Allahabad High Court
Ramesh Chandra And Others vs State Of U.P. And Others on 24 February, 2020
Bench: Sudhir Agarwal, Rajeev Misra
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Court No. - 34 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 56660 of 2011 Petitioner :- Ramesh Chandra And Others Respondent :- State of U.P. and Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shashindra Tripathi,Dharm Vir Singh,Shekhar Srivastav,V.D.Dubey Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C., Suresh C. Dwivedi Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.
Hon'ble Rajeev Misra,J.
1. Heard Sri Dharm Vir Singh, learned counsel for petitioners and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Surech Chand Dwivedi, Advocate for Respondents-2 to 4.
2. This is an old writ petition of 2011 and despite repeated request learned counsel for petitioners did not advance any argument and in these circumstances we ourselves have gone through the writ petition.
3. Petitioners are all Secretaries in various Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samities in State of U.P. A writ of mandamus has been prayed by petitioners to seek parity in condition of employment, in particular pay scale of Secretaries of all Mandi Samities working under U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, irrespective of size, quantum of transaction and other business carried out in such Samities. It is stated that various Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samities established in State of U.P. have been categorised in four categories, i.e., A Class Mandi Samities, B Class Mandi Samities, C Class Mandi Samities and D Class Mandi Samities. Secretaries posted in said Mandi Samities have been categorized according to aforesaid categories of Mandi Samities, i.e., Secretaries Grade-I, II, III and IV. Secretaries Grade IV are liable to be posted in D Class Mandi Samities, Secretaries Grade III are liable to be posted in Grade C Mandi Samities and so on.
4. The basic contention of petitioners is that duties, responsibilities and work performed by said Secretaries are similar, therefore, they are entitled to be treated at par and should be given a common and same pay scale applying the principle of "equal pay for equal work" and on the basis of categorization of Mandis no further classification should be made in respect of categories of Secretaries and there should be no difference in pay scales.
5. Petitioners have also challenged validity of Regulation 4 of U.P. Agricultural Produce Market Committees (Centralized Service) Regulations, 1984 (hereinafter referred to "Regulations, 1984") as ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 16 and doctrine of "equal pay for equal work".
6. The record shows that earlier one, Shahzade, came to this Court in Writ Petition No. 2742 of 2000 claiming that he was entitled for highest pay scale admissible to the post of Secretary on the principle of "equal pay for equal work" and prayed for a mandamus to respondents to grant the same. Vide judgment dated 27.02.2000 writ petition was decided requiring Chairman, U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad (hereinafter referred to as "Chairman, UPRKUMP") to decide his representation. Representation was rejected by Chairman vide order dated 22.05.2001. Same was challenged by Sri Shahzade, a Secretary in Mandi Samiti, in Writ Petition No. 30319 of 2001 which was decided vide judgment dated 23.04.2002. It was allowed. On behalf of U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad (hereinafter referred to as "UPRKUMP") a review petition was filed but the same was also dismissed vide judgment dated 23.05.2003. UPRKUMP brought the matter to Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 5289-5290 of 2004 (Chairman, Rajay Krishi Utpadan Nandi Parishad and others vs. Shahjade) which were allowed vide judgment dated 03.05.2011 and judgment of this Court was set aside. The judgment of Supreme Court dated 03.05.2011 reads as under:
"These appeals are directed against orders dated 23.04.2002 and 23.05.2003 passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 30319 of 2001 and Civil Miscellaneous Review Petition No. 104056 of 2002 whereby the High Court directed the appellants to fix the pay of the respondent in the scale of Rs. 2000-3000 with effect from 1.1.1986 with consequential benefits and dismissed the review petition filed by the appellants.
Respondent No. 3, who was then holding the post of Secretary Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samit, Baberu (Banda) filed Writ Petition No. 2742/2000 for issue of a direction to the functionaries of Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, Uttar Pradesh (for short, "the Parshad") to fix his pay in the higher scale of pay. The same was disposed of by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court with a direction that the concerned authority shall decide the representation.
In compliance of the direction given by the High Court, Director of the Prishad passed detained order dated 22.5.2001 and rejected the respondent's claim for fixation of his pay in the scale of Rs. 3,000-4,500.
The respondent challenged the aforesaid order in Writ Petition No. 30319/2001, which was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court in the manner indicated hereinabove. The appellants sought review of order dated 23.04.2002 but could not persuade the High Court to entertain the same.
We have heard Smt. Shobha Dikshit, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants and Shri S.R. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent.
If is not in dispute that the conditions of service of the persons holding the posts of Secretaries are governed by the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Produce Market Committees (Centralised) Service Regulations, 1984 (for short, "the Regulations").
