Himachal Pradesh High Court
Decided On: 28Thmay vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors on 28 May, 2025
Author: Vivek Singh Thakur
Bench: Vivek Singh Thakur
2025:HHC:16474 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CWPOA No.7001 of 2020 Decided on: 28thMay, 2025 ____________________________________________________________ Ashok Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge 1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the petitioner: Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate.
For the respondents: Mr. Baldev Negi, Vishav Deep Sharma, Additional Advocate General with Ms. Seema Sharma, Deputy Advocate General.
Ranjan Sharma, Judge Petitioner, Ashok Kumar, a Medical Officer in Health Department has come up before this Court, seeking following relief(s) :-
"(i) That directions may very kindly be issued to the respondents to grant increments to the applicant which have been withheld from January, 2011 by releasing the same, with further direction to the respondents to calculate the arrears on account of release of such increments and pay the same to the applicant with all consequential benefits along with interest @ 9% per annum 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
-2- 2025:HHC:16474 from the date the increments have been withheld, in the interest of law and justice.
(ii) That respondents may very kindly be directed to release the benefit of 4-9-14 (Assured Career Progression Scheme) to the applicant from the date when it became due i.e. 11.11.2012, by releasing the pay scale of Rs.37,400 - 67,000 + 8700 grade pay from the due date as mentioned above, with further direction to pay the arrears to the applicant by releasing the pay scale along with interest @ 9% per annum.
(iii) That respondents may very kindly be directed to release the 50% salary of the applicant for suspension period i.e. with effect from 13.04.2010 to 19.07.2010 along with interest @ 9% per annum."
FACTUAL MATRIX:
2. Case as set up by Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, Learned Senior Counsel is that the petitioner was appointed as Medical Officer in Health Department and was posted in ESI, Dispensary at Nalagarh in 11.11.1998.
While the petitioner was working at Nalagarh, he was framed in a false criminal case, originating from FIR No.5 of 2010, dated 13.04.2010, registered under Sections 7 and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, at the instance of State Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau.
Consequent upon the registration of FIR, the petitioner was arrested by the police on 13.04.2010.
-3- 2025:HHC:16474 2(i). Due to registration of FIR on 13.04.2010 and
his consequential arrest, the Respondent No 1-Principal Secretary [Health], issued an order on 02.05.2010 [Annexure A-1], placing the petitioner under suspension by invoking Rule 10 of the CCS [CCA Rules] with effect from the date of arrest i.e. 13.04.2010 and in fixing the head-quarters of the petitioner in the office of Chief Medical Officer, Solan. The suspension of the petitioner was revoked by the Respondent No.1-Principal Secretary [Health], Government of Himachal Pradesh on 19.07.2010 [Annexure A-2] and upon revocation of suspension, the petitioner was posted as Medical Officer in Civil Hospital, Nerwa, District Shimla and he joined at CH Nerwa on 28.07.2010 and remained posted at Nerwa till 26.04.2013, whereafter, he was transferred to Civil Hospital, Poanta Sahib and he remained posted till 05.09.2017.
2(ii). Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner stated that the first claim is that after revocation of suspension on 19.07.2010 [Annexure A-2], the respondents were bound to release the balance 50% of subsistence allowance i.e. salary and allowance, but the same was
-4- 2025:HHC:16474 not done. It is averred that the Block Medical Officer Nerwa, addressed a communication to Chief Medical Officer, Solan on 26.04.2012 [Annexure A-3], seeking information, as to whether the petitioner was to be granted annual increments and salary after revocation of suspension or not. The second claim is that the respondents have withheld the annual increments for last 8 years by making the petitioner to stagnate on the same basic pay of Rs. 26,630/-, fixed w.e.f.
01.01.2011 till day. The third claim is that in terms of Himachal Pradesh Civil Services [Revised Pay] Rules, and notification dated 1.9.1998 and communication dated 23.06.2000, Four Tier Pay Scale were admissible for Medical Officers of Health Department. The petitioner completed 14 years of service as a Medical Officer on 11.11.2012 and on completion of this service, he became eligible for grant of higher pay scale of Rs. 37,400- 67,000 + 8,700 GP with effect from 01.01.2013 but the respondents have denied this benefit till day.
2(iii). Learned Senior Counsel submits that these benefits have been denied probably due to registration
-5- 2025:HHC:16474 of criminal case, originating from FIR No.5 of 2010, dated 13.04.2010, registered under Sections 7 and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and the petitioner stands acquitted by Learned Special Judge, on 08.05.2013 [Annexure A-4], as the prosecution failed to establish that the petitioner raised a demand for illegal gratification and such gratification was accepted by the petitioner.
2(iv). After acquittal, the petitioner submitted a representation to Block Medical Officer, Nerwa, District Shimla on 20.06.2013 [Annexure A-5], informing about acquittal and requested the authorities for releasing remaining salary for the suspension period and to release annual increments due in normal course with effect from 01.01.2012 till filing of Original Application [now CWPOA No.7001 of 2020] and to release higher pay scale which became due on completion of 14 years of service [under Four Tier Scales] w.e.f. 01.01.2013.
In response to this, the Chief Medical Officer, Shimla, addressed a communication to Respondent No.2-Director of Health Service on 20.07.2013 [Annexure A-6]; but in vain. However, the Block Medical Officer, Nalagarh,
-6- 2025:HHC:16474 forwarded a request to Chief Medical Officer, Solan on 08.01.2019 [Annexure A-7], but since nothing was done, Chief Medical Officer, Solan addressed another communication to the higher authorities on 21.01.2019 [Annexure A-8], seeking directions qua the claims of the petitioner in view of his acquittal in the criminal case.
In above background, the petitioner is seeking release of balance 50% of salary i.e. pay and allowances for suspension period from 02.05.2010 till its revocation on 18.07.2010; and release of annual increments due in normal course from 01.01.2012 till the filing of Original Application on 11.06.2019 [converted as CWPOA No.7001 of 2020] and thereafter; and release of higher pay scale of Rs. 37,400 - 67,000 + 8,700 GP, upon completion of 14 years of service as Medical Officer on 11.11.2012 payable w.e.f. 01.01.2013 in accordance with Himachal Pradesh Civil Services Revised Pay Rules dated 01.09.1998 and the Notification dated 23.06.2000, with all arrears; but the action of the respondents in denying or withholding these service benefits to the
-7- 2025:HHC:16474 petitioner was stated to be illegal, arbitrary malafide and unconstitutional.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL [NOW ABOLISHED] AND THEREAFTER BEFORE THIS COURT:
3. The Original Application No.2324 of 2019 [now CWPOA No.7001 of 2020], was taken up before Learned State Administrative Tribunal, directing the respondents to file a reply on 01.07.2019. After abolition of Tribunal, the Original Application was transferred to this Court as CWPOA No.7001 of 2020, granting further time to file reply. Upon filing of reply dated 09.09.2022, the petitioner filed rejoinder and matter was listed on various dates and after hearing the arguments, the matter was finally decided.
STAND OF RESPONDENTS IN REPLY
4. Upon issuance of notice, Director of Health Services, Himachal Pradesh, filed the reply-affidavit dated 07.09.2022.
4(i). Perusal of reply affidavit indicates that the petitioner was appointed as Medical Officer and while working as such, an FIR No.5 of 2010 dated 13.04.2010,
-8- 2025:HHC:16474 was registered against him under Sections 7 and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, and the Learned Special Judge, acquitted the petitioner vide judgment dated 08.05.2013 [Annexure P-4].
4(ii). So far as the claim of petitioner for releasing 50% of balance salary [i.e. pay and allowances] for suspension period and claim for annual increments and further claim for higher pay scale after completion of 14 years service, the reply-affidavit indicated that these financial benefits cannot be released as Criminal Appeal No.4084 of 2013 is pending adjudication before the High Court. The operative part of the stand of the respondents in reply-affidavit reads as under :-
"6. That it is submitted that as per the further information gathered from the Vigilance authorities, against the judgment dated 08.05.2013, Annexure A-4, passed in corruption case No.4-S/7 of 2011 regarding acquittal of the petitioner, the further Criminal Appeal was preferred on behalf of the State of HP before the Hon'ble High Court of HP, which after being registered as Criminal Appeal No.4084/2013 under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is pending adjudication and decision before the Hon'ble Court in the matter.
10. That it is submitted that the claim
-9- 2025:HHC:16474 filed by the petitioner by way of the instant petition is bad in the eye of law being barred by limitation and the same as such deserves to be dismissed on this sole ground. It is added that the petitioner by way of an instant petition has raised his claim for the financial benefits of the increments, 4-9-14 pay scale as also the half salary of his suspension period pertaining to the year 2010 after a lapse of more than 9 years, which is not legally permissible.
11. That it is submitted that if at all the claim advanced by the petitioner for releasing him the financial benefits without final adjudication of his Criminal Appeal as well as decision/regularization with regard to his suspension period, is allowed, the same would not only be against the spirit of the service rules, but also hamper the judicial course in addition to leading to a wrong precedence as the other persons engaged and working in the same capacities would also try to adopt such practices, which is not legally permissible."
Perusal of the above reveals that in the Reply the Respondents have refused to release the benefits of balance salary for suspension period; the annual increments due from January 2011 and the higher pay scale on completion of 14 years service due to the pendency of criminal appeal against acquittal and with these averments, the respondents have prayed for the
- 10 - 2025:HHC:16474 dismissal of instant petition.
5. Heard, Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, Learned Senior Counsel along with Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate, for the petitioner and Mr. Baldev Negi with Mr. Vishav Deep Sharma, Learned Additional Advocate General & Ms. Seema Sharma, Deputy Advocate General for the respondents.
6. Based on factual matrix, the following question arises for determination :-
Whether mere pendency of appeal against acquittal can be the basis for denying service benefits [salary of pay and allowances for suspension period upon revocation of suspension and annual increments due in normal course from 01.01.2011, till day; and the higher pay scale of Rs. 37,400 - 67,000 + 8,700 GP, on completion of 14 years service from 01.01.2003], in absence of any departmental proceedings against the petitioner ?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED:
7. Before analyzing the claim of the petitioner, it is necessary to have a recap of statutory provisions of Rule 10 of the CCS [CCA] Rules, as applicable in instant case also, dealing with suspension of an employee, in following terms :-
10. Suspension :
(1) The appointing authority or any authority
- 11 - 2025:HHC:16474 to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension-
(a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (aa) where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or
(b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial:
Provided that, except in case of an order of suspension made by the Comptroller and Auditor - General in regard to a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and in regard to an Assistant Accountant General or equivalent (other than a regular member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service), where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made.
(2) A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority -
(a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours;
(b) with effect from the date of his
- 12 - 2025:HHC:16474 conviction, if, in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty- eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction.
EXPLANATION- The period of forty-eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this sub-
rule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account.
(3) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders.
(4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of Law and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement
- 13 - 2025:HHC:16474 and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders :
Provided that no such further inquiry shall be ordered unless it is intended to meet a situation where the Court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits of the case.
