Himachal Pradesh High Court
Takki Mohd vs Respondent on 22 May, 2015
Author: Sanjay Karol
Bench: Sanjay Karol, P. S. Rana
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
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Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 2009
Judgment Reserved on : 2.5.2015
Date of Decision : May 22 , 2015
Takki Mohd. ...Appellant
State of Himachal Pradesh
r to
Versus
...Respondent
Coram:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol, Judge.
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. S. Rana, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes. 1
For the appellant : Mr. Anoop Chitkara, Advocate for the appellant.
For the respondent : Mr. Ashok Chaudhary and Mr. V. S. Chauhan,
Addl. Advocate Generals and Mr. J. S. Guleria,
Asstt. A.G. for the respondent-State.
Sanjay Karol, J.
To a specific query put by the Court, a statement was made by learned Deputy Advocate General that neither Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 2any appeal stands filed, nor is one sought to be filed against the judgment of acquittal of co-accused Yusaf Ali.
.
2. Convict Takki Mohd., has assailed the judgment dated 22.12.2008, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sirmaur, District at Nahan, Himachal Pradesh, in Sessions Trial No. 13-N/7 of 2007, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Takki Mohd. & another, whereby he stands convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine of `15,000/- in relation to an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and in default thereof, to further undergo imprisonment for a period of one year. He has filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Both he and co-accused Yusaf Ali stand acquitted in relation to the charge under Section 120 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. It is the case of prosecution that co-accused Yusaf Ali, so acquitted by the trial Court, conspired with his brother-in-law Takki Mohd. (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) to commit murder of deceased Hussan Singh, husband of Sunita Devi (PW-1) and son of Gian Chand (PW-
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 32). Since Gian Chand had sold land for a sum of rupees one crore, Yusaf Ali who was working as his driver, sought rise in .
salary and an advance of rupees one lakh, which was refused. This being the motive, as part of conspiracy, on 27.3.2007, appellant went to the house of the deceased and around noon, took him on his motorcycle to a nearby jungle, where after consuming liquor, murdered him. Independent witness Mohan Singh (PW.3) noticed both the appellant and the deceased travel on the motorcycle. Independently, same day, SI Subhash Chand and Constable Rajeev Kumar (PW-17), who were on patrol duty, noticed the motorcycle parked at an isolated place on the road near the jungle.
Vinod Kumar (PW.10), a passerby, when queried by the police, expressed lack of knowledge about the ownership of the motorcycle. Hence police went into the jungle to search for the owner but could not find anyone. While they were returning, Vinod Kumar (PW.10), informed them that he heard ring of a mobile phone coming from a particular direction in the forest. Hence both the police officials went there and noticed a dead body. Ruka (Ext. PW-6/A) was immediately sent on the basis of which F.I.R. No. 57/2007 ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 4 (Ext. PW-20/A), dated 27.3.2007, was registered by LHC Krishna Devi (PW-20), at police station Sadar, Nahan.
.
Station House Officer Inspector Khazana Ram (PW-31) reached the spot and conducted necessary investigation.
Photographs were taken on the spot by Hukam Chand (PW-
13). Inquest reports (Ext.PW-9/B and PW-9/C) were prepared. While such proceedings were going on, co-
accused Yusaf Ali called the deceased on the mobile phone, which was attended to by Inspector Khazana Ram. By a common link, Gian Chand and Sunita Devi were called on the spot who identified the body to be that of Hussan Singh.
Personal belongings of the deceased were taken into possession by the police. Certain eatables found near the dead body were also recovered by the police. The dead body was sent for post mortem which was conducted by Dr. K.D. Bhatt (PW-9), who upon receipt of the report of the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Junga, issued Post Mortem Report (Ext. PW-9/D). The deceased died as a result of knife injury. On suspicion, appellant who was arrested on 28.3.2007 was got medically examined from Dr. A. Chaturvedi (PW-26) who opined the injuries found on the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 5 hand to be caused with a knife. On 30th March, 2007, appellant made a disclosure statement (Ext. PW-5/A) to the .
effect that both he and the deceased consumed liquor and that he could get the weapon of offence recovered.
Pursuant thereto, on 31.3.2007, police recovered knife (Ext.
P-2) in the presence of independent witness Inder Singh (PW-5). On 4.4.2007, appellant again made a disclosure statement (Ext. PW-7/A) and got identified the place from where he had purchased the eatables and liquor; the place where it was consumed and the place where he concealed the bottle (pint) (Ext. P-3) and the glasses (Ext.P-4 and P-5);
which he got recovered in the presence of independent witness Shiv Ram (PW-7). Police took into possession the same vide memo (Ext. PW-7/B). During interrogation, in the presence of Shiv Ram, accused also got recovered a motor cycle as also his blood stained clothes i.e. pants (Ext.
P-6), half sleeve sweater (Ext. P-7) and shirt (Ext. P-8), so kept in the dickey. Report of the Director, Finger Prints Bureau, Phillaur (Ext. PB) revealed the finger prints, lifted from the bottle (pint) and the glasses with the help of the tape, to be that of the appellant. Call records of mobile ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 6 numbers of the deceased, the appellant and co-accused Yusaf Ali, were obtained by the police. Investigation .
revealed complicity of both the accused in the alleged crime. Hence, challan was presented in the Court for trial.
