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[Cites 14, Cited by 1]

Gujarat High Court

Shah Ramniklal Mangalji & vs State Of Gujarat & on 14 October, 2013

Author: Harsha Devani

Bench: Harsha Devani

  
	 
	 SHAH RAMNIKLAL MANGALJIV/SSTATE OF GUJARAT
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	

 
 


	 


	R/CR.MA/6095/2012
	                                                                    
	                           ORDER

 

 


 
	  
	  
		 
			 

IN
			THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
		
	

 


 


 


CRIMINAL
MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE FIR/ORDER) NO. 6095 of
2012
 


 


 


With 

 


 


 


CRIMINAL
MISC.APPLICATION NO. 6096 of 2012
 


 


 

================================================================
 


SHAH RAMNIKLAL MANGALJI  &
 3....Applicant(s)
 


Versus
 


STATE OF GUJARAT  & 
1....Respondent(s)
 

================================================================
 

Appearance:
 

MR
YJ PATEL, ADVOCATE for the Applicants
 

MR
NARENDRA L JAIN, ADVOCATE for the Respondent No. 2
 

MR
AN SHAH, ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Respondent No. 1
 

================================================================
 

 


 


	 
		  
		 
		  
			 
				 

CORAM:
				
				
			
			 
				 

HONOURABLE
				MS.JUSTICE HARSHA DEVANI
			
		
	

 


 

 


Date : 14/10/2013
 


 

 


ORAL ORDER

Since both the applications are directed against common first information report, the same are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.

Rule.

Mr. A. N. Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the first respondent and Mr. N. L. Jain, learned advocate waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the second respondent.

Having regard to the facts of the case and with the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the matters are taken up for final hearing today.

By these applications under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code ), the applicants seek quashing of the first information report registered vide Zinzuvada Police Station, Surendranagar I C.R. No.25 of 2011.

The second respondent lodged the above referred first information report against the applicants herein alleging commission of the offences punishable under sections 465, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently, it appears that the parties have amicably settled the disputes between them pursuant to which, the second respondent is no longer desirous of prosecuting the applicants herein.

On 10.10.2013, the second respondent Kalubhai Chelabhai Koli was personally present before this Court and had stated that the parties have amicably resolved the disputes between them and that a Memorandum of Understanding is to be executed in this regard. He had stated that once the Memorandum of Understanding is executed, he has no objection if the first information report in question is quashed. The learned advocate for the second respondent had also tendered the affidavit of the second respondent which was taken on record. The matters came to be adjourned to 14.10.2013 so as to enable the parties to place on record the Memorandum of Understanding that was to be executed between the them.

Today, Mr. Y. J. Patel, learned advocate for the applicants has placed on record a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding executed between the parties, which is also signed by the second respondent.

Mr. Y. J. Patel, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that in the light of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties, no fruitful purpose would be served if the proceedings are permitted to continue. Hence, the first information report in question is required to be quashed.

Mr. N. L. Jain, learned counsel for the second respondent has submitted that in view of the fact that the matter has been amicably settled with the applicants herein, the second respondent has no objection if the first information report in question is quashed. It is further submitted that the settlement has been arrived at in the interest of both the parties and with the intervention of certain elderly persons of the community. That in view of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties, they are maintaining good relations. It was submitted that under the circumstances, the second respondent has no objection if the first information report in question is quashed.

This Court has also heard Mr. A. N. Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the first respondent.

Before adverting to the merits of the case, it may be germane to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein the Supreme Court after considering its earlier decisions in this regard held thus:

61.

The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case whereby the High Court had declined the prayer for quashing of the prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34 IPC despite a compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused. The High Court had taken the view that since the offence punishable under section 406 was not compoundable, the settlement between the parties could not be recognised nor the pending proceedings quashed. The court summed up the approach to be adopted in such cases in the following words:

6.

We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.

Examining the facts of the case in the light of the above decisions, the dispute involved between the parties is purely in the nature of a private dispute. The parties have amicably sorted out their differences which has been reduced in writing by a Memorandum of Understanding, a copy whereof has been placed on the record of this Court. In the light of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties, the second respondent is not interested in prosecuting the applicants herein. Under the circumstances, no fruitful purpose would be served if the proceedings are permitted to continue. Besides, even if the proceedings are permitted to continue, in the light of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak. This is, therefore, a fit case for exercise of powers under section 482 of the Code.

For the foregoing reasons, the applications succeed and are, accordingly, allowed. The first information report registered vide Zinzuvada Police Station, Surendranagar I C.R. No.25 of 2011 as well as all proceedings pursuant thereto, are hereby quashed qua the present applicants only.

Direct Service is permitted.

(HARSHA DEVANI, J.) parmar* Page 6 of 6