Telangana High Court
D.Muthyalu Died 12 Others vs Smt.D.Laxmi Bai 4 Others on 30 November, 2022
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A. VENKATESHWARA REDDY
C.C.C.A.No.8 of 2008
JUDGMENT:
The unsuccessful defendant has filed this appeal suit assailing the judgment and decree dated 06.12.2007 in O.S.No.311 of 1999 on the file of the XXI Additional Chief Judge-cum-Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for the trial of Communal Offence Cases-cum-VII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Nampally, Hyderabad.
2. The plaintiffs have filed the original suit for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession of the suit schedule property baring No.12-1-922/1/A admeasuring 353 square yards situated at Asifnagar, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as "suit schedule property"). The trial Court has decreed the suit. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 06.12.2007, this appeal is filed.
Pleadings in the plaint and written statement:
3. The plaintiffs have filed the original suit alleging that the plaintiff No.1 is the wife of plaintiff No.2 and she is Page 2 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 the absolute owner of suit schedule property. She purchased the same under registered sale deed dated 13.08.1975 from Sri D. Yellaiah and Smt. D. Venkatamma, parents of the defendant for a valuable consideration. The plaintiff No.1 demolished the two rooms which were in existence in the open place and constructed mulgies in the year 1979, let out the same to the tenants and collecting rents. While so, in the year 1980, the defendant has filed OS No.4196 of 1980 for perpetual injunction against the second plaintiff herein claiming that the suit schedule property as his ancestral property and that in the family settlement, a portion of the suit house admeasuring 325 square yards has fallen to his share with municipal No.12- 1-922/2/D. After full length of the trial, the suit was dismissed on 28.08.1986. Though the suit property is mutated on to the name of the second plaintiff in the municipal records, there is no conflict of interest between the plaintiff Nos.1 and 2. During pendency of the suit, the second plaintiff died and the legal heirs are brought on record. When the defendant has tried to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs over the suit Page 3 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 schedule property, the plaintiffs have filed OS No.880 of 1981 on the file of the learned II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for mandatory injunction restraining the defendant not to obstruct the plaintiff from using the plaint schedule property. The suit was decreed on 18.02.1982.
4. Thus, the defendant having failed in all the legal proceedings in respect of suit schedule property, tried to interfere and occupy the same on 27.03.1987 and again on 05.05.1987 with the help of unsocial elements and dispossessed the plaintiff forcibly and occupied the same on 05.05.1987. The second plaintiff has also lodged a report with the police and a case in CC No.710 of 1987 for the offence punishable under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code was registered. The plaintiffs were in possession of the suit schedule property from 13.08.1975 i.e., from the date of purchase till 05.05.1987, hence prayed for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of the suit schedule property.
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5. The defendant resisted the suit, filed a detailed written statement alleging that parties are closely related and there was a financial requirement, as such the suit schedule property was mortgaged by the defendant's father in favour of the plaintiffs, borrowed the amount, as a security a nominal sale deed was executed for a consideration of Rs.1,000/- only. In fact, the suit schedule property was never parted by the defendant or his parents and it is in his possession only. He has let out the same to the tenants and collecting the rents. The filing of suit in O.S.No.4196 of 1980 has no bearing on the facts of the present case. Whereas, the suit filed by the plaintiffs in OS No.880 of 1981 was decreed ex parte. The defendant has no knowledge about the same. After full length trial, CC No.710 of 1987 ended in acquittal. The defendant is in possession of suit schedule property much before to the year 1975 and the suit is barred by limitation. Issues:
6. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following issues:
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1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of their title to the suit schedule property?
2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for possession of their suit schedule property?
3) Whether the sale deed in favour of first plaintiff dated 13.08.1975 is only a transaction of mortgage?
4) Whether suit is barred by time? and
5) To what relief?