4. Accused Takki Mohd. (appellant) was charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 120-B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, whereas, co-accused Yusaf Ali was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial.
5. In order to prove its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as thirty three witnesses and statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C. were also recorded, in which appellant took the following defence:
"I am innocent and I have been falsely implicated in this case. I was arrested on suspicion because on the relevant date I had visited the house of deceased and thereafter the police planted recoveries against me and prepared other documents in order to fasten guilt on me. The cut injury on my palm was sustained in the marriage while I was working ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 7 there. The abrasions were sustained on account of beating by the police on 27.3.2007 as I was .
brought by the police from the marriage on that day."
In defence he examined four witnesses.
6. Appreciating the material on record, including the testimonies of the witnesses, trial Court disbelieved the prosecution case in relation to an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 120-B IPC, but however convicted the present appellant for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 302 IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid. Hence, the present appeal.
7. We have heard Mr. Anoop Chitkara, learned counsel appearing for the convict as also Mr. V.S. Chauhan learned Addl. Advocate General ably assisted by Mr. Ashok Chaudhary, learned Addl. AG. and Mr. J. S. Guleria, Asstt.
A.G. on behalf of the State. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that the reasoning adopted by the trial Court is not only perverse but is also not based on correct and complete ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 8 appreciation of testimonies of the witnesses. Judgment in question is not based on legal evidence and other material .
placed on record, causing serious prejudice to the accused, also resulting into miscarriage of justice.
8. Mr. Anoop Chitkara, learned counsel for the appellant, while making the following submissions has taken us through the record. (1) Genesis of the prosecution case of conspiracy and motive stands falsified and disbelieved by the trial Court. Hence accused merits acquittal; (2) In the absence of any motive, prosecution version of appellant having committed the crime is also rendered to be extremely doubtful; (3) Prosecution version of disclosure statement(s) and recoveries of incriminating articles effected pursuant thereto, stand belied if not falsified from the record; (4) Prosecution has not been able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and (5) Defence taken by the appellant stands probablized through clear, cogent and convincing piece of evidence.
9. On the other hand, Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Addl. Advocate General while supporting the impugned judgment for the reasons set out therein has argued that (1) ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 9 Prosecution has been able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) Defective investigation by the .
investigating agency cannot be a ground for acquitting the appellant.
10. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and another Versus State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793, the apex Court, has held that:
".......Lord Russel delivering the judgment of the Board pointed out that there was "no indication in the Code of any limitation or rrestriction on the High Court in the exercise of its powers as an appellate Tribunal", that no distinction was drawn "between an appeal from an order of acquittal and an appeal from a conviction", and that "no limitation should be placed upon that power unless it be found expressly stated in the Code". .... ....
(Emphasis supplied)
11. The apex Court in Lal Mandi v. State of W.B., (1995) 3 SCC 603, has held that in an appeal against conviction, the appellate Court is duty bound to appreciate the evidence on record and if two views are possible on the appraisal of evidence, benefit of reasonable doubt has to be given to the accused.
12. It is not in dispute that there is no eye witness to the occurrence of the incident. Prosecution relies upon the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 10 following circumstances for establishing the guilt of the accused:
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1. Recovery of dead body of the deceased who died on account of shock and haemorrhage as a result of multiple injuries.
2. Appellant was last seen in the company of the deceased.
3. Motorcycle driven by the appellant was seen parked on the road near the spot of crime.
4. Disclosure statement(s) (Ext.PW-5/A & Ext.PW-
7/A) made by the appellant, which also led to the identification of place of occurrence of crime; place from where he purchased eatables; place where both he and the deceased consumed the same; place where he committed the crime; place where he concealed the bottle (pint) of liquor, glasses, weapon of offence and the motor cycle.
5. Recovery of incriminating articles including blood stained clothes of the appellant from the dickey of his motorcycle.
13. Before we deal with the factual matrix, with profit, we discuss the law on the point.
Law on Circumstantial Evidence:
14. In Bodhraj alias Bodha & others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2002) 8 SCC 45, Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India held that:-
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 11"9. Before analysing factual aspects it may be stated that for a crime to be proved it is not necessary that the crime must be seen to have been .
committed and must, in all circumstances be proved by direct ocular evidence by examining before the Court those persons who had seen its commission. The offence can be proved by circumstantial evidence also. The principal fact or factum probandum may be proved indirectly by means of certain inferences drawn from factum probans, that is, the evidentiary facts. To put it differently circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other facts which are so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken together they form a chain of circumstances from which the existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed. ................."