Regulation 4 thereof, insofar as it relevant for deciding these appeals reads as under:
"4. Creation of Centralized Service-With effect from the commencement of these regulations there shall be a centralized service for the market Committes consisting of the cadres and posts given below:
1. Secretaries-
(a) Secretaries, Class-I
(b) Secretaries, Class-II
(c) Secretaries, Class III, Grade-I
(d) Secretaries, Class III, Grade-II
(e) Secretaries, Class III, Grade-III."
A glance at the above reproduced Regulation makes it clear that there are different classes and grades of Secretaries of the Market Committees. The High Court did not strike down classification of the cadre of Secretaries and yet directed the appellants to fix the respondent's pay in the higher scale. This, in our considered view, was legally impermissible.
Learned counsel for the respondent fairly states that without striking down Regulation 4, the High Court could not have ordained fixing of his client's pay in the higher scale.
In view of the above, the appeals are allowed, the impugned orders are set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal of the writ petition.
It will be open to the respondent to seek amendment of the writ petition for the purpose of challenging the vires of Regulation 4 and other related provisions. If such an application is filed, the High Court shall decide the same after giving notice to the appellants." (emphasis added)
7. We are informed by learned counsel for respondents that above Writ Petition No. 30319 of 2001 has ultimately been decided by this Court by a detailed judgment dated 22.01.2014. This Court has repelled challenge to vires of Regulation 4 of Regulations, 1984.
8. It appears that petitioners of this writ petition, also came to this Court earlier in Writ Petition No. 3369 of 2004 wherein present petitioners were arrayed as Petitioners-2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. They also challenged validity of Regulation 4 of Regulations, 1984 as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution on the ground of equal pay for equal work. A Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 24.05.2006 considered the matter in detail and dismissed writ petition vide judgment dated 24.05.2006. These very petitioners filed appeal in Supreme Court, i.e., Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 18674 of 2006 which also appears to have been heard by Supreme Court on 03.05.2011 alongwith Civil Appeal No. 5289-5290 of 2004 and appeal of present petitioners was allowed to be withdrawn but with further observing that petitioners may file a fresh writ petition and the same shall be decided without being influenced by the reasons incorporated in the judgment impugned in appeal before Supreme Court, i.e., judgment dated 24.05.2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 3369 of 2004.
9. We have, therefore, considered the matter independently and proceed to decide the same on the basis of record and relevant statutes.
10. Petitioners are working as Secretaries in different grades in various Mandi Samities. The matter is governed by U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1964"). Aforesaid Act was enacted by State Legislature providing for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets in the State of U.P. The legislature by its experience found that Farmers and Agricultural Producers were being exploited in Agricultural Produce Markets in different ways causing not only undue exactions but also lesser share of agricultural produce to the Owners. In the matter of dispute, the Producers used to suffer due to disadvantageous position lacking bargaining power. They also suffer due to user of defective weights and scales in the market. The Producers used to be denied lion's share of their produce. The situation was causing lot of dissatisfaction amongst the Farmers citizen of State attracting Government to consider the matter and take care by providing suitable legislation. Even Planning Commission recommended for a legislation in respect of regulation of market in pursuant whereto many other States enacted such laws. Ultimately U.P. Legislature enacted Act, 1964. The broad outlines and objective as mentioned in statement of object and reasons were as under:-
(i) to reduce the multiple trade chares, levies and exactions charged at present from the producer-sellers;
(ii) to provide for the verification of accurate weights and scales and see that the producer-seller is not denied his legitimate due;
(iii) to establish market committees in which the agricultural producer will have his due representation;
(iv) to ensure that the agricultural producer has his say in the utilization of market funds for the improvement of the market as a whole;
(v) to provide for fair settlement of disputes relating to the sale of agricultural produce;
(vi) to provide amenities to the producer-seller in the market;
(vii) to arrange for better storage facilities;
(viii) to stop inequitable and unauthorized charges and levies from the producer-seller; and
(ix) to make adequate arrangements for market intelligence with a view to posting the agricultural producer with the latest position in respect of the markets dealing with his produce."
11. Section 12 of Act, 1964 provides for establishment and incorporation of Mandi Samiti of a Market Area declared under Sections 5 and 6 of Act. Section 13 of Act provides for constitution of Committee and Section 23 provides for appointment of officers and servants of Mandi Samiti, which includes Secretaries of Committee. It provides that every committee shall have a Secretary and such other officers as may be considered necessary by Board for efficient discharge of functions of Committee, appointed by Board on such terms and conditions as being provided in Regulations, made by it.
12. It was amended vide U.P. Act No. 10 of 1991, w.e.f. 01.09.1990 and Section 23 (2), thereafter, read as under:-
Section 23 (2)- Every Committee shall have such number of secretaries and such other officers as may be considered necessary by the Board for the efficient discharge of the functions of the Committee, appointed by the Board on such terms and conditions as may be provided for in the regulations made by it.