(5) (a) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-rule (7), and order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so.
(b) Where a Government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government servant shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any of such proceedings.
(c) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may at any time be modified or revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate.
(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension, before expiry of ninety days from the effective date of
- 14 - 2025:HHC:16474 suspension, on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension.
Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time.
(7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rule (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days.
Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub- rule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of ninety days of suspension and the ninety days period in such case will count from the date the Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later."
8. The statutory provisions of Rule 54-B of Fundamental Rules, dealing with rights of an employee during suspension and its revocation and rights of an employee during pendency of departmental or judicial proceedings and corresponding obligations of an employer on conclusion of such proceedings and the legal
- 15 - 2025:HHC:16474 entitlements accruing to an employee therefrom; have been spelt out in following terms:-
FUNDAMENTAL RULE 54-B (1). When a Government servant who has been suspended is reinstated or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement (including premature retirement) while under suspension, the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order-
(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement or the date of his retirement (including premature retirement), as the case may be; and
(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 53, where a Government servant under suspension dies before the disciplinary or the Court proceedings instituted against him are concluded, the period between the date of suspension and the date of death shall be treated as duty for all purposes and his family shall be paid the full pay and allowances for that period to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, subject to adjustment in respect of subsistence allowance already paid.
(3) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8) be paid
- 16 - 2025:HHC:16474 the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been suspended:
Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within sixty days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the Government servant shall be paid for the period of such delay only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine.
(4) In a case falling under sub-rule (3) the period of suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes.
(5) In cases other than those falling under sub-rules (2) and (3) the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rules (8) and (9) be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period (which in no case shall exceed sixty days from the date on which the notice has been served) as may be specified in the notice.
- 17 - 2025:HHC:16474 (6) where suspension is revoked pending finalization of the disciplinary or the Court proceedings, any order passed under sub-rule (1) before the conclusion of the proceedings against the Government servant, shall be reviewed on its own motion after the conclusion of the proceedings by the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) who shall make an order according to the provisions of sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (5), as the case may be.
(7) In a case falling under sub-rule (5), the period of suspension shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose:
Provided that, if the Government servant so desires such authority may order that the period of suspension shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the Government servant. NOTE: The order of the competent authority under the preceding proviso shall be absolute and no higher sanction shall be necessary for the grant of-
(a) extraordinary leave in excess of three months in the case of temporary Government servant; and
(b) leave of any kind in excess of five years in the case of permanent or quasi-
permanent Government servant.
(8) The payment of allowances under sub-rule (2), sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (5) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible.
(9) The amount determined under the proviso to sub-rule (3) or under sub-rule (5) shall not be less than subsistence
- 18 - 2025:HHC:16474 allowance and other allowances admissible under Rule 53."
ANALYSIS:
9. Taking into account of the factual matrix and the stand of the Respondents in the Reply Affidavit this Court is of the considered view, that the claim of the petitioner, as prayed carries force, and the stand of the Respondents herein, in denying the benefits to the petitioner is misconceived and devoid of any merit, in view of the following discussion, {regarding Claim(s) A- B & C} hereinbelow :-
[A] NOT PASSING THE STATUTORY ORDERS AFTER REVOCATION OF SUSPENSION & REINSTATEMENT UNDER FR 54-B (1) (a) (b):
9(i). First contention of Learned Senior Counsel is that though an FIR No.5 of 2010, dated 13.04.2010 was registered against the petitioner under Sections 7 and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and due to his arrest he was placed under suspension on 02.05.2010 [Annexure A-2] and upon revocation of suspension on 19.07.2010 [Annexure A-2] the petitioner joined in CHC, Nerwa on 28.07.2010. The criminal case originating from the above FIR ended in acquittal on 08.05.2013
- 19 - 2025:HHC:16474 [Annexure A-4]. No disciplinary proceedings were ever initiated against the petitioner. Upon reinstatement, the Respondent No.1 was bound to consider and pass a specific order firstly, on reinstatement, regarding the pay and allowances payable to petitioner for the period of suspension till reinstatement and secondly, for treating suspension period as duty period in terms of FR 54-B[1].
The action of the Competent Authority-Respondent No 1 in neither considering nor in passing a specific order dealing with twin requirements of Clauses (a) & (b) of Sub Section (1) of FR 54 B amounts to abdication of powers mandated under the Rules.
NOT PASSING OF STATUTORY ORDERS ON TWIN ASPECTS UNDER FR 54-B (I) (a) & (b) VIOLATIVE OF NATURAL JUSTICE- HAVING CIVIL CONSEQUENCES:
9(ii). After suspension, the Respondents have given 50% subsistence allowance to the petitioner and after revocation of suspension/rejoining, the denial of balance of pay and allowances for suspension period has visited petitioner with civil consequences. Action of the Competent Authority in withholding admissible pay and allowances for suspension period, after revocation of suspension and
- 20 - 2025:HHC:16474 rejoining and also in not passing an order for treating this period as duty period under FR 54-B(1) (a) & (b) could not be resorted to without giving a prior notice, without affording a personal hearing without calling for an explanation from the petitioner before denying these benefits is violative of principles of natural justice. Thus, non-compliance of the mandate under Rule 54 B (1) (a) & (b) and non-compliance of principles of natural justice vitiates the State action, in instant case.
9(iii). While dealing with a similar fact situation, the action of the Competent Authority was deprecated in not passing the mandate under FR 54-B (1) (a) & (b) when, after revocation of suspension and acquittal in criminal case and when, neither any other departmental nor judicial-criminal proceedings were pending in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu vs State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 240, in the following terms:
"5. The first question which requires consideration is whether there was a duty on the competent authority to afford an opportunity to the appellant to show cause before that authority formed the opinion as to whether he was fully
- 21 - 2025:HHC:16474 exonerated and whether his suspension was wholly unjustified. Under F.R. 54 where a Government servant is reinstated, the authority has to consider and make a specific order (i) regarding pay and allowances payable to him for the period of his absence from duty and (ii) whether such period of absence should be treated as one spent on duty. The consideration of these questions depends on whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Government servant had been fully exonerated and in case of pension whether it was wholly unjustified. If the authority forms such an opinion the Government servant is entitled to full pay and allowances which he would have been entitled to had the order of dismissal, removal or suspension, as the case may be, not been passed. Where the authority cannot form such an opinion the Government servant may be given such proportion of pay and allowances as the authority may prescribe. In the former case the period of absence from duty has to be treated as period spent on duty for all purposes and in the latter case such period is not to be treated as period spent on duty. But the authority has the power in suitable cases to direct that such period of absence shall be treated as period spent on duty in which case the government servant would be entitled to full pay and allowances.
6. It is true that the order under FR. 54 in a sense a consequential order in that it would be passed aft an order of reinstatement is made. But the fact that it is a consequential order does not determine the question whether the government servant has to be given an
- 22 - 2025:HHC:16474 opportunity to show cause or not. It is also true that in a case where reinstatement is ordered after a departmental inquiry the government servant would Ordinarily have had an opportunity, to show: cause. In such a case, the authority no doubt, would have before him the entire record including the explanation given by the government servant from which all the facts and circumstances of the case would be before the authority and from which he can form the opinion as to whether he has been fully exonerated or not and in case of suspension whether such suspension was wholly unjustified or not. In such a case the order passed under a rule such as the present Fundamental Rule might be said to be a consequential order following a departmental inquiry. But there are, three classes of cases as laid down by the proviso in Art. 311 where a departmental inquiry would not be held, viz., (a) where a person is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge,
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied for reasons to be record in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry;
and (c) where the President or the Governor as the case may be is satisfied, that in the interest of security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. Since there would be no inquiry in these classes of cases the authority would not have before him any explanation by the' government servant. The authority in such cases would have to consider and pass the order merely on such facts which might be placed before him by
- 23 - 2025:HHC:16474 the department concerned. The order in such a case would be ex-parte without the authority having the other side of the picture. In such cases the order that such authority would pass would not be a consequential order as where a departmental inquiry has been held. Therefore, aft order passed under Fundamental Rule 45 is not always a consequential order nor is such order a continuation of the departmental proceeding taken against the employee
7. It is true as Mr. Sen pointed out that F.R. 54 does not in express terms lay down that the authority shall give to the employee concerned the opportunity to show cause before he passes the order. Even so, the question is whether the rule casts such a duty on the authority by implication. The order as to whether a given case falls under cl. 2 or cl. 5 of the Fundamental Rule must depend on the examination by the authority of all the facts and circumstances of the case and his forming the opinion therefrom of two factual findings; whether the employee was fully exonerated and in case of suspension whether it was wholly unjustified. Besides, an order passed under this rule would obviously affect the government servant adversely if it is one made under cls. 3 and 5. Consideration under this rule depending as it does on facts and circumstances in their entirety, passing an order on the basis of factual finding arrived at from such facts and circumstances and such an order resulting in pecuniary loss to the government servant must be held to be an objective rather than a subjective function. The
- 24 - 2025:HHC:16474 very nature of the function implies the duty to act judicially. In such a case if an opportunity to show cause against the action, proposed is not afforded, as admittedly it was not done in the present case, the order is liable to be struck down as invalid on the ground that it is one in breach of the principles of natural justice.
10. In our view F.R. 54 contemplates a duty to act in accordance with the basic concept of justice and fairplay. The authority therefore had to afford a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to show cause why Cls. 3 and 5 should not be applied and that having not been done the order must be held to be invalid."
9(iv). The Honble Supreme Court in Gurpal Singh versus High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, (2012) 13 SCC 94, has outlining that pendency of an appeal cannot be the basis for denying benefits accruing from revocation of suspension and upon his exoneration and the competent authority is bound to take a decision on admissibility of pay and allowances and to treat the period as duty period in the following terms:
"45. The acquittal of the petitioner having been affirmed by the High Court of Delhi, in our opinion, it was necessary for the High Court of Rajasthan to take a decision: (a) whether to revoke
- 25 - 2025:HHC:16474 the order of suspension and permit the petitioner to perform judicial functions;
(b) whether to hold a departmental enquiry with regard to the receipt of money allegedly received by him from the deceased; (c) as to how the period of suspension was to be treated; (d) whether the petitioner was entitled to full salary, part salary or no salary at all for the period of suspension.
46. It appears to us that given the findings recorded by the trial court, subsequently reiterated by the High Court of Delhi, the decision to continue the petitioner under suspension, thereafter, was rather harsh. It is true that the suspension of the petitioner was continued as the High Court had decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the petitioner on the charges that he had wrongly extracted certain money from the deceased. But it is a matter of record that both the trial court as well as the High Court had found the entire story with regard to the alleged receipt of money to be false. The enquiry was founded on the same facts and the same evidence which have had been examined by the trial court as well as the High Court.