10. .........In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab [AIR 1954 SC 621], it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Also it is a settled proposition of law that when there is no direct evidence of crime, guilt of the accused can be proved by circumstantial evidence, but then the circumstances from which conclusion of guilt is to be drawn, should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature, to fully connect the accused with crime. All the links in the chain of circumstances, must be established beyond reasonable doubt, and the proved ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 12 circumstances should be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused, being totally inconsistent .
with his innocence. While appreciating the circumstantial evidence, Court must adopt a very cautious approach and great caution must be taken to evaluate the circumstantial evidence. [Also: Pudhu Raja and another Versus State Represented by Inspector of Police, (2012) 11 SCC 196;
Madhu Versus State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399; Dilip Singh Moti Singh versus State of Gujarat, (2010) 15 SCC 622;
Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172; Trimukh Maroti Kiran versus State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681; Mulakh Raj and others Versus Satish Kumar and others, (1992) 3 SCC 43; Ashok Kumar Chatterjee vs. State of M.P., 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 560;
Balwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1987) 1 SCC 1; State of U.P. vs. Sukhbasi, 1985 Supp. SCC 79; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Versus State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Earabhadrappa vs. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 SCC 330; Hukam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (1977) 2 SCC 99; and Eradu vs. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 316] ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 13
16. In Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406, Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India held that:-
.
"13. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that "may be" proved, and something that "will be proved". In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason that the mental distance between "may be"
and "must be" is quite large, and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between "may be" true and "must be"
true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between "may be" true and "must be" true, the court must maintain the vital distance between mere conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny, based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided, and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense. [Vide: Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343; State through CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, (2011) 3 SCC 109: AIR 2011 SC 1017; and Ramesh Harijan vs. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 777].
14. In Kali Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808: AIR 1973 SC 2773, this Court observed as under:
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 14"25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are .
possible on the evidence adduced in the case one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases where in the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence.""
17. Relying upon its earlier decision in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343, Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 509, again reiterated that:
"15. .... ... Each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. Even when there is no eye-witness to support the criminal charge, but prosecution has been able to establish the chain of circumstances which is complete leading to inference of guilt of accused and circumstances taken collectively are incapable of explanation on any reasonable hypothesis save of guilt sought to be proved, the accused may be convicted on the basis of such circumstantial evidence."
18. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Versus State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India held that:-
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 15"Moreover the prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength .
from the weakness of the defence. It is not the law that where there is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted by a court." ... ...
... ... "There is a vital difference between an incomplete chain of circumstances and a circumstance which, after the chain is complete, is added to it merely to reinforce the conclusion of the court."
19. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, we proceed to deal with each of the circumstances separately.
Circumstance No. 120. Recovery of dead body of the deceased from the jungle is not in dispute.
21. Dr. K. D. Bhatt (PW-9) who conducted the post mortem of the deceased and issued report (Ext. PW-9/D), found multiple incised wounds on the vital parts of the body of the deceased, which could have been caused with the weapon of offence i.e. Knife (Ext.P-2). According to the Doctor, multiple injuries resulting into shock and hemorrhage was the cause of death. Through the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 16 testimony of this witness, it is quite apparent that death, which was instantaneous, took place sometime during the .
day on 27.3.2007. The deceased had also consumed alcohol.
Circumstance No. 2Law on Last Seen Theory:
22. Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in Ravirala Laxmaiah vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 9 SCC 283, after taking note of its earlier decisions rendered in Nika Ram vs. State of H.P., (1972) 2 SCC 80; Ganeshlal vs. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106 and Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 reiterated the principle that where accused is last seen with the victim, it becomes his duty to explain the circumstances under which the victim died. It is a strong circumstance indicative of the fact that he is responsible for the crime.
23. Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in Dharam Deo Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 509 has further held that:-
"19. It is trite law that a conviction cannot be recorded against the accused merely on the ground that the accused was last seen with the deceased. In other words, a conviction cannot be based on the only circumstance of last seen together. The conduct ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 17 of the accused and the fact of last seen together plus other circumstances have to be looked into. Normally, last seen theory comes into play when the .
time gap, between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead, is so small that the possibility of any person other than the accused being the perpetrator of the crime becomes impossible. It will be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. However, if the prosecution, on the basis of reliable evidence, establishes that the missing person was seen in the company of the accused and was never seen thereafter, it is obligatory on the part of the accused to explain the circumstances in which the missing person and the accused parted company.
Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Sahadevan vs. State, (2003) 1 SCC 534."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. In Krishnan alias Ramasamy & others, vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2014 SC 2548; and Harivadan Babubhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat, (2013) 7 SCC 45, the principle stands reiterated.
25. Significantly, in Rohtash Kumar vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434, Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India has held that:-
"34. Thus, the doctrine of "last seen together" shifts the burden of proof on the accused, requiring him to explain how the incident had occurred. Failure on the part of the accused to furnish any explanation in this regard, would give rise to a very strong presumption against him."
(Emphasis supplied) ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 18
26. Thus, last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and .
deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased died or is found dead, is so small that possibility of any person, other than the accused, being the author of crime becomes impossible. The burden would immediately shift upon the accused.
27. Prosecution through the testimonies of Sunita Devi (PW-1) and Gian Chand (PW-2) wants the Court to believe that the appellant came to the house of the deceased and took him away on his motorcycle.
