Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Ch. Papanna vs The Personnel Manager, State Bank Of ... on 27 September, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1995(2)ALT358
Author: Y.V. Narayana
Bench: Y.V. Narayana
JUDGMENT Y. Bhaskara Rao, J.
1. This writ petition is filed to declare the action of the respondents in disqualifying the petitioner for recruitment to the post of Messenger on the ground of possessing higher educational qualification as discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and also to direct the respondents to appoint the petitioner as a Messenger in the respondent-bank.
2. The case of the petitioner is that he passed Secondary School Certificate examination in the year 1974. He was originally appointed as a temporary Messenger in the State bank of India, Kurnool branch in April, 1977. He worked for 331 days at various branches of the respondent-bank as a temporary Messenger between April, 1977 and July, 1981. When the respondent-bank decided to absorb the services of temporary Class-IV employees in the year 1986, the petitioner applied for absorption. The criteria laid down for the absorption was that temporary class-IV employee must work for more than 270 days within a span of three years. The petitioner appeared for interview held on 5-4-1986. On 28-7-1986, he was informed by the bank authorities that he was disqualified for the post of Messenger as he is over-qualified. According to the Regulations governing recruitment to the post of Messengers/Watchman/ Armed Guards, one should have passed VIII Class, but no X Class passed, to seek appointment to those posts. The petitioner had passed S.S.C., even at the time of initial appointment. In view of the Regulations, the Bank has refused to absorb the petitioner in the post of Messenger though he had put in more than 270 days of service within a period of three years.
3. A counter was filed by the bank authorities stating that the petitioner has got adequate alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act and that the petitioner was not qualified to be appointed as Messenger as per the rules of recruitment of the Bank. Additional counter affidavit was also filed by the bank authorities stating that it is for the institution to fix eligibility norms, such as educational qualification, etc., depending upon the nature or work/duties involved to facilitate the institution's requirement and that if maximum qualification at a specific level is not fixed, higher educational qualification would pose several problems, like better qualified candidates naturally aiming for better jobs and leave the services, which results in unstability necessitating fresh recruitment, etc.
4. Actually, this writ petition was heard by our learned brother, justice S.R. Nayak. Before the learned single Judge, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Smt. Mary Sai Kumari v. Regional Manager and Disciplinary Authority, Region, State Bank of India, Vijayawada, rendered by B. Subhashan Reddy, J. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Y. Srinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah, , B. Subhashan Reddy, J. held in Smt. Mary Sai Kumari's case that the proposed action of the bank to discharge the petitioner therein solely on the ground of acquisition of better qualification is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. Differing with the view of B. Subhashan Reddy, J., the learned single Judge referred the matter to a Division Bench. That is how the writ petition came up before us.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the decision in Smt. Mary Sai Kumari's case, contended that disqualification of the petitioner on the ground of possessing higher qualification is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
6. Sri K. Srinivasa Murthy, the learned counsel for the respondents, contended that the management has got every right to prescribe qualifications for the employees to be appointed, that where the management requires the personnel with minimum qualification and prescribes minimum qualification and bars higher qualification as one of the requirements for recruitment, the same cannot be interfered with by the Courts and that the prescription that acquisition of higher qualification is a bar for recruitment cannot be said to be arbitrary in violation of Articles l4 and 16 of the Constitution as line employer has got every right to prescribe qualification.
7. In view of the above contentions, the points to be considered are:
(i) Whether the management has got a right to prescribe qualification for posts?
(ii) Whether the action of the management in prescribing that acquisition of higher qualification is a bar for recruitment to the posts, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution?
8. Adverting to the first point, it would be appropriate to refer to the decision of Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court Reported in Som Dutt v. State of Haryana, 1983 (3) SLR 141 . In that case, the Full Bench was dealing with the question whether the employer-State can insist on literal adherence to the qualifications prescribed by it or spelt out by a statute for a post even when the applicants with higher qualifications are seeking appointment to the said post. The Full Bench had taken the facts from one of the five petitions referred to it and in that petition the petitioner was a Post Graduate and also passed Bachelor of Education examination. He had applied for the post of J.B.T., Teacher for which the qualifications prescribed were; (i) Matric (Full) with English as one of the subjects and (ii) Pass in two years J.B.T. Diploma in Education Training Course from the Haryana Education Department or equivalent qualification. The Selection Committee after interviewing the petitioner rejected his candidature on the ground that he did not possess the minimum prescribed qualifications of two years J.B.T. Diploma from the Haryana Education Department. After considering the contentions of either side, the Full Bench observed:
"There appears to be wide variety of reasons for holding that the employer-State should, in law, be entitled to prescribe the qualification which it may think necessary as tailored to the peculiar needs of the particular post of service. Generally, it seems some what elementary that the employer alone would know what are the specialties and conditions of service or post for which the incumbent is required. Therefore, it would follow that its discretion in seeking the right man for the right job should be left relatively unfettered."
