Karnataka High Court
Sanjay Alloys (Private) Limited, ... vs V. Ramakrishna on 19 January, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001(3)KARLJ394
Author: R. Gururajan
Bench: R. Gururajan
ORDER
1. Petitioner is the landlord and has filed this petition challenging the order dated 18-6-1996 passed in HRC No. 1468 of 1992 on the file of the Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore City. He filed this petition HRC No. 1468 of 1992 seeking for bona fide use and occupation of the premises on the ground of a Corporate Office in the schedule premises. In the petition it is stated that the landlord is a Company having its office at New Bamboo Bazar, Bangalore. He purchased the property by way of a sale deed dated 4-11-1991. The respondent who is a tenant was paying Rs. 500/- per month as rent. After the purchase the respondent has attorned the petitioner as a landlord and was paying rent regularly. Petitioner-Company was dealing in iron and steel and of two branches, one situated at Patamaner in Chittoor District and the other at No. 2, Kadugondanahalli, Bangalore 45. It is employing more than 100 employees and are working at the factory and it has no place to set up a Corporate Office. With a view to have a suitable Corporate Office, Company wants to demolish the existing structure and put up a new construction in its place. For want of accommodation in the factory premises and with a view to streamline the office work it requires this premises. It has sufficient finance. The respondent is affluent businessman and has acquired its own premises. Petitioner requires the premises for occupation under Section 21(1)(h), (j) and (p) of the KRC Act.
2. The matter was contested. Respondent denied the averments with regard to the factual grounds in the statement filed before the Court. Evidence was recorded and one Sri Jayaprakash Gupta was examined for the petitioner and one Sri Ramakrishna was examined for the respondent. Exs. P. 1 to 4 were marked before the Trial Court for the petitioner and Exs. R. 1 to 18 for respondents. The Trial Court framed five issues in para 6 reading as under:
"1. Whether the petitioner proves that he requires the petition premises reasonably and bona fide for the purpose of demolishing and erecting a new building for his own use and occupation?
2. Who will be put to great hardship in the event an order of eviction being passed or not passed?
3. Whether the petitioner proves that the respondent has secured a suitable alternative building?
4. Whether an order of partial eviction is feasible in this case?
5. What order?"
3. He answered Issues 1 and 3 in the negative and ruled that points 2 and 4 does not survive for his consideration in view of the negative answer given insofar as points 1 and 3 is concerned. In conclusion the Trial Court dismissed the petition. This is challenged by the landlord before this Court. The petitioner is represented by Sri Rajanna, learned Counsel along with Sri Udaya Holla, the learned Counsel. Respondent is represented by Sri R.L. Narasimha Murthy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri P.S. Rajagopal, learned Counsel for the respondent.
4. Petitioner's Counsel elaborately argued to contend that the Trial Court is wrong in dismissing the petition. According to him there is no justifiable ground available on record for dismissing the petition. He referred to me the pleadings and evidence in support of his case. He also relied on various judgments in support of his case.
5. Per contra Sri R.L. Narasimha Murthy, learned Senior Counsel supported the order and also read to me the relevant pleadings and evidence to contend that no., case as such is made out for eviction. He wanted the Court to dismiss the petition on the facts and circumstances of this case.
6. After hearing the parties I pass the following order.
7. Before I deal with the case-laws let me see the pleadings and evidence to find out as to whether the Trial Court is justified or not in rejecting the petition.
8. In the petition filed before the Court below, the petitioner sought for eviction of the premises under Section 21(1)(h), (j) and (p). The grounds mentioned are found in para 5 in the following words:
The Company has no independent place of its own to set up the Corporate Office, as such it has become just and necessary to build a Corporate Office in the schedule premises, by demolishing the existing structure and putting up a new construction. Again in para 6 it is stated that the petitioner is serious in putting up a new structure to suit its convenience and is taking suitable steps, for obtaining a sanctioned plan and estimates. The petitioner has sufficient finance to pool for the new structure. Again in para 10 it is stated that the petitioner desires to have more space in the proposed construction, but the construction being regulated by the Zonal Regulation Act the petitioner is not in a position to commit or give categorical assurance of reletting a similar accommodation subject to the satisfaction of the need of the petitioner which includes, reception/audit/office/records/safelocks/independent office for staff, Managers/toilet facility/rooms. The petitioner may oblige the reletting a portion if available to the respondent".
9. Tenant denied the pleadings and he stated that the schedule premises is not suitable and petitioner be put to strict proof of all facts in addition to denying the various averments in the objection statements. As I mentioned earlier the petitioner examined one Mr. Gupta. This is what he says in his evidence insofar as the grounds are concerned:
Tetitioner-Company is a manufacturing unit, it manufactures steel items. There may be 100 labourers in the petitioner's Company. Petitioner-Company owns no Corporate Office at Bangalore. It is running its office in the petition premises. Except the said building the petitioner-Company does not own any other property. There may be 8 employees. Soon after getting vacant possession, they will construct a building in the same place. In the penultimate paragraph it is stated we want the petition premises for the purpose of immediate demolition and reconstruction. In cross-examination it is stated by him that:
I do not want the built-up area. I do not know whether there is vacant space in the front of the building, I do not know whether the respondents owned any other property. It is not true to say that the Corporate Office be at a business area. My one factory is at Palmenar in Chittoor District, and another factory is at Kadu-gondanahalli, Bangalore. In my office there may be 10 employees".
