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[Cites 20, Cited by 1]

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Cochin

M/S.Kerala State Warehousing ... vs The Acit, Cochin on 18 June, 2018

                                    1


       IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
               COCHIN BENCH, COCHIN
BEFORE S/SHRI CHANDRA POOJARI, AM & GEORGE GEORGE K., JM

                         I.T.A. No. 255/Coch/2017
                        Assessment Year : 2012-13

M/s. Kerala State Warehousing Vs.       The Assistant Commissioner of
Corporation, 39/1304,                   Income-tax, Corporate Circle-1(2),
Warehousing Corporation Road,           Kochi.
Kochi-682 016.
[PAN: AABCK 1583G]

  (Assessee-Appellant)                    (Revenue-Respondent)

                         I.T.A. No. 309/Coch/2017
                        Assessment Year : 2012-13

The Assistant Commissioner of Vs.       M/s. Kerala State Warehousing
Income-tax, Corporate Circle-           Corporation, 39/1304,
1(2), Kochi.                            Warehousing Corporation Road,
                                        Kochi-682 016.
                                        [PAN: AABCK 1583G]

  (Revenue-Appellant)                     (Assessee-Respondent)

          Revenue by        Shri A. Dhanaraj, Sr. DR
          Assessee by       Shri K. Gopi, CA

             Date of hearing               18/06/2018
             Date of pronouncement         18/06/2018
                                                        I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017


                               ORDER


Per CHANDRA POOJARI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER:

These are cross appeals, one filed by the assessee is directed against the order of the CIT, Kochi passed u/s. 263 of the Income Tax Act dated 24/03/2017 for the assessment year 2012-13 and the other filed by the Revenue is directed against the order of the CIT(A)-I, Kochi dated 31-03-17 for the assessment year 2010-11.

2. The assessee raised the following grounds:

1) The learned Commissioner of Income tax has erred in setting aside the impugned proceedings u/s 143(3) on 27.03.2015.
2) There was no error prejudicial to the interest of revenue in the said proceedings requiring revision under section 263 of the I.T Act, for the following reasons:
a) The learned CIT ought to have found that the assessing officer had examined the issue regarding disallowance of the contribution to provident fund made after the due date prescribed under the relevant PF Act/Rules but before the due date for filing the return of income and the learned AO allowed the claim in view of the decision of Hon Jurisdictional High Court of Kerala in the appellant's own case in the AY 2003-04 and AY 2004-05. (Copy of the submission before the AO vide letter dated 06.03.2015 and Copy of the order of Hon High court enclosed). There is neither absence nor inadequacy of verification by the assessing officer before allowing the deduction and the Ld AO has only rightly followed the principles as per the order of the Hon Jurisdictional High Court and hence his order is not erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue.

b) The learned CIT erred in re-opening the assessment on the ground that the AO has not verified the issue on account of the dormant scheme 2 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 of spraying on coconut trees against the attack of eriophyid mite. The learned CIT ought to have found that learned AO has, while completing the assessment, rightly appreciated the issue as stated in Note No 13 to the audited financial statements, which is self-explanatory.

c) The learned CIT erred in appreciating the issue as stated in the said Note. The said note has been given to disclose the contingent liability of Rs.2107835/- (ie.Rs 9331215- 7223380/-) arising out of the claim made by the state government directing the corporation to refund the entire amount of Rs 9331215/- and also to disclose the counter claims made by the Corporation.

d) The learned CIT erred on facts in stating that the assesse has claimed an amount of Rs 22.50 lakhs on account of the issue of dormant scheme of spraying of coconut trees against the attack of eriophyid mite. No such claim has been made by the appellant by debiting it in the Profit & Loss Account.

3) For these and other grounds that may be further adduced at the time of hearing, the order of the Ld. Commissioner of Income tax requires to be modified suitably.

3. The CIT after perusing the assessment order, observed that the order was erroneous in so far as it was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue for the reasons mentioned below:

i) Omission to consider by AO the disallowance on belated payments of employees contribution of EPF and ESI as envisaged u/s. 2(24)(x) r.w.s. 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax Act.
ii) Omission by the AO to consider the issue on account of dormant scheme of spraying on coconut trees against the attack of eriophyd mite amounting to Rs.22.5 lakhs.

