Madras High Court
Annammal vs R. Narasimhan on 30 January, 1992
Equivalent citations: (1992)2MLJ22
ORDER Srinivasan, J.
1. This revision petition is directed against an order of the Registrar of Court of Small Causes, Madras, dismissing an application filed by the petitioner herein under Section 60 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, for discharging a distress warrant dated 13.9.1991 issued on an application filed by the respondent herein in Distress Application No. 113 of 1991. The necessary facts for deciding this revision petition are as follows:
2. The petitioner and the respondent entered in to an agreement on 25.2.1982 under which the respondent agreed to sell a flat allotted to him by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and situated in the First Floor in 5th Avenue, Anna Nagar, Madras-40, Under that agreement, the petitioner was to pay a sum of Rs. 1,75,000 as sale consideration and paid a sum of Rs. 40,000 by way of advance. The agreement fixed the time for payment of the balance in stages. Under Clause (11) of the Agreement it is provided that till the date of execution of the deed of sale by the respondent in favour of the petitioner, the petitioner will be treated as a tenant and she shall pay a monthly rent of Rs. 600 excluding the charges for amenities. On 14.7.1982, the respondent issued a receipt to the petitioner's daughter Mrs. K.V. Sudha for a sum of Rs. 2,000 stating that it represented the rental advance for June, July, August, September and October, 1982, for the said premises. It was also provided in the receipt that if the sale deed gets registered in favour of the petitioner herein before October, 1982, the respondent would return the rent for the period from the date of registration to October, 1982.
3. The petitioner filed C.S. No. 73 of 1983 on the file of the Original side of this Court for specific performance of the agreement for sale. One of the prayers in the plaint is for a declaration that the petitioner is not liable to pay any amount by way of rent to the respondent in respect of the said flat by way of rental on and from 7.10.1982. The respondent filed a suit in the City Civil Court, Madras, for recovery of possession with arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. That suit was transferred to the file of this Court and numbered as C.S. No. 487 of 1985. Both the suits were tried together and disposed of by a common judgment. A decree for specific performance was granted in. favour of the petitioner herein and she was directed to deposit the balance of sale consideration in a sum of Rs. 1,09,000 within 60 days from the date of the decree. The prayer of the petitioner for declaration that she is not liable to pay the rent on and from 7.10.1982 was negatived. It was held that the petitioner would be liable to pay rent as the relationship of landlord and tenant continued to exist till the execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. The other suit filed by the respondent was dismissed. The judgment was rendered on 9.4.1991.
4. It is not in dispute that during the pendency of the suits, orders were passed by this Court directing the petitioner herein to deposit a sum of Rs. 15,000 and deposit a sum of Rs. 600 every month from October, 1986 representing the rent for the building. Accordingly, the petitioner deposited the sum of Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 600 every month till April, 1991, when the suits were disposed of. Thus, a total sum of Rs. 48,000 was deposited by the petitioner. It is not in dispute that the amount had been withdrawn by the respondent as and when the deposits were made.
5. By the judgment, this Court decided that the rent payable by the petitioner was only Rs. 400 per mensem and not Rs. 600 as contended by the respondent. The court relied on the receipt issued by the respondent on 14.7.1982 to the petitioner's daughter to which I have made reference already. The court held that from 14.7.1982 the rent was reduced to Rs. 400 from Rs. 600 per mensem. The court also held that the petitioner having deposited at the rate of Rs. 600 per mensem in court was not liable to pay any amount by way of arrears of rent as the rent was only Rs. 400 per mensem as decided by it.
6. On 16.7.1991, the petitioner through her counsel sent a letter to the respondent to the effect that there was an over-payment of Rs. 7,600 and that the respondent was liable to refund the same. The letter made a reference to an application filed by the petitioner in court for an order to direct the respondent to refund the said amount. However, the letter added the following:
For the present assuming the rent is liable to be paid you are called upon to adjust a sum of Rs. 400 each month against the rent payable from April, 1991 from and out of the said sum. As you have stated that you have filed an appeal, this matter also can be placed before the Appellate Court. For the present it is stated that my client calls on you to adjust the rental payment as mentioned above.
7. It appears that there was a reply by the respondent on 19.7.1991 raising certain contentions. A rejoinder was issued by the petitioner's counsel on 23.7.1991 in which the particulars about the claim for the sum of Rs. 7,600 were given. The relevant portion of the rejoinder reads thus:
You have asked for particulars about the claim for a sum of Rs. 7,600. The following are the particulars. As per the order of court the payments were made in the following manner.
