Jharkhand High Court
Kiran Devi vs Sanjay Kumar on 1 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:21437-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No. 182 of 2024
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Kiran Devi, aged about 39 years, W/o-Sanjay Kumar and daughter of
Sushil Kumar, resident of-Hindu Mission Gali No.-3, Hirapur, P.O.,
P.S.+District-Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
... ... Appellant/Opposite Party-Respondent
Versus
Sanjay Kumar, aged about 44 years, S/o-Late Shivjee Rai, resident of-
New Bishunpur, P.O.-B. Polytechnic, P.S. & District-Dhanbad,
Jharkhand
...... Respondent/Petitioner
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
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For the Appellant : Mr. P.K. Mukhopadhyay, Advocate
Mr. Raj Nandan Chatterjee, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Suman Saurav, Advocate
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CAV on 18.07.2025 Pronounced on 01/08/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the order/judgment dated 19.06.2024 (decree signed on 01.07.2024) passed by the learned Addl. Principal Judge, Addl. Family Court No.II, Dhanbad in Original Suit No. 105 of 2023, whereby and whereunder, the petition filed by the petitioner-husband (respondent herein) under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion, has been allowed.
2. The brief facts of the case leading to filing of the divorce petition by the petitioner-husband (respondent herein), needs to be referred herein as under:
1 F.A. No. 182/2024
2025:JHHC:21437-DB The case in brief as per petition filed by the petitioner-husband (respondent herein) before the learned Family Judge is that marriage between the parties were solemnized on 27-02-2004, according to Hindu rites and customs. After the marriage both the petitioner-husband and respondent-wife was living together as husband and wife at New Bishunpur, Dhanbad. Out of wedlock, the couple was blessed with two children.
The petitioner-husband (respondent herein) always tried his level best to maintain the respondent-wife and minor children with full dignity and honour. On the other hand, the respondent-wife always creating nuisance, trouble and tortured the petitioner and old aged mother of the petitioner and deserted the petitioner.
It is further stated that the respondent-wife (appellant herein) went away to her maika without any reasonable excuse in year, 2012 and the petitioner several times requested the respondent-wife and her parents to took bidai, but, the respondent-wife did not ready to lead her conjugal life with the petitioner.
It has further been stated that the petitioner-husband has filed a case under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal right vide O.S. Case No.738/14 against his wife. The respondent appeared before the court and court has referred the case in Lok Adalat for conciliation and the matter has been succeeded and court has directed to respondent to lead happy conjugal life with the petitioner. The respondent- wife always tortured the petitioner-husband and his old aged mother and deserted the petitioner-husband but the petitioner-husband (respondent 2 F.A. No. 182/2024 2025:JHHC:21437-DB herein) tolerated all the acts of the respondent only to live happy life and future of the children.
It has further been stated that in the month of March, 2019 the respondent-wife went away to her maika without any reasonable excuse and the respondent-wife (appellant herein) performed second marriage with one Deepak Yadav.
Cause of action for the present case arose on 27-02-2004 when the marriage of the petitioner-husband and the respondent-wife (appellant herein) was performed and in month of March, 2019, when the respondent-wife left the house of the petitioner-husband and performed second marriage with Deepak Yadav in the month of August, 2019.
After issuance of process, the opposite party appeared before the court and filed show-cause, in which, it has been stated that the respondent is the legally married wife of the petitioner whose marriage was solemnized on 27-02-2004 according to the Hindu Rites and customs and since then, they are living their conjugal life happily as husband and wife. Out of the wedlock there are two children.
It has further been stated that the respondent-wife denied all the allegation made in the petition of the petitioner-husband (respondent herein). The petitioner has falsely made allegation that the respondent has married to Deepak Yadav despite the fact that actually Deepak Yadav is the brother-in-law (Bahnoi) of the respondent. On various occasions, a Panchayati was held but the petitioner did not comply and follow the same and always subjected to cruelty upon the respondent and harassed her mentally and physically.3 F.A. No. 182/2024
2025:JHHC:21437-DB The learned Family Judge, in view of the above pleadings, has framed altogether five issues, which are as follows:
(i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?
(ii) Whether the petitioner was got valid cause of action for the suit?
(iii) Whether the marriage of the petitioner and respondent is fit to be dissolved on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act?
(iv) Whether the marriage of the petitioner and respondent is fit to be dissolved on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act?
(v) Whether the petitioner is entitled for the relief as claimed for?