Accordingly, he set aside the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act dated 27/03/2015 by the Assessing Officer for the assessment year 2012-13 for 3 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 de nova examination and pass a detailed speaking order in respect of the above issues.

4. Against this, the assessee is in appeal before us. Regarding the first issue of direction of the CIT to disallow the payment of employees' contribution to EPF and ESI after the specified date prescribed under the respective Act, the contention of the Ld. AR is that the issue was held in favour of the assessee in assessee's own case for the assessment years 2003-04 and 2004-05 by the judgment of the Jurisdictional High Court in ITA No. 280/2010 dated 13/08/2010.

According to him, in view of the above judgment, the order of the Assessing Officer on this issue cannot be considered as erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Further, it was submitted that on a similar issue the CIT invoked the provisions of sec.263 for the assessment year 2012-13.

5. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the record. Admittedly, the issue of disallowance of payment of employees' contribution to EPF and ESI after the specified date prescribed under the respective Act, was held in favour of the assessee in assessee's own case for the assessment years 2003-04 and 2004-05 by the judgment of the Jurisdictional High Court in ITA No. 280/2010 dated 13/08/2010 by observing as follows:

4
I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 "At the admission stage, standing counsel took notice and both sides were heard on the question of law raised. The only issue pertains to section 43B disallowance, which for another year in respect of the same assessee, stands decided by our judgment produced as Annexure-D. In that case, we remanded the matter to consider and allow such of the payments made before the date of filing of the return. We direct the Assessing Officer in this case also to verify the dates on which employees' contributions were paid to Provident Fund and if found paid before the date of filing of the return, such amounts should be allowed as a deduction. The assessee will furnish the details before the Assessing Officer. Appeal stands allowed modifying the order of the Tribunal and that of the lower authorities, as stated above."
5.1 As rightly pointed out by the Ld. AR, the CIT invoked the jurisdiction u/s.
263 of the Act for the assessment year 2012-13 in assessee's own case and in ITA No. 34/Coch/2017 dated 14/12/2017, it was held as under: "9. The CIT has powers to revise the assessment orders if he finds that the assessment order passed by the A.O. is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, but to invoke the jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act, twin conditions prescribed u/s 263 must be satisfied, i.e., the order of the A.O. is erroneous and it must be prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Unless the order passed by the A.O. is erroneous and it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue are vice versa, then the CIT cannot assume the jurisdiction to revise the assessment order. This is because the twin conditions prescribed u/s 263 are co-exists. Sometimes the order passed by the A.O. may be erroneous but it may not be of prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Therefore, invoke the jurisdiction u/s 263, the CIT has to point out how the assessment order passed by the A.O. is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. In this case, on perusal of the details filed by the assessee, we find that the issue of belated payment of employees' contribution to PF has been examined by the A.O. in assessment proceedings by issuing a specific questionnaire dated 13.01.2015 for which the assessee has filed a letter dated 16.02.2015 explaining the reason for delay in payment of PF. The assessee has also explained in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Kerala High Court in the case of Kerala State Warehousing Corporation Limited (supra) and argued that the employees' contribution remitted after due date prescribed under respective Acts, but before the date of filing of return of income as per section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, cannot be disallowed in view of 5 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 the amended provisions of section 43B of the I.T.Act. The A.O. after considering the explanation of the assessee has taken one of the possible views with which the CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, unless the view taken by the A.O. is unsustainable in law. The question of deductibility of belated payment of PF has been considered by the jurisdictional High Court in two cases; in one case, the jurisdictional High Court has taken a view that belated payment of PF within the date prescribed under the respective Acts cannot be allowed as deduction. In the earlier decision, the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Kerala State Warehousing Corporation Limited, after considering the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT v.

