Central Administrative Tribunal - Allahabad
Satyapal Singh S/O Sri Ganga Singh R/O ... vs Director General on 30 August, 2013
Reserved on 05.08.2013
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ALLAHABAD BENCH,
ALLAHABAD
Execution Application No. 01 of 2013 in
Original Application No. 1111 of 2000
Allahabad this the, _30th day of August, 2013
Honble Mr. Justice S.S. Tiwari, Sr. J.M./HOD
Honble Ms. Jayati Chandra, Member (A)
1. Satyapal Singh s/o Sri Ganga Singh r/o Village and Post Mandure, Aonla, Distt. Bareilly (U.P.) presently working as Casual Personal C.P. Chowkidar with Temporary Status in Sub Post Office, Aonia, District Bareilly.
2. Sushil Kumar s/o Sri Ram Bharosey r/o H. No. 910 Bakarganj, Balmiki Basti, Bareilly, presently working as a Safai Wala in S.S.P. Office, Head Post Office, Bareilly, U.P. with temporary status.
3. Madan Singh Bisht s/o Late _____ r/o 505 Marinath, Bareilly, U.P. presently working as Gateman in the office of Superintendent of Post Stores Deptt. Rampur Bagh, Bareilly, U.P. with temporary status.
4. Prabhu Dayal s/o Shri Bhoop Ram r/o Village Doharia P.O. B.K. University, Bareilly, presently working as Care Taker with Temporary status.
5. Purkan Ahmad s/o Late Sri Maula Bux r/o H. No. 268, Chare Cheikh Mithoa, Bareilly, presently working as Pump Operator, Postal Colony, Bareilly with temporary status.
6. Chet Ram s/o Shri Bhurri Lal r/o Subhash Nagar, Bareilly, presently working as Night Chowkidar in the CGHS Dispensary Choupla Exchange, Bareilly with temporary status.
7. Daulat Ram, s/o Shri Tika Ram r/o Q. No. 9, Second Floor, Type- I, P&T Choupla Colony, Choupla, Bareilly, presently working as a Plumber in the Office of SSP Head Post Office, Bareilly Cantt.
8. Madan Singh s/o Shri Kharag Singh r/o P&T Colony, Q. No. 10, Second Floor, Type I, Choupla, Bareilly, presently working as a Nigh Chowkidar, SSP Office, head Post Office, Bareilly, U.P. with temporary status.
9. Rai Bahadur s/o Chhideo Singh C/o Sri Lakhan Ram (Lekhpal), Nekpar, presently working as a (Farrash), in the office of the PMO Civil Lines, bareilly, U.P. with temporary status.
10. Subhash Singh s/o Shri Poom Singh, r/o Village Banjaria, P.O. Sheiat Khan Baheri District Bareilly (U.P.), presently working as a Chawkidar Post Office Baheri, District Bareilly, U.P. with temporary status.
11. Hari Om s/o Shri Raghunath Prasad Sharma, r/o H. No. B-35, Ashok Vihar, P.O. Izatnagar, Chowkidar in Head Post Office, Bareilly with temporary status.
Applicants
By Advocate: Sri R.C. Pathak
Versus
1. Director General, Directorate of Director General, Department of Post, Ministry of Communication, Govt. of India, Dak Bhavan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi.
2. Chief Postmaster General, Department of Post, Govt. of India, U.P. Circle, Lucknow.
3. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Bareilly Division, Head Post Office, U.P.
Respondents
By Advocates: Sri Saurabh Srivastava
Sri Raghvendra Pratap Singh
O R D E R
By Honble Mr. Justice S.S. Tiwari, Sr. J.M./H.O.D. This Civil Misc. Execution Application has been filed by the applicants under Sections 22, 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 read with Rule 24 of the C.A.T. (Procedure) Rules, 1987 and Order 21 Rules 10, 11 (2) 22 of the C.P.C. for a direction to the respondents to execute the Tribunals Order dated 21.03.2001 passed in O.A. No. 1111/2000 Satyapal Singh and 10 others Vs. Union of India and others or, to issue summon to the respondents/Judgment debtors for attachment of their salary and allowances, who are found responsible for not executing the aforesaid Order.
2. The brief facts may be mentioned as follows: -
The applicants (11 in number) filed O.A. No. 1111 of 2000 for quashing the order dated 19.09.2000 by which they were denied the productivity linked bonus at par with Group D employees of the Postal department. O.A. No. 1111/2000 was decided by this Tribunal on 21st March 2001, in favour of the applicants, quashing the order dated 19.09.2000 for non-payment of bonus to the applicants at par with Group D employees. The respondents filed Writ Petition No. 21577 of 2001 before the Honble High Court, which was registered as Union of India and others vs. C.A.T. and others against the Order dated 21.03.2001. The Writ Petition was dismissed on 09.05.2007 with a direction to the respondents (petitioners in Writ Petition) to pay the bonus to the applicants (respondents in the Writ Petition) at par with Group D employees of the Postal department. The respondents i.e. Union of India filed S.L.P. No. CC 4934 of 2008 before the Honble Apex Court, which was registered as Union of India and others vs. Satyapal Singh and others. The said S.L.P. was also dismissed on 07.04.2008. The applicants filed the Contempt Petition No. 164 of 2007 before this Tribunal against the respondents for non-compliance of the Order passed by this Tribunal on 21.03.2001, and the Contempt Petition was decided on 21.10.2011. The Contempt notice was discharged and the Contempt Petition was dismissed on the ground of full compliance. (According to the applicants, the Contempt Petition was wrongly got dismissed on the misrepresentation and misleading facts presented before the Tribunal by the contemnors. As per the Supreme Court decision, if any order is obtained fraudulently, same is void and nullity in the eye of law.). The applicants filed Recall Application of Contempt Petition No. 164/2007, which was referred to Full Bench and the Full Bench has dismissed the Recall Application on 11.06.2013.