Evidence and findings of the trial Court:
7. During trial on behalf of the plaintiffs, the plaintiff No.3 is examined as PW.1, Exs.A.1 to A.10 documents are marked. Originally, an ex parte decree was passed on 24.10.2005. Thereafter, the defendant has filed two applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and under Order-IX Rule-13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree by condoning the delay. But both the applications were dismissed by the trial Court. Against such orders, the defendant has preferred Civil Revision Petition, vide CRP No.5251 of 2006. This Court has dismissed the said civil Page 6 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 revision petition confirming the order dated 11.09.2006 in IA No.180 of 2006 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
8. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the defendant has preferred Civil Appeal No.4615 of 2007 before he Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein the ex parte decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs was set aside subject to the condition that the appellant/defendant shall deposit of Rs.25,000/- before the trial Court and the plaintiffs are entitled to withdraw the said amount, the defendant is not entitled to adduce any further evidence and he is only entitled to cross-examine PW.1, as such pursuant to the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the ex parte judgment and decree was set aside, an amount of Rs.25,000/- was paid by the defendant and PW.1 was cross-examined.
9. The trial Court upon hearing on both sides decreed the suit of the plaintiffs holding that they are entitled for declaration that the first plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule property and she is entitled for recovery of possession from the defendant and also directed the Page 7 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 defendant to put the first plaintiff in possession of the suit schedule property within one month from the date of decree, failing which the first plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession through process of law. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendant has filed this appeal.
10. Heard learned counsel for the appellant/ defendant and respondents/appellants. The submissions made on either side have received due consideration of this Court.
11. For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs and defendant as arrayed in OS no.311 of 1999 before the trial Court.
12. In the light of the rival contentions and the material available on record, the following points would arise for consideration:
i) Whether the plaintiff No.1 is entitled for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of the suit schedule property, as prayed for?; and Page 8 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008
ii) Whether the judgment impugned is sustainable?
Point Nos.(i) & (ii):
13. Since both the points are inter-related, to avoid repetition, for the sake of brevity and convenience, it is proposed to answer them together as under:
14. The plaintiff Nos.1 & 2 have filed the original suit for declaration of title alleging that the plaintiff No.1 has purchased the suit schedule property under the original of Ex.A.1 sale deed dated 13.08.1975 for a valuable consideration from parents of the defendant and they were in possession of the same till 05.05.1987 on which date the defendant has forcibly dispossessed them, hence the suit is filed for declaration of title and for recovery of possession.
15. The case of the defendant is that Ex.A.1 is a nominal document. Neither his parents nor himself have parted with the possession of the suit schedule property at any point of time, much less at the time of execution of Ex.A.1 and it is only executed as security for the amount of loan availed from the plaintiffs. Though he has filed OS Page 9 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 No.4196 of 1980 against the second plaintiff herein for perpetual injunction, that suit was dismissed on technical grounds stating that the claim made by him in respect of house bearing No.12-1-922/2/D is not established, whereas the suit schedule property is house bearing No.12- 1-922/2/A and that he is not aware of the judgment and decree in OS No.880 of 1981 against him.
16. During trial on behalf of the plaintiffs, the third plaintiff is examined as PW.1. He filed his evidence affidavit in lieu of the chief examination reiterating the plaint averments. In his evidence, Exs.A.1 to A.10 documents are marked. Pursuant to the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as stated supra, this witness is cross-examined on behalf of the defendant. In the cross-examination, he has stated that the Government has not acquired any portion of the property purchased by his mother for road widening and there is no mention of existence of two mulgies in the original of Ex.A.1. He admitted that as per the plan appended to Ex.A.1, two rooms are located towards southern end of the plaint schedule property, but these Page 10 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 rooms were demolished approximately after one year of the purchase. They did not obtain any permission for construction of rooms and the plaintiffs have not filed any document evidencing their possession over the suit schedule property between the years 1976-1993.
17. PW.1 has explained that he noticed a pooja mandir of Lord Shiva and he did not protest any constructions in the plaint schedule property, but they have filed execution petition for recovery of possession and denied the other suggestions given to him. The trial Court has answered issue Nos.1 and 3 together holding that the material on record would clearly indicate that the first plaintiff is the owner of suit schedule property and consequently, she is entitled for recovery of vacant possession from the defendant. While answering issue No.4 with regard to limitation, the trial Court has held that in the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the suit is barred by limitation and accordingly in view of findings on issue Nos.1, 3 and 4, the issue No.2 was Page 11 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 answered in favour of the plaintiffs holding that they are entitled for recovery of suit schedule property.