Vinay Cement (213 CTR 268), observed that the belated payment of contribution to PF before the due date of filing of return is sufficient compliance of provisions of section 43B and hence allowable as deduction. Though the subsequent decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT v. Merchem Ltd. (supra) is in favour of the Revenue with regard to belated payment of employees' contribution to PF, the A.O. has taken a possible view on the basis of earlier decision of the jurisdictional High Court. Since the A.O. has taken one of the possible views, in our considered view, the view taken by the A.O. is a possible view. This view is further supported by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. [(1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC)], wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if there is two reasonable constructions of a taxing provision are possible, that construction which favours the assessee must be adopted. In this case, the A.O. has taken one of the possible views and allowed the deduction towards belated payment of employees' contribution to PF in the assessment passed u/s 143(3) of the Act. The view taken by the A.O. is one of the possible views. The CIT may not agree with the view taken by the A.O., but it cannot be a reason for treating the assessment passed by the A.O. as erroneous order prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, unless the CIT demonstrates that the view taken by the A.O. is unsustainable in law. This legal view further supported by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Max India Ltd. [(2007) 295 ITR 282 (SC)]. We further note that the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Gabriel India Ltd. [(1993) 71 Taxman 585 (Bom.)] observed that once the A.O. has considered the issue and allowed the claim, then the CIT cannot assume jurisdiction to revise the assessment order on the guise of inadequate inquiry or lack of inquiry. Therefore, we are of the view that, the CIT was incorrect in coming to the conclusion that the order of the A.O. is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of revenue.

10. Coming to the case laws relied upon by the assessee, the assessee has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Saravana Developers [(2016) 68 taxmann.com 148 (Kar.)], wherein the 6 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 Hon'ble Court observed that where the Assessing Officer found to have applied his mind before accepting valuation declared by the assessee in work- in-progress report and the Commissioner failed to satisfy that valuation report accepted was erroneous, the order passed u/s 263 by the Commissioner setting aside the assessment was bad in law. The relevant portion of the order is extracted below:-

"The Commissioner has invoked the provisions of section 263 only for the reason that the Assessing Officer has not spelt out in his order regarding the verification of the work-in-progress report and the reasons for accepting the valuation of work-in-progress report declared by the assessee. [Para 12] It is also noticed that the Tribunal has called for the records of assessment of the relevant assessment year and examined the various details, questionnaire called by the Assessing Officer along with notice under section 142(1) and additional details vide questionnaire (2) vis-à-vis the assessee's reply to the said questionnaire. [Para 14] The examination of the figures as reflected in the computation of development charges establishes that the development charges claimed by the assessee per sq. ft. is Rs. 251.11/- which is lower than Rs.299.41/- accepted by the department for the assessment year 2007-08 while concluding the assessment under section 143(3). One mode of computation works out to Rs. 296.68/- per sq. ft. The development charges of Rs. 251.11/- per sq. ft. claimed by the assessee is just and reasonable and does not result in any loss to the revenue. Thus, the Commissioner invoking the provisions of section 263, is uncalled for as the order passed by the Assessing Officer is no way prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The revenue has miserably failed to satisfy that the valuation of the work-in-progress accepted by the Assessing Officer is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Yet another important aspect which is significant to notice is that the Assessing Officer has accepted the valuation of the work-in-progress of the assessee for the assessment year 2007-08, while concluding the assessment under section 143(3). [Para 16] The twin tests propounded by the Courts for invoking the provisions of section 263 are not satisfied in the instant case. The Commissioner proceeded to initiate proceedings under section 263 only on the ground that the Assessing Officer has not assigned any 7 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 reasons for accepting the valuation of the Assessing Officer has not assigned any reasons for accepting the valuation of the work-in-progress declared by the assessee. As per the materials placed before the Tribunal in the records pertaining to the assessment year in question, a detailed examination is made by the Tribunal and the Tribunal is of the view that the Assessing Officer has applied his mind before accepting the figure declared by the assessee in the work-in-progress report. Such an order cannot be held to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. It is not a case of 'lack of inquiry'. Further, inquiry ordered by the Commissioner would amount to fishing/rowing inquiry in the matter already concluded. [Para 19] The assessee placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of CIT v. Dr. L. Narendra Prasad [IT Appeal No. 473 of 2009, dated 18-8-2015 to contend that generally in the business of real estate, the net profit would be 8 per cent as accepted by the department. In the instant case, the profit declared by the assessee works out to more than 8 per cent that is normally adopted and accepted by the department. However, in the computation of work-in-progress made by the Appellate Commissioner, the profit margin works out to more than 31.8 per cent which is practicably not acceptable.
Accordingly, on this count also, the order passed by the Commissioner computing the margin at more than 31 per cent which is not normally workable in the business of real estate could not be accepted. This view is also supported by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Dr. L. Narendra Prasad's case (supra). [Para 20] The Tribunal having considered the material placed before it, rightly set aside the order passed under section 263, as not sustainable. Accordingly, the assessee's appeal is allowed as the consequential order passed under section 143(3), read with section 263 does not survive for consideration as having become infructuous. No exception can be found with the well reasoned order passed by the Tribunal. [Para 21]"

11. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Gabriel India Ltd. (supra) has considered a similar issue in the light of provisions of section 263 of the Income-tax Act. The Hon'ble High Court after considering relevant provisions, held that the order passed by the A.O. could not be held to be erroneous simply because in his order he did not 8 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 make an elaborate discussion in that regard. The relevant part of the order is extracted below:-

"The power of suo motu revision under sub-section (1) is in the nature of supervisory jurisdiction and the same can be exercised only if the circumstances specified therein exist. Two circumstances must exist to enable the Commissioner to exercise power of revision under this sub-section, viz., (i) the order is erroneous; and
(ii) by virtue of the order being erroneous prejudice has been caused to the interests of the revenue. It has, therefore, to be considered firstly as to when an order can be said to be erroneous.

One finds that the expressions 'erroneous', 'erroneous assessment' and 'erroneous judgment' have been defined in Black's Law Dictionary. According to the definition, 'erroneous' means 'involving error; deviating from the law'. 'Erroneous assessment' refers to an assessment that deviates from the law and is, therefore, invalid, and is a defect that is jurisdictional in its nature, and does not refer to the judgment of the Assessing Officer in fixing the amount of valuation of the property. Similarly, 'erroneous judgment' means 'one rendered according to course and practice of Court, but contrary to law, upon mistaken view of law, or upon erroneous application of legal principles'.

From the aforesaid definitions it is clear that an order cannot be termed as erroneous unless it is not in accordance with law. If an ITO acting in accordance with law makes a certain assessment, the same cannot be branded as erroneous by the Commissioner simply because, according to him, the order should have been written more elaborately. This section does not visualise a case of substitution of the judgment of the Commissioner for that of the ITO, who passed the order, unless the decision is held to be erroneous. Cases may be visualised where the ITO while making an assessment examines the accounts, makes enquiries, applies his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and determines the income either by accepting the accounts or by making some estimate himself. The Commissioner, on perusal of the records, may be of the opinion that the estimate made by the officer concerned was on the lower side and left to the Commissioner he would have estimated the income at a figure higher than the one determined by the ITO. That would not vest the Commissioner with power to re-examine the accounts and determine the income himself at a higher figure. It is because the ITO has exercised the quasi-judicial power vested in him in accordance with law and arrived at a conclusion and such a 9 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 conclusion cannot be termed to be erroneous simply because the Commissioner does not feel satisfied with the conclusion. It may be said in such a case that in the opinion of the Commissioner the order in question is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. But that by itself will not be enough to vest the Commissioner with the power of suo motu revision because the first requirement, viz., that the order is erroneous, is absent. Similarly, if an order is erroneous but not prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, then also the power of suo motu revision cannot be exercised. Any and every erroneous order cannot be the subject-matter of revision because the second requirement also must be fulfilled. There must be some prima facie material on record to show that tax 'which was lawfully exigible has not been imposed or that by the application of the relevant statute on an incorrect or incomplete interpretation a lesser tax than what was just has been imposed. Therefore, in order to exercise power under section 263(1) there must be material before the Commissioner to consider that the order passed by the ITO was erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue and that it must be an order which is not in accordance with the law or which has been passed by the ITO without making any enquiry in undue haste. An order can be said to be prejudicial to the interests of the revenue if it is not in accordance with the law in consequence whereof the lawful revenue due to the State has not been realised or cannot be realised. There must be material available on the record called for by the Commissioner to satisfy him prima facie that the aforesaid two requisites are present. If not, he has no authority to initiate proceedings for revision. Exercise of power of suo motu revision under such circumstances will amount to arbitrary exercise of power.