3. Since the respondents, despite specific directions by the hierarchy of the Courts for giving bonus to the applicants who have attained temporary status at par with Group D employees, is not being complied with, this Execution Application has been filed.
4. The respondents have filed the Objection against the Execution Application stating that full compliance of the Order of the Tribunal has already been made by them, and the bonus has already been paid to the applicants at par with the Group D employees. The applicants had filed the Contempt Petition before this Tribunal bearing Contempt Petition No. 164/2007 which on the basis of full compliance of the Order dated 21.03.2001 was dismissed on 21.10.2011. Even the Recall Application, filed by the petitioners (applicants) was also dismissed on 11.06.2013. During the pendency of Recall Application, extant Execution Application has been filed by the applicants. This Execution Application is not maintainable on the ground of delay as it has been filed after about 12 years of the Order passed in the O.A. and there is no application for condonation of delay, filed by the applicants. The respondents against whom this Execution Application has been filed, they have already superannuated way back in the year 2009. The Execution Application is liable to be dismissed.
5. Counter Affidavit, Rejoinder Affidavit, Supplementary C.A., Objection and Reply have been exchanged between the parties. Learned counsel for the applicants has also submitted the Written Arguments, which is taken on record.
6. Learned counsel for the applicants has argued that this Execution Application is not barred by limitation as according to him there is no period of limitation prescribed under the Administrative Tribunals Act for filing Execution Application. He has also submitted that it is not open to this Bench to look into the genuineness or otherwise of the Order in question, as it has to execute the Order as it is. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the observation made by the Honble Supreme Court, in the case of Food Corporation of India vs. S.N. Nagarkar 2002 SCC (L&S) 312 in which it has been observed by the Honble Supreme Court that the Court cannot examine the correctness of the Order sought to be executed after attaining finality. With all respect to the above decision, the question of correctness of the Order sought to be executed is not in issue here nor its correctness is being examined. Hence, the applicant cannot get any benefit of this case law.
7. Learned counsel for the applicants in support of his contention that the extant Execution Application is not barred by limitation, has submitted that since there is no period of limitation, prescribed under the Act for filing the Execution Application, the objection raised by the respondents counsel has got no force. Execution Application under this Act can be filed at any time. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the case of Uttam Namdeo Mahale Vs. Vithal Deo and others (1997) 6 Supreme Court Cases 73, in which the Honble Supreme Court has observed as follows: -
It is seen that the order of ejectment against the applicant has become final. Section 21 of the Mamlatdars Court Act does not prescribe any limitation within which the order needs to be executed. In the absence of any specific limitation provided thereunder, necessary implication is that the general law of limitation provided in the Limitation Act (Act 2 of 1963) stands excluded. The Division Bench, therefore, has rightly held that no limitation has been prescribed and it can be executed at any time, especially when the law of limitation for the purpose of this appeal is not there. Where there is statutory rule operating in the field, the implied power of exercise of the right within reasonable limitation does not arise. The cited decisions deal with that area and bear no relevance to the facts.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that there is a specific provision of limitation under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and this Execution Application has admittedly been filed after about 12 years of the Order passed by the Tribunal without any application for condonation of delay. Hence, this Execution Application is barred by period of limitation.
9. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of learned counsel for both the parties, on the point of limitation, a perusal of the provisions contained under Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is necessary, which reads as follows: -
27. Execution of orders of a Tribunal Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, [the order of a Tribunal finally disposing of an application or an appeal shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court (including a High Court) and such order] shall be executed in the same manner in which any final order of the nature referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2) or section 20 (whether or not such final order had actually been made) in respect of the grievance to which the application relates would have been executed.
Similarly, relevant part to the sub section (2) of Section 20 of the Act provides as follows: -
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances, -
(a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or, officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance . . . . Section 21 of the Act prescribes limitation. Sub section (1) (a) of this Section provides as follows: -
(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the observation made by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Hukam Raj Khinvsara Vs. Union of India and others (1997) 4 Supreme Court Cases 284. The Honble Supreme Court has observed in the aforesaid case, on the point of limitation, as follows: -
Thus it could be seen that the final order passed by the Tribunal is executable under Section 27 of the Act within one year from the date of its becoming final. Admittedly, the final order was passed on 13-3-1992. Consequently, the appellant was required to file the execution application within one year from the said date unless the order of the Tribunal was suspended by this Court in a special leave petition/appeal which is not the case herein. Admittedly, the application came to be filed by the appellant on 13-12-1994 which is well beyond one year. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the application was barred by limitation.
10. In the light of observations made by the Honble Supreme Court, when we examine the present Execution Application under consideration, we find that the final order in the O.A. was passed on 21.03.2001 and the present Execution Application has been filed on 06.01.2013. It is also an admitted fact that no application for condonation of delay has been filed along with this Execution Application. Thus, apparently this Execution Application is barred by period of limitation, as prescribed, under the Administrative Tribunals Act. Learned counsel for the applicants could not show anything on record to prove that they had filed any Writ Petition before the Honble High Court or any Appeal before the Honble Supreme Court. If for the sake of argument, it is said that the Writ Petition, filed by the respondents, before the Honble High Court and thereafter the SLP filed before the Honble Supreme Court was pending, even then it is apparent on record that the SLP filed before the Honble Supreme Court was dismissed on 07.04.2008. Even from that date i.e. 07.04.2008, the present Execution Application is beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
11. In view of the above discussion, we find that this Execution Application is barred by period of limitation and accordingly it is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Member A Member J
/M.M/
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