18. Be it stated that though the defendant has taken several pleas in his written statement, he failed to enter into the witness box to speak the averments of written statement on oath, thereby avoided cross- examination by other side, this by itself is sufficient to draw an adverse inference against him under Section 114
(g) of the Indian Evidence Act to hold that the defence set up by him is not correct (Vidhyadhar Vs. Manikrao and another1).
19. The learned counsel for the appellant/ defendant would submit that initially an ex parte decree was passed against the defendant though he has properly filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing an application under Order-9 Rule-13 of CPC, the trial Court has dismissed the same and that order was confirmed by this Court in the civil 1 AIR 1999 SC 1441 Page 12 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 revision petition. The defendant has carried the matter to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein he was only permitted to cross examine PW.1 with a specific condition that he is not entitled to adduce any evidence on his behalf, as such no evidence was adduced on behalf of defendant in the original suit and the presumption under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act could not be drawn against him.
20. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred by limitation. Ex.A.1 is a nominal document only executed as collateral security to ensure that the loan is promptly repaid, the plaintiffs have misused the said document. The burden is on the plaintiffs to establish their case irrespective of the fact whether the defendant failed to prove their case or not and in the present case, no such legally acceptable evidence adduced on behalf of plaintiffs and that the defendant under Section 92 of the Evidence Act by way of cross-examination of PW.1 in the form of oral evidence able to prove the real nature of the transaction Page 13 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 covered by Ex.A.1 and relied on the principles laid in the following decisions:
i) Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs Vs. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs2;
ii) Union of India and others Vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others3;
iii) North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur Vs. Bhagwan Das (D) by LRs4;
iv) Habeeb Khan and others Vs. Valasula Devi and others5;
21. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs would submit that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is well within the limitation; the defendant is not entitled to lead any evidence against the recitals in Ex.A.1, since the document was executed by his parents; he is bound by it and the suit is filed based on the title under Ex.A.1; and the plaintiffs are not supposed to prove their possession stating that they were in possession of suit schedule property within 12 years from the date of filing of the suit and relied on the principles laid in the following decisions: 2
AIR 2000 SC 426 3 (2014) 2 SCC 269 4 AIR 2008 SC 2139 5 AIR 1997 AP 53 Page 14 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008
i) Roop Kumar Vs. Mohan Thedani and others6;
and
ii) Mahendra C. Mehta and others Vs. Kousalya Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Hyderabad7;
22. In Ishwar Dass Jain's case (2nd supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the Section 92 of Indian Evidence Act held that oral evidence to prove that the document is sham, is admissible, in view of the plea taken by the defendant that mortgage deed was executed, though the real relationship between the parties is landlord and tenant and such mortgage was only executed as a collateral security to ensure vacation of leased premises by mortgagee, as such oral evidence is adduced to prove that the document is sham is admissible under Section 92 (1) of Evidence Act. In Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited's case (3rd supra), the Apex Court held that in a suit for declaration, burden is always on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such declaration and the weakness, if any of the case set up by 6 AIR 2003 SC 2418 7 2001 (5) ALD 102 Page 15 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 the defendant could not be a ground to grant the relief to the plaintiffs.
23. In North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur's case (4th supra), the Apex Court has held that as per the provisions of Order-41 Rule-27 of CPC the trial Court is entitled to receive additional evidence. In Habeeb Khan's case (5th supra) while interpreting Section 92 of Evidence Act, a learned single Judge of this Court held that the oral evidence to prove the real nature of the transaction is permissible under Section 92 of the Evidence Act.
24. Whereas, in Roop Kumar's case (6th supra), the Apex Court while dealing with the interpretation of Sections 91 and 92 of Evidence Act held in para-17 as under:
"It is likewise a general and most inflexible rule that wherever written instruments are appointed, either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them. This is a matter both of principle and policy. It is of principle because such instruments are in their own Page 16 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 nature and origin, entitled to a much higher degree of credit than parol evidence. It is of policy because it would be attended with great mischief if those instruments, upon which men's rights depended, were liable to be impeached by loose collateral evidence. (See Starkie on Evidence p. 648)".
