Madras High Court
Soundara Pandian vs Viswanathan on 7 November, 1984
JUDGMENT
1. This is an appeal by the complainant against the order of acquittal. The facts of the case are summarily as follows :
2. The complainant is a member of the Legislative Assembly. The two accused are known to the complainant. They all belonged to the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Party. In the year 1972 there was a split in the party and a new party under the name Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam was founded. The complainant joined that party. There were several allegations levelled against the D.M.K. Ministry by the dissident party. On 14-8-1973, on the floor of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, the then Chief Minister referred to a letter purported to have been written by one of the members then belonging to the A.D.M.K. Party wherein the said member had promised the addressee of the letter a Director's post if he collected funds for presenting a car to him. On 27-11-1973, the complainant spoke forcefully in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly about the corruption of the Ministry. In his reply, the then Chief Minister asked the complainant whether he had not written a letter promising the post of Director if the addressee gave car fund and paid expenses for his journey to Madras. The complainant denied the same. The Chief Minister then read out a letter purported to have been written by the complainant to A-1, the contents of which are as follows :
In the evening edition of the daily 'Navamani' dt. 27-11-1973, the contents of the letter read out by the Chief Minister were published. At his request, the complainant was subsequently shown the letter Ex. P.-6 by the Speaker. On coming to know that the body of the letter had been written by the second accused, he came to the conclusion that the letter was forged and then obtained a photostat copy of the letter. Thereupon, he filed a complaint against both the accused for offences under Sections 469, 471 and 500, I.P.C. A-2 pleaded guilty and was accordingly convicted and sentenced. A-1 pleaded not guilty. The trial Court, by judgment dt. 18-12-1978, acquitted A-1 of all the charges. It is against the acquittal of A-1, that the present appeal is preferred.
3. As far as the charge under S. 469, I.P.C. is concerned, the trial Court found that there was no evidence whatsoever and the same was conceded by the learned counsel for the complainant before the trial Court itself. Therefore, the order of acquittal is beyond reproach as far as this point is concerned.
4. As regards the charge under S. 471, I.P.C. one essential ingredient is found missing viz., the knowledge by the accused that Ex. P. 6 was a forged letter. The fact that A-2 pleaded guilty could not in any manner be made use of against A-1. It is to be independently proved that A-1 was aware that Ex. P-6 was a forged document. Such a proof was not adduced by the complainant. The trial Court found that, though the document was a forged one, it was not shown that the postal seals were also forged. In fact, there are as many as three postal seals. These would show that the letter was received by A-1 in the year 1968 itself, when the complainant and A-2 were both on good terms. The entire evidence was perused and the learned counsel for the appellant was not in a position to persuade me that there was adequate evidence to show that first accused was aware that the document was a forged one, when he passed it on to the Chief Minister. So, the acquittal of the charge under S. 471, I.P.C. is also found to be a proper one.
5. What remains is the charge under S. 500, I.P.C. In fact, it is on this aspect of the appeal that the learned counsel for the appellant stressed very much. He complained that the trial Court has neither given a clear finding nor has given a clear reasoning for acquitting of the charge under S. 500, I.P.C. S. 500, I.P.C. provides punishment for defamation and S. 499, I.P.C. defines 'defamation' as under :
"Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Explanation .........."
For being guilty of defamation, one should by his own words make or publish an imputation. In the present case, what is alleged by the complainant is that A-1 has passed on to the Chief Minister a letter received from A-2. It is not alleged that he is the author of the contents of the letter. So he has not made any imputation. As argued by the learned counsel for appellant, the imputation has been made public on account of his act of handing over the letter to the Chief Minister. But there is no evidence whatsoever by the prosecution to show what was contemplated by A-1 when he handed over the letter. The only thing available in the records is the declaration of A-1 himself to the effect that he handed over the letter because that person happened to be the President of the Party. It cannot be inferred that he intended it to be read by him. Since he was not shown to be responsible for the ensuing publication, it cannot be said that he published the imputation. So, A-1 is found to be active neither at the stage of making nor at the stage of publishing, he is only at an intermediary point. He cannot be directly made liable for an offence under S. 500, I.P.C. The criminal liability, if any, of A-1 could come only by virtue of S. 34 I.P.C. In the present case, firstly there was no charge under that section and, secondly, there is no proof whatsoever that Accused 1 and 2 were acting in furtherance of a common intention, and thirdly, the person responsible for publishing was not inculpated. So it is not possible to convict A-1 under S. 500, I.P.C.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant, basing his argument on the terms "intended to be read" found in S. 499, I.P.C. contended that A-1 intended the letter to be read while passing it on to the Chief Minister and that therefore he is guilty. Those terms are found in the phrase "by words either spoken or intended to be read". When words are spoken, they necessarily reach a third person, but words reduced to writing, may remain in the custody of the author without any person having knowledge thereof. Since for constituting the offence, the imputation should reach a third person, or at best is shown to be meant to reach a third person, the terms 'intended to be read' have been used. And these terms do not mean anything further. They only qualify the terms 'by words' and they only relate to the mode, the manner of action. The verbs which indicate the acts which constitute the offence are "makes or publishes" (as imputation), without any of these two acts, there is no offence. The contention of the appellant has no merit.
7. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
8. Appeal dismissed.