Karnataka High Court
State Of Karnataka vs Sanjiv Mehra And Anr. on 28 November, 1989
Equivalent citations: [1990]79STC372(KAR)
JUDGMENT S. Rajendra Babu, J.
1. The respondent in these two cases is a dealer in slotted angles, door closers, paint brushes, etc. For the assessment years 1975-76 and 1978-79 the assessing authority held that door closers are machinery covered by entry 20 of the Second Schedule to the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (in short "the Act") and levied tax at the rate provided under that entry on the particular turnover. An appeal was filed against that order and the first appellate authority agreed with the finding of the assessing authority. When the matter was carried in second appeal, the Tribunal allowed the appeal holding that door closers do not answer the description of the term "machinery" dealt in entry 20 of the Second Schedule to the Act and hence remitted the matter to the assessing authority to levy tax on the respondent under the appropriate provision but not under entry 20 of the Second Schedule to the Act. Aggrieved by his order the Revenue has come up in revision before this Court.
2. The question that falls for our consideration is whether the door closers are machinery under entry 20 of the Second Schedule to the Act. Entry 20 of the said Schedule reads as follows :
"All machinery and spare parts and accessories thereof."
In order to understand the spare parts and accessories thereof."
In order to understand the meaning of the word machinery we may refer to certain dictionaries and decisions. According to Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition, "machinery" means :
"(i) the component parts of a complex machine.
(ii) machines collectively."
The leading case on the point is that of Corporation of Calcutta v. Cossipore Municipality AIR 1922 PC 27. In that case the question that fell for consideration was whether a steel tank with is supporting structure for storage of water was "machinery" within the meaning of the third proviso to section 101 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed that it was not an easy task to define the meaning of the word "machinery" in the absence of definition of the said term. However, in understanding the concept and meaning of the word "machinery" the committee stated as follows :
"A completed machine or a number of completed machines may of course according to the ordinary use of language, be properly described as 'machinery', so may those parts or members of a machine which when assembled, as it is styled, form a complete machine so also may some such of those parts, which when assembled with the other necessary parts, would form a complete machine be styled 'machinery' but none of these conditions exits in the present case."
Their Lordships of the Privy Council while agreeing with Lord Davey's observations that there was great danger in attempting to give a definition of the word "machinery" which would be applicable in all cases, stated that it might be impossible to succeed in such an attempt and then made certain observations, which are as follows :
"If their Lordships were obliged to run the hazard of the attempt they would be inclined to say that the word 'machinery' when used in ordinary language, prima facie, means some mechanical contrivances which by themselves or in combination with one or more other mechanical contrivances, by the combined movement and interdependent operation of their respective parts generate power, or evoke, modify, apply or direct natural forces with the object in each case of effecting so definite and specific a result ......
But their Lordships think that however skilful definitions of 'machinery' may be framed, the determination in any given case of what is or is not 'machinery' must, to a large extent, depend upon the special facts of that case."
A division Bench of this Court in D. B. Bhandari v. State of Mysore [1967] 20 STC 25 following the dictum of the Privy Council referred to above expressed its view in these words :
"In simpler language 'machinery' is a contrivance whereby several things are put together to work in such a way that force may that force may be applied at a most convenient point in a most convenient way to get a particular work or an item of work done or to produce a specific article or manufactured goods.
If this is the essential feature of a machinery which distinguishes it from other things, the mode or the manner in which power is fed into it or force is applied, need not and should not make any difference. It is conceded, for example, that a machinery would be a machinery whether it is fed by electrical power or other form of power applied by steam or generated by burning combustible oils. If the mode or the manner in which the power is applied makes no difference in these specified cases, it should make no difference either if the source of power is either human or animal."
This Court again had an occasion to explain the concept of the term "machinery" in K. B. Dani v. State of Karnataka [1979] 44 STC 276; (1979) 2 Kar LJ 286. This Court in that decision after referring to several decisions on the point, held thus :
"..... 'machine' means a mechanical device consisting of a planned and an organised arrangement of various parts, each part having definite functions and, as a result of combined functioning, does some work, which may be impossible or difficult for human physical power to perform or even if it can be done it cannot be done continuously for a long period or with the speed and with the same uniformity with which the machinery does the same work. Supply of power to the machine could be either by the natural forces or by human or animal energy, or electric energy or any other type of energy."
3. In the present cases, the respondent produced certain literature before the assessing authority in support of its contention that door closers should be treated as hardware. According to the respondent the term "door closers" was deal with and considered by a committee known as Builders Hardware Section Committee constituted under the aegis of Indian Standards Institution, New Delhi, and produced the brochure entitled "Indian Standard Specification for Door Closers (Hydraulically Regulated)" which stated that automatic door closers are being increasingly used by builders. According to the said brochure "a hydraulic door closer is an equipment for automatic closing of doors by the help of spring such that the phase of closing is slowed down by a hydraulic damper". Applying the test laid down by the Privy Council and this Court in the decisions referred to above, it is clear that the contraption or device known as door closer consists of an arrangement having certain parts containing several materials which uses hydraulic oil filling and also with the main arm securely fitted to the shaft by a square or hexagonal profile or profile of any other suitable shape with a nut and a washer. The assembly consists of not less than sixteen items of material. Thus, the function of the door closer being one to retard the closing of the door by use of a hydraulic damper, the device clearly comes within the description of "machine". We are aware of the decision of the Supreme Court which says that there should not be any technical approach nor should a commodity be understood in any technical sense but in the ordinary parlance of commercial context to class an item of goods in one category or another. In the present cases, considering the nature of the arrangement of the device and its functions it cannot be said that it is merely a door hinge and a simple device, not to be called a machine. Therefore, we cannot but reject the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent. The above discussion leads to the irresistible conclusion that door closers of the type sold by the respondent are machinery for the purpose of entry 20 of the Second Schedule to the Act and the decision to the contrary rendered by the Tribunal will have to be set aside restoring the orders of the assessing and appellate authorities. Ordered accordingly. Revision petitions stand allowed.
4. Petitions allowed.