28. In court, initially Sunita Devi does state that on 27.3.2007 at 11.30 a.m. appellant came to her house in village Moginand, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmaur, on a motorcycle bearing No. HP-17A-0086. He had wanted the deceased to arrange for a party. After some time, her husband left with the appellant on his motorcycle. Same day, at 4.30 p.m., she also informed her father-in-law of such fact. She does state that both the appellant and the deceased were not only known to each other from before but were also on visiting terms. But then, she qualifies her ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 19 statement by deposing that the appellant went alone on his motorcycle towards the main road whereas the deceased .
went on foot, which version is so corroborated by Gian Chand. Significantly where did they go, remains unexplained by them. These witnesses do establish presence of the appellant in the house of the deceased, but as to whether deceased left with the appellant, on his motorcycle, to an undisclosed destination, cannot be said to have been established, with certainty, on record. It is not the case of the witnesses that the appellant coerced, threatened, intimidated or enticed the deceased to accompany him. Also what conversation took place between them is not so disclosed. Both left voluntarily to an undisclosed destination. So, in our considered view, the first link in the chain cannot be said to have been conclusively established.
29. Further, prosecution, through the testimony of Mohan Singh (PW-3), a close relative of the deceased, wants the court to believe that this witness, while travelling in a private truck, had also seen the deceased and the appellant travel on the very same motorcycle. This was around the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 20 same time when the appellant left the house of the deceased. Though in the earlier part of his testimony, .
witness clearly states such fact, but however later on contradicts himself rendering his earlier version to be not true. He admits himself to be a government servant, posted as a driver at Nahan, with the Civil Supplies Corporation. On the day of occurrence of the incident he admits to be on duty. His duty hours are between 10.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. It is not his case that either he was on leave or was required to travel for some official work. He does not disclose the purpose of his visit to Paonta Sahib, a place far off from Nahan. It is not that he had left Nahan on an official tour and that too in a private vehicle. We very much doubt the presence of this witness at the place where he allegedly noticed the appellant. He does not know the number of the truck or the name of the driver in which he travelled. Thus his presence on the spot, and having seen the appellant drive the motorcycle appears to be extremely doubtful. He does not remember the speed at which the motorcycle was being driven. All this may or may not be significant in rendering his testimony to be untrue. But what ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 21 is relevant is his admission to the effect that "The driver of the motor cycle was wearing helmet and so it was not .
possible to see his face to identify him" and that "It is correct that since the driver of the motor cycle was wearing helmet and so I had not identified him. It is correct that I have told today in the court that Taki Mohd. was driving the motor cycle at the instance of the police. I had not told to anybody that Hussan Singh was sitting on the motor cycle."
It is nobodies case that the police got conducted a test identification parade for the purpose of identifying the rider of the motorcycle. Hence this admission, also breaks the link in the chain of the circumstance of the deceased seen last together in the company of the appellant.
30. We are not unmindful of the fact that both Sunita Devi as also this witness do disclose the number of the motorcycle, but then evidently motorcycle is not registered in the name of the appellant. It is in the name of his wife.
Testimony of Rahish Ahmad (PW-30) and document (Ext.
PW-30/A) is clear to this effect.
31. Also prosecution failed to establish that after the appellant left the house of the deceased, motorcycle ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 22 remained in his possession or was being driven by him. Also police made no inquiries from the wife of the appellant. The .
circumstance cannot be said to have been proved.
Circumstance No.3
32. Through the testimonies of Vinod Kumar (PW-
10), Constable Rajeev Kumar (PW-17) and SI Subhash Chand (PW-6), prosecution wants the court to believe that the motorcycle of the appellant was seen parked on the road at a secluded place in the forest. This was on the road from Paonta Sahib to Kala Amb.
33. Vinod Kumar, working as a helper in the Military Engineering Services, posted at the Pump House, Judoo, states that at about 2.15 - 2.30 p.m. he went to the forest for easing out. Two police officials inquired about the ownership of a motorcycle bearing No. HP-17A-0086 so parked on the road. He expressed his ignorance.
Thereafter, these officials went towards the jungle, searching for the owner of the vehicle. Meanwhile he heard ring of a mobile phone, which fact he also informed them.
Later on he came to know that body of the deceased was found at the place from where mobile was ringing.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 2334. Version of this witness, to us, is uninspiring in confidence. His presence appears to be doubtful. He had .
no reason to be near the place where motorcycle was parked, for it is at a distance of 2 k.m. from his place of work. Why would a person travel this far only for the purpose of easing out and that too in a jungle area, remains unexplained. His explanation of owning land close by remains uncorroborated by any evidence. Crucially witness admits to have been called by the police to the police station on 6.4.2007, where his statement was recorded. He specifically does not state that the very same police officials had called him. The question which arises is as to how did the police reach out to him. It is not that police was aware of his identity or that he had disclosed his identity to the police. He was just a passer by. Then how is it that police was able to call him after a gap of more than 10 days. The witness had not seen the motorcycle on an earlier occasion and under normal circumstances, was not expected to have remembered its number. The possibility of the witness being introduced cannot be ruled out. Further what discredits the witness is his admission to the effect that "I ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 24 had not told to the said persons that I had seen motor cycle No. HP-17A-0086 parked on the road side or that the police .
had met me or that I had heard any sound of ring of the mobile phone". As such his testimony is of not much use to the prosecution. But the matter does not end here.