1986 September Rs. 15,000.00
October, 1986 to December, 1986 for 3 months. Rs. 1.800.00
January, 1987 to December, 1990 for 48 months. Rs. 28,000.00
January, 1991 to April, 1991 for 4 months. Rs. 2,400.00
Total Rs. 48,000.00
As per the judgment rendered
by the court the rent payable
is at Rs. 400 per month. Rs. 40,400.00
Balance Rs. 7,600.00
Once again, the respondent was called upon to adjust the amount as against the monthly rent payable, if any. No doubt a contention was put forward in the letters by the petitioner that she was not liable to pay rent after the judgment delivered by this Court.
8. The respondent issued a notice on 7.9.1991 to the petitioner that he will be taking distress proceedings against the petitioner as she has committed wilful default in payment of rental dues. After making a reference to a petition for eviction filed under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, which was pending as R.C.O.P. No. 2195 of 1986, the respondent stated that in obedience to the order of this Court the petitioner had remitted Rs. 600 every month into court but stopped remitting the same from April onwards. Hence, the petitioner was called upon to pay a sum of Rs. 3,000 being rent for 5 months at the rate of Rs. 600 per month from April, 1991 to August, 1991. The respondent added that if she failed to comply with the notice, distress proceedings will be taken against her. The notice bears the date 7th September, 1991. That day happens to be a Saturday. It is seen that the notice was sent by Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due. Hence the notice would have reached the petitioner at the earliest only on 9.9.1991 as 8.9.1991 happened to be a Sunday. The notice does not fix any time limit for payment of Rs. 3,000. The respondent filed Distress Application No. 113 of 1991 on 11.9.1991 without waiting for any reply from the petitioner. The application was ordered and distress warrant was issued on 13.9.1991. When it was taken to the petitioner by the bailiff, she gave a sum of Rs. 3,004.50 to the bailiff under protest'. The amount was deposited in court by the bailiff.
9. The petitioner filed M.P.Nos. 534 to 586 of 1991 for excusing the delay in filing the application for discharge of the distress warrant, for retention of the money recovered from her in court and for discharge of the distress warrant. The respondent filed M.P. No. 575 of 1991 for payment of the amount to him. The Registrar of the Court of Small Causes passed an order on 11.10.1991 dismissing the application for retention of the amount in court and the discharge of distress warrant by two separate orders. In the order dismissing the application for retention of the amount in court, the Registrar observed that the remedy of the petitioner is only to file a separate suit for recovery of the excess amount paid to the respondent even if there is any dispute as regards the rent payable for the premises. In the other order, the Registrar held that the liability of the petitioner to pay rent was not in dispute as this Court had held that the relationship of landlord and tenant continued till the execution of the sale deed. He also observed that no doubt this Court had referred to the rent as Rs. 400 per mensem; but, looking into all the circumstances, there was no justification for discharging the distress warrant". Consequently, the amount was paid out to the respondent by the court. Aggrieved by the order dismissing the application for discharge of the distress warrant, the petitioner has filed this revision petition.
10. It is argued that the Registrar of the Court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to dispose of the application filed by the petitioner under Section 60 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It is also argued that the rent having been found by this Court to be Rs. 400 per mensem, it is not open to the respondent to file an application for distress on the footing that the rent was Rs. 600 per mensem. Hence the issue of distress warrant was illegal and consequently, the warrant should be discharged and the application for the issue of warrant should be dismissed in toto. Thirdly it is contended that even assuming that there is a dispute between the petitioner and the respondent as to the quantum of rent, the Registrar had no jurisdiction in an application under Section 53 of the Act to decide the matter and on that ground, he ought to have rejected the application. Lastly it is argued that it is a malicious abuse of process of court by the respondent inasmuch as he had approached the court for the issue of distress warrant after the exchange of notices in July, 1991, referred to earlier.,
11. Per contra, it is contended by learned Counsel for the respondent that he has filed an appeal against the judgment in the suits and the decision of the court has not yet become final. According to learned Counsel for the respondent, the matter not having attained finality, he had been bona fide believing that he was entitled to claim rent at the agreed rate of Rs. 600 per mensem. It is also contended that, if an account is taken, the petitioner would be found liable to pay some more amount to the respondent and in those circumstances, there is no error in the issue of a distress warrant. It is further contended that this Court should not interfere with the issue of distress warrant in the interest of justice as the petitioner owes some more amount to the respondent.