13. Section 23-A was inserted by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1973 and re-enacted by U.P. Act No. 30 of 1974 providing Constitution of Centralized service and transfer of employees. The said Section is reproduced herein as under-
"Section 23-A. Constitution of Centralized service and transfer of employees:-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, the Board may constitute cadres of secretaries and such other officers common to all Committees as it may deem fit to appoint under sub-section (2) of Section 23.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2-B)-
(a) every person, other than a government servant, serving in any Committee on deputation, who holds a post comprised in the cadre referred to in sub-section (1), and
(b) every Government servant, serving in any Committee on deputation on a post in the said cadre, who is not found to be unsuitable, suitability being determined in such manner as may be laid down in regulations, shall on and from the date of the constitution of the said cadre (hereinafter in this section to be referred to as the said date) become member of the cadre on the terms and conditions mentioned in sub-section (2-A).
14. Section 24 provides for functions, powers and duties of the 'Secretary'. Section 24 as amended vide U.P. Act 10 of 1991 is reproduced as under:-
"24. Functions, powers and duties of the Secretary-(1) The secretary of a committee shall be its chief executive officer, and shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, perform such functions exercise such powers and discharge such duties, as may be prescribed, or provided for in the bye-laws or as the Board or the Director may, by order in writing direct:
Provided that when more than one secretaries are posted in a Committee, the Director shall nominate one of the Secretaries to be its chief executive officer and shall determine the functions to be performed, powers to be exercised and duties to be discharged by each of them.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, but subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules and bye-laws made thereunder, the Secretary shall.
(a) -exercise all powers of superintendence and control over-
(i) all officers and servants of the Committee so as to ensure less proper and efficient discharge of the duties assigned to them less by or under this Act; and
(ii) the affairs of the Committee;
(b) report cases of neglect, misconduct or dereliction of duty by an employee of the Committee to the appointing authority for necessary action, and where so empowered, take disciplinary action against any of the employees of the Committee;
(c) ensure proper execution of all orders issued by the Board, the Chairman or the Committee;
(d) ensure proper maintenance of-
(i) accounts of all money received and of all moneys expended for and on behalf of the Committee;
(ii) records of disputes coming up for decision under this Act or the rules or bye-laws framed thereunder; and
(iii) a record of the disputes settled by him in such form as may be prescribed.
(3) All licenses under this Act shall be issued under his signatures."
15. Section 25-A provides for prescription of terms and conditions of employment of officers and servants of Committees by Regulations. Section 40 confers powers upon State Government to frame Rules.
16. Exercising Rule framing power, State Government has enacted U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Niyamavali 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1965"). Chapter V of Rules, 1965 deals with the officers and servants of the Committee. Prior to 30.6.1984, Rule 59 reads as under:-
"59- Secretary of the Market Committee-(Section 23)--(1) Persons who are approved by the public Service Commission U.P. for a post in U.P. Subordinate Agriculture Service and possess at least two years experience in Agricultural Marketing and have successfully completed one years Training course in Agricultural Marketing or the training course of market Secretary organized by the Directorate of Marketing and Inspection, Government of India, shall be eligible for appointment s Secretary of the market committee.
(2) The cadre of Secretary shall have the following three grades namely;
(a) Grade I-For A Class Markets.
(b) Grade II-For B Class Markets.
(c) Grade III-For C Class Markets.
(3) The scale of pay of the market Secretary in each grade shall be such as may be approved by the State Government and shall carry the usual allowances as may be admissible to Government Servants of the State in corresponding scales of pay from time to time.
(4) The Seniority of the incumbents in each grade of the cadre of market secretary shall be reckoned from the date of the order of their first appointment as secretary in that grade, but in case the date of appointment of two or more incumbents as secretary in any grade is same, their seniority shall be in accordance with the order of their appointment.
(5) The secretary shall be liable to be transferred from one market committee to another in any part of the state by the appointing authority and his transfer traveling allowances shall be borne by the committee to which he is transferred.
(6) The secretary shall be entitled to raveling allowance as admissible to the Government servants of the state in the corresponding scales of pay.
(7) The secretary of every committee shall be governed by such rules and regulations as are applicable to Government Servants on foreign services as laid down in Fundamental Rules 110 to 127 of Financial Handbook volume II Part-II"
17. Vide notification dated 30.06.1984, the entire Rule 59 was substituted as under-
"59- Secretary of the Market Committee (Section 23)-- That qualifications, method of recruitment and other conditions of service of the secretaries and other officers and employees of centralized service constituted under section 23-A shall be such as may be laid down by Regulations." (emphasis added)
18. Rule 60 provides qualifications, designations, grades, salaries and allowance of the posts of officers and servants whose appointing authority is Committee and to be approved by Director.