3. In order to prove and substantiate his case, the petitioner has produced and examined three witnesses as follows: -
(i) P.W.1-Sanjay Kumar
(ii) P.W.2-Shiv Prasad Singh
(iii) P.W.3-Jawala Singh
4. No any documentary evidence has been adduced on behalf of the petitioner.
5. On the other hand, defendant-wife has also not adduced any oral or documentary evidence on her behalf.
6. Thereafter, the judgment has been passed by learned family court allowing the suit by holding that petitioner (respondent herein) has got 4 F.A. No. 182/2024 2025:JHHC:21437-DB valid cause of action for filing the suit and the suit is maintainable for the relief as prayed for by the petitioner. Further, it has been held that the petitioner is entitled to get a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant-wife
7. It has been contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent/appellant (herein) that the factual aspect which was available before the learned Family Judge supported by the evidences, has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment impugned is perverse, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
8. It has been submitted that the issue of cruelty and desertion has not been taken into consideration in right perspective as the learned Family Court has failed to appreciate the fact that the appellant has produced evidence which are sufficient to establish the case and as such, ground of desertion was not available to him, therefore, he was not entitled for grant of decree of divorce.
9. Further, it has been submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Family Court while answering issues of cruelty and desertion are perverse and based on mere presumption, the same will not stand in the eyes of law.
10. It has also been submitted that the learned Family Court has failed to appreciate the evidence produced on behalf of the petitioner, respondent herein and, thus, has come to wrong conclusion 5 F.A. No. 182/2024 2025:JHHC:21437-DB
11. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from an error as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent
12. It has been contended on behalf of learned counsel for the respondent-
husband that it is incorrect on the part of the appellant-wife to take the ground that the issue of cruelty and desertion has not been taken into consideration in right perspective. The learned Family Court has well been considered the fact which has been produced by the petitioner (respondent herein) as the same is sufficient to establish the case.
13. It has been submitted that the act of appellant-wife towards the respondent-husband amounts to cruelty and she has deserted her husband for more than two years without any reasonable cause.
14. It has also been submitted that the appellant-wife without any reasonable cause went away to her maika and performed second marriage with Deepak Yadav and now she is living with him.
15. It has also been contended that the learned Family Judge has considered all aspects of the matter in right perspective and hence, decreed the suit in favour of the respondent-husband.
16. Learned counsel for the respondent-husband, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned passed by the learned Family Judge, therefore, suffers from no error.
Analysis:
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17. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment.
18. The case has been heard at length. The admitted fact herein is that the suit for divorce has been filed by the respondent-husband on the ground of cruelty and desertion, i.e., by filing an application under Section 13(1)(i-
a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and accordingly, issues have been framed primarily the issue nos.(iii) and (iv) pertain to cruelty and desertion.
19. The evidence has been led on behalf of the petitioner-husband. Altogether three witnesses have been examined on behalf of the petitioner-husband, i.e., P.W.1, namely, Sanjay Kumar, P.W.2, namely, Shiv Prasad Singh and P.W.3, namely, Jawala Singh.
P.W.1 is the petitioner (husband) who has stated in his examination-in-chief that he was married with Kiran Devi on 27- 02-2004 and out of the wedlock there are two children. He has further stated that his wife is residing in her maika since March 2019 and during the said period, no cohabitation took place between both the parties. He tried to resolve the dispute with his own level but his wife did not obey and in the year, 2012, she went away to her maika without any reason. In this regard, he has filed a suit for Restitution of conjugal life and thereafter; after executing the bond, she came to her sasural in year, 2015 and resided for six months only and again went away to her maika. She liked another person namely Deepak Yadav prior to 7 F.A. No. 182/2024 2025:JHHC:21437-DB her marriage. In March 2021, his father-in-law and brother-in- law came to his house and took away his wife. His wife again remarried with another person namely Deepak Yadav in Tarapith Temple in the month of August 2021. Now, he wants divorce with his wife. This witness was not cross-examined on behalf of the respondent.
P.W.-2 and P.W.-3 are independent witnesses, who have supported the evidence of petitioner (husband) and stated that wife of petitioner went away to her maika in March, 2019. Petitioner tried his level best to bring his wife back but she did not return to her sasural and now she was married with another person namely Deepak Yadav. These witnesses were not cross-examined on behalf of the respondent.
20. The learned Family Judge has gone into the interpretation of the word "cruelty" and "desertion" and assessing the same from the evidences led on behalf of the petitioner as also the submission made in the pleadings, i.e., in petition, has found that the element of cruelty and desertion could have been established on behalf of the petitioner (respondent herein).
21. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the evidence of cruelty and desertion has not properly been considered and as such, the impugned judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
22. This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant on the issue of perversity, needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word "perverse" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court 8 F.A. No. 182/2024 2025:JHHC:21437-DB which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:
"24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression "perverse" means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that "perverse finding" means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a "perverse verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined "perverse" as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. 9 F.A. No. 182/2024 2025:JHHC:21437-DB
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.
"Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable."
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn.
Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.--Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.--Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
"Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.""
23. Further the ground for divorce in form of cruelty and desertion has been pleaded before the learned family judge, therefore it wound be apt to discuss herein the scope of cruelty and desertion herein.
24. In the context of the aforesaid factual aspect only seminal issue has to be decided herein that "Whether the plaintiff-husband is entitled to get divorce dissolving the marriage of the petitioner/appellant with wife (appellant herein) U/s 13(1) (i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
25. The "cruelty" has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastana, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it 10 F.A. No. 182/2024 2025:JHHC:21437-DB has been laid down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the conduct charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent.