It is well-settled that when exercise of statutory power is dependent upon the existence of certain objective facts, the authority before exercising such power must have materials on record to satisfy it in that regard. If the action of the authority is challenged before the Court, it would be open to the Courts to examine whether the relevant objectives were available from the records called for and examined by such authority.

The ITO in this case had made enquiries in regard to the nature of the expenditure incurred by the assessee. The assessee had given a detailed explanation in that regard by a letter in writing. All these were part of the record of the case. Evidently, the claim was allowed by the ITO on being satisfied with the explanation of the assessee. This decision of the ITO could not be held to be 10 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 'erroneous' simply because in his order he did not make an elaborate discussion in that regard. Moreover, in the instant case, the Commissioner himself, even after initiating proceedings for revision and hearing the assessee, could not say that the allowance of the claim of the assessee was erroneous and that the expenditure was not revenue expenditure but an expenditure of capital nature. He simply asked the ITO to re-examine the matter. That was not permissible. Hence, the provisions of section 263 were not applicable to the instant case and, therefore, the Commissioner was not justified in setting aside the assessment order."

12. In this view of the matter and considering the ratios of case laws discussed above, we are of the view that the assessment order passed by the A.O. is neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Therefore, we set aside the order passed by the CIT u/s 263 and restore the assessment order passed by the A.O. u/s 143(3) of the Act.

13. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed."

5.2 In view of the above decisions, we are of the opinion that the payment of employees' contributions to EPF and ESI after the due date prescribed under the respective Act but before the due date of filing of the return u/s. 139(1) of the Act is to be allowed. Hence, this ground of appeal of the assessee is allowed.

6. Coming to the issue of dormant scheme of spraying on coconut trees, after hearing both the parties, we find that there was no whisper about the issue in the assessment order. The Assessing Officer is duty bound to make enquiries while passing the assessment order u/s. 143 of the Act. Section 263 of the Income-tax Act seeks to remove the prejudice caused to the revenue by the erroneous order passed by the Assessing Officer. It empowers the Commissioner to initiate suo moto proceedings either where the Assessing Officer takes a 11 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 wrong decision without considering the materials available on record or he takes a decision without making an enquiry into the matters, where such inquiry was prima facie warranted. The Commissioner is well within his powers to regard an order as erroneous on the ground that the Assessing Officer should have made further inquiries before accepting the claims made by the assessee. The Assessing Officer cannot remain passive in the face of a claim, which is apparently in order but calls for further enquiry. In other words, he must carry out investigation where the facts of the case so require and also decide the matter judiciously on the basis of materials collected by him as also those produced by the assessee before him. The Assessing Officer was statutorily required to make the assessment under Section 143(3) after scrutiny and not in a summary manner as contemplated by Sub-section (1) of Section 143. The Assessing Officer is therefore, required to act fairly while accepting or rejecting the claim of the assessee in cases of scrutiny assessments. The Assessing Officer should protect the interests of the revenue and to see that no one dodged the revenue and escaped without paying the legitimate tax. The Assessing Officer is not expected to put blinkers on his eyes and mechanically accept what the assessee claims before him. It is his duty to ascertain the truth of the facts stated and the genuineness of the claims made in the return. The order passed by the Assessing Officer becomes erroneous when an enquiry has not been made or genuineness of the claim has not been examined.. The Commissioner may consider an order of the Assessing Officer to be erroneous 12 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 not only when it contains some apparent error of reasoning or of law or of fact on the face of it but also when the Assessing Officer fails to make enquiries or examine the genuineness of the claims of the assessee. In taking the aforesaid view, we are supported by the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rampyari Devi Saraogi v. CIT (67 ITR 84) (SC), Smt. Tara Devi Aggarwal v. CIT (88 ITR 323) (SC), and Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd's case ( 243 ITR 83) (SC).