19. Rule 63 provides functions, powers and duties of Secretary, which is reproduced herein as under-
"63. Functions, powers and duties of the Secretary (section 24)-(1) The Secretary shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the Market Committee and shall carry into effect the resolutions of the Market Committee.
(2) All other officers and servants of the Committee shall be subject to his control. He shall also be responsible for directing their work in such manner as to ensure proper and efficient working of the Market committee.
(3) It shall be the duty of the Secretary to supervise the work of the officers and servants of the committee and to take necessary disciplinary action against any of the officers and servants of the committee for their neglect, misconduct, dereliction of duty etc. subject to the approval of the Chairman of the Committee.
(4) The secretary shall be responsible for the proper execution of all orders issued by the Chairman or the Committee. He shall take or cause action to be taken against any of the officers and servants of the Committee in accordance with the directions given by the Chairman of the Committee.
(5) Subject to the control of the Chairman, or in his absence of the vice-Chairman of the Market Committee, the secretary shall be responsible for maintaining proper accounts of money received and/or expended for or on behalf of the Committee.
(6) The Secretary shall conduct all routine correspondence and attend to other office work and all correspondence with the Director or Officers subordinate to the Director shall be conducted through the Chairman or with the previous approval of the Chairman.
(7) The Secretary shall be responsible for maintaining complete records of all the disputes, which come up for decision before the Disputes Sub-Committee in such manner as may be specified in the bye-laws of the Committee.
(8) The Secretary shall maintain a record of the disputes settled by him in the form and manner as may be specified in the bye-laws of the Committee.
(9) On receipt of a complaint either written or oral regarding any matter concerning sale or purchase of specified agricultural produce in the Market Area, the Secretary shall conduct an enquiry and shall make a report of he same to the Chairman for taking such action as he may think necessary in accordance with the provisions of the Act, these rules and the bye-laws.
(10) It shall be the duty of the Secretary to ensue that proper payments to sellers in the Market Yards are made and no irregularities in making weighment of the specified agricultural produce in the Market Yards are committed.
(11) The secretary shall advise the Committee and its Chairman in all matters elating to the regulation of the sale and purchase of agricultural produce in the light of the provisions of the Act, these rules and the bye-laws framed thereunder and his opinion shall be recorded in the proceedings of the Committee.
(12) The Secretary shall grant casual leave to the officers and servants of the Committee. For other kinds of leave the Secretary shall recommended he same to the Chairman who shall take action to sanction such leave in accordance with the leave rules applicable to officers and servants of the Committee.
(13) The Secretary shall submit to the Chairman by thirtieth April each year his annual confidential remarks in respect of the work and worth of the officers and servants appointed by the Committee.
(14) The Secretary shall submit to the Chairman his recommendations in respect of the annual increments of the officers and servants appointed by the Committee within thirty days from the date any such increment falls due.
(15) The Secretary shall, on the orders or with the prior approval of the Chairman or on the orders of Director call meetings of the Market Committee and shall have right to attend, speak at, and otherwise take part in the meetings of the Committee;
Provided that the secretary shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the committee." (emphasis added)
20. In exercise of power under Section 25-A read with 26-X of Act, 1964, Board has framed Regulations, 1984. Regulation 4 of Regulations, 1984 provides for creation of Centralized Services of Secretaries and others and prior to 05.03.1991, it reads as under-
"Regulation-4: with effect from the commencement of these regulations there shall be a centralized service for the market committees consisting of the cadres and post given below-
(i) Secretaries:
(a)Secretaries, Grade-I, for ''A' Class Markets,
(b)Secretaries, Grade-II, For ''B' Class Markets,
(c)Secretaries, Grade-III, for ''C' Class Markets,
(d)Secretaries, Grade-IV, for ''D' Class Market,
(ii) Market Staff:
(a)Mandi Paryavekshak
(b)Amin/Auctioneers
(iii) Accounts Staff:
(a)Accountant
(b)Accounts Clerk
(c)Cashier-cum-clerk,
(iv) General Staff:
(a)Head Clerk
(b)Clerk-cum-Typist."
21. The aforesaid Regulation 4 was amended on 05.03.1991 and in respect of Secretaries it was substituted as under-
1. Secretaries.
(a) Secretaries Grade -I
(b) Secretaries Grade -II
(c) Secretaries Grade -III Class I
(d) Secretaries Grade -III Class II
(e) Secretaries Grade -III Class III
22. However after amendment of 1991 in Regulation 4, it appears that corresponding amendment in regulation 13 has not been made and it continue to read as under:-
"13 Quota.-Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) recruitment to various categories of posts in the cadres of the service shall be made from the source and in the proportion indicated below:
S.No Name of post Source and method of Recruitment Percentage
1. Secretary, Grade IV Direct recruitment 100
2. Secretary, Grade III By promotion of secretary grade IV, who has put in at least 5 years continuous service as such (Not being service on ad hoc basis) as on the first day of year of recruitment.