12. In the course of arguments it was pointed out by learned Counsel for the petitioner that, pursuant to the decree in the suits, a sale deed has been executed by the court on 20.9.1991 in favour of the petitioner and that, even if she had been liable to pay rent to the respondent, that liability came to an end on 20.9.1991 as per the judgment. Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that his client was not aware of the execution of the sale deed and he was bona fide believing that he could file an application for the issue of a distress warrant. At any rate, according to him, the arrears claimed in the distress warrant related to the period ending with August, 1991 and the execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner would not affect the issue of the warrant.
13. Before considering the respective contentions of the parties, it is necessary to refer to the provisions in the Act. Section 53 of the Act is a special provision enabling a landlord to claim arrears of rent by a summary process and recover the same by the issue of a warrant under the circumstances set out in the section. The section reads thus:
Any person claiming to be entitled to arrears of rent of any house or premises to which this Chapter extends, or his duly constituted attorney, may apply to any Judge of the Small Cause Court, or to the Registrar of the Small Causes Court, for such warrant as is hereinafter mentioned.
The application shall be supported by an affidavit or affirmation to the effect of the form (marked A) in the third schedule hereto annexed.
Form A in the Third Schedule enjoins the applicant to affirm and state that the respondent in the application is justly indebted to the applicant in a particular sum for arrears of rent of the house and premises described therein relating to a particular period. It is clear on a bare perusal of the two provisions that the Act does not contemplate any dispute being brought before the Court of Small Causes for decision under the said provisions. The very basis of the provisions for application for distress warrant is that the liability is an admitted one. Unless the liability is undisputed, no application can be made under the section to the court by any person. When he states on oath in the affidavit or solemnly affirms that the amount is justly due to him, the enactment expects that he states the same truly and that there is no element of falsehood therein. Thus a person who swars to an affidavit under Section 53 of the Act that the respondent to the application is liable to pay a particular sum of money, it ought to be true for the purpose of maintaining the grant of relief to him.
14. No doubt the procedure prescribed does not warrant issue of notice at that time to the respondent and an enquiry. That again shows that the court acts on the statements made in the affidavit of the applicant and grants him relief initially without giving an opportunity to the respondent to contest the same. As and when the warrant is served on the respondent and he chooses to dispute the correctness of the statement contained in the affidavit filed by the appellant, the matter should be enquired into by the court only to find out whether there is an admitted liability or not.
15. Section 60 of the Act provides for an application to discharge or suspend the warrant. Under the section, the respondent is entitled to apply within 5 days from the seizure of the goods under the warrant to any Judge of the court to discharge or suspend the warrant or release the distrained article. The Judge is enabled to discharge or suspend the warrant upon such terms as he thinks fit.
16. There is a clear distinction between the provision in Section 53 and Section 60 of the Act. Under Section 53 of the Act, the application could be considered by either the Judge of the court or the Registrar of the court. But, under Section 60 it is only the Judge of the court who can dispose of the application. The Registrar has no jurisdiction to dispose of an application under Section 60. For the purpose of administrative convenience the application might be presented in the office of the Registrar but orders should be passed on the application only by a Judge of the court. The significant omission to empower the Registrar under Section 60 to dispose of the application should not be ignored and should never be forgotten. In this case, the Registrar of the Court of Small Causes has taken upon himself the responsibility of disposing of the application under Section 60 and dismissed the same on certain grounds. That order is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the Registrar. He ought not to have disposed of the application. He ought to have placed the matter before a Judge of the court who could have disposed of the same. On that ground itself, the order under revision deserves to be set aside. This proposition has been clearly laid down by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Balkrishna v. Mohd. Ikbal A.I.R. 1977 Guj. 160. The relevant passage in the judgment is found in paragraph 6 of the judgment which reads thus:
In our opinion, the Registrar has no jurisdiction to modify the distress warrant because the modification of a distress warrant presupposes a contest between the parties and determination by him. He has no jurisdiction to decide the contest between the parties. Rule 8(c) of the Ahmedabad Small Cause Court Rules, 1961 empowers the Registrar to hear and dispose of applications for issue of distress warrants made under Section 53 of the Act. No section empowers him to decide the contest between the parties with a view to modifying the distress warrant. So far as discharge of an illegal distress warrant is concerned it is governed by Section 60 of the Act. Now, Section 53 deals with an application for distress warrant and Section 54 deals with issue of distress warrant. Both these sections empower the Judge of a Small Cause Court or its Registrar to exercise powers thereunder. It is in that context that Section 8(c) of the Ahmedabad Small Cause Court Rules., 1961 has been made. When Rule 8(c) provides that "the Registrar shall have power to hear and dispose of...applications for issue of distress warrants" it only means that the Registrar can exercise power under Section 53 or Section 54 of the Act. It does not enable him to exercise power under Section 60 which requires an application to be made only to a Judge of the Court of Small Causes. In other words, whereas, Sections 53 and 54 confer power both on a Judge as well as the Registrar, Section 60 confers power only upon the Judge. Therefore, if an application for discharge of a distress warrant which the tenant alleges to be illegal or unlawful is to be made, it must be made to a Judge. That it should be made to a Judge and not to the Registrar is otherwise also in conformity with the principles governing administration of Justice by the Court of Small Causes which do not contemplate the decision or adjudication of a dispute or a defended action by the Registrar except where he has been expressly authorised to decide such actions. In the instant case, therefore, when the tenant made an application for discharging the distress warrant, it ought to have been tried and decided by a Judge and not by the Registrar. The Registrar was, therefore, in error in assuming the jurisdiction to decide it.
17. In Sadhanandham v. Leelavathy (1988) 1 L.W. 384, K.M. Natarajan, J., took the same view after referring to the Judgment of the Gujarat High Court. The learned Judge observed as follows:
The above conclusion has been reached in view of the opinion of the Division Bench that the Registrar has no jurisdiction to modify the distress Warrant, because the modification of distress warrant presupposes a contest between the parties and determination by him, and he has no jurisdiction to decide the contest between the parties. Further, no section empowers him to decide the contest between the parties with a view to modifying the distress warrant. Section 62 of the Small Cause Courts Act also refers only to a 'Judge' who is competent to award such compensation by way of damages to the applicant. It is no doubt true that a wrongful distraint is actionable at law.
18. I have no hesitation to hold that the Registrar of the Court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to dispose of the application filed by the petitioner herein under Section 60 of the Act. I have already referred to the fact that this Court held in the suits that the rent payable was only Rs. 400 per mensem from 14.1.1982. If the respondent was aggrieved thereby, the remedy was only to file an appeal and he has already filed an appeal. After the judgment was rendered by this Court, being fully aware of the same, it is not open to the respondent to approach the Court of Small Causes with an application under Section 53 for issue of distress warrant stating that the rent payable is Rs. 600 per mensem and on that basis claiming a sum of Rs. 3,000 for five months from the petitioner. The respondent has in his application under Section 53 referred to the result of the suit for specific performance. In fact he has relied on that part of the judgment whereby the contention of the petitioner that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant after 7.10.1982 was negatived. He makes an express reference to the declaration contained in the judgment that the relationship of landlord and tenant will continue till the execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. After doing so, the respondent proceeds to state that the rent payable by the petitioner is Rs. 600 per mensem and a sum of Rs. 3,000 is due for five months from April, 1991 to August, 1991. The respondent has also made a reference to the interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of the suit in pursuance of which amounts were deposited by the petitioner in court towards the rent. Significantly, there is no reference whatever in the application to the notices exchanged between the parties in July, 1991. I have already referred to the circumstances that in the two notices dated 16.7.1991 and 23.7.1991 the petitioner had clearly called upon the respondent to adjust the rent of Rs. 400 payable to him as against the sum of Rs. 7,600 which, according to the petitioner, was in the hands of the respondent representing excess payment. Even assuming that the respondent does not admit that there was an excess payment of Rs. 7,600 to him by the petitioner, it is only a matter in dispute and it is not open to the respondent to approach the Court of Small Causes as if there is an admitted liability to pay a sum of Rs. 3,000 for five months at the rate of Rs. 600 per mensem. Unless the liability is admitted and there is no dispute about the same, an application under Section 53 is not maintainable.