6.1 In view of the foregoing, it can safely be said that an order passed by the Assessing Officer becomes erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue under Section 263 in the following cases:

(i) The order sought to be revised contains error of reasoning or of law or of fact on the face of it.
(ii) The order sought to be revised proceeds on incorrect assumption of facts or incorrect application of law. In the same category fall orders passed without applying the principles of natural justice or without application of mind.
(iii) The order passed by the Assessing Officer is a stereotype order which simply accepts what the assessee has stated in his return or where he fails to make the requisite enquiries or examine the genuineness of the claim which is called for in the circumstances of the case.

6.2 In the present case, the CIT was of the opinion that there is no proper enquiry by the Assessing Officer and he accepted the claims of the assessee without making any enquiry with regard to the claims of the assessee. The 13 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 Assessing Officer has not gathered any information and evidence to suggest that the claims of the assessee were right. The Assessing Officer is required to cause enquiries with regard to the claims of the assessee. As such, the CIT is justified in remitting this issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration by invoking the provisions of sec. 263 of the Act. Accordingly, this ground of appeal of the assessee is dismissed. Hence, the appeal of the assessee in ITA No.255/Coch/2017 is partly allowed.

7. The only ground in the Revenue's appeal in ITA No. 309/Coch/2017 is with regard to deletion of disallowance of payment of employees' contribution to EPF and ESI by the CIT(A).

7.1 After hearing both the parties, we find that this issue is covered by the judgment of the Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Merchem Ltd.

(378 ITR 443) wherein it was held as follows:

"On a reading of section36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, along with section 2(24)(x), it is categoric and clear that the contribution received by the assessee from the employees alone was treated as income for the purpose of section 36(1)(va) and, therefore, the assessee is entitled to get deduction for the sum received by the assessee from his employees towards contribution to the fund or funds so mentioned only if, the amount was credited by the assessee on or before the due date to the employees account in the relevant fund as provided under Explanation to section 36(1)(va) of the Act. So far as section 43B(b) is concerned, it takes care of only the contribution payable by the employer or the assessee to the respective funds. Therefore, sections 36(1)(va) and 43B(b) operate in different fields, i.e., the former takes care of the employees' contribution and the latter the employer's contribution . The assessee is entitled to get 14 I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017 the benefit of deduction under section 43B(b) as provided under the proviso thereto only with regard to the portion of the amount paid by the employer to the contributory fund.
Held, allowing the appeal, that since the assessee had admittedly not paid the remittance of the employees contribution to the provident fund and ESI within the dates prescribed under the respective Acts, the assessee was not entitled to deduction under section 43B of the amounts deducted thereunder for and on behalf of the employees."

7.2 Accordingly, we direct the Assessing Officer to disallow the payment of employees' contribution to EPF and ESI which were made after the due date prescribed under the respective Act. This ground of appeal of the Revenue is partly allowed for statistical purposes.

8. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed and the appeal filed by the Revenue is partly allowed for statistical purposes.

Order pronounced in the open Court on this 18th June, 2018.

             sd/-                                         sd/-
       (GEORGE GEORGE K.)                             (CHANDRA POOJARI)
        JUDICIAL MEMBER                               ACCOUNTANT MEMBER

Place: Kochi
Dated: 18th June, 2018
GJ
Copy to:

1. M/s. Kerala State Warehousing Corporation, 39/1304, Warehousing Corporation Road, Kochi-682 016.

2. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Corporate Circle-1(2), Kochi.

15

I.T.A. No. 255 & 309/C/2017

3. The Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals)-I, Kochi.

4. The Pr. Commissioner of Income-tax, Kochi

5. D.R., I.T.A.T., Cochin Bench, Cochin.

6. Guard File.

By Order (ASSISTANT REGISTRAR) I.T.A.T., Cochin 16