By promotion of Mndi Paryvekshak who has put in at least 5 years continuous service as such of year of recruitment 75 25
3. Secretary, Grade II By promotion of secretary Grade III, who has put in at least 5 years continuous service as such (not being service on ad hoc basis) as on the first day of year of recruitment.100
4. Secretary, Grade I By direct recruitment.
By promotion secretary grade II, who has put in at least 5 years continuous service as such (not being service on ad hoc basis) as on the first day of the year of recruitment.50
23. Regulation 23 provides that seniority of persons in any category or grade of any post shall be determined from the date of the order of substantive appointment. It is further stated that after 1991 and 1995 amendment of the Regulations, 1984, there are four grades of Secretaries which are as follows:-
i.
Secretary Class I 3000-4500 ii Secretary Class II 2200-4000 iii Secretary Class III Grade I Grade II Grade III 2000-3500 1400-2600 merged with scale 1350-2200 of 1640-2900 1640-2900 w.e.f 1.10.95
24. A perusal of Rules and Regulations aforesaid makes it clear that Rule framing authority contemplated a specified hierarchy of Secretaries at different levels and for recruitment thereto different qualifications, eligibility conditions etc. have been provided. The appointment and posting of Secretaries belong to different cadres depends upon various factors, namely Mandi Samiti of highest class having highest quantum of transaction and business shall be maintained by the Secretaries working in highest grade or there may be more than one secretary in such Mandis of same grade or different grades and the Secretaries of lower grade may be posted in smaller Mandi Samitis. It is worth of notice that prior to amendment of this Act, each Mandi Samiti had to have one Secretary and therefore, classification of Mandi Samitis was also relevant and hierarchy of Secretary would have its application accordingly. However, vide 1991 amendment while omitting the provision pertaining to classification of Mandi Samitis, simultaneously it has been provided under Section 23 read with Section 24 of the Act that there can be more than one secretary in a Mandi Samiti and in such case Director shall have the authority to nominate one Secretary as Chief Executive Officer of a Mandi Samit. Obviously, pursuant to the existing provision, more than one Secretaries may be posted in a Mandi Samiti considering its size, quantum of business etc. Further, Director while nominating Chief Executive Officer is bound to take into account the qualifications, hierarchy of Secretaries, grade and seniority etc. working in the Mandi Samitis. In view of the aforesaid, ex-facie, the aforesaid scheme can neither be said to be irrational nor it violates any right enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is always open to the Rule framing authority to provide different pay scales and hierarchy of their employees taking into account relevant factors justifying such creation of hierarchy and different pay scale and grade.
25. The principle of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine but has been applied on the facts and circumstances when it is found in all respects that two sets of employees are equally placed. Time and again what circumstances would be necessary to attract doctrine of equal pay for equal work has been examined by Supreme Court in catena of decisions and instead of referring to all aforesaid authorities, we find appropriate to refer that a Division Bench judgment dated 22.01.2014 passed in Writ Petition No. 30319 of 2001 (Shahjade vs. Chairman, Rajay Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad) where it has held as under:
"So far as the challenge on the bifurcation of the cadre of Secretary under Regulation-4 on the ground that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India is concerned , we may only record that under Regulations of 1984 an hierarchy of post of Secretary's has been created. A right for being considered for promotion from lower class/grade to higher within the category of Secretaries has been provided under Regulation-10 read with Regulation-13. For a Secretary of Class-3 Grade-II to be promoted as Secretary Class-3 Grade I five years continuous service as on the first date of the year of recruitment has been provided for. The post of Secretary Class-3 Grade-I are to be filled up by way of promotion 100%.
As already noticed above, the power to lay down the strength and the pay-scale to each category of posts has been conferred under Regulation -6 upon the Board and such pay-scales have to be the one as recommended from time to time and approved by the State Government.
So far as the plea of violation of Article 14 is concerned, suffice it to refer the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Jasmer Singh & Ors.,(1996) 11 SCC 77, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Article 39 (d), 14 and 16 of the Constitution and held that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not always easy to apply. There are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organisations, or even in the same organisation. there may be differences in educational or technical qualifications, which may have a bearing on the skills which the holders bring to their job although the designation of the job may be the same. There may also be other considerations which have relevance to efficiency in service which may justify difference in pay scales on the basis of criteria such as experience and seniority, or a need to prevent stagnation in the cadre, so that the good performance can be elicited from persons who have reached the top of the pay scale. There may be various other similar considerations which may have a bearing on efficient performance in a job. The evaluation of such jobs for the purposes of pay scale must be left to expert bodies and, unless there are any malafides, its evaluation should be accepted.
