Central Administrative Tribunal - Bangalore
K. Balaji vs Integral Coach Factory on 27 September, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(2)SLJ130(CAT)
ORDER
B.S. Raikote, Vice Chairman
1. In this case the applicant has challenged the communication dated 24.10.2000 vide Annexure-A8 issued by the respondent. Integral Coach Factory, Chennai. In this circumstance, the respondents have raised the objection in their reply statement that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction. Therefore, we heard the case regarding the jurisdiction of this Tribunal.
2. The Counsel for the respondent submitted that vide Annexure-A2. applications were invited for the post of Office Clerk Grade-II/Accounts Clerk at Chennai by an office situated in Chennai. Even the impugned endorsement vide Annexure-A8, treating the applicant medically not fit for the post is issued in Chennai and as such this Tribunal has no jurisdiction. As against this argument, the argument of the Counsel for the applicant is that the applicant applied for the post from Bangalore as a resident of Bangalore; and even the impugned communication vide Annexure-A8 is sent to the applicant on his Bangalore address. Therefore, a part of the cause of action arose before this Tribunal and hence this application can be maintained. In support of his contention he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 2000 SC 2966, Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka reported in ILR 2000 Kar. 990, Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Chairman, State Bank of India and Anr., and also a judgment of the Division Bench reported in ILR 1990 Kar. 2244, Management of Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. v. Karur Vysya Bank Employees Union, and contended that this Tribunal has jurisdiction. As against this, the Counsel appearing for the respondent by relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1988 Allahabad 36, Dayashankar Bharadwaj v. Chief of the Air Staff, New Delhi and Ors., AIR 1988 Allahabad 47, Rakesh Dhar Tripathi v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1998 Allahabad 52, Smt. Sona Devi and Ors. v. The District Judge, Allahabad and Ors., 1998(5) Kar. L.J. 279, Narayanaswamy G.V. v. Union of India and Ors., (1999) 4 SCC 656, CBI, Anti-Corruption Branch, Mumbai v. Narayan Diwakar and Ors., 2001(2) SCC 294, Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India and Ors., and contended that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction. He further submitted that the cause of action to the applicant arose only in Chennai and as such the applicant should have filed the application before the C.A.T., Chennai Bench and not before this Tribunal. Therefore, the application is not maintainable.
3. Heard, perused the records. Under Rule 6(1)(ii) of the C.A.T. Procedure Rules, we find that this Tribunal has jurisdiction, in case cause of action, wholly, or in part has arisen before this Tribunal. The contention of the applicant is that since he received the impugned communication vide Annexure-A8 on his Bangalore address a part of cause of action arose in Bangalore and therefore, this Tribunal has jurisdiction.
4. In support of his contention he relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court and judgment of the Hon'ble High Court interpreting Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India. On reading of these judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as Hon'ble High Court, we find that Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, was under consideration which reads as under:--
"226(2): The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or Writs to any Government Authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part arises for the exercise of such power not withstanding that the seat of such Government or Authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories."
5. From a reading of the above Article it is clear that Article 226 Clause (2) was specifically amended by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and by the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976 so as to enlarge jurisdiction of the High Court. Hence, it can exercise jurisdiction even regarding the authorities notwithstanding the fact that seat of such Government authority is not within those territories, as notified for the concerned High Court. But similar provision is not found under the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985.
6. In fact, Section 19 (1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act specifically provides that: "Subject to the other provisions of this Act a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance." According to this Section, the aggrieved person can maintain an application before the Tribunal within whose jurisdiction the order is passed and he is aggrieved of it. This section specifically does not provide that this Tribunal has jurisdiction regarding the orders passed outside the State; To entertain an application in terms of Section 19(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, the place where the impugned order is passed should be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and normally the place of the order is the place where the respondent who passed the order is situated or resides. Therefore, in our opinion the impugned order is being passed in Chennai, this Tribunal would not have any jurisdiction in view of the clear mandate of Section 19 of the Tribunals Act. Rule 6 of CAT Procedure rules no doubt provides that the Tribunal would have jurisdiction even if part of cause of action arises. A part of cause of action means, the cause of action relating to the impugned order only. In other words, there should be an action on the part of the authority within the jurisdiction in pursuance of the order passed by the other authority situated outside jurisdiction. For instance, an applicant was transferred from Ambala Station to join duty at Delhi Station, he was not allowed to join duty at Delhi station on the fact that the applicant was residing in Delhi after his transfer hence the Principal Bench, New Delhi had territorial jurisdiction. Devidayal v. Union of India, (1991) 16 ATC 366. In this case the cause of action arose outside Delhi where the transfer order was passed and also in Delhi where the applicant had joined after transfer. In these circumstances, it was held in Devidayal's case that a part of cause of action also arose in Delhi. Likewise if any person who is working in different places and if the dispute relates to the grant of higher pay scale a part of cause of action to receive the higher pay scale is available to him in all the place and as such he could maintain an application before the Bench were he was working. [G.L. Garg v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India and Ors., (1991) 16 ATC 324]. The cases decided in R.K. Misra v. Union of India and Anr., (1991) 16ATC 426, etc., would be other instances regarding the nature of part of cause of action that would arise to an applicant for maintaining the application. The case of the applicant that since he was residing in Bangalore and he had sent an application for appointment to the appointing authority at Chennai. Therefore, a part of cause of action arose in Bangalore cannot be accepted.
7. The judgment relied upon by the applicant interpreting Article 226(2) would not apply to the facts of this case since this Tribunal is circumscribed by the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Under Section 19(1) of the Act and this Tribunal can entertain applications regarding those orders passed within the jurisdiction and not regarding the orders passed outside the jurisdiction.
8. Moreover, in AIR 1985 SC 1289, State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Swaika Properties and Anr., The Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled that even for the purpose of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226(2), mere service of notice does not give rise to part of cause of action unless the notice is an integral part of the impugned order. Accordingly, it is held that only because the petitioner in that case received notice under Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, at Calcutta, no cause of action or part of cause of action arose in Calcutta, since the acquisition was done in Rajasthan by passing the appropriate order and consequently the notified land vested with the Rajasthan Government. Thus, as per the law laid down in this case it is clear that neither the cause of action nor part of cause of action would arise to the applicant only because he received the impugned order passed in Chennai in Bangalore. Moreover, this Tribunal would not have authority or power to punish the respondent admittedly residing in Chennai in case contempt of this Tribunal is committed by such respondent by disobeying the order of this Tribunal. This Tribunal would exercise even its contempt jurisdiction effectively if the respondent who has passed the order resides within its jurisdiction. Even the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Narayan Swamy G.V. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) held that mere residence of the person does not confer jurisdiction unless the cause of action or part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the High Court. The Hon'ble High Court also referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in (1994) 4 SCC, Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors. in which it was held that only because the respondent before the Supreme Court read advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made respresentations from Calcutta would not constitute facts forming an integral part of cause of action. The Hon'ble High Court also took note of the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in Natural Gas Commission's case in Para-12 of the said judgment of the Supreme Court which reads as under"--
".... it must be remembered that the image and prestige of a Court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in case which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, certain members of the Court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said Court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation,"
9. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the Hon'ble High Court, mere sending an application from Bangalore to Chennai for appointment and receiving the order from Chennai are so trivial that they cannot be treated as constituting a part of cause of action. Therefore, in our considered opinion this application is not maintainable. Accordingly we pass the order as under.
ORDER The application is not maintainable and the office is hereby directed to return the same to the applicant for presentation to the appropriate Forum by keeping a copy of the same. No costs.