35. Constable Rajeev Kumar does state that on 27.3.2007, he along with SI Subhash Chand were on patrol duty in connection with a Motor Car Rally. At 3.30 p.m. they reached Khajurna Pull, and noticed a motor cycle bearing No. HP-17A-0086 parked on the side of the road. He saw a "Nepali" (he specifically does not name Vinod Kumar) who on inquiry, expressed lack of knowledge about the ownership of the motorcycle. On suspicion, police party went into the forest to search for the owner. While they were returning, the said "Nepali" informed that he had heard ring of a mobile phone and when they went in that direction, they saw a dead body of a male person lying in the forest. Ruka was immediately sent to the police station for registration of the F.I.R.
36. Version of this witness stands corroborated by SI-
Subhash Chand who further states that with the registration ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 25 of the F.I.R., SHO Khazana Ram arrived on the spot and conducted necessary investigation.
.
37. Now when we read the cross examination part of the testimonies of these police officials, on the point in discussion, we find that this "Nepali" had only disclosed the place of his employment. It is not the case of the prosecution that these police officials went to the place where the very same "Nepali" was working and got him identified. Crucially these witnesses admit that despite the fact that dead body was recovered shortly (within five minutes) after the "Nepali" informed them of a phone call, they did not call him. Why so? remains unexplained. In our considered view, in fact this "Nepali" was a prime suspect, for he was the last one to have been seen in the jungle, near the place where dead body was recovered. This "Nepali" was also not interrogated for more than 10 days.
Where all did the "Nepali" go for easing out? What all did he see there? For how much time he remained in the jungle?
Where did he go from there? What all did he take with himself? Why did he not go towards the place from where the sound of the call was coming? All these questions, which ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 26 remain unexplained, were required to be looked into by the investigating agency. After all, possibility of involvement of .
any other person had to be ruled out by the prosecution. Is it that the "Nepali" himself took away the motorcycle? Also who interrogated him? What all did he disclose to the police, remains unexplained on record. Significantly these witnesses do not state that when they went to the jungle, motorcycle was taken away by someone. Had it been so, they would have definitely got such fact recorded at the first instance. Unclaimed motorcycle, raising suspicion, prompting the police to search for its owner, would have only led the police to seizure of the vehicle. Which was not so done. This fact, as we shall see herein later, would acquire significance. Hence, we are of the considered view that even this circumstance, cannot be said to have been established by leading clear, cogent, consistent or reliable piece of evidence.
Circumstance No. 438. Prosecution through the testimonies of Inspector Khazana Ram (PW-31), SI - Chain Ram (PW-32), Inder Singh (PW-5) and Shiv Ram (PW-7) relies upon the circumstance of ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 27 disclosure statements (Ext. PW-5/A and Ext. PW-7/A) made by the appellant, which further led to the recovery of .
incriminating articles and identification of spot of crime and other places.
39. Inspector Khazana Ram does state that he conducted the necessary investigation on the spot. He prepared inquest reports (Ext. PW-9/B and Ext. PW-9/C); got the dead body identified from Gian Chand and Sunita Devi;
took into possession bathroom slipper (Ext. P-1) as also blood stained sample of soil and leaves and some eatables (grams and egg fry) found near the dead body. He further states that the appellant, who was arrested by him on 28.3.2007, made a disclosure statement (Ext. PW-5/A) on 30.3.2007 and also in the presence of Inder Singh (PW-5) led the police party and got identified the place (i) where both he and the deceased consumed liquor and (ii) concealed the knife (Ext. P-2). Also memos (Ext. PW-5/B and Ext.PW-5/D) were prepared.
40. Having perused the testimony of Inder Singh we express our doubt about the genuineness and legality of the disclosure statement and correctness of the version so ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 28 disclosed by Khajana Ram. Inder Singh admits the disclosure statement and the memos to have been recorded .
in the police station and that too only on their return from the Khajurna jungle. It is not the case of the Investigating Officer that the disclosure statement was oral or that the appellant of his own led the police to the place of crime, as such his statement could not be recorded on the spot. Now if the police was already aware of the places so identified by the appellant, then in law, disclosure statement loses its relevance and significance and cannot be relied upon by the prosecution. It is not a discovery of fact, pursuant to a disclosure statement. Crucially it has come in the testimony of Inder Singh that police did try to recover the weapon of offence on 30.3.2007 itself, but was prevented from doing so by the mob present on the spot. It appears that there was hue and cry with regard to false implication of the accused. Be that as it may, knife (Ext. P-2) kept on a shelf in the bathroom, was recovered on 31.3.2007 vide memo (Ext.
PW-5/D), as is evident from the testimony of Inder Singh.
We find that SI Chain Ram (PW-32) who took over the investigation of the case from Inspector Khazana Ram on ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 29 30.3.2007, was present at the time of recovery of weapon of offence. He is categorical that knife was not covered or .
kept in a concealed manner. Further it is an admitted case of the prosecution, as stands revealed through the ocular (PW-5 and PW-32) and documentary evidence, that knife so recovered was immediately sealed with seal impression-A. Undisputedly this parcel was neither opened nor tampered with. But when we examine the testimony of Gian Chand, father of the deceased, we find the circumstance of recovery of knife to have been totally contradicted and belied, also contradicting the testimonies of the witnesses, for according to him "police had shown me a knife in the police station". Now if the parcel in which knife was kept was sealed, then how is it that it was shown to the father of the deceased. All this renders the prosecution case to be doubtful, if not false and the circumstance not to have been proved, much less beyond reasonable doubt.
