Orissa High Court
Sukant Kumar Narendra vs The Chairman-Cum-Managing Director ... on 16 October, 2015
Author: A.K.Rath
Bench: A.K.Rath
HIGH COURT OF ORISSA: CUTTACK
WP(C) No.1239 of 2003
In the matter of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India.
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Sukant Kumar Narendra .... Petitioner
Versus
The Chairman-cum-Managing
Director United Commercial
Bank & others .... Opposite parties
For Petitioner ... Mr. Chandan Panigrahi, Advocate
For Opp. Parties ... None appears
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.RATH
Date of hearing: 07.10.2015 : Date of judgment: 16.10.2015
Dr. A.K.Rath, J By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, challenge is made to the order dated 15.1.2003 passed by the
learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Khurda in Misc. Case No.84 of
1996 arising out of Money Suit No.87 of 1996 whereby and
whereunder the compromise decree passed in the Lok Adalat was set
aside under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
2. The petitioner had availed a term loan amounting to
Rs.80,000/- from opposite party no.2-Bank to purchase a tractor. He
became defaulter. Thereafter, opposite party no.2-Bank laid Money
Suit No.87 of 1996 in the court of learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Khurda for realization of Rs.2,44,539/- along with interest.
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While the matter stood thus, the matter was placed before the Lok
Adalat held on 7.5.2000. A joint compromise petition was filed by the
parties on certain terms and conditions, vide Annexure-7. The
contents of the petition had been read over and explained to the
parties. They admitted to be correct. Learned trial court accepted the
compromise petition and decreed the suit in terms of the
compromise. Learned trial court observed that the compromise
petition will form part of the decree. Thereafter, the petitioner
deposited the entire amount in terms of the compromise and the
same was accepted by the Bank. While the matter stood thus, the
plaintiff filed an application under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC to review the
order dated 7.5.2000 passed by the learned court below in the Lok
Adalat. It is stated that the suit was originally filed for recovery of
Rs.2,44,539/- and subsequently the same was increased to
Rs.3,09,722/- by way of amendment. The suit was placed before the
Lok Adalat on 7.5.2000 and decreed for Rs.1,15,000/- on the
compromise petition signed by defendant no.1 and Assistant
Manager of the Bank. While signing the compromise petition, the
Assistant Manager put the seal of the Bank and signed the same as if
he was an agent of the Bank without any authority to act as a Bank
Manager in the Lok Adalat. Further, advocate for the plaintiff had not
signed the compromise petition and unaware of the same. The
Branch Manager has alone the authority to file a suit, sign the plaint,
petition, appoint lawyers and has no authority to transfer power to
any other officer/employee. It is further stated that the compromise
made in the Lok Adalat was not lawful and the court acted beyond
his jurisdiction and accepted the petition for compromise between
the Bank and the defendants. To substantiate the case, the Assistant
Manager of the Bank, who signed the compromise petition, was
examined as P.W.1. By order dated 15.1.2003, learned trial court
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allowed the application and set aside the order dated 7.5.2000
passed in the Lok Adalat.
3. Heard Mr. Chandan Panigrahi, learned counsel for the
petitioner. None appears for the opposite parties.
4. With a solemn aim for providing free legal aid, the Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act")
was enacted by the Parliament. The statement of objects and reasons
of the Act states as follows:
"Article 39A of the Constitution provides that the State shall
secure that the operation of the legal system promotes
justice on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in
particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or
schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for
securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of
economic or other disabilities.
2. With the object of providing free legal aid, Government
had, by a Resolution dated the 26th September, 1980
appointed the "Committee for Implementing Legal Aid
Schemes" (CILAS) under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice
P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was) to monitor and implement
legal aid programmes on uniform basis in all the States and
Union territories. CILAS evolved a model scheme for legal aid
programme applicable throughout the country by which
several legal aid and advice boards have been set up in the
States and Union territories. CILAS is funded wholly by
grants from the Central Government. The Government is
accordingly concerned with the programme of legal aid as it
is the implementation of a constitutional mandate. But on a
review of the working of the CILAS, certain deficiencies have
come to the fore. It is, therefore, felt that it will be desirable
to constitute statutory legal service authorities at the
National, State and District levels so as to provide for the
effective monitoring of legal aid programmes. The Bill
provides for the composition of such authorities and for the
funding of these authorities by means of grants from the
Central Government and the State Governments. Power has
also been given to the National Committee and the State
Committees to supervise the effective implementation of legal
aid schemes.
3. For some time now, Lok Adalats are being constituted at
various places in the country for the disposal, in a summary
way and through the process of arbitration and settlement
between the parties, of a large number of cases expeditiously
and with lesser costs. The institution of Lok Adalats is at
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present functioning as a voluntary and conciliatory agency
without any statutory backing for its decisions. It has proved
to be very popular in providing for a speedier system of
administration of justice. In view of its growing popularity,
there has been a demand for providing a statutory backing to
this institution and the awards given by Lok Adalats. It is felt
that such a statutory support would not only reduce the
burden of arrears of work in regular courts, but would also
take justice to the door-steps of the poor and the needy and
make justice quicker and less expensive."
5. The Act was enacted with a view to give effect to the
mandate of Article 39A of the Constitution of India. The Lok Adalat is
an ancient system of adjudication of disputes. It is a People's Court.
