Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Kamalamma And Ors. vs The Management Of Sri Narsing ... on 2 February, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996(1)ALT541, (1996)IILLJ175AP
Author: M.H.S. Ansari
Bench: M.H.S. Ansari
JUDGMENT P.S. Mishra, C.J.
1. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellants (workmen) and the learned Counsel for the respondents (management)
2. It is not in dispute that the (respondents) appellants were employed in the coke manufacturing industry of the respondent- management. They were subjected to a domestic enquiry and removed from service on the alleged proof of various allegations levelled against them. The Labour Court ordered reinstatement without back-wages. The management moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The court at the time of admission of the writ petition granted stay on condition of complying with the requirements of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appeal against the said order under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was dismissed. There is some proceeding taken in the Court of the District Munsiff, Hyderabad West and South, Ranga Reddy in O.S. No. 180 of 1986 in which an order of interim injunction is granted on September 9, 1988 in the following terms:"
"The Court doth order that interim injunction be awarded restraining the respondents, their agents, servants, nominees etc., or any person claiming through them, from holding any meetings, demonstrations and shouting slogans, in any manner whatsoever, in or around the factory premises, including its corridor/passage or from interfering or obstructing in any manner whatsoever with the running of the said Industry, Sri Narsing Industries, 5-121, Durga Hussain Shah Wali, Lingampally Revenue Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and with the rights of the Petitioner, its staff, workers, officers, visitors, callers, clients etc., from using the factory premises of the petitioner firm until further orders".
The award, however, has been contested and all that has been urged and decided by the learned single Judge is stated in these words :
"I heard both the Counsel. While it is true that the terms of injunction did not restrain the respondents 1 to 7, 9, and 11, 12 from attending to their duties, some margin has to be given to them in the manner they understand. Generally, if an injunction order is shown, they construe it is a restrain without going into the details. May be this is one of such cases. While the abstaining from work by the respondents 1 to 12 cannot be approved, but in a labour movement, this kind of Dhamas or strikes to project the grievances of the labour are not unusual. But Sri G. Ramachandra Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents 1 to 12 are not in service since 1986 and 9 years lapsed since then, that other workers have been employed in the place of the Respondents 1 to 12 and that if respondents 1 to 12 are employed, the other workmen have got to be ousted which will again give rise to further litigation and also hardship.
Once there was a strain between respondents 1 to 12 and the petitioner, there will not be harmony even if respondents 1 to 12 are reinstated and it is reasonable for the petitioner to apprehend the situation as occurred in the year 1986. Taking these into overall consideration, I modify the award passed by the Labour Court which is subject - matter of this writ petition, directing the petitioner to pay a lumpsum amount of Rs. 8,000/- (Rupees eight thousand only) to each of the respondent 1 to 12 towards full and final settlement of all the claims of R 1 to 12 including the gratuity. The petitioner shall pay half of the said amount within 2 months from the date of receipt of this order and the balance half of the amount within 2 months thereof. Till such time, the regular payment under Section 17-B of the I.D. Act shall be coninued. The amounts paid complying with the provision of Section 17-B of I.D. Act, 1947 shall not be liable to be refunded. Accordingly this writ petition is disposed off".
3. Nothing has been shown to us to take the view, however, that there is any mistake in the award. Modification, as ordered by the learned single judge, however, has been ordered, it appears, in exercise of the power of the Labour Court by the learned single Judge as provided under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Ordinary rule, however of the judicial review, of an order is that the Court invariably should exercise refrain of not entering into the exercise of judicial discretion in deciding whether any compensation should be awarded in lieu of reinstatement by the Labour Court. The rule as is ordinarily applied in cases of imposition of punishment in exercise of a statutory power by a statutory authority is that the Court doesn't prefer to enter into the sufficiency, or otherwise of the punishment and whether the punishment imposed is reasonable or not, unless the punishment awarded is shockingly inappropriate and so arbitrary that no reasonable person can support the same. The same view, however is relaxed in the case of an award under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned single Judge, therefore, in our opinion, was acting within the jurisdiction in entering into the desirability of the order of reinstatement. The case has, however, caused us to think that interference with the order of reinstatement is not justifiable for the reasons as stated in the order of the learned single Judge. He has considered matters not pertaining to the case which was taken before the Labour Court in a casual manner. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we have noticed the reluctance of the employer for the reasons apparent on the face of the record that they have no trust any more upon the appellants for what they have done after the order of reinstatement. This almost made the management helpless in continuing its work. The same, in our opinion, however,will not justify denial of compensation in such terms which will adequately compensate the appellants for the loss of service which will be occasioned in case reinstatement is denied to them. Keeping the above in view, we are of the opinion that the appellants have to be adequately compensated and reinstatement be denied to them,
4. We accordingly order that the appellants shall be treated as if they were in continuous service from the date of the order of reinstatement (when it became effective), the money paid under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act will be taken into account, but they shall be paid retrenchment compensation from the date the award became effective based on the calculation that they shall be paid fifteen days wages for each completed year of service and gratuity in full and difference of pay, if any, in any year of payment of salary under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. The management shall not be liable for any other amount but calculate the above and pay to the workmen within a period of two months of the service of the order. The above, however, shall not be applicable to the claim of gratuity and provident fund and the employer shall, besides the same, pay gratuity and provident fund, if any, to the appellants.
5. With the above modification in the judgment of the learned single Judge, the appeal is disposed of.