41. Another disclosure statement (Ext. PW-7/A) so recorded in the presence of Shiv Ram (PW-7) as also Babu Ram (PW-11) was made by the appellant on 4.4.2007, through which, prosecution wants the Court to believe that ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 30 the appellant got identified the spot (i) where he had concealed the bottle of liquor/glasses and (ii) the .
motorcycle. Independent witnesses who are close relatives/acquaintances of the deceased have deposed that the appellant first took the police party to the place from where he had purchased liquor and then got identified the spot where he had concealed the bottle and glasses. Memo (Ext. PW-7/B) was recorded. Appellant also took the police to the place where he concealed the motorcycle and got recovered his blood stained clothes from its dickey vide memo (Ext. PW-7/D).
42. We do not find testimonies of these witnesses or the prosecution case to be inspiring in confidence at all.
Sanjay Kumar (PW-8) from whom the accused allegedly purchased eatables has not supported the prosecution. It has come in the testimony of Gian Chand and Inspector Khazana Ram that on 27.3.2007 itself, police had searched entire Khajurna jungle and nothing was found there. Hence subsequent recovery is rendered to be doubtful. Constable Rajeev Kumar (PW-17) states that having seen the spot on 27.3.2007, he could make out that someone had consumed ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 31 alcohol. Then why did the police not interrogate the appellant on this aspect. It is not the case of the .
prosecution that despite interrogation, accused refused to co-operate or divulge information. The spot from where recovery was effected was not far off from the place of crime. On the issue, there is yet another mitigating circumstance in favour of the appellant, rendering the factum of disclosure statement (Ext. PW-7/A) and the recovery of glasses and bottle to be extremely doubtful.
Shiv Ram (PW-7) an independent witness states that "Takki Mohd. accused lifted the glasses and the pint of 8 PM. Again stated that the police had lifted the same and the accused had only shown the same. The glasses and the pint were lying together. The police had given the glasses and the pint in the hands of the accused Takki Mohd. so as to hold them. The entire documents were reduced into writing on the National Highway and my signatures on all the documents were taken on the National Highway. The police had not reduced into writing any document before proceeding to the forest from the spot, where we had been waiting for arrival of the police at Khajurna. The wooden box ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 32 in which the pint and glasses were sealed was called from Nahan through some person. He was some police man. It is .
correct that the pint and the wooden box are exactly of the same size. The pint was not sent by the police to Nahan for preparing the wooden box of its size." (Emphasis supplied)
43. Evidently impression of finger prints of the appellant, on the glasses and the bottle were obtained by the police by asking him to hold the same. But the matter does not end here. Still there is contradiction. SI Chain Ram states that the impression of finger prints on the pint were taken with the help of a tape. But then where is this tape?
It is not on record. Also report of the Director, Finger Print Bureau, Phillaur (Ext. PB) does not establish the prosecution case on this point. The manner in which finger prints were obtained and the bottle and glasses recovered, renders the prosecution case to be doubtful. How did the police know the exact dimensions of the bottle or the glasses? Is it that police was already aware of the same and thus got a box specifically prepared for keeping the articles in safe custody? There is no other evidence to link the appellant ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 33 with the same. Thus even this circumstance cannot be said to have been proved.
.
Circumstance No. 544. The next circumstance pertains to recovery of motorcycle and blood stained clothes of the accused found in its dickey. This is pursuant to disclosure statement (Ext.
PW-7/A) so made in the presence of Babu Ram and Shiv Lal.
It has come in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that the motorcycle was parked in an open courtyard. It was not kept in a covered/concealed manner. Between the time of arrest of the appellant on 28.3.2007 and recovery of the motorcycle on 4.4.2007, anyone could have seen the same. In view of our earlier discussion, the factum of recovery of motorcycle itself is rendered to be extremely doubtful, for it has not come on record that after committing murder it was only the accused who took away the motorcycle and concealed it in the house of his brother.
45. Shiv Lal categorically does not state that the clothes so recovered, belonged to the accused. Testimony of Babu Ram is also to similar effect. Now clothes i.e. Pants (Ext. P-6), Sweater (Ext. P-7), shirt (Ext. P-8) contained ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 34 blood stains, which as per report of the Forensic Science Laboratory (Ext.PW-33/A), was of Group-A. It is not that of .
the appellant. No blood of the accused was found on these clothes.
46. It is the positive case of the prosecution that while committing murder, accused also sustained knife injuries on his hand. Had it been so, some blood would have fallen on his clothes.
r There is no other evidence linking the appellant to these clothes. He was not made to wear the same. Clothes are also not of his size. In fact, the best person who could have testified such fact was Sunita Devi who incidentally is silent on this aspect. After all, just four hours prior to the occurrence of the incident, she had seen the appellant in her house. Whether or not he was wearing the very same clothes, she could have testified to such fact. Even this circumstance cannot be said to have been proved.
47. Appellant who was arrested on 28.3.2007, had already made a disclosure statement on 30.3.2007.
Possibility of being subjected to torture cannot be ruled out.
After all it has come on record that local residents were ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 35 enraged and had not allowed the police to enter his house.
Significantly police did not take any action against the .
villagers who prevented them from discharging their duties.
