof. However, we notice that all that paragraph 14 records is the agreement of the Division Bench with the view expressed by this Court in Gateway Auto Service and the Calcutta High Court in M/s. Baranagar Services Station, 1988 LAB IC 302. Reliance is also placed on judgment of Esic, Bombay vs. Vyankatesh Cop. Processors Society Ltd. & another reported in 1993 (2) LLJ 394 Bombay in support of the submission that the use of electric power must be an integral power of the working for the establishment to attract the applicability of the expression "with the aid of power". Perusal of the said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reveals that the question which fell for consideration is whether the use of electric power for processing the effluent preparatory to its eventual disbursal can be termed as manufacturing process as contemplated by the expression "manufacturing process" in Section 2(12) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The establishment-society was using electricity for treatment of effluent after using water for dyeing and bleaching purpose. The electricity was not used for bleaching and ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 15 lpa54.04 dyeing purpose. The Division Bench held that the use of power was not for any manufacturing process. The finding of the Division Bench is based on the view that if electricity is used for any activity which is not a part of the manufacturing process, it cannot be said that the manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power.
11. The judgment of Union of India and others vs. Digamber Jain Secondary School, 2003 I CLR 233, has no applicability to the factual matrix of the present appeal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a factual scenario where the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions (Recognition-Grant-in-Aid and Service Conditions) Rules, 1993 provided for contributory provident fund benefits and in the context of the statutory provisions of the State Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 would not apply to the establishments belonging to or under the control of the State Government. Reliance is further placed on the judgment of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. Sanatan Dharam Girls Secondary School and others, 2006 III 1046, to urge that educational institutions under the superintendence and control of the State Government would be exempted from the provisions of the Act. The ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 16 lpa54.04 said judgment is of no relevance muchless applicability to the facts of the case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking note of Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions, Act, 1989 held that educational institutions in the State of Rajasthan were under the substantive control of the State Government and would fall within the exception under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act. Shri Ghate, learned Advocate lastly placed reliance on the judgment of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, (2008) 3 SCC 247, in support of the submission that the authority under the Act is duty bound to adhere to the principles of natural justice in exercise of adjudicatory power.
12. The learned Single Judge has held that on a true and plain construction of Section 16(1)(a) of the Act, only those establishments would be exempted to which there is no power supply. The learned Single Judge is of the view that even if the power supply is to facilitate the use of lighting, cooling or heating, the working of the establishment would be with the aid of power. We have noticed a judgment of another learned Single Judge in Central Board of Trustees, EPF vs. Nutan Pushpak Premises Co-op. Society Ltd., 2016(150) FLR 163, which takes a diametrically opposite view which ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 17 lpa54.04 is apparent from a perusal of paragraph 7, which reads thus :
"7. Secondly, the Respondent society is excluded from the operation of the Act under sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act. The provision excludes establishments registered under any law for the time being in force in any State relating to co-operative societies, employing less than fifty workers and working without the aid of power. The Respondent society is admittedly a co-operative housing society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. Far from there being any material to show that it employs more than fifty workers, the material on record in the form of salary registers maintained all these years actually show that at no point of time fifty or more workers were employed with the Respondent society. There is also no case that the establishment was working with the aid of power. Merely because electricity is used in the premises of the society for providing light and other amenities at the work place, it cannot be said that the establishment works with the aid of power. Working with the aid of power implies that there must be some work or process carried on in the establishment with the use of power. Such use must be direct and proximate as regards the activity carried on by the establishment. An indirect application such as use of electric bulbs for providing light or electric fans for providing comfortable working environment, does not amount to working with the aid of power. The Respondent society, accordingly, answers fully the description of an establishment covered under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16, all three characteristics necessary for such coverage being present in its case."