10. This is all the evidence led by the petitioner in support of eviction. The respondents have led elaborate evidence in the matter. Insofar as the respondent owning other buildings are concerned it is stated that those buildings are not suitable for his activities. It is rather unfortunate that the petitioner has not even stated even in evidence what he has stated in the petition. There is absolutely no evidence with regard to the need of setting up of a Corporate Office or the demolition or merger of the office or the need to improve the existing office as stated in various paragraphs. There is no evidence as to how much space is required and as to why so much space is required for its Corporate Office. To say the least that there is absolutely no evidence with regard to bona fide use and occupation, for having the office for other reasons mentioned in the petition. A reading of the evidence would show that the petitioner is not serious about his case. In Fact this is what is commented upon by the Trial Judge in the impugned order. The Trial Judge has after noticing the evidence stated that in the instant case except stating that the petitioner has no Corporate Office at Bangalore, petitioner has not led any evidence to show what is the requirement of the Company. The Trial Judge again noticed that there is also no evidence to show how much area is required by the petitioner for the Corporate Office, He has also noticed in the absence of any evidence a bald say of the petitioner requiring premises for the demolition and reconstruction of the office cannot be held to be sufficient. The Trial Judge has stated that on the bald statement of P.W. 1 it cannot be said that the petitioner established his case for demolition and reconstruction and personal occupation are reasonable and bona fide. This is the finding of the Trial Judge after noticing the pleadings, which being all the evidence cannot be said to be a finding requiring my interference in the revision. Petitioner-landlord who conies before the Court for vacant possession of the premises particularly in respect of a non-residential one, has to be more careful in placing evidence. In the case on hand except the bald statement as held by the Trial Judge no acceptable evidence is forthcoming for consideration of any one of the grounds in support of this case. Ultimately the Court has to decide on the basis of evidence and not on the basis of case-laws cited before me by the Counsel. If there is no evidence the Court has no option but to reject the case. Any amount of multiplicity of case-laws in the absence of evidence is of no use. In the case on hand the petition has to be thrown out for want of evidence and has rightly been rejected by Court below. Sri R.L. Narasimha Murthy, learned Senior Counsel is right in saying that with this evidence no eviction can be ordered by a Court of law.
11. In this connection let me refer to a recent judgment in Liaq Ahmed v Habeeb-Ur-Rehman, the Supreme Court has ruled:
"Rent control legislation have been acknowledged to be pieces of social legislation which seek to strike a just balance between the rights of the landlord and the requirements of the tenants. Such legislations prevent the landlords from taking extreme steps of evicting the tenants merely upon technicalities or carved grounds. This Court in Mangat Rai v Kidar Nath, held that where the Rent Acts afford a real and sanctified protections to the tenant, the same should not be nullified by giving as hyper-technical or liberal construction to the language of the statute which instead of advancing the object of the Act may result in its frustration. The Rent Acts have primarily been enacted to give protection to the tenants.
The history of the legislation regarding rent controls in the country would show that the Rent Acts were enacted to overcome the difficulties arising out of the scarcity of the accommodation which arose primarily due to the growth of industrialisation and commercialisation and inflow of the population to the urban areas. Such legislations were initially confined to the big cities like Bombay, Calcutta and Rangoon but their jurisdiction was gradually extended to other areas in the country. Because of the scarcity of the accommodation and gradual rise in the rents due to appreciation of the value of urban properties, the landlords were found to be in a position to exploit the situation for their unjustified personal gains which were consequently detrimental to the helpless tenants who were subjected to uncalled litigation for eviction. It thus became imperative for the legislature to intervene to protect the tenants against harassment and exploitation by the landlords for which appropriate legislations came to be passed by almost all the States and Union Territories in the country with the paramount object of essentially safeguarding the interest of tenants and for their benefit. The Rent Acts also made provision for safeguarding the interest of genuine landlords. The Rent Acts are intended to preserve social environment and promote social justice by safeguarding the interests of the tenants mainly and at the same time protecting the legitimate interests of the landlords. The provisions of the Rent Acts are, therefore, not required to be interpreted in a hyper-technical manner which in cases may result in frustrating the object for which the legislation was made. It should be kept in mind that the Rent Acts undoubtedly lean more in favour of the tenants for whose benefits they were essentially passed. The rational approach in interpreting the law relating to the control of rents is expected from the Courts dealing with the cases under the statutes relating to rent by keeping in mind the object of the legislation intended to provide social justice preventing unscrupulous landlord to exploit the circumstances and force the tenants to submit to their pressure under the threat of eviction".
12. In the light of this decision it is clear to me that this landlord has filed this petition only with a view to disturb a right granted to the tenant in terms of statute.