19. The respondent is certainly guilty of suppression of the relevant facts. He ought to have disclosed in the application under Section 53 of the Act, the exchange of notices in July, 1991. His failure to make a reference to the notices while applying for issue of distress warrant shows that he has abused the process of court. Particularly, when this Court had decided that the rent payable was only Rs. 400 per mensem, it was not open to the respondent to claim Rs. 600 per mensem in a court subordinate to this Court. In this connection, my attention is drawn to a passage in the common counter affidavit filed by the respondent in M.P.Nos. 584 to 586 of 1991. In paragraph 6 of the said counter, it is stated as follows:
Referring to the averments contained in para 4 of the Affidavit under reply, I humbly state that it is not for the High Court of Madras, to fix the rent at Rs. 400 while the actual rent that should be paid by the tenant is Rs. 600 and at no point of time, the High Court can clothe itself and reduce itself to the level of a Rent Control Court, which alone has got jurisdiction and competency to fix the rent in proper proceedings.
20. I have no doubt that the respondent is guilty of contempt of this Court when he signed the counter affidavit containing the above passage. I would have certainly initiated proceedings against him, but for the fact that he has been acting under legal advice and the real culprit is not himself but somebody else who has been misleading him by giving wrong advice. There is no necessity to point out that this Court did not fix fair rent or reduce the rent from the agreed rent. This Court found, as a fact, that the parties had agreed to a reduced rent from a particular date, i.e., from 14.7.1982. That conclusion was arrived at on the basis of the evidence on record and the same can be disturbed only by an appellate court and it cannot be canvassed before the Court of Small Causes. It is very unfortunate that such passages are put in the mouth of a client and the person who is really guilty of drafting the counter affidavit on those lines escapes punishment.
21. I do not agree with learned Counsel for the respondent that there is a bona fide dispute as to the quantum of rent inasmuch as he has filed an appeal against the judgment of this Court. The mere fact that he has filed an appeal will not enable him to go before a Subordinate Court and contend that the rent is Rs. 600 and not Rs. 400 as found by this Court. Even assuming that there is a dispute whether it is bona fide or mala fide, that itself is sufficient to throw out the application under Section 53 of the Act. When according to the respondent there is a dispute as to the quantum of rent, he ought not to have approached the Court of Small Causes for issue of distress warrant. His remedy was only to approach the Appellate Bench as suggested by the petitioner in her notices dated 16.7.1991 and 23.7.1991. Even if the contention of learned Counsel for the respondent that the petitioner is still liable to pay some amount to the respondent is correct, that will not enable the respondent to apply under Section 53 for issue of distress warrant. At my instance a statement of calculation is filed before me by the respondent. As per that statement, a sum of Rs. 1,266 is due by the petitioner to the respondent as on 20.9.1991. Even that statement shows that the claim for Rs. 3,000 in the distress warrant is unsustainable. It has been held repeatedly by our courts that distress warrants cannot be sought for anything other than admitted rent.
22. In S. Shankar Kumar v. Ramachandran 1979 T.L.N.J. 40, Chief Justice Ramaprasada Rao had occasion to consider the provisions of Section 53 of the Act. He held that the word 'rent' used in the section would not include 'amenities' The learned Judge observed as follows:
Rightly, therefore, an objection was taken by the petitioner-tenant that as Section 53 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act would only apply to a case for the application and issue of distraint warrant in cases where the entitlement of the claimant relates to arrears of rent simpliciter, and as in the present application, the respondent claimed such an issue of war-rant not only for rent in the popular sense but also for incidental charges also such as amenities etc., Section 53 of the Act cannot be invoked. The Small Cause Court Registrar held otherwise. Hence, these revision petitions.
I agree with Miss. Bakula appearing for the petitioner that this is a case in which law should be understood in its strictest sense as it is a peculiar provision available to the City in favour of the landlord and it should not be taken undue advantage of by the landlords if strictly the text and the intendment of the provision is not invokable in a given circumstances. Admittedly in this case, the distraint warrant is sought for from the Small Cause Court Registrar under Section 53 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act on the ground that the petitioner-tenant is not only in arrears of the rent but also charges for amenities. Such consolidation and integration of the claim is not provided for under the Act. The Act only speaks of an application for the issue of distress warrant for recovery of rent alone. If any other claim is included in it and a distress warrant is sought for even for such a consolidated amount which could not be recovered under the provisions of the said Act, as stated above, then it follows that such an application is not maintainable in law.