In such circumstances, it was necessary for the High Court to examine the findings of the trial court as well as the High Court in detail before taking a decision to initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioner, founded on the same set of facts and the evidence. It is apparent from the record that no such examination of the judgment was undertaken by the High Court.
Even after taking a decision to initiate departmental proceeding against the
- 26 - 2025:HHC:16474 petitioner, it was no longer imperative to continue the petitioner under suspension. The petitioner was no longer charged with any criminal offence as both the trial court as well as the High Court had literally concluded that the charges against the petitioner had been concocted. The petitioner had been subjected to continued suspension since 22nd December, 1985. During the period of departmental proceedings, even if the petitioner was not to be assigned any judicial work, the High Court could have conveniently given him suitable posting on the administrative side. In our opinion, from the time of dismissal of the appeal by the Delhi High Court, the continued suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified.
50. In view of the authoritative judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Jankiraman (supra), the submissions made by Mr. Calla would have to be accepted. In the aforesaid judgment it was held that:-
"26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings."
52. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition. We reject the submissions
- 27 - 2025:HHC:16474 of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by the trial court. We also reject the submissions of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. We, however, hold that the continued suspension of the petitioner during the pendency of the departmental proceedings was wholly unjustified. The petitioner is, therefore, held entitled to full pay and allowances from 27th September, 2005, i.e. the date of the judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court onwards. We further hold that the petitioner was entitled to be considered for promotion notionally from the date when an officer junior to him was promoted. We, therefore, direct the High Court to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion (if he otherwise satisfies the requirements as per the rules) from the date when a person junior to him was considered and promoted to the next higher post. Let such a decision be taken by the High Court within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order.
53. We further direct that the petitioner would be entitled to all consequential benefits, such as salary and other allowances by treating him on duty with effect from the date the appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the Delhi High Court and after fixing his last pay drawn correctly. The consequential benefits shall be paid to him with 6% interest from the date of the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court on 27th September, 2005. The enhanced retiral
- 28 - 2025:HHC:16474 benefits shall be released to him within three months of the receipt of a copy of this order."
9(v). While dealing with an issue that failure to pass an order after revocation of suspension shall entitle an employee for full salary for the suspension period has been mandated by the Honble Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Agarwal versus Union of India and another, (2015) 17 SCC 625, in the following terms:-
22. When the order of suspension is revoked and the suspended employee is asked to join the duty, he is required to do so. How the period of suspension is to be treated is another aspect.
At the most, such an employee would be entitled to full salary during the suspension period if no order is passed as to how the suspension period would be governed. That would not mean that order revoking suspension itself becomes bad in law. It is pertinent to mention that even the Tribunal did not say that order revoking suspension was bad in law (In fact that part of the order was favorable to the petitioner). What it held was that in terms of Rule 5(b), the Government should have also decided how the period of suspension is to be treated and, therefore, directed the Government to pass necessary order to that effect.
- 29 - 2025:HHC:16474 DENIAL OF FULL PAY AND ALLOWANCES FOR SUSPENSION PERIOD DESPITE HONOURABLE ACQUITTAL DATED 08.05.2013 [ANNEXURE A-4]
10. In order to appreciate the contention of the petitioner, it is necessary to analyze the judgement dated 08.05.2013 [Annexure A-4], acquitting the petitioner, in following terms:
18. In his cross-examination, the complainant has stated that he had gone to ESIC office on 9.4.2010 where he met the accused who raised demand of bribe money. It is to be noted that the accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C has admitted that the accused had met him on 9.4.20101 in ESI Dispensary at Nalagarh but pleaded that the complainant requested for issuance of leave certificate at which he told the complainant that he was not competent to issue the same and the same is to be issued by treating doctor. The accused has specifically denied that he demanded any bribe money from the complainant at that time and pleaded that on his refusal the complainant got enraged and threatened to teach him a lesson.
19. The accused has examined Hari Ram (DW4) who was posted in ESI Dispensary at Nalagarh at the relevant period as Class IV. It is his statement that on
9.4.201010 he was present in the room of the accused and at about 11.30 AM the complainant Raj Kumar came there and asked the accused to prepare documents pertaining to leave of his wife and the accused thereafter saw the papers and told the complainant that he cannot prepare
- 30 - 2025:HHC:16474 the leave documents and the same are to be prepared by treating doctor at which the complainant showed resentment and thereafter left the room by threatening the accused to face consequences. Be it noted that there is no cross-
examination of this witness on behalf of the prosecution denying that he was posted as Class IV in ESI Dispensary, Nalagarh during April, 2010 which means that the statement of this witness on the aforesaid point has gone unchallenged and thus the same has to be relied upon as there is nothing on record to prove anything to the contrary. Though, DW4 has been cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution but nothing contrary could be elicitea in his cross- examination. He has denied that he is deposing falsely to favour the accused being Subordinate of the accused. Thus, the statement of the complainant Raj Kumar (PW7) that the accused demanded bribe money from him for issuing leave certificate in favour of his wife stands contradicted/belied by Hari Ram (DW4). As far as other witnesses relied upon by the prosecution as referred above are concerned, they are witnesses to the recovery of tainted money and none of them were accompanying the complainant when such demand was raised by the accused and none of them have also seen the complainant handing over the currency notes to the accused and all of them are alleged to have entered in the room of the accused on the receipt of signal from the complainant. Accordingly, even the statement of the complainant that he has handed over the currency notes of Rs 500/- to the accused on his demand also remains uncorroborated.
- 31 - 2025:HHC:16474 In view of this, the uncorroborated statement of the complainant cannot be relied upon and the same also cannot be considered to be sufficient to prove the demand of illegal gratification on the part of the accused.
26. In view of such material discrepancy in the evidence of PW7 and PW8 as referred above coupled with the fact that no independent person has been associated as a shadow witness by the Investigating Officer and no explanation has been put forward by the prosecution for departing from the normal practice of associating an independent person as shadow witness, the version of the prosecution is rendered to be suspicious and in view of this on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution it cannot be concluded that the accused has demanded the bribe money from the complainant at the relevant date and time.
27. As already observed, it is not the case of the prosecution that independent witnesses were not available who had witnessed the demand as well as acceptance of bribe money from the complainant by the accused at the. relevant date and time. On the other hand, it is in the cross-examination of the complainant that when he went to the room of the accused on 13.4.2010 at about 2-2.30 PM in order to hand over the bribe money to him then there were 5-10 patients in the room of the accused which statement of the complainant means that the demand as well as acceptance of bribe money was also witnessed by the said patients who were present in the room of the accused. Though, the complainant has tried to
- 32 - 2025:HHC:16474 make an improvement in his version over the version as recorded in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C mark -A with which he has been duly confronted by stating that the accused has taken him behind the curtain where he handed over the bribe money to the accused but such version narrated by the complainant is an improvement over the version as recorded in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C and as such the same cannot be relied upon. However, it is to be noted that the Investigating Officer has not associated any of such patients in the investigation and the prosecution has also not examined any such patients who were present in the room of the accused when the alleged demand of bribe money was raised by the accused and the complainant is alleged to have handed over the bribe money to the accused. Similarly, Malkiat Singh (PW8) has stated in his cross-examination that there were patients inside the room of the accused when they entered into the room of the accused on receipt of specific signal from the complainant which statement of PW-8 is corresponding to the statement of the complainant (PW7). Though, Daya Sagar (PW13) Investigating Officer has stated that there was no employee or patient inside the dispensary when they entered into the room on receipt of specific signal from the complainant but such statement of the PW13 cannot be relied upon in view of the statements of the complainant Raj Kumar (PW7) and Malkiat Singh (PW8). The patients who were in the room of the accused when the bribe money is alleged to have been handed over by the complainant to the accused
- 33 - 2025:HHC:16474 were the best available evidence for the prosecution to corroborate/support the version of the complainant that the accused has demand bribe money and the complainant has handed over the bribe money to the accused on his demand. In view of the fact that the prosecution has not examined any such witness without any plausible reasons goes to establish that the best available evidence has been withheld by the prosecution and in such circumstances, an adverse inference can be legitimately drawn against the prosecution that if examined such witnesses would not have supported the version of the prosecution making the version of the prosecution to be suspicious and unworthy of credence.
32. It is to be noted that it is the defence plea of the accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C that he has declined to issue any leave certificate in favour of the wife of the complainant and told him that he could not issue such certificate because he was not the treating doctor at which the complainant tried to forcibly put curreney notes in the pocket of his pant but the same were taken out immediately by him and placed the same on the table and he asked the complainant to take away the said notes which defence plea taken by the accused thus stands substantiated /corroborated by the defence evidence adduced by the accused as discussed above by me. Be it noted that it is admitted by the complainant Raj Kumar (PW7) that he has admitted his wife in Akash Hospital and that she was not checked or treated by the accused in connection with her pregnancy at the time of her admission or at the
- 34 - 2025:HHC:16474 time of delivery. He has further stated that he went to ESI Hospital to have eligibility certificate which was required for the purpose of leave. However, he has further admitted that eligibility certificate is required for the purpose of free treatment from the attached hospital/dispersary and the same is not required for the purpose of obtaining any leave. Dr. Bhupesh Gupta (PW-l) who is proprietor of Akash Hospital, Nalagarh in his cross- examination has stated that the medical certificate issued by the faculty to the patient treated in the hospital need not be counter signed by referred dispensary /Medical Officer and on the basis of said medical certificate all the facilities can be provided by ESIC to the concerned person. Thus, on the basis of such evidence adduced by the prosecution it is established that the accused has not treated the wife of the complainant at any point of time and he has also not referred her to Akash Hospital where she was admitted during the period of her pregnancy. In view of this, it does not appeal to reason that the complainant would have approached the accused for issuing leave certificate when the accused has no connection with the treatment of the wife of the complainant during period of her admission in Akash Hospital, Nalagarh. Thus, in view of this coupled with the aforesaid defence evidence adduced by the accused, the defence plea taken by the accused stands probablized that he has refused to issue medical certificate to the complainant in respect of his wife at which the complainant got enraged and has implicated him in the instant case. In
- 35 - 2025:HHC:16474 such circumstances, the version of the prosecution that the accused has demanded and accepted the bribe money from the complainant at the relevant time is also rendered to be suspicious and as such no reliance can be placed upon the testimony of complainant Raj Kumar (PW-7), Malkiat Singh (PW-8) and Daya Sagar (PW-13) that such bribe money was later on recovered from the pocket of the pant of the accused.