Lok Adalat provides for cheap and inexpensive justice to the common
man. The benefits of Lok Adalat have been succinctly stated by the
apex Court in the case of P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job, (2005) 6 SCC
478, which is quoted below:
"The 'Lok Adalat' is an old form of adjudicating
system prevailed in ancient India and its validity has not
been taken away even in the modern days too. The words
'Lok Adalat' mean 'People's Court'. This system is based on
Gandhian principles. It is one of the components of ADR
system. As the Indian courts are overburdened with the
backlog of cases and the regular courts are to decide the
cases involve a lengthy, expensive and tedious procedure.
The court takes years together to settle even petty cases.
Lok Adalat, therefore provides alternative resolution or
devise for expedious and inexpensive justice.
In Lok Adalat proceedings there are no victors and
vanquished and, thus, no rancour.
Experiment of 'Lok Adalat' as an alternate mode of
dispute settlement has come to be accepted in India, as a
viable, economic, efficient and informal one.
LOK ADALAT is another alternative to JUDICIAL
JUSTICE. This is a recent strategy for delivering informal,
cheap and expeditious justice to the common man by way
of settling disputes, which are pending in courts and also
those, which have not yet reached courts by negotiation,
conciliation and by adopting persuasive, common sense
and human approach to the problems of the disputants,
with the assistance of specially trained and experienced
members of a team of conciliators."
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19. Benefits under Lok Adalat
1. There is no court fee and if court fee is
already paid the amount will be refunded if the
dispute is settled at Lok Adalat according to the rules.
2. The basic features of Lok Adalat are the
procedural flexibility and speedy trial of the disputes.
There is no strict application of procedural laws like
the Civil Procedure Code and the Evidence Act while
assessing the claim by Lok Adalat.
3. The parties to the dispute can directly
interact with the judge through their counsel which is
not possible in regular courts of law.
4. The award by the Lok Adalat is binding on
the parties and it has the status of a decree of a civil
court and it is non-appealable, which does not cause
the delay in the settlement of disputes finally.
In view of above facilities provided by "the Act" Lok Adalats
are boon to the litigating public that they can get their
disputes settled fast and free of cost amicably."
6. Section 21 of the Act deals with award of Lok Adalat. The
same is quoted hereunder;
"21. Award of Lok Adalat- (1) Every award of the Lok
Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court or, as
the case may be, an order of any other Court and where a
compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok
Adalat in a case referred to it under Sub-section (1) of
Section 20, the Court-fee paid in such case shall be
refunded in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act,
1870 (7 of 1870)
(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final
and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal
shall lie to any Court against the award."
7. The specific language used in sub-section (1) of Section
21 of the Act makes it clear that every award of the Lok Adalat shall
be deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court and, as such, executable
by that court. Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act provides that
every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all
the parties to the disputes, and no appeal shall lie to any Court
against the award. The decree can be reviewed under Order 47 Rule
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1 CPC provided the same satisfies the pre-conditions enumerated
under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
8. Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, which is the hub of the issue, is
quoted hereunder;
"Order - XLVII
REVIEW
1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved --
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed,
but from which no appeal has been preferred;
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed; or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes;
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter
or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was
not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him
at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or
on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face
of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to
obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against
him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which
passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may
apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the
pendency of an appeal by some other party except where
the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and
the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to
the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the
review."
9. Interpreting the aforesaid provision, the apex Court in
the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati & others AIR 2013 SC 3301
held as follows:
"15. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and
have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order
XLVII, Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere
disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the
ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already
dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to
challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an
alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.
Summary of the Principles:
16. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of
review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
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(A) When the review will be maintainable:-
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge
of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted
in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by
this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev.
Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 520 : (AIR
1954 SC 526), to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at
least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same
principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur
Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., JT 2013 (8) SC 275 :
(2013 AIR SCW 2905).
(B) When the review will not be maintainable:-
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough
to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original
hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,
manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness
or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby
an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only
for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot
be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not
be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within
the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to
be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought
at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."
10. On the anvil of the decisions cited supra, the instant case
may be examined. The matter was placed before the Lok Adalat on
7.5.2000. The Assistant Manager of the Bank as well as defendant no.1-loanee signed the compromise petition. The Assistant Manager of the Bank had put the seal of the Bank. The contents of the compromise petition had been read over and explained to the parties in presence of their advocates. They admitted the same to be correct.
8Thereafter, the learned trial court decreed the suit in terms of the compromise and observed that the compromise petition shall do form part of the decree. When a responsible officer of the Bank signed the compromise petition and admitted the same to be correct, this Court fails to understand as to how learned trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction in accepting the compromise petition. Neither there is any material on record to show that the Assistant Manager of the Bank signed the compromise petition at the behest of the Court, nor the decree was obtained by playing fraud on Court. Frivolous allegation has been made against the court without any foundational facts. A litigant cannot be permitted to make frivolous allegation against the Court to get his affairs settled in the manner he wishes. If such a petition is entertained, then it will frustrate the mandate of the Act.
11. Pursuant to the compromise petition the suit was disposed of. Defendant no.1-loanee has paid the entire amount and the same has been accepted by the Bank. There is no error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of the decree passed in the Lok Adalat.
12. In the wake of the aforesaid, the impugned order dated 15.1.2003 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Khurda in Misc. Case No.84 of 1996 is hereby quashed.
Accordingly, the petition is allowed.
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DR. A.K.RATH, J.
Orissa High Court, Cuttack.
The 16th October, 2015/Pradeep.