13. The Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the facts admitted need not be proved. I am afraid this is not the case on hand, There is no admission of the landlord with regard to need of a Corporate Office for the petitioner neither in the objection statement or in the pleadings. The petitioner seems to confuse one sentence in the circumstance that the Company needs an office premises. That one sentence is of grave obstruction as not with regard to petitioner needs. Nobody can deny the need of an office for the Company. In the case on hand as to whether the said need in terms of the pleadings has been proved or not is the question. The Court on evidence found that the same is not proved with which I agree in terms of my discussion in the above paragraphs. Therefore, the contention that the facts admitted need not be proved has absolutely no basis on facts. There is no proper evidence of admission with regard to petitioner needs anywhere. If that is real admission the respondent would not be objecting to his evidence before this Court. The Counsel referred to the citation in Nagindas Ramdas v Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and Others . The Supreme Court while noticing a clear admission of a compromise in that case ruled:
"Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted and they by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties".
14. In the case on hand there is absolutely no admission/muchless a clear admission of either the need of Corporate Office or details about office etc., etc. This judgment therefore is not available to the petitioner.
15. The Counsel relies on another judgment of the Supreme Court in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (Mrs.) v M/s. Traders and Agencies and Others. This was a case with regard to bona fide requirement of landlord and it is stated that the landlord is a best judge of his essential requirement. It is stated that if a landlord decides to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis is either insecure or inconvenient it is not for the Courts to dictate to him to continue to occupy such premises. While coming to conclusion in para 20, the Court relied on the evidence of Court below.
In the case on hand in the absence of any evidence it cannot be contended that notwithstanding the non-availability of evidence Court must come to the rescue of the landlord. The same cannot be accepted.
16. Similarly, a decision in Raj Kumar Khaitan v Bibi Zubaida Khatun, in which the Court ruled that landlord need not indicate the precise nature of business which they intended to start in premises.
17. There cannot be any dispute regarding this proposition. But the proposition has to be on the basis of the facts proved by way of evidence before the Court. In the absence of evidence mere proposition would not be of any use to the petitioner. In the circumstances in my view all the judgments which are not acceptable on the facts of this case. On the other hand the respondents relies on a judgment of this Court in somewhat identical circumstances in the case of Sheena Naik v Lawrence D'Souza. In para 21 in the said case the Court ruled:
"It is not every wish or desire of the landlord that can be described as a reasonable and bona fide requirement. The word 'requirement' has been judicially interpreted in cases more than once and the term 'require' implies something more than a mere wish or impulse or desire on the part of the landlord. It denotes something more than desire. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real distinction between 'desire' and 'require' lies in the insistence of the need. There is an element of 'must have' in the case of 'require' which is not present in the case of mere 'desire'".
In the case on hand there is no material showing the requirement "enjoy". Therefore the Trial Judge is right in dismissing the petition in the light of this judgment.
18. The Counsel lastly contended on the basis of the additional facts available to him that in the light of the order passed by the Trial Court in HRC No. 1072 of 1988 the grant under Section 21(1)(p) is to be considered. Section 21(1)(p) reads as under:
"21(1)(p) that the tenant whether before or after the coming into operation of this part has built, or acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a suitable building".
19. A reading of the provision would show that only in the event of a suitable accommodation being available to a tenant Section 21(1)(p) is attracted for eviction. The petitioner herein relies on an order passed in HRC No. 1072 of 1988 initiated by the respondent's mother to contend that an order has been passed by XVI Additional Small Causes Judge on 3-10-1996. According to the petitioner the said petition was filed by one Smt. Padmavatamma, respondent's mother for starting a business with the petitioner. The submission is that now that an order has been passed, Section 21(1)(p) is attracted. I am afraid this argument is a fallacious one. A reading of the petition in HRC No. 1072 of 1988 shows that the petition has been filed by Padmavatamma for eviction of the premises as well as other premises for starting business with the respondent and her daughter Gajalakshmi and her children. The emphasis in the petition is to start a business after getting eviction of all the premises not only the premises of the respondent-tenant in the case. What is now ordered is only one premises in HRC No. 1072 of 1988. That by itself cannot be said to be a factor under Section 21(1)(p) providing for suitable accommodation. No material is available to show that the order in HRC No. 1072 of 1988 provides for suitable accommodation with respondent. Therefore, on the facts again I hold that the additional material has of no consequence insofar as this case is concerned. When an applicant states that a new business can be conducted after eviction of all other premises it cannot be said that eviction of one premises is suitable under Section 21(1)(p). As I mentioned earlier case-laws depend on facts. Unless the facts are proved multiplicity of case-laws will not come to the aid of a landlord. In the case on hand the landlord failed to prove his case before the Trial Court and also by way of additional material before the Court.
20. In the circumstances I do not find any grounds to interfere with a well-considered order based on the materials placed before the Court. If such orders are reviewed a very right granted to a tenant would be wiped out at the instance of greedy landlords. The landlord has to plead and prove his case and any non-proof on their part has to face similar consequence of dismissal of his petition.
21. In the circumstances the petition stands dismissed with costs at Rs. 3,000/-.