33. No doubt, on the basis of the statements of PW7, PW8 and PW13, it is established that hand wash of the accused was conducted immediately after he was apprehended and such hand wash when mixed with solution of sodium carbonate turned into pink and similarly the pant of the accused was also washed and when solution so obtained was mixed with solution of sodium carbonate its colour also changed into pink and both the solutions so obtained were put in separate nips and each of the nip was sealed with seal impression W and impression of seal used was taken separately and later on the said nip along with sample seal was forwarded to FSL Junga for chemical examination. It is further established on the basis of the report of Assistant Chemical Examiner, SFSL, Junga Ex.PX that the contents of both the parcels on analysis were found to be containing traces of Phenolphthalein and Sodium carbonate. However, the presence of phenolphthalein on the hand of the accused as well in the pocket of the pant of the accused in the circumstances as enumerated above in no manner leads to a definite conclusion that the accused has voluntarily accepted the bribe money from the complainant and has thereafter put the same in the
- 36 - 2025:HHC:16474 pocket of his pant. Thus, such evidence adduced by the prosecution also does not establish the commission of offences as alleged against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is further to be noted that as already observed on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution the demand of bribe money on the part of the accused is not established.
35. Thus, in view of what has been stated above, the only irresistible conclusion which can be drawn is that there is no cogent and reliable evidence to establish that the accused has raised demand for illegal gratification of Rs.500/- as well as to prove that currency notes of Rs.500/- were accepted by the accused as illegal gratification. Hence, the charge as framed against the accused cannot be held to have been established. Thus, the point in hand is decided against the prosecution and is answered accordingly."
HONOURABLE ACQUITTAL OF PETITIONER IN CRIMINAL CASE:
10(i). Notably, though the expressions 'honorable acquittal' or 'acquitted of blame' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, but once the petitioner was acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and coupled with the fact that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges leveled, then, in these
- 37 - 2025:HHC:16474 circumstances, the acquittal of the petitioner was an honorable acquittal for all purposes, as has been outlined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another vs S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598, as under :-
"24. The meaning of the expression 'honourable acquittal' came up for consideration before this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honorable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions 'honourable acquittal', 'acquitted of blame', 'fully exonerated' are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression 'honourably acquitted'. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourhbly acquitted."
10(ii). Likewise, the honorable acquittal shall lead to conferment of service benefits in view of the mandate
- 38 - 2025:HHC:16474 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration and Others vs Pradeep Kumar and Another (2018) 1 SCC 797, in the following terms:-
"10. The acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of the candidates in the concerned post. If a person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved or he had no criminal antecedents. Unless it is an honourable acquittal, the candidate cannot claim the benefit of the case. What is honourable acquittal, was considered by this Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598, in which this Court held as under:-
"24. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated"
are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression
- 39 - 2025:HHC:16474 "honourably acquitted". When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted."
10(iii). In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another vs Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685, the principle of honourable acquittal has been outlined as under :-
24. We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the respondents' candidature, the Screening Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal court. We are aware that the question of co- relation between a criminal case and a departmental inquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in connection with it because the issue involved is somewhat identical namely whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in the department.
While the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of
- 40 - 2025:HHC:16474 India this Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable.
25. The expression 'honourable acquittal' was considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram. In that case this Court was concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section 509 of the IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case.
Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank's action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the expressions 'honourable acquittal', 'acquitted of blame' and 'fully exonerated' are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression 'honourably acquitted'. This Court expressed that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges leveled against the accused,
- 41 - 2025:HHC:16474 it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted."
Even a perusal of the judgement of acquittal dated 08.05.2013, [Annexure A-4], reveals that prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges and even the evidence adduced did not prove the charge of demand for gratification and receipt of gratification by petitioner-
accused. Even, the statement of complainant that the accused has treated his wife at the initial stage or till the time of her delivery at Akash Hospital was not proved. Since the wife of complainant was never treated by the petitioner-accused, therefore, no medical certificate could have been issued by petitioner-accused.
In absence of any evidence connecting the petitioner with the accusation/charge, the acquittal of petitioner was an honorable acquittal/acquittal on merits. That being so, the suspension of petitioner based on FIR and resultant arrest and the judicial-criminal proceedings in which he was honorably acquitted leads to an irresistible conclusion, that the suspension was wholly unjustified.
Thus, once the acquittal was an honourable acquittal
- 42 - 2025:HHC:16474 as the prosecution failed to prove the accusation against the petitioner, in these circumstances, the denial of benefits of pay and allowances during the suspension period and in not treating the suspension period as duty period and after obliteration of stigma on acquittal even the denial of service benefits accruing from such period when, neither any other judicial proceedings nor any departmental proceedings were initiated/pending against the petitioner ; and therefore, the inaction and denial of these benefits is uncalled for and the same is accordingly interdicted, in instant case.
DENIAL OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES INABSENCE OF FORMATION OF OPINION & WITHOUT SEEKING REPLY : VIOLATIVE OF PROVISIO TO FR 54-B (3) & (4):
11. After revocation of suspension and upon his acquittal, the Competent Authority-Respondent No. 1 could deny part of the pay and allowances subject to fulfilment of twin pre-conditions under the proviso to FR 54-B (3) i.e. "forming an opinion as to whether the proceedings {departmental or criminal proceedings, as the case may be} had been delayed for reasons directly attributable to the petitioner" and upon formation of such opinion, in
- 43 - 2025:HHC:16474 case, the competent authority intended to deny any part of full pay and allowances due to delay in termination-
conclusion of such proceedings, then, such an action could be resorted to after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to submit a representation against the intended action, considering the representation and after passing a speaking order dealing with the aspect as to whether the proceeding were in-fact delayed at the instance of the petitioner or not. In instant case, the Reply Affidavit does not refer to any such formation of opinion that the criminal proceedings were delayed at the instance of the petitioner and nothing has been placed on record to assert that the mandatory notice/opportunity was given calling for a representation from the petitioner to justify the denial of the remaining admissible pay and allowances. Non-performance of the statutory duty by Respondent No.1-Competent Authority under the proviso to FR 54-B (3) is enough to infer that the denial or withholding or deprivation of financial benefits due for suspension period suffers from non-application of mind, is contrary to the intent and object of the Rules and
- 44 - 2025:HHC:16474 such deprivation resulting in financial loss cannot be permitted to operate against the petitioner.
NOT PASSING ORDERS QUA SUSPENSION PERIOD {PAY AND DUTY} AFTER CONCLUSION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IS VIOLATIVE OF FR-54-B (6)
12. While dealing with the issue that assuming, even if no decision was taken on the admissibility of pay and allowances for the suspension period and in treating this period as duty period due to pendency of judicial-criminal/disciplinary proceedings, then upon the termination-conclusion of these proceedings [as the case may be], the Competent Authority was bound to take a decision on both these twin aspects in terms of FR-54B(6), for giving effect to FR-54B(1) (a) & (b) as mandated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and another versus Mangat Lal Sidana, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 378 as under:
16. Rule 54 with which we are concerned contemplates an amalgam of situations which deal with disciplinary proceedings culminating in dismissal, compulsory retirement and removal and it also deals with absence from duty on account of suspension. In other words, when an employee at the end of the disciplinary proceedings is punished in terms thereof
- 45 - 2025:HHC:16474 and as a result of the order passed is reinstated, then the competent authority is called upon to consider and pass specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid for the period for absence from duty. The Rule appears to separately contemplate the duty to provide for the pay and allowances for the period of suspension ending with the date of retirement on superannuation as the case may be. In other words, the Rule in its application contemplates a situation wherein a Government servant being dismissed, removed, compulsory retired or suspended is reinstated. It also takes in a case where but for his retirement, he would have been reinstated while under suspension. In both these cases, the duty of the competent authority is to pass the order within the contemplation of Rule 54 (1) (a) and
(b). This means that apart from dealing with pay and allowances, as to whether the period of absence is to be treated as duty must be dealt with. This flows from Rule 54(1)(b). The manner in which the authority is to pass the order is regulated by subsequent provisions in Rule 54. Sub-rule 54(2) contemplates that the competent authority must examine the proceedings, apply its mind, and find whether it is a case where the Government servant at the end of the day has been fully exonerated. In the case of suspension where a person being under suspension is reinstated, the duty lies on the competent authority to consider the question as to whether the suspension was justified or wholly unjustified. If the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant would be entitled to be paid the full pay and dearness
- 46 - 2025:HHC:16474 allowance which he was entitled to had he not been suspended. The same is the case of the Government servant visited with the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement. If it is found that at the end of the day that the penalty was wholly unjustified in that, on merit it is found that the employee stands completely exonerated, he would be entitled to get full pay and dearness allowance. Rule 54 (3) is the residuary clause. The provisions of Rule 54 (2) and (3) are mutually exclusive. In other words, if an employee is not fully exonerated, he is to be given such proportion of the pay and allowances as the competent authority may prescribe. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 54 is relatable to sub-rule 54(1) (b).
In other words, whenever there is re- instatement in the circumstances attracting Rule 54, the authority is to pass a specific order relating to the pay and allowances to be paid and also as to whether the period of such absence is being treated as period spent on duty. Both these aspects must be reflected in the order.
21. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants would point out that in such circumstances, the course to be adopted would be to remit it back to the competent authority so that the competent authority may ensure that the respondents appear before the authorities and then the case is decided. In fact, we find that the course adopted by this Court finally in M. Gopalakrishna Naidu (supra) was to remit the matter back to the competent authority to pass an order after hearing the employee. But then, learned counsel for the respondent
- 47 - 2025:HHC:16474 would point out that the respondent is aged 76 and at this stage, remitting back the matter would be highly inequitable. In the leading case, we notice, at the time of admission, this Court had passed an order of stay subject to payment of 50 per cent of the backwages.
23. The disciplinary proceedings against the respondents in both the cases have not culminated in a situation where it could be said that they have been completely exonerated. This would take their case outside the four walls of Rule 54(2) of the Rules. Their suspension may not fall in the category of unjustified suspension. This inevitably and necessarily would bring their cases within the scope of Rule 54(3). This would necessarily mean that the exact amount of pay and allowances to be paid is to be less than the full pay and allowances. However, this exercise can be done only after notice to the employee. Admittedly, there is a failure by the appellants in this regard. But, at the same time, to remit it back for this purpose in our view would be inequitable. Hence we would rather adopt the middle path by directing that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents be paid pay and allowances fixed at 50 per cent of the pay and allowances which they would have drawn for the period of their absence. Accordingly, the appeals are partly allowed. We direct that the respondents in both the cases will be paid the pay and allowances at 50 per cent of the amount which they would be entitled for the period in question.
