Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Radheshyam @ Parasram Kirar Judgement ... on 30 September, 2013
Misc. Criminal Case No.12712/2013
30.9.2013 Per B.D.Rathi,J
Shri Vijay Pandey, Deputy Advocate General for the
applicant-State.
Heard on I.A. No.21477/13 for condonation of delay in
preferring this application for leave to appeal.
As per Office note, the application is barred by 63
days.
Considering the reasons assigned therein, the I.A. is
allowed and the delay in filing the application is hereby
condoned.
Heard on admission.
This is an application for grant of leave to appeal
under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
("Code" for short) against the acquittal of respondent
Radheshyam alias Parasram Kirar of the offences punishable under Sections 450, 343, 366, 376 and 506 of the IPC. The impugned judgment was passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Amarwada, District Chhindwara, in Sessions Trial No.340/12 on 17/4/2003.
Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 17/4/12 at about 11 p.m., when the prosecutrix was alone in her house and resting in the Courtyard, respondent asked her for water and as she went inside, he also followed her and made her inhale some stupefying substance rendering her unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was in a Train and as she tried to speak, respondent pressed her mouth and threatened to throw her off the train in case she uttered anything. He brought her to Nagur and confined her in a room for 7-8 days and during this period, persistently subjected her to sexual assault. He also sell her silver anklet and expended her eight thousand rupees. Somehow, she escaped, reached home and informed her husband. Report of the incident was lodged by the prosecutrix at Police Station Chaurai upon which Crime No.578/12 was registered and after investigation, charge-sheet was filed.
Learned Dy. Advocate General submitted that the impugned judgment was passed without proper appreciation of evidence on record and the same deserved to be interfered with.
Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Dy. Advocate General, impugned judgment was perused.
Admittedly, prosecutrix is a married lady and a mother of three children. Santosh (PW2), husband of the prosecutrix, admitted that he had not lodged any missing person report with regard to the prosecutrix. He also deposed that in the morning he had come to know that she had eloped with the respondent. According to him, on the date of incident his children were at home. However, they have not been examined by the prosecution. Radheshyam S/o Chhiddi (DW1) deposed that he had overheard a quarrel between the prosecutrix and her husband regarding calling of the respondent by the prosecutrix at her home. Santosh (DW2) deposed that husband of the prosecutrix had come to his house and informed him that prosecutrix had gone somewhere consequent upon their quarrel as she used to call the respondent. He further deposed that husband of the prosecutrix had also told him about receiving a call from Nagpur whereby he was informed not to search for the prosecutrix, as she was in Nagpur. Respondent Radheshyam examined himself as DW3. He testified that prosecutrix was her sister-in-law and he had lent her money on many occasions. He further deposed that previously also her husband had falsely implicated him in a case under Section 354 and 456 of the IPC. He stated that there had been some dispute between the prosecutrix and her husband due to which the prosecutrix had gone somewhere for 10-15 days and then returned. Incident had occurred on 17/4/12, whereas report of the incident was lodged on 25/10/12. There is no satisfactory explanation for delay. In the aforesaid premises, the trial Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.
Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question.
The application, therefore, stands dismissed in limine.
(AJIT SINGH) (B.D.RATHI) JUDGE JUDGE (and)