9. Coming to the decision of the Supreme Court in J. Ranga Swamy v. Govt. of A.P., in that case the grievance of the petitioner was that he was not selected as Professor in Radiological Physics and whereas the respondent, D.K. Subrahmanya Reddy, who was less qualified, was selected. The petitioner pleaded that the Diploma in Radiological Physics, held by him, was more relevant than the prescribed qualification of Doctorate in Nuclear Physics. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court held:
"It is not for the Courts to consider the relevance of qualifications prescribed for various posts.......It is not for us to assess the comparative merits of such a Doctorate and the BARC Diploma held by the petitioner and decide or direct what should be the qualifications to be prescribed for the post in question,"
10. Thus, it is clear from the above decisions that the employer has got every right to prescribe qualifications, which he may think necessary, keeping the peculiar needs of the particular post or service in view.
11. The second question for our consideration is whether the prescription that acquisition of higher qualification is a bar for recruitment to post, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution.
12. Here, again it is relevant to state as to what had been held by the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court while considering the right of the employer-State to prescribe minimal qualifications:
"Consequently, no doctrinaire rule can be laid down that a technically higher educational qualification is necessarily better or more advantageous for the peculiar needs of a post for which the employer-State has prescribed lower qualifications........On the larger perspective, it was submitted and in our view rightly that superlatively higher qualified individuals may not have requisite job satisfaction or motivation in holding a post disquietingly below their academic rank though circumstances for the time being may compel them to accept such a job. The respondent-State apart from qualifications may have the larger interest of the service in mind in having persons to man posts who value them and would have individual job satisfaction to hold on to them as well."
13. Facts situation similar to the present case came up before the Supreme Court in Kerala Solvent Ex. Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan and Anr., 1994 (II) LLJ 888. In that case, one of the conditions for eligibility for appointment to the post of Badli workman was that the educational qualification of the candidates should not be more than VIII standard and the respondent sought employment in the appellant-company as Badli workman suppressing the fact that he had completed X standard and stating that he passed only VIII standard examination. On this ground, the services of the respondent were terminated. The Labour Court set aside the order of termination and granted relief to the respondent. Against the award of the Labour Court, the writ petition was filed by the company. The learned single Judge of the High Court disapproved the view of the Labour Court and held:
"Workers were expected to give correct information as to their qualification. They failed to do so. They were in fact over-qualified and therefore ineligible to apply for the job. It has been stated that applications received from some over-qualified candidates were rejected. The petitioner as also the workers are bound by the terms of Exs.P-1 which had to be given effect to. Over-qualification is certainly, in the circumstances a disqualification, which aspect the first respondent failed to grasp. Exs.P-10 in these cases is unsustainable and is accordingly set aside."
14. But, the learned single Judge ordered reinstatement of the respondent extending judicial compassion. The writ appeal was also dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. When the matter was carried to the Supreme Court, (he Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal of the management setting aside the orders of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and rejected the industrial dispute raised by the respondent Further, the Supreme Court observed that the view taken by the learned single Judge of the High Court that over qualification is certainly a disqualification is right.
15. Thus, it is clear from the above two decisions that it is for the employer to prescribe qualifications and that over-qualification is certainly a disqualification. It, therefore, cannot be said that prescription by the management that acquisition of higher qualification is a bar for recruitment, is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
16. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Y. Srinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah, for the proposition that giving preference to less educated person is arbitrary and discriminatory. In that case, one of the conditions laid for appointment of Fair price shop dealer was that candidates who are having experience in the business will be preferred and that the policy decision of the Government in Order No.951 dated 16-5-1988 was that only unemployed persons shall be eligible for appointment and that another Government order stated that preference has to be given to less educated persons. The Revenue Divisional Officer allotted the fair price shop to the respondent. The Collector allowed the appellant's claim and the High Court quashed his judgment by condemning it as perverse. The Supreme Court held that the decision to prefer an uneducated person over an educated person amounts to gross arbitrariness and therefore illegal discrimination. It is to be noticed that in that case, acquisition of higher qualification was not prescribed as a bar for recruitment to the post. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court held that the candidature of better qualified person cannot be rejected on the ground of possessing over-qualification. Relying on the said decision, the learned Single Judge of this Court, B. Subhashan Reddy, J., in Smt. Mary Sai Kumari's case (1 supra) held that the proposed action of the respondent-Bank to discharge the petitioner therein solely on the ground of acquisition of better qualification is not only violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, but also hit by the postulates of Article 21 of the Constitution.
17. Thus, it is manifest from the above decisions that where over-qualification is not prescribed as a bar for consideration of appointment and if the candidature is rejected on the ground of possessing over-qualification, the same amounts to arbitrariness and therefore illegal discrimination and violative of Articles 14 and 16. Where the management or the employer prescribes minimum qualification as a requirement and in addition to that it prescribes that over-qualification is a bar, in such a case, the rejection of the candidature on the ground of over-qualification cannot be said to be arbitrary or violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution because the management or the employer has got every right to prescribe qualifications keeping its peculiar needs in view.
18. In view of the above principles, we hold that prescription of over-qualification as a bar for recruitment to the post cannot be said to be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
19. In the present case, the petitioner was possessing S.S.C., qualification on the date when he was originally appointed as a temporary Messenger. Thereafter, the Bank absorbed the services of temporary Class IV employees, who worked for more than 270 days within a span of three years. The petitioner was not absorbed on the ground that he was over-qualified to hold the post of Messenger. In view of our finding that over-qualification is certainly a disqualification, we see no ground to issue a writ of Mandamus as prayed for.
20. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.