In view of the aforesaid, the challenge to the classification o the ground it violates the principles of equal pay for equal work appears to be wholly misconceived. The Regulation provides hierarchy qua the different categories of post of Secretaries and merely because the Secretaries belonging to as of the categories can be posted in any Mandi Samiti because of the deletion of the categories of the modes will make no difference in the matter of salary admissible to the possible classification under Regulation-4. The order absorbing the petitioner as senior Grade III Class II dated 2.7.1996 was accepted by the petitioner by open eyes and has not been questioned even in the petition.
In the totality and circumstances of the record, we do not find any substance and plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the challenge to the vires of Regulation-4.
In view of the aforesaid facts and the reasons recorded, we repel the challenge to the vires of Regulation-4 of the The Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Produce Market Committees (Centralised) Services Regulations, 1984.
Since, the challenge to Regulation-4 fails, the question of higher pay-scale being granted to the petitioner fails. No relief can be granted.
The writ petition is dismissed." (emphasis added)
26. We do not find any reason to have a different view than what has been taken in aforesaid judgment.
27. Even otherwise, we find that principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not attracted in the case in hand. Doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but it has to be applied only when all relevant factors and considerations in comparative posts are same.
28. In Randhir Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 618, Court considering principle of equal pay for equal work held that it is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of Preamble and Article 39(d) of the Constitution, Court held that principle of equal pay for equal work is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. However it was also held -
"It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional, avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied to them..." (emphasis added)
29. In R.D. Gupta and Ors. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi Administration and Ors. (1987) 3 SCC 505, Court applying principle of equal pay for equal work, in para 20 of the judgment, considered correctness of defence taken by employer justifying non application of said principle, and held -
"the ministerial staff in the NDMC constitute a unified cadre. The recruitment policy for the selection of the ministerial staff is a common one and the recruitment is also done by a common agency. They are governed by a common seniority list. The ministerial posts in the three wings of the BDNC viz, the general wing, the electricity wing and the waterworks wing are interchangeable posts and the postings an made from the common pool according to administrative convenience and exigencies of service and not on the basis of any distinct policy or special qualifications. Therefore, it would be futile to say that merely because a member of the ministerial staff had been given a posting in the electricity wing, either due to force of circumstances or due to voluntary preferment, he stands on a better or higher footing or in a more advantageous position than his counterparts in the general wing. It is not the case of the respondents that the ministerial staff in the electricity wing perform more onerous or more exacting duties than the ministerial staff in the general wing. It therefore follows that all sections of the ministerial staff should be treated alike and all of them held entitled to the same scales of pay for the work of equal nature done by them." (para 20) (emphasis added)
30. In Federation of All India Customs and Central excise Stenographers and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1988) 3 SCC 91, it was held :
"there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility justifying different pay scale. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a mater of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bonafide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination" (Para 7) (emphasis added)
31. It was further observed that-
"the same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less, it varies from nature and culture of employment," (para 11) (emphasis added)
32. In Jaipal and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1988) 3 SCC 354, Court held :
"The doctrine of equal work equal pay would apply on the premise of similar work, but it does not mean that there should be complete identity in all respects. If the two classes of persons do same work under the same employer, with similar responsibility, under similar working conditions the doctrine of 'equal work equal pay would apply and It would not be open to the State to discriminate one class with the other in paying salary. The State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that equal pay is paid for equal work." (para 6) (emphasis added)
33. In State of U.P. and Ors. v. J.P. Chaurasia and Ors. (1989)1 SCC 121, Court while considering justification of two pay scales of Bench Secretaries of High Court, observed :
"Entitlement to the pay scale similar would not depend upon either the nature of work or volume of work done by Bench Secretaries. Primarily it requires among others, evaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts. More often functions of two posts may appear to be the same or similar, but there may be difference in degrees in the performance. The quantity of work may be the same, but quality may be different that cannot be determined by relying upon averments in affidavits of Interested parties. The equation of posts or equation of pay must be left to the executive Government. It must be determined by expert bodies like Pay commission. They would be the best judge to evaluate the nature of duties and responsibilities of posts. If there is any such determination by a Commission or Committee, the court should normally accept it. The Court should not try to linker with such equivalence unless it is shown that it was made with extraneous consideration" (para 18) (emphasis added)
34. In Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India and Ors. JT 1991 (1) SC 60, it was observed :
"the question of parity in pay scale cannot be determined by applying mathematical formula. It depends upon several factors namely nature of work, performance of duties, qualifications, the quality of work performed by them. It is also permissible to have classification in services based on hierarchy of posts, pay scale, value of work and responsibility and experience. The classification must, however, have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved." (para 7) (emphasis added)
35. In Jaghnath v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1992 SC 126, Court, following its earlier judgments, observed:
"classification of officers into two grades with different, scales of pay based either on academic qualification or experience, or length of service is sustainable. Apart from that, higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is very common in career service. There is selection grade for District Judges. There is senior time scute in Indian Administrative Service. There is suppertime scale in other like services. The entitlement to these higher pay scales depends upon seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority. The differentiation so made in the same cadre will not amount to discrimination. The classification based on experience is a reasonable classification. It has a rational nexus with the object thereof. To hold otherwise, it would be detrimental to the Interest of the service itself." (para 7)
36. In Secretary, Finance Department and others Vs. West Bengal Registration Service Association and others, AIR 1992 SC 1203 Court held that equation of posts and determination of pay scales is the primary function of Executive and not the Judiciary. Therefore, ordinarily Courts will not enter upon the task of job evaluation which is generally left to expert bodies like the Pay Commissions, etc. It does not mean that Court has no jurisdiction and the aggrieved employees have no remedy if they are unjustly treated by arbitrary State action or inaction. Courts must, however, realise that job evaluation is both a difficult and time consuming task which even expert bodies having the assistance of staff with requisite expertise have found difficult to undertake, sometimes on account of want of relevant data and scales for evaluating performance of different groups of employees. This would call for a constant study of the external comparisons and internal relativities on account of the changing nature of job requirements. Some of the factors which have to be kept in view for job evaluation may include (i) the work programme of his department, (ii) the nature of contribution expected of him (iii) the extent of his responsibility and accountability in the discharge of his diverse duties and functions, (iv) the extent and nature of freedoms/limitations available or imposed on him in the discharge of his duties, (v) the extent of powers vested in him, (vi) the extent of his dependence on superiors for the exercise of his powers,, (vii) the need to coordinate with other departments, etc.
37. Court further said that a pay structure is evolved normally keeping in mind several factors, like, (i) method of recruitment, (ii) level at which recruitment is made, (iii) the hierarchy of service in a given cadre, (iv) minimum educational/technical qualifications required, (v) avenues of promotion, (vi) the nature of duties and responsibilities, (vii) the horizontal and vertical relativities with similar jobs, (viii) public dealings, (ix) satisfaction level, (x) employer's capacity to pay, etc. The list is not exhaustive but illustrative.
38. In State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Pramod Bhartiya and Ors. (1993) 1 SCC 539, Court held:
"It would he evident from this definition that the stress is upon the similarity of skill, effort and responsibility when performed under similar conditions. Further, as pointed out by Mukharji, J. (as he then was) in Federation of All India Customs and Excise Stenographers the quality of work may vary from post to post. It may vary from institution to institution We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter of assumption but one of proof. The respondents (original petitioners) have failed to establish that their duties, responsibilities and functions are similar to those of the non-technical lecturers in Technical Colleges. They have also failed to establish that the distinction between their scale of pay and that of non technical lecturers working in Technical Schools is either irrational and that it has no basis, or that it is vitiated by mala fides, either in law or in fact (see the approach adopted in Federation case). It must be remembered that since the plea of equal pay for equal work has to be examined with reference to Article 14. The burden is upon the petitioners to establish their right to equal pay, or the plea of discrimination, as the case may be This burden the original petitioners (respondents herein) have failed to discharge." (para 13) (emphasis added)
39. In Shyam Babu Verma and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 521, Court observed :
"the principle of equal pay for equal work should not be applied in a mechanical or casual manner. Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of equal pay for equal work to them. Unless it is established that there is no reasonable basis to treat them separately in matters of payment of wages or salary, the Court should not Interfere holding different pay scale as discriminatory"(para 9)
40. In Sher Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1995)6 SCC 515, Court rejected the claim of Library staff of Delhi University and its Constituent Colleges regarding parity in pay with the teaching staff on the ground that the nature of duties, work load, experience and responsibilities of the two sets of employees in question are totally different from each other.
41. In Union of India and Ors. v. Delhi Judicial Service Assn. and Anr. JT 1995 (2) SC 578, Court, reversing the judgment of High Court, which allowed same scale of pay to all officers of Higher Judicial Services, held :
"We think that the high Court was not right in giving selection grade scale of pay to all the officers on the principle of equal pay for equal work. If that be so the Dist. Munsif (Junior civil Judge, Junior subordinate Judge) etc. lowest officer in judicial hierarchy is entitled to the pay of the Senior most super-time scale district Judge as all of them are discharging judicial duty. The marginal difference principle also is equally inappropriate. Similarly of posts or scale of pay in different services are not relevant. The nature of the duty, nature of the responsibility and degree of accountability etc. are relevant and germane considerations Grant of selection grade, suppertime scale etc. would be akin to a promotion. The result of the impugned direction would wipe out the distinction between the time Scale and Selection grade officers. The learned Counsel for the Union of India, pursuant to our order, has placed before us the service conditions prevailing in the Higher Judicial Services in other States in the country. Except Gujrat which had wiped out the distinction after the judgment in all India Judges Association's case, all other States maintained the distinction between the Grade I and tirade II Higher Judicial offices or Time Scale and Selection Grade or Suppertime scales etc. In fact this distinction is absolutely necessary to inculcate hard work, to maintain character, to improve efficiency, to encourage honesty and integrity among the officers and accountability. Such distinctions would not only be necessary in the Higher Judicial Service but also, indeed in all services under the State and at every stage." (para 5) (emphasis added)
42. In Sita Devi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. JT 1996 (7 SC 438, Court upheld different pay scales on the basis of qualification, relying on its earlier judgments in The State of Mysore and Anr. v. P. Narasinga Rao, AIR 1968 SC 349; State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa, AIR 1974 SC 1 and P. Murugesan and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (2) SCC 340.