25. In Mahendra C. Mehta's case (7th supra), a learned single Judge of this Court while dealing with Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act held in para-15 that in a suit based on title, plaintiff need not to prove that he was in possession of suit land within 12 years from the date of filing of the suit and that in accordance with the recommendations of the Law Commission of India, Article 65 of Limitation Act is enacted in respect of suits based on title. Therefore, when a suit is based on title, the plaintiff need not to prove that he was in possession of the land sought to be recovered within 12 years of the suit. Suits falling the Article 64 of the Limitation Act are based purely on previous possession of plaintiff and therefore, not covered by Article 65 because he is not claiming recovery of possession basing on his title.
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25. Reverting back to the facts of the case on hand, the specific case of the plaintiffs is that the plaintiff No.1 has purchased the suit schedule property through the original of Ex.A.1 on 13.08.1975, there is no conflict of interest between the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the property was mutated on to the name of the second plaintiff who died during pendency of the suit. The defendant was trying to dispossess the plaintiffs, having filed OS No.4196 of 1980 against the plaintiffs for perpetual injunction, the defendant has lost that suit, thereafter, the plaintiffs have filed OS No.880 of 1981 and obtained a decree on 18.02.1992 against the defendant and continued their possession till 05.05.1987. As pleaded and proved by the plaintiffs, the defendant dispossessed them on 05.05.1987 and occupied the suit schedule property.
26. Thus, the suit of the plaintiffs for declaration of title, recovery of possession is only based on title and not based on previous possession and dispossession. Therefore, the suit of the plaintiffs filed on 29.04.1999 is well within the limitation. The plaintiffs have obtained Page 18 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 decree in OS No.880 of 1991 restraining the defendant from interfering with their possession over the suit schedule property. Exs.A.8 and A.9 are certified copies of judgment and decree and they have attained finality. Equally, the defendant has filed a suit in OS No.4196 of 1980 for perpetual injunction against the plaintiffs alleging that in the family partition, a portion of the suit schedule property has fallen his share and that it is with municipal No.12-1-922/2/D, whereas the suit schedule property is with municipal No.12-1-922/1/A, accordingly, the suit was dismissed holding that the defendant herein who was the plaintiff in OS No.4196 of 1980 failed to establish the identity of the property with municipal No.12-1-922/2/D and that judgment also attained finality and no appeal is preferred.
27. The plaintiffs have filed municipal tax receipts as in Exs.A.3 to A.7 in respect of suit schedule property. Though PW.1 has answered that they did not resist the installation of Lord Shiva or construction of small pucca room which was in existence as mentioned in evidence, Page 19 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 that by itself is not sufficient to disbelieve the entire evidence of PW.1 in the given circumstances of the case.
28. The defendant is suffering the judgment and decree in OS No.4196 of 1980, in a suit filed by him against the plaintiff for perpetual injunction and he is also suffering a decree in OS No.880 of 1981 for mandatory injunction which was decreed against him on 18.02.1982 and that he is not at all diligent in prosecuting the litigation. In the present case also, initially, an ex parte decree was passed, but by virtue of the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court he is allowed to cross-examine PW.1 with a direction and he was not permitted to adduce any evidence on his behalf. Accordingly, PW.1 was cross- examined, but nothing worth mentioning is elicited in the entire cross-examination in support of defendant's case.
29. The plaintiff with their own evidence without depending on the weaknesses or otherwise of the defendant's case are able to establish that the plaintiff No.1 has purchased the suit schedule property under the original of Ex.A.1 and the plaintiffs were in possession from Page 20 of 21 AVR,J CCCA No.8 of 2008 the date of purchase till 05.05.1987 and it is not a sham or nominal document, the sale deed was executed for a valid consideration. Though the learned counsel for the defendant has taken a plea that the defendant is entitled to adduce evidence under Section 92 of Evidence Act to explain the real nature of suit document, no such evidence is available on record, thereby I hold that the principles laid in the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand.
30. Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, on overall consideration of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, submissions made on either side, I do not find any infirmity in the findings recorded by the trial Court, the judgment and decree impugned does not warrant any interference by this Court and it is sustained. Both the points are accordingly answered against the appellant/ defendant and in favour of respondents/plaintiffs.
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31. In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree dated 06.12.2007 in OS No.311 of 1999 on the file of the learned XXI Additional Chief Judge-cum-Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for the trial of Communal Offence Cases-cum-VII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Nampally, Hyderabad, in its entirety. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any pending in this appeal, shall stand closed.
_________________________________ A. VENKATESHWARA REDDY, J.
Date: 30.11.2022 Isn