48. On 28.3.2007 police got the appellant medically examined from Dr. A. Chaturvedi (PW-26) who found the following injuries on his body:
"1. On left palmer surface of hand, just below little finger, there was clear cut, sutured wound/ situated size 2.7 C.M. regular colour dusky red, three sutured applied.
2. On left dorsum of hand multiple linear superficial abrasions present size 2 to 3 C.M. horizontally situated colour dusky red. No fresh bleeding present.
3. On right dorsum of hand multiple small superficial abrasion present colour dusky red/ situated no fresh bleeding size 1 to 1.5 C.M.
4. On nose three superficial abrasion, present size 1.25 C.M. colour dusky red/ situated no fresh bleeding.
5. On right temple/situated broad abrasion present size 3 cm. X 3 cm. colour dusky red."
49. Though no definite opinion could be given with regard to injury No. 1, but the Doctor did not rule out possibility of such injury, being caused by a knife in a scuffle. Significantly Doctor opined that injuries No. 2 to 5 ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 36 could be caused as a result of beatings. It is not the case of prosecution that there was a scuffle between the accused .
or the deceased. This itself raises doubt about the prosecution story. Prosecution, through the testimony of Vijay Pal (PW-4) has tried to establish that appellant got his wound stitched. However, his testimony cannot be said to be inspiring in confidence. He was only working in the clinic of Dr. H. K. Panth, a medical practitioner, not examined in Court. Also record of employment is not proved. Register pertaining to the treatment so administered by him is also not placed or proved on record. It is not that he was medically trained, experienced or authorized to treat the patients. In what capacity he administered such treatment remains unexplained. Whether he was working in the clinic as a peon, an attendant, or a compounder remains undisclosed. He also did not issue any prescription slip to the accused.
50. On the other hand we find that with an endeavour of probabilising his defence, appellant examined Dr. Satpal Verma (DW-1), a registered medical practitioner, who proved the wound to have been stitched on 27.3.2007 ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 37 at his clinic in Jagadhari. It has come on record through the testimony of Amit Kumar (DW-2) as also Iqbal (DW-3), which .
we see no reason to disbelieve, that the accused did attend the marriage ceremony of his cousin in village Amadalpur, Tehsil Jagadiri, District Yamunagar (Haryana) and while removing the tent, he sustained injury on his left hand. As per the prosecution, while inflicting injuries on the deceased, appellant also sustained injuries on his hand. Had it been so, and had the accused driven the motorcycle with a bleeding hand, then positively on the handle, blood stains would have been found. But none were there, for there is no such evidence proved on record by the prosecution. Such blood on the handle of the motorcycle could have linked the accused to the motorcycle. Absence thereof only goes in favour of the accused. Thus, defence so taken by the accused sands probabilised and not falsified.
51. Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in M.G. Agarwal vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 200, has held as under:
"18. There is another point of law which must be considered before dealing with the evidence in this case. The prosecution case against accused No. 1 ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 38 rests on circumstantial evidence. The main charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B is sought to be .
established by the alleged conduct of the conspirators and so far as accused No. 1 is concerned, that rests on circumstantial evidence alone. It is a well established rule in criminal jurisprudence that circumstantial evidence can be reasonably made the basis of an accused persons's conviction if it is of such a character that it is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is consistent only with his guilt. If the circumstances proved in the case are consistent either with the innocence of the accused or with his guilt, then the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. There is no doubt or dispute about this position. But in applying this principle, it is necessary to distinguish between facts which may be called primary or basis on the one hand and inference of facts to be drawn from them on the other. In regard to the proof of basic or primary facts, the Court has to judge the evidence in the ordinary way, and in the appreciation of evidence in respect of the proof of these basic or primary facts there is no scope for the application of the doctrine of benefit of doubt. The Court considers the evidence and decides whether that evidence proves a particular fact or not. When it is held that a certain fact is proved, the question arises whether that fact leads to the inference of guilt of the accused person or not, and in dealing with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt would apply and an inference of guilt can be ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 39 drawn only if the proved fact is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is consistent .
only with his guilt." ... ...
[Emphasis supplied]
52. It is also a settled principle of law that absence of motive, in a case of circumstantial evidence itself would not be a ground to acquit the accused, but however such fact has to be kept in mind, while appreciating the prosecution evidence for determining his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case co-accused stands acquitted so also appellant Takki Mohd. on the charge of conspiracy. Now if the link of conspiracy in the chain of circumstances stands snapped, prosecution version on a material fact is only rendered to be not true or proven on record.
53. In Balkar Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 2 SCC 746, Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India held that one alleged conspirator cannot be convicted if all co-
conspirators are acquitted. Under these circumstances, conspiracy would remain unestablished.
54. It is a settled principle of law that when allegedly several persons commit an offence in furtherance of common intention and all except one are acquitted, it is ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 40 open to the appellate court to find out, on reappraisal of evidence whether some of the accused persons stood .
wrongly acquitted, although it would not interfere with such acquittal in the absence of any appeal by the State Government. The effect of such finding is not to reverse the order of acquittal into one of conviction or visit the acquitted person with criminal liability. The finding is relevant only in invoking against the convicted person his constructive criminality. (See: Brathi alias Sukhdev Singh v.
State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 519).
