Karnataka High Court
The Jayanagar Co-Operative Housing ... vs The State Of Karnataka And Others on 3 July, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001(5)KARLJ467, 2001 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 2985, 2001 AIHC 4840, (2001) 4 ICC 479, (2001) 5 KANT LJ 467, (2002) 1 LACC 155
Author: P.V. Reddi
Bench: P.V. Reddi, N.K. Patil
JUDGMENT P.V. Reddi, C.J.
1. The limited question in this appeal is whether at the instance of respondents 6 to 9 who entered into agreements for purchase of land and who entered into possession on payment of full sale consideration before the publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, the Government can exercise its power under Section 48 to withdraw the lands from acquisition irrespective of the consent of the landowners for the acquisition of the land.
2. In the writ petition out of which the appeal arises, the order dated 16-12-1988 passed by the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department was assailed. That order was passed pursuant to the liberty given to the Government to pass orders afresh as regards the withdrawal of the land in question from acquisition after giving opportunity of making representation to the beneficiary, namely, the appellant-Society. On giving notice to the appellant-Society, the Government considered it just and proper to withdraw the notified land of an extent of 3.25 acres from acquisition. The reasons given are these:
I find from the records and from the personal representation that the original owners had entered into an agreement of sale with 4 persons and later the 4 persons also obtained a decree of specific performance from the Civil Court in respect of the concerned Sy. Nos. It is also seen that the 4 purchasers have also formed the layout after obtaining permission for conversion to non-agricultural use under the Land Revenue Act. The permission was given on 25-7-1992 which was before the date of 4(1) notification dated 7-1-1993. It is also seen from the survey maps certified by the Surveyor of the Special Land Acquisition Officer that the four Sy. Nos. are coming on the edge and periphery of the total land acquired on behalf of the society for which award was passed for 67.23 acres. The land under dispute and deleted from acquisition is only 3 acres 25 guntas. It is seen that the deletion of these four survey numbers does not in any way affect the formation of the layout by the members of the Jayanagar House Building Co-operative Society. On the other hand, inclusion of these Sy. Nos. will cause hardship to the occupiers of these four Sy. Nos. who have also obtained the decree of specific performance from the Civil Court.
3. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Amarnath Ashram Trust Society and Another v Governor of Uttar Pradesh and Others, holding that the decision of the Government to withdraw from acquisition should be based on appreciation of the correct legal position and such a decision cannot be arrived at arbitrarily, the discretion of the Government in this behalf not being absolute, the learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the withdrawal in the instant case is based on an irrelevant reason and incorrect legal approach as regards the locus standi of respondents 6 to 9 to make a representation for withdrawal. It is further contended, relying on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Poornapraina House Building Co-operative Society, Bangalore v Bailamma alias Dodda Bailamma, that respondents 6 to 9 cannot be regarded as owners of land despite the fact that a sale deed was executed in their favour through Court after the notification under Section 4(1) and in any case, when the original owners are not objecting for acquisition, it is not open to respondents 6 to 9 to move the Government for withdrawal.
4. We find it difficult to accept the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel. The reasons given by the Government in the order extracted above are self-explanatory. The question is whether comparative hardship that would be caused to respondents 6 to 9 could be legitimately taken into account. The appellant contends that respondents 6 to 9 being merely agreement holders on the date of preliminary notification and technically having no interest over the land, cannot project their own grievances and hardship as a ground for withdrawal of land from acquisition and the Government, in taking account of such representation, adopted an erroneous legal approach and acted on irrelevant material. The argument does not appeal to us. We do not think that there is any legal bar to take cognizance of the representation of respondents 6 to 9 and to delete the lands in question from acquisition. The fact remains that respondents 6 to 9 who entered into agreements prior to Section 4(1) notification and who were inducted into possession in part performance of the agreement, obtained a decree for specific performance and got the sale deed executed through Court after the notification under Section 4(1) was issued, but, before the land vested with the Government. The right, title and interest of the original owner of the land stood transferred to respondents 6 to 9. Even if they did not get ownership rights over the land as such by virtue of the post-notification sale deed at least, they have sufficient interest to urge before the Government that for valid reasons the lands are liable to be excluded from acquisition. It may be noted that by virtue of the sale deed, respondents 6 to 9 virtually stepped into the shoes of the owners (respondents 4 and 5). If the original owners have the locus standi to approach the Government for release of land from acquisition, equally so, respondents 6 to 9 who are transferees could also approach. The problem can be viewed from another angle. When once the land is released from acquisition, it is respondents 6 to 9 who can exercise the rights of ownership as they become full-fledged owners by virtue of the sale deed already executed. The withdrawal will directly enure to the benefit of respondents 6 to 9 alone and no one else as the original owner has already been divested of the title. We are, therefore, of the view that the decision taken by the Government cannot be said to be based on irrelevant considerations nor can it be said to be arbitrary or mala fide so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition.
5. The writ appeal is dismissed.