After revocation of suspension on 19.07.2010
- 48 - 2025:HHC:16474 [Annexure A-2] and joining after revocation/reinstatement on 28.07.2010, even if due to continuance of criminal proceedings, then, upon conclusion of judicial-criminal proceedings on 08.05.2013 resulting in honorable acquittal coupled with the fact that no other disciplinary or any criminal proceedings were initiated leading to irresistible conclusion that the suspension originating from FIR was unjustified and still the Respondents-Competent Authority intended to deny the pay and allowances {not being the whole} for the suspension period admissible under FR 54-B (1) (a) & (b) then, the same could be resorted to only and only if the competent authority had formed an opinion that the delay in conclusion of the judicial proceedings was directly attributed to the petitioner and that too after issuing a notice to the petitioner, affording an opportunity to submit a representation-reply explanation and then after passing a reasoned order under provisio to FR 54-B (3), which has not been complied with in the instant case. Nothing has been placed on record to show that these proceedings were delayed at instance of petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record to assert
- 49 - 2025:HHC:16474 that the competent authority had formed an opinion that criminal proceedings were delayed directly at the instance of the petitioner so as to denying any part of the pay and allowances for suspension period and to treat this period as duty period. Non-compliance of mandate of proviso to FR 54-B(3) by not passing the statutory orders as contemplated under FR 54-B(1) (a) & (b) since acquittal on 08.05.2013 till filing of OA [now CWPOA No. 7001 of 2020 on 11.06.2019 and even thereafter has visited the petitioner with civil consequences ;
and has resulted in depriving the petitioner of his legal entitlement by giving a complete go-bye to principles of natural justice as well as the mandate of FR 54-B(1) (a) & (b) read with FR 54-B (3) & (4) & (6), rendering the State action as illegal, arbitrary, uncalled for and the aforesaid action is set-aside.
13. Given in terms of discussion in Paras 7 to 12 [supra], this Court is of the considered view that the action of the Respondents-Competent Authority in denying the pay and allowances to the petitioner for the suspension period from 2.5.2010 till revocation of
- 50 - 2025:HHC:16474 suspension i.e. 19.7.2010 and the consequential rejoining /reinstatement on 28.07.2010 cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny for the reason that firstly, the denial of the benefit of pay and allowances for the suspension period has visited the petitioner with civil consequences and; secondly, such deprivation could not be resorted to by giving a complete go bye to the principles of natural justice in an arbitrary manner without giving a prior notice, without affording a personal hearing ; and thirdly even after revocation of suspension and reinstatement the Respondents-Competent Authority has abdicated its authority by not passing the mandatory specific order as contemplated under Clause (a) & (b) of sub-rule (1) of FR-54B; and fourthly, failure to pass the mandatory order under FR-54B (1) (a) & (b) cannot be the basis for denying the pay and allowances for the suspension period and to treat suspension period as duty period;
and fifthly, upon an honorable acquittal in criminal proceedings on 8.5.2013 [Annexure A-4] the suspension was wholly unjustified and therefore, the denial of pay and allowances for the suspension period was violative of
- 51 - 2025:HHC:16474 sub rule (3) of FR-54-B and was uncalled for; and sixthly, nothing has been placed on record to assert that the judicial-criminal proceedings, which ended in acquittal were delayed by the petitioner and when, such deprivation could only be ordered only after formation of opinion qua delay attributed directly to the petitioner and that too after issuing a notice, calling for a reply-representation and after passing a reasoned order in writing, in terms of the proviso to Rule 54-B (3) and not otherwise and once these facts are absent in the instant case, then, the only irresistible conclusion is that the pay and allowances and in not treating this period as duty period has been denied by acting wholly contrary to and in defiance of the Rule 54-B as discussed above;
and seventhly, once other than the criminal proceedings in which he stood acquitted, neither any departmental proceedings nor any other criminal proceedings were pending against the petitioner as on the date of reinstatement or date of acquittal and therefore, the suspension was wholly unjustified; and eighthly, the denial of benefits due to the mere pending of criminal appeal
- 52 - 2025:HHC:16474 against acquittal amounts to denying these benefits on extraneous factors, which have no legal sanctity and ninthly, even if, the Respondents did not issue the twin orders mandated under FR 54-B (1) & (3) from date of revocation of suspension due to the pending criminal case then also, upon termination-
conclusion of criminal case, the Respondents were bound to pass the specific order regarding the twin aspects under FR 54-B(1) (a) & (b) after the decision of the criminal case leading to acquittal but the State Action in not passing the specific statutory orders for releasing pay and allowances for suspension period and in not treating this period as duty period since acquittal on 8.5.2013 [Annexure A-4] till the filing of OA-CWPOA on 11.6.2019 and even thereafter defeats the mandate of FR 54-B (1) (3) (4) & (8) ; and lastly, the action of the State Authorities in not passing the specific order on twin aspects probably, on the ground that an appeal against acquittal is pending and this plea cannot be permitted to be invoked for the reason, that nothing has been placed before this Court entitling/empower an
- 53 - 2025:HHC:16474 employer not to pass the statutory order under FR 54-B even after his exoneration-acquittal ; and further such a plea is without any authority of law; and when, mere pendency of an appeal against acquittal cannot be treated as continuation of the criminal proceedings in which he stood acquitted, as mandated by law, which is discussed in succeeding paras of this judgement and failure to issue resultant order(s) by the Respondents-
Competent Authority reveals non application of mind to the relevant twin aspects and abdication or inaction has resulted in depriving the petitioner of his legal entitlements of pay and allowances and other service benefits flowing from such service resulting in depriving the petitioner of his property within the meaning of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India without authority of law. The non-compliance of Sub-Rule (1) (3) and (5) of FR 54-B, and the denial of full salary, pay and allowances and in not treating the suspension period as duty period since acquittal in 2013 till day i.e. for last 12 years now, cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to
- 54 - 2025:HHC:16474 full pay and allowances [minus the balance of subsistence allowance, already received] for suspension period upon reinstatement, after conclusion of criminal proceedings leading to acquittal and to treat this period as duty period for all service benefits accruing therefrom in favor of the petitioner.
B. DENIAL OF ANNUAL INCREMENT W.E.F. 01.01.2012 ONWARDS ILLEGAL
14. Learned Senior Counsel submits that petitioner was appointed as Medical Officer in November 1998 on regular basis. During his posting in ESI, Dispensary, Nalagarh, he was placed under suspension on 02.05.2010 and the suspension was revoked on 19.07.2010 [Annexure A-2]. After revocation of suspension he was reinstated in CHC Nerwa on 28.07.2010. Learned Senior Counsel submits that respondents had granted the annual increment to the petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2011 when his basic pay was fixed at Rs.26,630/- but the annual increments due to the petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2012 onwards till filing of [Original Application No.2324 of 2019, renumbered as CWPOA No.7001 of 2020] and
- 55 - 2025:HHC:16474 even thereafter have not been released or were withheld.
The prayer of the petitioner for releasing the annual increments due w.e.f. 01.01.2012 onwards till day, deserves to be accepted for the following reasons :-
14(i) Respondents could not withhold or deny the annual increments w.e.f. 01.01.2012 till the filing of the Original Application/CWPOA and thereafter, till day but without giving issuing prior notice and without affording a personal hearing and without giving him an opportunity to submit an explanation, in case, any justifiable grounds-material existed against the petitioner.
Absence of any grounds or material vitiates the action of withholding/denying annual increments is certainly illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice.
14(ii). Withholding or denial of annual increment w.e.f.
01.01.2012, till filing of Original Application/CWPOA and even thereafter when nothing adverse regarding the unsatisfactory work or improper conduct was ever pointed out or exists and thus the withholding of increments is violative of FR 24, which reads as under :-
"An increment shall ordinarily be drawn
- 56 - 2025:HHC:16474 as a matter of course unless it is withheld. An increment may be withheld from a Government servant by the Central Government or by any authority to whom the Central Government may delegate this power under Rule 6, if his conduct has not been good or his work has not been satisfactory. In ordering the withholding of an increment, the withholding authority shall state the period for which it is withheld, and whether the postponement shall have the effect of postponing future increments."
14(iii). Learned Senior Counsel contends that the action of the State Authorities in withholding annual increments payable to petitioner w.e.f. 1.1.2012 onwards till filing of instant petition and even thereafter is punitive, is without any authority of law, is uncalled for and this could not be resorted to without complying with the mandate of Rule 11 and Rule 16 of CCS (CCA) Rules. The operative part of Rule 11 (iv) and Rule 16 read as under :-
"11. Penalties The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a Government servant, namely :-
Minor Penalties -
(i) censure;
(ii) withholding of his promotion;
(iii) recovery from his pay of the whole or part
- 57 - 2025:HHC:16474 of any pecuniary loss caused by him to the Government by negligence or breach of orders;
(iii a) reduction to lower stage in the time-scale of pay by one stage for a period not exceeding three years, without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting his pension.
(iv) withholding of increments of pay Major Penalties -
(v) to (ix) [not relevant]
16. Procedure for imposing minor penalties (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (5) of rule 15, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in clause (i) to (iv) of rule 11 shall be made except after-
(a) informing the Government servant in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken, and giving him reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal;
(b) holding an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub-rules (3) to (24) of rule 14, in every case in which the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that such inquiry is necessary;
(c) taking the representation, if any, submitted by the Government servant under clause (a) and the record of inquiry, if any, held under clause (b) into consideration;
(d) consulting the Commission where such consultation is necessary. The
- 58 - 2025:HHC:16474 Disciplinary Authority shall forward or cause to be forwarded a copy of the advice of the Commission to the Government servant, who shall be required to submit, if he so desires, his written representation or submission on the advice of the Commission, to the Disciplinary Authority within fifteen days; and
(e) recording a finding on each imputation or misconduct or misbehavior.
(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of sub-rule (1), if in a case it is proposed after considering the representation, if any, made by the Government servant under clause (a) of that sub-rule, to withhold increments of pay and such withholding of increments is likely to affect adversely the amount of pension payable to the Government servant or to withhold increments of pay for a period exceeding three years or to withhold increments of pay with cumulative effect for any period, an inquiry shall be held in the manner laid down in sub-rules (3) to (24) of Rule 14, before making any order imposing on the Government servant any such penalty.
(2) The record of the proceedings in such cases shall include-
(i) a copy of the intimation to the Government servant of the proposal to take action against him;
(ii) a copy of the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour delivered to him;
(iii) his representation, if any;
- 59 - 2025:HHC:16474
(iv) the evidence produced during the inquiry;
(v) the advice of the Commission, if any;
(vi) representation, if any, of the Government servant on the advice of the Commission;
(vii) the findings on each imputation of misconduct or misbehavior; and
(viii) the orders on the case together with the reasons therefor."
In the instant case, the respondents have not passed any specific order, withholding the annual increments of the petitioner, then, the denial of annual increments w.e.f. 01.01.2012 till 2019 and thereafter, is unsustainable. Moreover, the annual increments which were due to the petitioner, in the normal course, could only be withheld, in case, the conduct was not good and the work was not satisfactory, for the period for which the increments were due. Nothing has been placed on record to show that the conduct of petitioner for one year preceding 01.01.2012 and even thereafter, till filing of OA/CWPOA in 2019 and even thereafter till day [decision thereof] was not good/unsatisfactory and absence of any adversial events, the action of the
- 60 - 2025:HHC:16474 State Authorities in withholding the increments accrued for service rendered during this period is illegal. Further, the action of withholding of increment(s), of the petitioner has resulted in imposing the penalty in terms of Rule 11 (iv) of the CCS [CCA Rules] and since withholding of increments was a recognized penalty and such penalty could not have been imposed without complying with the mandate of Rule 16 of the CCS [CCA Rules]. The total non-compliance of Rule 11(iv) and Rule 16 of CCS [CCA] Rules in instant case, renders the action withholding/denying the actual benefits to be highly perverse, illegal and unsustainable and thus, withholding of annual increments due to petitioner from 01.01.2012 onwards till 2019 and thereafter, till day cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny.