26. This Court deems it fit and proper to take into consideration the meaning of 'cruelty' as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon'ble Apex Court emphasized that "cruelty" can have no fixed definition.
27. According to the Hon'ble Apex Court, "cruelty" is the "conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial obligations". It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either "mental" or "physical", intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more "a question of fact and degree."
28. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty it is important for the court to not search for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties are used to, "their economic and social conditions", and the "culture and human values to which they attach importance."
29. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement 11 F.A. No. 182/2024 2025:JHHC:21437-DB filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty.
30. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337, the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband was suffering from "mental problems and paranoid disorder". The wife's lawyer also levelled allegations of "lunacy" and "insanity" against the husband and his family while he was conducting a cross-examination. The Hon'ble Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to constitute "cruelty".
31. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was "unchaste" and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute "cruelty" itself.
32. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be "grave" and "weighty" and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
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33. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vidhya Viswanathan v. Kartik Balakrishnan, (2014) 15 SCC 21 has specifically held that cruelty is to be determined on whole facts of the case and the matrimonial relations between the spouses and the word 'cruelty' has not been defined and it has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the other.
34. Further, at this juncture the definition of "desertion" is required to be referred herein as defined under explanation part of Section 13 which means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage.
35. Rayden on Divorce which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.) has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms:
"Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party."
The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:
"In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. 13 F.A. No. 182/2024
2025:JHHC:21437-DB Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion.
36. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence.
37. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) 14 F.A. No. 182/2024 2025:JHHC:21437-DB the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end.
38. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. In such a situation, the party who is filing for divorce will have the burden of proving those elements.
39. Recently also, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of 'desertion' on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus:
"13. Divorce.--(1) ...
15 F.A. No. 182/2024
2025:JHHC:21437-DB Explanation.--In this sub-section, the expression "desertion" means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly."
40. This Court, on the premise of the interpretation of the word "cruelty" and "desertion" has considered the evidences of the witnesses as has been incorporated by the learned Court in the impugned judgment.
41. In this case, the admitted fact is that in the month of March, 2019, the appellant-wife went away to her maika and thereafter performed second marriage with one Deepak Yadav.
42. On the other hand, the respondent-husband has alleged that his wife (appellant herein) always tortured the husband (respondent herein) and his old aged mother and deserted him but the husband tolerated all the acts of the appellant-wife only to live happy life with her and children.
43. In the instant case, it is evident from the testimony of witnesses that since year 2019, the relation between both parties got strained and after sometime, the respondent-wife left her sasural. Thereafter, petitioner (husband) tried to bring his wife back and in this regard, he has filed a case under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act also and thereafter, she again came to her sasural and lived for six months only but she again went away to her maika and since thereafter she did not return. The evidence of petitioner was supported by other two independent witnesses also.
44. Respondent-wife (appellant herein) has filed written statement and denied the pleadings of respondent-husband. She has stated that she has filed maintenance case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and thereafter, her husband 16 F.A. No. 182/2024 2025:JHHC:21437-DB has filed this divorce case. Respondent has further admitted that her husband has filed a case under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Hence, it appears that respondent-wife (appellant herein) is residing in her maika without any reason. In her written statement, respondent-wife (appellant herein) has not disclosed the fact as to why she is residing in her maika and left her sasural.
45. It further appears from the evidence of witnesses that for more two years, no cohabitation took place between both parties and respondent-wife (appellant herein) has deserted the petitioner-husband (respondent herein) for more than two years.
46. Respondent-wife (appellant herein) has filed written statement but to prove her pleadings, she did not adduce any witness even she did not come forward to examine herself in support of her pleadings and the witnesses examined on behalf of the respondent-husband could not be controverted and they remain intact.
47. It is further evident from the testimony of witnesses, that act of respondent-wife (appellant herein) towards the petitioner-husband (respondent herein) amounts to cruelty and she has deserted her husband for more than two years without any reasonable cause.
48. It is apparent from the impugned judgment that the learned Family Judge, has taken into consideration all the evidences led by the parties and after threadbare analysis of the same, has found the ground for dissolution of marriage is available in favour of the respondent-husband and therefore, has allowed the suit.
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49. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the appellant has failed to establish the element of perversity in the impugned judgment as per the discussion made hereinabove, as such, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.
50. This Court, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove, is of the view that the judgment passed on 19.06.2024 and decree signed on 01.07.2024 by the learned Addl. Principal Judge, Addl. Family Court No.II, Dhanbad, in Original Suit No. 105 of 2023, whereby and whereunder, the petition filed by the petitioner/husband (respondent herein) under Section 13(1)(i-
a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion, has been allowed, requires no interference by this Court.
51. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
52. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) I Agree (Rajesh Kumar, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.) Rohit /A.F.R. 18 F.A. No. 182/2024