Punjab-Haryana High Court
Hardawari Lal vs Moti Ram on 18 August, 1952
Equivalent citations: AIR1952P&H416, AIR 1952 PUNJAB 416
JUDGMENT Kapur, J.
1. This is a rule directed against an order passed by Mr. Harbans Singh, District Judge, Ludhiana, ordering the ejectment of the tenant from a portion of the property in his possession.
2. The learned Judge has found that the landlord is in possession of one room because he had already been evicted from another. His statement was that he was using that room for his business purposes. The learned Judge has also found that twelve years ago he had two rooms when his family consisted of himself, his wife and six minor children. Since then the children have grown up, two of his sons have got married and one of them has got a son so that there are now ten members of the family.
3. The premises in dispute were purchased by the landlord for Rs. 21,000/- and the learned District Judge has found that merely because he has been living in two rooms instead of in comfort in his own house is no ground for depriving him of the possession of the house which he has purchased. Taking all these facts into consideration, the learned Judge has ordered the eviction of the tenant from a portion of the building in which the tenant is now residing and has given that portion to the landlord.
4. Mr. Mela Ram for the petitioner has submitted that the learned Judge has misdirected himself in the matter of construction of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) (b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act where the words are "he is not occupying another residential or a scheduled building, as the case may be, in the urban area concerned" and that the Judge has added words which do not exist. He has relied on a judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in -- 'Robert Wigram Crawford v. Richard Spooner', (1846) 4 Moo. Ind. App. 179 (PC), where it was held that the plain words of a section must be construed as they are and words cannot be added but that was a rule laid down very long ago. Only recently in -- 'Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher', (1949) 2 All. E.R. 155 at p. 164, Denning L.J., took a different view and said that "in the absence of it (clarity), when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give force and life to the intention of the legislature."
It is not necessary in this case to say whether there was a case of casus omissus or to add words. We are being asked to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In my opinion, the learned Judge has tried to do substantial justice between the parties and no case seems to have been made out for interfering with his order.
5. Mr. Mela Ram has asked that some time should be allowed to his client to vacate "the premises. I am of the opinion, that three months' time as from today allowed by law would be sufficient for the purpose,
6. I would, therefore, dismiss this petition except as to giving of time and discharge the rule but leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.
Soni, J.
7. I agree. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes at p. 236 states as follows :
"Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construc tion, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hard ship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, by rejecting them altogether, or by interpolating other words, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the Legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. The rules of grammar yield readily in such cases to those of common sense."
This is supported by the ruling of the Privy Council -- 'Salmon v. Duncombe', (1886) 11 AC 627. Even if the Judge in the interpretation of the language of a statute has come to a conclusion which is erroneous, this by itself is no ground for interference in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution if he has in his order come to substantial justice.
I agree to the orders proposed by my learned brother.