14(iv). Action of the State Authorities, in resorting to abrupt withholding/denial of increments is without authority of law. Withholding/denying the petitioner of entitlements without any basic and without authority of law and in violation of principles of natural justice and that too by way of a penalty cannot sustain in eyes
- 61 - 2025:HHC:16474 of law in facts of the instant case. An employee, alike the petitioner, who has worked without anything adverse having been conveyed regarding his work and/or conduct w.e.f. 1.1.2012 onwards, then the petitioner has acquired a right for enhancement by way of annual increments under Pay Revision Rules and Fundamental Rule 24 could neither be restricted, curtailed, withheld or taken away and denied dehors the mandate in the Rules as discussed above. Entitlement for increment adds towards salary payable every month and such legal entitlement undoubtedly comes within the ambit of property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and deprivation of annul increments is uncalled for and is accordingly quashed and set-aside.
[C] DENIAL OF TIME-SCALE ON COMPLETION OF 14 YEARS W.E.F. 01.01.2013 ILLEGAL
15. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioner was appointed as a Medical Officer in Health Department in November 1998 and he completed 14 years of service as Medical Officer on 11.11.2012 and on completion of this service, the petitioner became
- 62 - 2025:HHC:16474 eligible and entitled for grant of four tier pay scale due on completion of 14 years of Rs.37,400 - 67,000 + 8,700 GP w.e.f. 01.01.2013, in view of Himachal Civil Services [Revised Pay Rule] on 01.09.1998 and guidelines issued for grant of four tier pay scales on 23.06.2000 but the State Authorities-Respondents have denied the benefit of higher pay scale w.e.f. 01.01.2013 illegally. The plea of the petitioner for grant of time scale on completion of 14 years of service as Medical Officer w.e.f. 01.01.2013, deserves to be accepted for the following reasons:-
15(i). Once the time scale on completion of 14 years service on 11.11.2012, become due and payable to the petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2013, then, the denial of higher pay scale without giving a prior notice and without giving a personal hearing is violative of the principles of natural justice.
15(ii) . As per guidelines dated 23.06.2000, issued by the State Government, the Four Tier Pay Scale-Higher Pay Scale was admissible to an employee, by assessing the work and conduct by adopting the same procedure as was applicable in case of promotion. Guidelines
- 63 - 2025:HHC:16474 indicate that the placement in higher pay scales shall be granted from the first day of January of next year in which an employee completes the required span for placement in the higher scale. Since placement in higher pay scale, was akin to promotion and respondents have withheld the same, on account of registration of FIR No.5 of 2010, dated 13.04.2010, but the aforesaid accusation and charge was tried by Learned Special Judge, Solan, in which the petitioner was acquitted on 08.05.2013 [Annexure A-4]. Consequent upon his acquittal on 08.05.2013, the respondents were bound to consider the case of the petitioner for grant of time scale, due on completion of 14 years service as Medical Officer on 11.11.2012 w.e.f. 01.01.2013, which would have accrued in the normal course but for the pending criminal proceedings. Once the criminal proceedings concluded, leading to acquittal, then, the respondents were bound to consider the case of the petitioner for grant of higher pay scale/four tier pay scale, but the inaction of respondents amounts to penalizing the petitioner by subjecting him to further penalty by
- 64 - 2025:HHC:16474 depriving him of the Four Tier Pay Scale illegally.
15(iii). On acquittal in criminal case on 08.05.2013 [Annexure A-4], coupled with the fact that respondents have not initiated any departmental action against the petitioner, then, on conclusion of the Court proceedings leading to acquittal, respondents were bound to consider and grant the benefits which would have accrued in the normal course. The denial of consideration and denial of resultant benefits of four tier pay scale/higher pay scale, which is a kin to promotion is violative of the mandate of law in Union of India vs K.V. Jankiraman 1991 (4) SCC 109, which reads as under :-
"22. This sentence is preceded by the observation that when the employee is completely exonerated on the conclusion of the disciplinary/ court proceedings, that is, when no statutory penalty, including that of censure, is imposed, he is to be given a notional promotion from the date he would have been promoted as determined by the Departmental Promotion Committee. This direction in the Memorandum has also to be read along with the other direction which follows in the next sub-paragraph and which states that if it is found as a result of the proceedings that some blame attaches to the officer then the penalty of censure at least, should be imposed. This direction is in supersession
- 65 - 2025:HHC:16474 of the earlier instructions which provided that in a case where departmental disciplinary proceedings have been held, "warning"
should not be issued as a result of such proceedings.
26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings. However, there may be cases where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore, however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration
- 66 - 2025:HHC:16474 and jeopardise public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. While, therefore, we do not approve of the said last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz., "but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion", we direct that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum:
"However, whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what extent, will be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution. Where the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so."
32. In this case, no charge-sheet was served on the respondent-employee when the DPC met to consider the respondent's promotion. Yet, the sealed cover procedure was adopted. The Tribunal has rightly directed the authorities to open the sealed cover and if the respondent was found fit for promotion by the DPC, to give him the promotion from the date his immediate junior Shri M. Raja Rao was promoted pursuant to the order dated April 30, 1986. The Tribunal has also directed the authorities to grant to the respondent all the consequential benefits. The Tribunal has further stated in the impugned order that its order would not mean that the
- 67 - 2025:HHC:16474 disciplinary proceedings instituted against the respondent-employee should not go on. We see no reason to interfere with this order. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs."
15(iv). In backdrop of the above facts, once the respondents appears to have denied the higher pay scale/ four tier pay scale on completion of 14 years of service on 11.11.2012 payable from 01.01.2013, due to pendency of criminal case, but once the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case, then, the denial of consideration of the case of petitioner for releasing of higher pay scale, as referred to above, is perverse, illegal when, the grant of higher pay scale was a kin to promotion and nothing adversarial existed against the petitioner, then, without /non-grant of higher pay scale does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny and therefore, the denial is quashed and set aside.
MERE PENDENCY OF APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL CANNOT BE BASIS FOR WITHOLDING-NOT RELEASING BENEFITS WHICH WERE WITHELD PRIOR TO ACQUITTAL.
16. In reference to Question formulated {Para 7} as to whether mere pendency of appeal against acquittal
- 68 - 2025:HHC:16474 can be the basis for denying service benefits [salary of pay and allowances for suspension period upon revocation of suspension and annual increments due in normal course from 01.01.2011, till day; and the higher pay scale of Rs. 37,400 - 67,000 + 8,700 GP, on completion of 14 years service from 01.01.2003], in absence of any departmental proceedings against the petitioner, the answer is in the negative, for the reason, that the claim of petitioner for releasing the salary i.e. pay and allowances for suspension period w.e.f. 02.05.2010 till the revocation of suspension on 19.07.2010 and till reinstatement/joining on 28.07.2010 at CHC Nerwa; and the claim for annual increments w.e.f. 01.01.2012 till filing of OA/CWPOA in 2019 and thereafter; and the denial of four tier pay scale of Rs. 37,400 - 67,000 + 8,700 GP, on completion of 14 years as Medical Officer on 14.11.2012, payable w.e.f. 01.01.2013; merely on the plea that an appeal [Criminal Appeal No. 4084 of 2013] against acquittal is pending before the High Court cannot be the basis for depriving the petitioner of service benefits, for the reasons, firstly, mere pendency of appeal against acquittal cannot
- 69 - 2025:HHC:16474 be regarded as a continuation of a trial, when, the acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner and secondly, in case an appeal against acquittal is to treated as continuation of the criminal proceedings, then, there would be no end to the litigation; and thirdly, the petitioner who stands acquitted honorably, shall not get legal entitlements including service benefits which accrue to him till the appeals were concluded and fourthly, once acquittal leads to affirmation of innocence of accused then, it would be unfair, unjust and unreasonable to deny the legal entitlements-service benefits due to mere pendency of criminal proceedings /appeal, if any and fifthly, the pendency of criminal appeal cannot be permitted to be the reason for denying admissible service benefits on acquittal, when no departmental proceedings were initiated or were pending in this case; and sixthly, in the event of reversal of acquittal, in pending appeal leading to conviction, the State Authorities are free to take action against an employee or a pensioner, by resorting to Rule 19 of CCS [CCA Rules] or by taking recourse to such other action
- 70 - 2025:HHC:16474 under the aforesaid Service Rule. Likewise, even in case of a pensioner, the State Authorities are not powerless and upon conviction the State Authorities are at liberty to proceed under Rule 9 of the CCS Pension Rules by withdrawing or withholding the Pension or Gratuity or both in part or in full, as the case may be.
16(i). The inaction of the respondents in denying the above service benefits, merely due to pendency of appeal preferred by the State Authorities against the judgment of acquittal, does not conforms to the mandate of law passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Himachal Pradesh and Another (1985) 3 SLR 254 [CWP No.191/1984], reads as under :-
"12. It may be recalled in this connection that as a result of the lodgement of the first information, the petitioner was detained in custody and that after investigation, he was put up for trial in two cases before a criminal court. The trial court convicted him but the appellate court acquitted him in both the cases. The orders of acquittal are indubitably under challenge in the High Court. The preferment of acquittal appeals cannot, however, be regarded as the continuance of the trial. The trial shave concluded with the judgment of acquittal. The
- 71 - 2025:HHC:16474 initial presumption of innocence must, therefore, be regarded as having been doubly reinforced by orders of acquittal passed in favour of the petitioner. Under such circumstances, the continued operation of the order of suspension as from the date of acquittal cannot be regarded as reasonable, fair and just. Merely because the petitioner was, at one point of time detained in custody for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, he cannot be kept under suspension perpetually, especially when the allegations on the basis of which he was detained and which ultimately became the subject matter of two trials before the criminal court, are found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been not established beyond reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances, in our opinion, on a rational and just view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is required to be re-instated in service on and with effect from the date of the orders of acquittal. If the acquittal appeals are allowed and the petitioner is convicted, there is nothing to prevent the competent authority from dealing with the petitioner in accordance with law. If, on the other hand, the acquittal appeals fail and a departmental inquiry, if any, is ordered to be instituted on the same charges, it would not be fair and just and reasonable to suspend the petitioner once again in view of the initial presumption of innocence having been reinforced twice over.