13. With deepest respect to the view of the learned Single Judge who has authored the judgment impugned, we find it difficult to ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 18 lpa54.04 agree with the extremely broad proposition that exemption would be available only to those establishments which have not availed of power supply. We can visualized plethora of diverse situations in which establishment may be availing the facility of power supply to satisfy the basic needs of the workmen or to offer the very minimal comfort and dignified working ambiance. Illustratively, a society of artisans engaged in creating handcrafts may well have availed power supply to operate a motor pump installed at a Well only to ensure the availability of drinking water to the workmen. The fact that such an establishment is availing power supply would not, however, mean or imply that the artisans are working with the aid of power. The use of power of electricity must necessarily have a direct or proximate nexus with the work. Power or electricity need not be necessarily used at every stage or part or process of the work to hold the working as working with the aid of power. However, some activity or process integral to the working must be aided with power for an establishment be termed as working with the aid of power. With respect to the learned Single Judge, who has delivered the judgment impugned, we are inclined to agree with and approve the view of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition 2493/2003.
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14. The learned Counsel for the respondents 1 is right in contending that since the act is a piece of beneficial and social welfare legislation, the provisions thereof must be interpreted liberally and that a narrow, technical or pedantic interpretation which may frustrate the legislative object and intent must be avoided. The learned Counsel would further urge that the expression "with the aid of power" must receive a purposive interpretation to ensure that the legislative object and intent as advanced rather than diluted or nullified. He would urge, a fortiori, that a provision which carves out an exception to the applicability of the Act must be strictly construed and the endeavour ought to ensure that any beneficiary whom the protective umbrella of the beneficent provision of the Act is intended to cover, must not be excluded from the benefits of the Act.
15. We are alive to the legal position that a provision providing for an exemption from the provisions of a beneficial statute must be strictly construed. This juristic principle is as deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence as the principle of liberal construction or interpretation of beneficial or social welfare statute. However, neither the principle of liberal construction of a beneficial or social welfare legislation nor the principle of interpretation that a provision ::: Uploaded on - 14/08/2017 ::: Downloaded on - 15/08/2017 02:12:51 ::: 20 lpa54.04 providing exemption from the applicability or rigor of a beneficial or social welfare legislation, permits or justifies doing violence to the language of the statute. The principle of liberal construction of beneficial social welfare legislation or the principle of strict construction of an exemption provision would come into play only if there is more than one possible interpretation. If the words are neither ambiguous or obscure, the anxiety or urge to advance the object of the legislation must not result in an artificial expansion of the category of beneficiaries. In the factual matrix of the appeal, we are not persuaded to hold that every establishment which avails of power supply would necessarily be an establishment working with the aid of power. We are not for a moment suggesting that in every fact situation the work of imparting education would not be a work with the aid of power. Imparting of education with the aid of electronic gadgets like computers, projectors or the like may possible imply that the working is with the aid of power. However, if the use of power is only to operate tube-lights or fans as is the factual scenario in the present appeal, such use of power shall certainly not imply that the imparting of education is with the aid of power.
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16. The appellant has brought on record that with effect from 07-10-2006 the State Government has extended grant-in-aid to the appellant institution and the alternate submission is that the appellant society is exempted from the provisions of the Act in view of Section 16(1)(b) thereof at least from 07-10-2006. In light of the view which we have taken, we need not delve on the aforesaid submission which is founded on events occurring during the pendency of the appeal. We have recorded a finding that the appellant society was exempted from the provisions of the Act during the period in dispute. We have recorded the said finding on the basis of the factual position that the appellant society was employing less than 50 persons who were not working with the aid of power. If the respondent 1 is of the view that due to any subsequent change in the factual position like increase in the strength of employees, the appellant society ceases to be exempted, the respondent authority is at liberty to take an appropriate decision on the applicability of the Act to the appellant institution, in accordance with law. In such a situation, it is also open for the appellant society to demonstrate that in view of the grant-in-aid by the State Government or any other development or event, the appellant society shall continued to be exempted.
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17. The learned Single Judge has rejected the contention that the failure of the authority to issue notice to the appellant society before holding the review application under Section 7-B of the Act is not maintainable. In the view of the learned Single Judge, requirement of notice would not apply where the office of the reviewing authority summarily rejects the application under Section 7-B(3) of the Act. In the light of the view which we have taken, we do not express any opinion on the view taken by the learned Single Judge on the requirement of issuance of notice before summary rejection of an application seeking review and the contention that failure to issue notice would vitiate the order or rejection is expressly kept open.
18. We set aside the order dated 04-01-2000 of the respondent 1 and the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge on 08-12-2003 in Writ Petition 2493/2003.
The letters patent appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
JUDGE JUDGE
adgokar
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