Punjab-Haryana High Court
Padmashree Smt.Anjolie Ela Menon And ... vs The State Of Haryana And Others on 24 May, 2013
Author: Ajay Kumar Mittal
Bench: Ajay Kumar Mittal, Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia
CWP No.6714 of 2012 1
THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP No.6714 of 2012
Date of decision: 24.05.2013
Padmashree Smt.Anjolie Ela Menon and another
-----Petitioners
Vs.
The State of Haryana and others
----Respondents
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR MITTAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GURMEET SINGH SANDHAWALIA
Present:- Mr. M.L.Sarin Senior Advocate with
Mr. Avi Singh and Mr. Nitin Sarin, Advocates
for the petitioners in CWP No.6714 of 2012.
Mr. Sanjay Vashisth, Advocate for the petitioners
in CWP No.4254 and 4261 of 2012.
Mr. Vinod Gupta and Mr. Amit Jain, Advocates
for the petitioners in CWP No.5212 of 2012.
Mr. Ashish Chopra, Advocate for the petitioners
in CWP No.6354 of 2012
Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Advocate for the
petitioners in CWP Nos.6801, 7072 and 9194 of 2012.
Mr. D.S.Patwalia and Mr. Salil Sabhlok, Advocates
for the petitioners in CWP No.6755 of 2012.
Mr. Vinod S.Bhardwaj, Additional A.G.Haryana.
Mr. Amit Jaiswal, Advocate for HUDA in
CWP Nos.4254, 4261 and 6354 of 2012.
Mr. Ajay Kaushal, Advocate for HUDA in
CWP No.6755 of 2012.
Mr.Sikander Bakshi, Advocate for respondent No.3 in
CWP No.6714 of 2012.
Ajay Kumar Mittal,J.
1. This order shall dispose of Civil Writ Petition Nos.6714, 4254, 4261, 5212, 6354, 6801, 7072, 9194 and 6755 of 2012 as learned CWP No.6714 of 2012 2 counsel for the parties are agreed that the facts and the issue involved are identical. However, the relevant facts for disposal of these writ petitions are being extracted from CWP No.6714 of 2012 which may be briefly noticed.
2. The land of the petitioners in CWP No.6714 of 2012 is being acquired for the public purpose of building a 60 metre wide sector road east of the Ghatta bandh based only on a general outline of Sector 58 in the Gurgaon Manesar Master Plan 2021. The respondents issued notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short, "the Act") on 24.6.2008. This was followed by declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 14.7.2008 by invoking urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act. The petitioners challenged the acquisition proceedings by filing CWP No.6809 of 2009. This Court on 6.8.2009 granted stay of dispossession of the petitioners from their land under acquisition. On 28th January 2011, declaration under Section 6 of the Act was set aside as it was held that there existed no urgency in terms of Section 17 of the Act. The petitioners were given liberty to file objections to the proposed acquisition and an opportunity of hearing to them before deciding the objections within a month from the date of the decision. The notice was issued by the respondents on 11.5.2011 inviting objections from the petitioners which were submitted on 22.6.2011. Section 6 declaration was issued on 3.2.2012. The petitioners have filed instant writ petition again challenging the acquisition proceedings.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
CWP No.6714 of 2012 3
4. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, since the award was not announced within one year from 28.1.2011 when the earlier CWP No.6809 of 2009 was decided, the Section 6 declaration issued on 3.2.2012 was beyond limitation of one year provided under Clause (ii) of First Proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act and the entire acquisition proceedings have lapsed.
5. On the other hand, learned State counsel on the basis of the written statement urged that the order dated 28.1.2011 passed by this Court was received by them on 24.2.2011 and, therefore, the notification under Section 6 of the Act issued on 3.2.2012 was legal, valid and within limitation of one year as prescribed thereunder from the date of receipt of copy of order of the High Court, i.e. 24.2.2011.
6. The core controversy in these writ petitions relates to whether for the purposes of determining limitation for publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the period would commence from the date of receipt of copy of the order of the Court or from the date of the order. The matter is no longer res integra. Similar contention of learned counsel for the respondents in Anil Gupta and another v. State of Punjab and others, CWP No.25018 of 2012 that limitation for issuing notification under Section 6 of the Act would start running from the date of receipt of a copy of the order passed by this Court, was repelled with the following observations:-
"8. The plea of the respondents that the limitation for issuing notification under Section 6 of the Act would start running from the date of receipt of a copy of the order passed by this Court cannot be accepted in view of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Padma Sundara Rao's case (supra) [(2002) (3) SCC 533].The Hon'ble Supreme Court while accepting its earlier decisions in A.S. Naidu v.CWP No.6714 of 2012 4
State of Tamil Nadu, SLPs (C) Nos. 11353-55 of 1988 and Oxford English School v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (1995) 5 SCC 206 and overruling the judgments in N.Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 3 SCC 88 and State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 SCC 619 had held that once a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Act cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period of the notification under Section 6(1) of the Act and the period cannot be construed to commence from the date of receipt of the order of the Court, quashing the declaration. It was noticed as under:-
"14. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. vs. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd.). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6 (1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah's case (supra). In Nanjudaiah's case (supra), the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non- prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent.
15. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole - appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with CWP No.6714 of 2012 5 reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou (at All ER pp. 544-I), "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C. where at AC p. 577 he also observed: (All ER p. 664-I) "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".
16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K Chinnathambi Gounder (supra) was rendered on 22.6.1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim 'actus curia neminem gravibit' highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras HighCourt has no application to the fact situation of this case.
17. The view expressed in Narasimhaiah's case and Nanjudaiah's case, is not correct and is over-ruled while that expressed in A.S. Naidu's case and Oxford's case is affirmed."
7. In view of the above, all the writ petitions are allowed. The CWP No.6714 of 2012 6 notification dated 3.02.2012 (Annexure P.1) issued under Section 6 of the Act in all the writ petitions being beyond limitation is quashed. As a consequence, notification under Section 4 of the Act shall also be considered to have lapsed. Any consequential proceedings taken in pursuance to the aforesaid notifications shall also be non est. (Ajay Kumar Mittal) Judge May 24, 2013 (Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia) 'gs' Judge