Karnataka High Court
Karnataka State Road Transport ... vs Nagaraj Hatwar on 6 March, 2000
Equivalent citations: AIR2000KANT325, 2001(2)KARLJ209, AIR 2000 KARNATAKA 325, (2001) 2 CIVILCOURTC 478, (2001) 2 KANT LJ 209, (2001) 3 CURCC 119, (2001) 2 RENTLR 77, (2002) 3 RECCIVR 379
ORDER
1. Heard Mr. Govindaraj for the petitioner and Mr. B.L. Acharya, for the respondent.
2. By the impugned order the First Appellate Court has granted the injunction restraining the K.S.R.T.C. from disturbing the possession of the respondent who claims to be the licensee. The Trial Court however dismissed the application for injunction.
3. It is contended by the K.S.R.T.C. that once the licence comes to an end, the question of granting any injunction does not arise in favour of the licensee. In fact, the matter came to be considered by this Court in the two unreported revision petitions, i.e., C.R.P. No. 3077 of 1999, disposed of on 7-1-2000, my brother Justice Mohamed Anwar, considered the Standing Order No. 407 of 1994 applicable to the K.S.R.T.C., which is to the following effect:
"Obviously the expression of the words 'enhanced to 6 years' should be understood that the duration of the contract period of the commercial establishments of the Corporation hereafterwards would be for 6 years. In other words the licence for commercial establishments of the Corporation should not be granted for more than 6 years. After implementation of G.S.O. No. 407 of 1994 obviously it does not mean any contract concluded prior to the new G.S.O. will ipso facto stand enhanced to six years. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the period of licence is enhanced to 6 years has to be rejected for the reasons that no such interpretation can be placed to the said clause".
On the basis, he held as follows:
"In that view of the legal position, with respect to the said G.S.O. No. 407 of 1994, it can be safely stated that the plaintiff after expiry of the licence period happens to be unauthorised occupant of the suit restaurant belonging to the defendant Corporation, which is a public premises. Therefore, he cannot seek relief of temporary injunction with respect thereto as against the defendant which is the true owner of the Corporation".
4. This view was affirmed by my brother Justice Chandrashekaraiah in C.R.P. No. 4001 of 1999, disposed of on 24-1-2000. This is what Justice Chandrashekharaiah has held:
"Both the Courts have not considered whether the respondent-plaintiff being a licensee is entitled for an order of temporary injunction. Admittedly, the licence granted in favour of the respondent has expired. Further, the petitioner, under a licence has no right whatsoever in respect of the premises belonging to the petitioner. If that is so, so far as possession of the premises is concerned, the respondent-plaintiff has no right whatsoever. The learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision of this Court in ILR 1998 Kar. 1770 (sic). The said decision has been considered by this Court in W.P. No. 26808 of 1999 disposed of on 24-8-1999 and held that the resolution has no application in respect of a subsisting contract. In view of this decision, the petitioner cannot claim any extension on the basis of the said resolution since the licence that was granted in favour of the petitioner was prior to the date of the resolution of the Corporation".
5. So the position is clear that once the licence expires, the power of the licensee to continue in possession as his possession comes to an end. Such a person is in unlawful possession or in unauthorised occupation within the meaning of any Act for the time being, is not entitled to seek for injunction against his eviction or disturbance of possession. In fact, the Supreme Court has clarified that in respect of a licensee, the lawful way of taking possession is just to walk into the premises and take possession, as is always the case of a licensee, that possession and control of possession is kept with the licensor. A licensee is after all occupying the premises under the permission and control of the licensor. So the due process of law has also been interpreted as to mean that on the expiration of the licence, the licensor is entitled to occupy the premises and prevent the licensee from entering into the premises.
6. In this view, the impugned order is set aside and the revision petition is allowed.