23. In Sadhanantham v. Leelavathy (1988) 1 L.W. 384, to which I have already made a reference, K.M. Natarajan, J., has reiterated the same position in the following words, It is clear from the above decision that if the court finds that the distress was levied for an excess amount, the only course open to the, court is to discharge the distress warrant in its entirety on the ground of illegality under Section 60 of the Act. Thus it is clear that the proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Act are suigeneris and are of the nature of an execution proceedings to recover arrears of rent on accepted facts. Further, under Chapter VIII of the Act, the court does not adjudicate upon the liability to pay rent nor on the question of rent payable. If these are disputed the court ceases to have jurisdiction over the matter.
24. Thus, there is no doubt whatever that the order passed by the Registrar, Court of Small Causes, is unsustainable. It is very strange that the Registrar who was provided with a copy of the judgment of this Court did not read the relevant parts thereof before passing order in question. When the petitioner had referred, in the affidavit filed in support of her applications, to the relevant portions of the judgment, the Registrar ought to have looked into the judgment himself and ascertained the correct position. In the order dismissing the application for discharge of the distress warrant be has chosen to state that this Court had referred to the rent as Rs. 400 at page 147 of Ex.P-1 (judgment of this Court). The last sentence that "on taking into account all the circumstances, there is no justification, for cancelling the distress warrant" is inexplicable. I am unable to follow the reasoning of the Registrar. Once he finds that the amount claimed in the application for issue of distress warrant is in excess of what the High Court has found as rent, he ought to have cancelled the warrant if he had jurisdiction to deal with the application under Section 60 of the Act. As pointed out earlier, he ought to have placed the matter before a Judge. But he has chosen to dispose of the application himself which he should have done at least in accordance with law on the subject. In the order passed by him, very curiously he states that the only remedy of the petitioner is to file a separate suit. That means, the Registrar accepts that what is collected by the respondent is in excess of what is due to him. If that is so, the Registrar should automatically have cancelled the warrant or discharged the same.
25. Learned Counsel for the respondent places reliance on the judgment in M.R. Nataraja Naicker v. Kamalammal I.L.R. 1958 Mad. 913. In that case, an application was filed by the learned under Section 41 of the act for eviction on the ground that the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent for two consecutive months which amounted to the breach of a condition in the lease deed executed by the tenant. A plea was raised by the tenant that the case of the landlord being based on alleged forfeiture of the lease, the court had no jurisdiction as the question involved related to title to immovable property and adjudication was barred by the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act. Justice Ramachandra Ayyar (as he then was), overruled the same and held that the termination of tenancy based upon the landlord taking advantage of the forfeiture clause came within Section 41 of the Act and the court had jurisdiction to decide the question. It was held that the fact that the defence raised the question of title to the property in that the tenancy had not been validly terminated did not oust the jurisdiction of the court which was bound to decide the question under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act.
26. That judgment has no relevance whatever to the present case. I am unable to appreciate how it helps the respondent herein. What is stated above is sufficient to set aside the order passed by the Registrar of Court of Small Causes. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed with costs and the order of the Registrar of Court of Small Causes, Madras, is set aside. The Distress Warrant issued in Distress No. 113 of 1991 is discharged. The natural consequence will be for the respondent to deposit the amount realised by him in court. Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent would deposit the money in six weeks. Hence, the respondent is granted six weeks time for depositing the amount in the Court of Small Causes, Madras. Counsel's fee Rs. 750.
27. Before parting with the case it is necessary for me to make the following observations regarding the procedure which should be followed in the Court of Small Causes, Madras, in disposing of applications under Section 60 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. The judgment in Sadhanantham v. Leelavathy (1988) 1 L.W. 384, was delivered on 10th September, 1987 and reported in the Law Weekly dated 9th and 16th April, 1988. Inspite of that, as late as in October, 1991, the Registrar of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, has chosen to decide an application under Section 60 of the Act. If the procedure which is now followed in the Court of Small Causes is for the Registrar of that court to dispose of applications under Section 60 of the Act, it is clearly illegal. He has no jurisdiction to decide those applications. The section refers only to the Judge of the court and the Registrar is nowhere in the picture. Hence, the Chief Judge of Court of Small Causes is directed hereby to see that the applications under Sections 60 and 62 of the Act shall be posted before a Judge of the Court and be decided only by such Judge. They shall not, in any event, be disposed of by the Registrar.