55. No doubt in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. appellant admits to have visited the house of the deceased. He had wanted deceased to accompany him to the place of marriage. Since deceased refused, he left alone. His explanation is in the line of testimony of Sunita Devi and Gian Chand who have deposed that appellant alone left the house on a motorcycle and deceased only followed him on foot.
56. The Court below erred in ignoring the fact that police did not rule out the possibility of involvement of the ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 41 "Nepali", for he was the last to have been seen near the place where dead body was recovered.
.
57. Also who took the motorcycle away from the spot, despite presence of the police, remains unexplained and not considered by the trial Court. It is not the case of prosecution that accused was seen around the place of crime by anyone else. Testimony of Mohan Singh, is not worthy of credence.
r Vinod Kumar, Rajeev Kumar and
Subhash Chand are silent on this aspect. Also no
explanation as to why police did not seize the motorcycle lying idle on the road under suspicious circumstance, is forthcoming.
58. The Court erred in not correctly appreciating the testimonies of defence witnesses. No doubt in the photographs so proved by Amit Kumar (DW-2), accused is not there but nonetheless, testimony of Iqbal (DW-3), rendering presence of the accused in the wedding cannot be said to be false or uninspiring in confidence.
59. On the question of link evidence, court erred in holding that knife (Ext. P-2) was properly sealed and not tampered with by the investigating agency.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 4260. No doubt Doctor (PW-26) has opined that injury on the hand of the accused could have been caused by the .
knife (Ext.P-2), but then this fact itself would not be sufficient enough to convict the accused, more so, in the light of improbabilities and weak or missing link in the chain, which, as we have already discussed, stands snapped. Knife was not kept in a concealed manner. It was lying on the shelf inside the bath room and was clearly visible. Family members of the accused could have easily destroyed such evidence on 30.3.2007 itself.
61 As already discussed, prosecution has failed to link the accused with the clothes so recovered from the dickey of the motorcycle.
62. On the point of recovery of bottle of alcohol (pint) and glasses, findings returned by the trial Court, as is evident from para-84 of the judgment, are contradictory.
63. The tape with which finger prints were lifted from the tumblers and the pint is not proved as a fact on record.
64. We now proceed to consider certain decisions referred to on behalf of the State.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 4365. In the given facts and circumstances, ratio of law laid down by the apex Court in Ramesh & others vs. .
State of Rajasthan, (2011) 3 SCC 685, is misconceived. In the instant case very recovery of the incriminating articles, pursuant to disclosure statements, so made by the accused, itself is rendered to be doubtful, notwithstanding the fact that it was so effected from the very same place from where the body was recovered.
66. The case in hand is not of defective investigation. Prosecution has to establish, the circumstances, forming complete chain of events, pointing towards the guilt of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt, without their being any possibility of any other hypothesis.
Ratio of law laid down by the apex court in Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu vs. John David, (2011) 5 SCC 509 in the given facts and circumstances is thus inapplicable. So is the decision rendered in Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 11 SCC 111.
67. Reliance on Dharam Deo Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 509, so relied upon by the State is also distinguishable on facts. The Court was dealing ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 44 with a case where dead body was recovered from the house of the accused who was lastly seen in his company.
.
68. The apex Court in State of Karnataka vs. Suvarnamma & another, (2015) 1 SCC 323 has only reiterated that mere lapse on the part of the investigating agency would not be a ground to discard the overwhelming evidence establishing the prosecution case on record. Also false plea taken by the accused would be an additional circumstance which can be used against him, which is not the fact in fact.
69. It cannot be said that each and every incriminating circumstance stands clearly established by leading reliable and clinching piece of evidence. It also cannot be said that the circumstances, so proved form a chain of events, leading to the only irresistible conclusion drawing the guilt of the accused and no other hypothesis against such guilt is possible. The evidence collectively is incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis, save the guilt of the accused.
70. From the material placed on record, prosecution has failed to establish that the appellant is guilty of having ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 45 committed the offence. The circumstances cannot be said to have been proved by unbroken chain of unimpeachable .
testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The guilt of the appellant does not stand proved, beyond reasonable doubt, to the hilt. The chain of events do not stand conclusively established, leading only to one conclusion, i.e. guilt of the appellant. Circumstances when cumulatively considered do not fully establish completion of chain of events, indicating to the guilt of the appellant and no other hypothesis other than the same.
71. Thus, findings returned by the trial Court, convicting the appellant, cannot be said to be based on correct and complete appreciation of testimonies of prosecution witnesses. Such findings cannot be said to be on the basis of any clear, cogent, convincing, legal and material piece of evidence, leading to an irresistible conclusion of his guilt. Incorrect and incomplete appreciation thereof, has resulted into grave miscarriage of justice, inasmuch as he stands wrongly convicted for the charged offence.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP 4672. Hence, for all the aforesaid reasons, appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction and sentence, .
dated 22.12.2008, passed by Addl. Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 13-N/7 of 2007, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Takki Mohd. and another, is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charged offence. He be released from jail, if not required in any other case. Amount of fine, if deposited, be refunded to him. Release warrants be prepared accordingly.
Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.
(Sanjay Karol), Judge.
(P. S. Rana), Judge.
May 22 , 2015 (PK) ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 18:14:01 :::HCHP