Gauhati High Court
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs Ajoy Medhi And Anr. on 16 June, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996ACJ727, (1997)IIILLJ413GAU
JUDGMENT M. Sharma, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred by the Appellant Under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, against the judgment dated January 16, 1992 by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Dhubri in W.C., No. 7/89.
2. Respondent No. 1 is a driver. He filed a claim case before the Commissioner at Dhubri under the Act, seeking compensation for the injuries suffered by him. The Respondent No. 1 on January 28, 1989 was driving the Vehicle bearing Registration No. ASG 3493, in the capacity of driver and coming from Chapor towards Kokrajhar. The said vehicle's owner was Respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 1 met an accident near the Kokrajhar Police Station. Police stopped the car and dragging out the Respondent No. 1 from the vehicle assaulted him in the Chapor Police Station causing grievous injuries as a result of which the right eye of the Respondent No. 1 was seriously injured. He was admitted in the Dhubri Civil Hospital on January 29, 1989 till March 11, 1989 as an indoor patient. On the advice of doctor, he consulted eye specialist in Gauhati.
3. Respondent No. 2 is the registered owner of the vehicle in question, which was insured from February 12, 1988 to February 11, 1989 vide policy No. 31511120101098 (comprehensively) with the appellant Company.
4. Respondent No. 2 submitted written statement, but the appellant company did not submit any written statement nor any evidence denying the liability. After examining the witnesses of the workman, the learned Commissioner awarded Rs. 65,985/- against the appellant insurance company as the insurer of the vehicle in question.
5. For the purpose of preferring the appeal Under Section 30 of the Act, the appellant had deposited Rs. 65,985/- vide cheque No. 473059 dated March 13, 1992, before the Commissioner, along with an application apprising the intention of preferring appeal before the High Court.
6. Appellant company's ground for appeal inter alia is that, the injury to the eye of the appellant occurred in an incident, not in the accident alleged to be occurred on January 28, 1989 which caused in the hands of the police personnels. That there was no nexus between the injuries sustained by the Respondent No. 1 at the hands of the police personnels and the accident caused to the workman (Respondent No. 1) arising out of the course of employment and that in such cases, the employer, not the insurer is liable to pay compensation, that as per insurance policy condition with the vehicle in question, appellant was not liable to indemnify the Respondent No. 2, the owner of the vehicle, as the injury was not due to accident injuries caused pertaining to the work entrusted to the Respondent No. 1 by Respondent No. 2 as his driver.
7. The Act 1923, is a piece of social security legislation, and generally accepted that the various provisions of the Act, ought to be received a liberal interpretation. Since the Act is a welfare legislation, made for the interest of the poor workmen, if any particular provision of the Act is capable of two interpretations, that is more favourable to the person for whose benefit the legislature in its great wisdom has legislated it, should be adopted (relied on the case of Lipton India Ltd. v. Gokul Ch. Mandal (1982-I-LLJ-255) (F.B.) (Calcutta.) Therefore the doubt, which the appellant has insisted to bring in the mind of the Court, must be resolved in favour of the workman, in reference to the employer.
8. Further judicial consensus has been reflected, in the case of Sarup Singh v. Mukimd Lal AIR 1960 Punj, 119, which I respectfully agree and in agreement to the said Hon'ble High Court's view I prefer to quote the same-
"Ia a welfare state which is being progressively industrialised measures like the Workmen's Compensation Act should be construed in a more liberal sense in favour of the workmen so that deserving workman gets full and speedy benefit and advantage of these beneficient measures. Such liberal interpretation would accomplish the humane and beneficial purpose of this legislation the provisions of which are truly responsive to the socio-economic needs which have been recognised by our society and by our Constitution. The rights of workmen deserve to be generously treated while applying the statutory provisions because the procedure under this law provides a speedier, simpler, cheaper and more efficient machinery for the determination and payment of compensation to the workmen. Judicial and quasi-judicial officers should therefore not treat matters of procedure so rigidly as to deprive the citizens of the advantages of the beneficial legislation on technical grounds. It is of the utmost importance that no construction of the provisions relating to procedure should sacrifice the rights of the poor workmen due to technical mistake, omissions, or inaccuracies."
9. To examine the submission of Mr. Barkataky, learned counsel for the appellant, that the injury sustained by the workmen was occurred in an incident, not in accident, I am constrained to hold that the meaning of the terms 'incident' and 'accident' in the legal parlance cannot be accepted according to his interpretation.
10. An 'incident' which is unforeseen is an accident; both the same meaning in its context and be construed in its proper sense in a given situation. What Workmen's Compensation Act intends to convey is, what right a workman expressed in an accidental injury is entitled to (sic.). It is settled law that the term 'accident' means some unexpected and 'unforeseen event' or 'unlocked mischief'. If the injury or death from the point of view of the workman, who suffers or dies, is unexpected or undesigned on his part, then that injury would be by an accident, although it may be brought about by heart attack or some other cause to be found, in the condition of the workman. The term 'accident' as defined in Section 3 of the Act includes only such occurrence as, collusion, tripping, overflow, obstacle, fall of roofs etc. but also obvious ones, causing injuries. The common favour is, all those causes, in some happening at a definite point of time and capacity resulting from happening. This established position of law has been pervaded in a series of decisions and reflected in the cases referred in AIR 1955 NOC, 817 (Vol.42) Cal (DB); in Bhagu Bai's case (AIR 1955 Bom, 105 (DB); in Nath Mat's case (AIR 1955 NOC, (Raj) 4038 and AIR 1960 Bom-387.
Admittedly in this case the insurance policy was a comprehensive policy. In view of my above discussion I hold that the compensation against the Respondent No. 2, workman be borne by the appellant only, under the Act.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.