13. It would be pertinent, in this connection, to refer to the decision in Corporation of Nagpur City v. Ramachandra. In that case, the order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on
- 72 - 2025:HHC:16474 September 23, 1974. The order was confirmed by the Corporation on the same day. The suspension was ordered in connection with a departmental inquiry relating to two accidents which occurred during the construction of a stadium which was being looked after by the delinquents and which resulted in the death of seven persons and injuries to eight others. A complaint was also filed before the police as a result of which a charge-sheet under Section 304-A IPC, was filed against the delinquents on September 25, 1976. In view of the chargesheet submitted by the police, another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on January 13, 1977 with effect from October 8, 1976. The delinquents filed an unsuccessful appeal to the departmental appellate authority and thereafter moved a writ petition which was allowed and the order of suspension was quashed on the ground that the competent authority to pass the order of suspension was the Corporation itself and not the Chief Executive Officer, On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Municipal Commissioner was fully competent to suspend the delinquents and that, therefore, the decision rendered in the writ petition was not sustainable. The Supreme Court, however, proceeded to make the following observations :
"The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court.
- 73 - 2025:HHC:16474 ...... If, however, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the inquiry, it can certainly do so. In case the respondents are acquitted, we direct that the order of suspension shall be revoked and the respondents will be reinstated and allowed full salary thereafter even though the authority chooses to proceed with the inquiry...............If the respondents are convicted, then the legal consequences under the rules will automatically follow."
15. For the foregoing reasons, the respondents are directed to revoke the order of suspension and to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith effect from the date on which the orders of acquittal were recorded by the appellate court in the criminal proceedings instituted against him, that is, November 30, 1981. As regards the treatment of the period actually spent by the petitioner under suspension from May 7, 1976 till November 29, 1981, and the refixation of his pay and allowances for the said period, the competent authority will make suitable orders in accordance with law and in light of the provisions of F.R. 54. As regards the period commencing from November 30, 1981 till the date of actual reinstatement of the petitioner pursuant the order made hereinabove, the petitioner will be entitled to all the benefits following upon such reinstatement including back wages which shall be adjusted against the suspension allowance already drawn."
16(ii). While dealing with the issue that an appeal
- 74 - 2025:HHC:16474 against acquittal, cannot be made the basis for withholding /denying the service benefits has been answered by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh In Re: Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, A.P. Hyderabad and Another vs R.S. Ramakrishna Rao and Another, WP Nos. 27607, 27614 and 22929 of 2009, decided on 28.01.2010, in the following terms :-
"10. The facts, as narrated above, are not in dispute. In all these cases, the criminal cases filed against the applicants ended in acquittal, against which, criminal appeals were filed and the same are still pending. During pendency of the criminal cases, they were allowed to retire subject to finalization of criminal proceedings and their retirement benefits were withheld.
11. Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration is as to whether the applicants are entitled for retirement benefits immediately after the orders of acquittal?
20. Insofar as the criminal cases are concerned, the department has got a right to file an appeal. But, it cannot be said that the judicial proceedings have not been concluded. Once the criminal Court acquits the accused, it must amount to be the conclusion of the judicial proceedings in the first instance. Therefore, the appeals filed against the acquittal orders cannot be treated as continuation of criminal proceedings. The same view was taken by a Division
- 75 - 2025:HHC:16474 Bench of Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal's case (supra), referred to above. Para 9 of the said judgment reads as follows:
"The submission of Mr. Chakraborty to the effect that pendency of the appeal against acquittal will amount to continuation of the proceedings cannot be accepted. Continuation of the proceedings must relate to investigation, enquiry or trial, and such investigation, enquiry or trial, if any, have come to an end with the judgment of acquittal. The same being continuing in the instant case, is misconceived, only on the ground that an appeal there against is pending. If the respondent No.1 is convicted by the Appeal Court for commission of a criminal offence, sub-rule (4) of Rule 3 of the said Rules would be attracted. Keeping in view the fact that different sub- rules of Rules 3 operate in different fields, we are of the opinion that sub- rule (3) of Rule 3 be held to be operative only in the case namely, when an investigation enquiry or trial remains pending and not or when the employee person is acquitted. The situations obtaining under different sub-rule being absolutely different, in our opinion, sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 must be given a restrictive interpretation".
21. If the appeal is not in continuation of original criminal proceedings, the order of acquittal is a final order within the ambit of Rule 52 of the Pension Rules, referred to above. After the orders of acquittal passed by the criminal
- 76 - 2025:HHC:16474 Court, as already stated above, there is no power for the Government to withhold pension or retirement benefits. The said benefits therefore, are liable to be paid immediately after acquittal order.
22. If the appeal or revision proceedings are in continuation of the criminal proceedings, there will be no end for the litigation and the employees, who have been acquitted honourably, shall not get retirement benefits till conclusion of all appeals, revisions, special leave petitions etc. Appeal against acquittal, not being continuation of original criminal proceedings, Rule 52 as above, will not be available to Government for withholding retirement benefits.
23. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was correct in passing the impugned order and we do not see any error committed by the Tribunal warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India."
16(iii). While dealing with a similar issue as to whether the mere pendency of criminal appeal can be made the basis for denying service benefits to an employee has been answered, by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Balak Singh Thakur vs The State of Madhya Pradesh 2014 SCC OnLine MP 1036, [decided on 23.01.2014], in the following terms :-
"Question is whether an appeal against
- 77 - 2025:HHC:16474 an acquittal can be said to be a continuation of criminal case.
Section 2 (i) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 defines expression "judicial proceedings" "includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath." The definition as apparent is not exhaustive. Therefore, before proceeding can be held to be a judicial proceeding, it must be found that in the course of that proceeding evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. If evidence could not be taken legally on oath it would not judicial proceeding. Furthermore, a criminal proceeding is initiated when a criminal law is set at motion against a person on the basis of an information to the police that a person has committed a cognizable offence leading to an investigation into the accusation against the person and filing of report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C whereupon an accused is tried of an offence registered leading to the conviction or the acquittal, as the case may be. With the acquittal the charges of commission of offence gets washed of. A person so acquitted of the charges stand at par with a person who is not being charged and was not subjected to a criminal proceeding.
The preferment of a criminal revision or an appeal against an acquittal cannot be regarded as a continuance of the trial and cannot be treated to be pendency of judicial proceeding as the initial presumption of innocence gets reinforced by the orders of acquittal. The contention, therefore, put forth by the respondents that the filing of revision against the judgment dated 12.12.2000 would
- 78 - 2025:HHC:16474 tantamount to the pendency of judicial proceeding does not reason with the provisions as they stand under law. In the considered opinion of this Court, after acquittal, which lead to an affirmation of the innocence of the accused, an appeal or revision, as the case may be, being not a continuation of trial, will not amount to a pendency of judicial proceedings.
In this context regard can be had of judgment of Division Bench of High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Shri Surinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1985 (3) SLR 254).
In view whereof, since with the acquittal of petitioner for an offence under Section 13 (1)(e) and 13(2) of 1988 Act, his suspension which was based on criminal proceedings stands unjustified. The respondents are directed to settle the same within a period of 3 months from the date of communication of this order."
16(iv). Even the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Madras in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.
vs S. Rajagopal and Another, (2015) 7 MLJ 851 decided on 26.08.2015 while dealing with the issue of as to whether the time bound upgradation scale could be withheld/denied due to pendency of criminal appeal has been answered in the following terms :-
"11. Admittedly, Criminal proceedings in ACB Case No.3/2006 has ended up in acquittal on 31.03.2008, by the learned
- 79 - 2025:HHC:16474 Special Judge and Presiding Officer of Fast Track Court, Vadodara. On the contention of the writ petitioner that filing of an appeal and pendency in the High Court, is a continuation of the proceedings, disentitling the 1st respondent to receive all consequential benefits, this Court deems it fit to consider the decisions relied on by both the parties.
xxx..... xxx.... xxx...
13. In State of West Bengal v. Hari Ramalu reported in 2000 (3) LLN 638, the respondent therein was placed under suspension on 09.09.1994. FIR was registered on 28.08.1994. The question posed before the Hon'ble Division Bench, was that in view of the pendency of the appeal, whether sub-rule (3) of rule of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, would still be applicable. The said rule states that a member of the service in respect of, or against, whom an investigation, inquiry or trial, relating to a criminal charge is pending may, at the discretion of the Government be placed under suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge if the charge is connected with his position as a member of the Service or is likely embarass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. Defining the words "inquiry" and "investigation, under Sections 2(g) and 2(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and considering Rule 3 of abovesaid Rules, a Hon'ble Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, at Paragraph 10, held as follows:
"Continuation of the proceedings must relate to investigation, enquiry or trial and such investigation,
- 80 - 2025:HHC:16474 enquiry or trial, if any, have come to an end with the judgment of acquittal. The same being continuing in the instant case is misconceived, only on the ground that an appeal there against is pending. If respondent 1 is convicted by the appeal Court for commission of a criminal offence, sub-rule (4) of rule 3 of the said Rules would be attracted. Keeping in view the fact that different sub-rules of rule 3 operate in different fields, we are of the opinion that sub-rule (3) of rule 3 be held to be operative only in the case namely, when an investigation, enquiry or trial remains pending and not or when the employee person is acquitted. The situations obtaining under different sub-rule being absolutely different, in our opinion, sub-rule (3) of rule 3 must be given a restrictive interpretation."
14. In Chandu Ram v. State of H.P., reported in 2009 SCC Online HP 1303, a corruption case was registered against the petitioner therein before the Special Judge (Forests), Shimla. He was acquitted by the Special Judge, vide judgment delivered on 17.06.2000. Thereafter, he retired on 31.10.2000. Thus, he was eligbile to be considered for promotion as Deputy Ranger in the year 1992.
Even after the acquittal, he was not given gratuity amount. It was the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner therein that after acquittal, he was entitled to get his gratuity, with interest, as per Rule 68 of the CCS (Pension) Rules. He has also pleaded that he was eligible to be promoted as Deputy Ranger, with effect from the
- 81 - 2025:HHC:16474 date, his immediate juniors were promoted. Following the decision in Shri Surinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 1985 (3) SLR 254, the Calcutta High Court allowed the petition and directed the respondents therein to release the gratuity to the petitioner therein with interest, as per Rule 68 of the CCS (Pension) Rules. The respondents therein were further directed to open the sealed cover and in case, the name of the petitioner therein has been recommended by the Departmental Promotion Committee for promotion to the post of Deputy Ranger, necessary consequential orders, be passed.
xxx... xxx... xxx...
20. Insofar as the criminal cases are concerned, the Department has got a right to file an appeal. But, it cannot be said that the judicial proceedings have not been concluded. Once the criminal court acquits the accused, it must amount to be the conclusion of the judicial proceedings in the first instance. Therefore, the appeals filed against the acquittal orders cannot be treated as continuation of criminal proceedings. The same view was taken by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in STATE OF WEST BENGAL's case, referred to above. Para 9 of the said judgment reads as follows....
21. If the appeal is not in continuation of original criminal proceedings, the order of acquittal is a final order within the ambit of Rule 52 of the Pension Rules, referred to above. After the orders of acquittal passed by the criminal court, as already stated above, there is no power for the Government
- 82 - 2025:HHC:16474 to withhold pension or retirement benefits. The said benefits, therefore, are liable to be paid immediately after acquittal order.
22. If the appeal or revision proceedings are in continuation of the criminal proceedings, there will be no end for the litigation and the employees, who have been acquitted honourably, shall not get retirement benefits till conclusion of all appeals, revisions, special leave petitions etc. Appeal against acquittal, not being continuation of original criminal proceedings, Rule 52 as above, will not be available to Government for withholding retirement benefits.
20. While that be the clear finding recorded in the judgment, acquitting the respondent, under the premise of appeal, being filed and pending, against the order of acquittal, the 1st respondent cannot be deprived of the time bound IDS scale upgradation, endlessly. Disposal of the appeal may take a long time. The 1st respondent is stated to have retired from service. There is no certainity that the State would be satisfied, even if the appeal in the High Court fails. If the State chooses to prefer a further appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Department may again contend that the appeal is pending before the Apex Court. Thus, if the arguments of the petitioner have to be accepted, then there is no finality to the judgment of acquittal. In the light of the discussion and decisions considered, the further contention of the learned counsel that Vigilance has not given a clearance, cannot be countenanced.
- 83 - 2025:HHC:16474
22. Hence, the Writ Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the petitioner is directed to comply with the orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, within a period of two months, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also also closed."
16(v). After following the mandate of law in the case of Balak Singh Thakur [supra], the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has reiterated the mandate of law that mere pendency of criminal revision or appeal against acquittal cannot be treated as continuance of trial and cannot form the basis for denying the legal entitlements due to an employee in Gayaram Singh Rathore vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, WP No.12953 of 2017, dated 14.03.2018 as under :-
"7. The point involved in this case is not more res integra. In Balak Singh Thakur (supra). This Court has opined as under:
"The preferment of a criminal revision or an appeal against an acquittal cannot be regarded as a continuance of the trial and cannot be treated to be pendency of judicial proceedings as the initial presumption of innocence gets re- enforced by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh orders of acquittal. The contention, therefore, putforth by the
- 84 - 2025:HHC:16474 respondents that the filing of revision against the judgment dated 12-12-2000 would tantamount to the pendency of judicial proceedings does not reason with the provisions as they stand under law. In the considered opinion of this Court, after acquittal, which lead to an affirmation of the innocence of the accused, an appeal or revision, as the case may be, being not a continuation of trial, will not amount to a pendency of judicial proceedings."
9. Considering the aforesaid, the action of respondents in not releasing the retiral dues under the garb of pendency of criminal appeal is disapproved. The respondents are directed to release and settled the retiral dues of the petitioner within 90 days from the date of production of copy of this order."
16(vi). Further, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Kona Appa Rao vs State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine AP 2730, decided on 02.04.2024 has mandated that unless there is any Rule mandating denial of service benefits, upon filing of an appeal, review or revision against acquittal, then deprivation of salary and other service benefits accruing therefrom, which constitutes property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to an employee in the following terms :-
- 85 - 2025:HHC:16474
12. The short issue that falls for consideration in the present W.P. is in regard to the encashment of the earned leave when the Criminal Appeal on conviction is pending and when the disciplinary proceedings on the very same allegations are dropped. It is appropriate to extract Rule 52 of the Rules, 1980 which was cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondents and it reads as under:
"Rule 52. Provisional pension where departmental or judicial proceeding may be pending:-
(1) (a)
(b)
(c) No gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental or judicial proceedings and issue of final orders : Provided that where departmental proceedings have been instituted under Rule 9 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Control Classification and Appeal) Rules, 1991, for imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Rule 9 of the said rules, except the cases falling under sub-
rule (2) of Rule 22 of the said rules, the payment of gratuity shall be authorized to be paid to the Government servant.
Provided further that notwiths-
tanding anything contained in clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of sub-rule (1) above, where a conclusion has been reached that a portion of pension only should be withheld or withdrawn and the retirement gratuity remains unaffected in the
- 86 - 2025:HHC:16474 contemplated final orders, the retirement gratuity can be released upto 80%."
13. As relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is relevant to refer to the decision dated 16.02.2022 of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.196 of 2022, captioned as State of Andhra Pradesh v. Miryala Jagannadham, which is an Appeal against the order of learned Single Judge, whereby the action of not releasing the encashment of earned leave amount and 80% of retirement gratuity on the account of pendency of a C.C. before the ACB Court was declared to be illegal. The Division Bench modified the judgment to the extent of gratuity, but upheld the view taken on earned leave encashment. Relevant portion reads thus;
"11. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner submits that the petitioner is entitled for leave encashment. To this extent, learned State counsel would not object to the prayer because, according to him, the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in W.P. No. 30443 of 2016 deals with encashment of leave and moreover, clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 52 of the Rules, 1980 deals with gratuity and not with leave encashment.
12. For the foregoing discussion, the said part of the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge allowing payment of 80% of the retirement gratuity to the writ petitioner is set aside. However, we observe that the writ petitioner is entitled to leave encashment."
- 87 - 2025:HHC:16474
14. It is also relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava, wherein the following observations were made:
"16. The fact remains that there is an imprimatur to the legal principle that the right to receive pension is recognised as a right in "property".
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India reads as under:
"300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law."
Once we proceed on that premise, the answer to the question posed by us in the beginning of this judgment becomes too obvious. A person cannot be deprived of this pension without the authority of law, which is the constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 300-A of the Constitution. It follows that attempt of the appellant to take away a part of pension or gratuity or even leave encashment without any statutory provision and under the umbrage of administrative instruction cannot be countenanced.
17. It hardly needs to be emphasised that the executive instructions are not having statutory character and, therefore, cannot be termed as "law" within the meaning of the aforesaid Article 300-A. On the basis of such a circular, which is not having force of law, the appellant cannot withhold even a part of pension or gratuity. As we noticed above,
- 88 - 2025:HHC:16474 so far as statutory Rules are concerned, there is no provision for withholding pension or gratuity in the given situation. Had there been any such provision in these Rules, the position would have been different."
15. In the backdrop of the legal position referred to supra, the Petitioner is entitled for earned leave encashment, though the Appeal is pending for consideration before the Appellate Court as there is no Rule stipulating otherwise. In that view of the matter, the impugned Memo dated 27.12.2008 passed by the Respondent No. 1 rejecting the claim of the Petitioner is liable to be interfered with as the due is only relating to payment of earned leave encashment, but not gratuity.
16. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned Memo dated 27.12.2008 passed by the respondent No.1 is hereby set aside. The respondent authorities are directed to settle the encashment of the earned leave of the Petitioner pending before them, which is due and payable to the Petitioner, within a period of six (6) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs."
DOUBLE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ON ACQUITTAL NOTWITHSTANDING PENDENCY OF APPEAL
17. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal and the effect of acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chandrappa and Ors. vs State of Karnataka (2007)
- 89 - 2025:HHC:16474 4 SCC 415, has mandated that the acquittal of a person gives rise to double presumption in favour of an accused and such presumption of innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court on acquittal in the following terms :-
"42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
- 90 - 2025:HHC:16474 (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
17(i). This view has further been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Champaben Govindbhai vs Popatbhai Manilal and Others (2009) 13 SCC 662, reinforcing the right of an accused on acquittal, conferring double presumption has been outlined in the following terms:-
"14. The counsel for the respondents referred to the decision of this Court in Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka , to put forward the argument that an appellate court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
- 91 - 2025:HHC:16474 innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having been acquitted, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court."
Taking into account the extents of facts and circumstances, as referred to above and the fact that the service benefits of salary for the suspension period, annual increments and higher pay scale was denied to the petitioner due to the pendency of a criminal case. Once the petitioner stands acquitted, which appears to be honourable and no departmental proceedings have been initiated by the respondents against the petitioner for the relevant period coupled with the fact that there is no express provision in the service Rules either in the CCS [CCA Rules] or CCS Pension Rules or the Fundamental Rules providing for denying the admissible and accrued service benefits due to the mere pendency of the criminal appeal against acquittal, then, in absence of any statutory mandate, the denial or withholding of service benefits to the petitioner, is wholly unwarranted
- 92 - 2025:HHC:16474 and the same cannot be permitted to operate to the prejudice of the petitioner anymore.
SERVICE BENEFITS ARE PROPERTY UNDER ARTICLE 300-A OF CONSTITUTION:
18. This Court proceeds to examine the case of the petitioner from another angle. As per Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. Article 300-A of the Constitution reads as under :-
"300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.-- No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law."
In the background of the mandate of Article 300-A, in case of the petitioner, who is an employee of the State Government the service benefits, which entail accrue to an employee in the normal course by way of service benefits in terms of money, constitute the property of the petitioner. Such service benefits, be it salary for the period of suspension and the annual increments due in the normal course and the higher/ four tier pay scales constitute the hard earned legal entitlements which constitute the property of an employee.
- 93 - 2025:HHC:16474 That being so, the deprivation of such legal entitlements or property merely due to the pendency of the criminal appeal against acquittal, without there being any authority of law i.e. without there being any statutory mandate in the service Rules to withhold the legal entitlements merely due to pendency of criminal appeal is wholly arbitrary, illegal, perverse, without authority of law and the same cannot sustain. In these circumstances, the stand so taken by the State Authorities that the benefits cannot be granted/extended/released till the conclusion of the criminal appeal which is pending against acquittal before the High Court, is arbitrary, perverse and cannot sustain in law. Accordingly, the action of the respondents in withholding or denying the above service benefits, is interdicted by this Court and accordingly quashed and set aside.
CONCLUSION
19. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition is allowed, in the following terms :-
(i) State Authorities-Respondents are directed
- 94 - 2025:HHC:16474 to release the salary i.e. pay and allowances for the suspension period from 02.05.2010 [Annexure A-1] till revocation of suspension on 19.07.2010 [Annexure A-2] and joining thereafter at CHC Nerwa, Shimla on 28.07.2010 forthwith;
(ii). State Authorities-Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period as duty period for all purposes and to extend benefit of such period for all accruable service benefits forthwith;
(iii) State Authorities-Respondents are directed to release the withheld / unreleased annual increments to the petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2012 till filing of Original Application No 2324 of 2019, renumbered as CWPOA No.7001 of 2020 and the increments due thereafter forthwith;
(iv) State Authorities-Respondents are directed to consider and release the time scale due on completion of 14 years service as a Medical Officer on 11.11.2012, payable w.e.f. 01.01.2013 in pay scale of Rs 37,400
- 67,000 + 8,700 GP and the revised scale thereof forthwith;
(v) State Authorities-Respondents shall release all consequential benefits, flowing from the directions (i) to (iv) in favour of petitioner within six weeks from today; (v).
(vi) Failure to release the above benefits shall mandate the respondents to pay interest
- 95 - 2025:HHC:16474 @ 6% per annum thereafter.
In aforesaid terms, the instant writ petition and all pending applications, shall stand disposed of accordingly.
(Vivek Singh Thakur) Judge (Ranjan Sharma) Judge May 28,2025 (Chiranjeev/tm)