43. In State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh and Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1788:1997 (1) AWC2.145 (SC)(NOC), Court justified different pay scales, on various factors, observing as under:
"It is therefore, clear that the quality of work performed by different sets of persons holding different Jobs will have to be evaluated There may be differences in educational or technical qualifications which may have a bearing on the stills which the holders bring to their job although the designation of the job may be the same. There may also be other considerations which have relevance to efficiency in service which may justify differences in pay scales on the basis of criteria such as experience and seniority, or a need to prevent stagnation in the cadre, so that good performance can be elicited from persons who have reached the top of the pay scale. There may be various other similar considerations which may have a hearing on efficient performance in a job. This Court has repeatedly observed that evaluation of such jobs for the purposes of pay scale must be left to expert bodies and, unless there are any mala fides, its evaluation should be accepted." (para 8)
44. In Garhwal Jal Sansthan Karmachari Union and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1997) SCC 24, Court, in para 8 of the Judgment, rejected claim of pay parity, between employees of Jal Nigam and Jal Sansthan, on the ground of qualitative difference in the duties, function and responsibilities in the two organizations.
45. Considering difference in mode of recruitment and different service rules, in State of Rajasthan v. Kunji Raman, AIR 1997 SC 693, the Court upheld different pay scale for work charged employees and those employed in regular establishment.
46. In Union of India and Ors. v. Pradip Kumar Dey (2000) 8 SCC 580 : 2001 (1) AWC 176(SC), question of parity of pay scale of Naik, Radio Operator in CRPF and employees working as Radio Operator in Directorate of Coordination Police Wireless came up for consideration on the principle of equal pay for equal work and the Court negated parity, observing that different pay scale prescribed taking into account hierarchy in service and other relevant factors, cannot be interfered, as it would disturb entire chain of hierarchy.
47. In State of Orissa and Ors. v. Balaram Sahu and Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 250 : 2003 (1) AWC 273 (SC), Court observed as under:
"Though "equal pay for equal work" is considered to be a concomitant of Article 14 as much as "equal pay for unequal work" will also be a negation of that right, equal pay would depend upon not only the nature or the volume of work, tint also on the qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility as well and though the functions may be the same, but the responsibilities do make a real and substantial difference." (para 11)
48. In State of Haryana and Anr. v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, (2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 (3) AWC 2477 (SC), Court held, in para 10, as under:-
"It is to be kept in mind that the claim of equal pay for equal work is not a fundamental right vested in any employee though it is a constitutional goal to be achieved by the Government. Fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which is for the executive to discharge, While taking a decision in the matter, several relevant factors, some of which have been noted by this Court in the decided case, are to be considered keeping in view the prevailing financial position and capacity of the State Government to hear the additional liability of a revised scale of pay. It is also to be kept in mind that the priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the Slate Government is also a relevant factor for consideration by the State Government. In the context of the complex nature of issues involved, the far-reaching consequences of a decision in the matter and its impact on the administration of the State Government, courts have taken the view that ordinarily courts should not try to delve deep into administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity. That is not to say that the matter is not Justiciable or that the courts cannot entertain any proceeding against such administrative decision taken by the Government. The courts should approach such matters with restraint and interfere only when they are satisfied that the decision of the Government is patently irrational, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and the Government while taking the decision has ignored factors which are material and relevant for a decision in the matter..." (Para 10) (emphasis added)
49. In State Bank of India and Anr. v. M.R. Ganesh Babu and Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 556, Court observed in para 16 as under:
"The principle of equal pay for equal work has been considered and applied in may reported decisions of this Court. The principle has been adequately explained and crystallized and sufficiently reiterated in a catena of decisions of this Court. It is well settled that equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done. It cannot he judged by the mere volume of work; there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. The principle is not always easy to apply as there are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organizations, or even in the same organization. Differentiation in pay scales of persons holding same posts and performing similar work on the basis of difference in the degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality would be a valid differentiation. The judgment of administrative authorities concerning the responsibilities which attach to the post, and the degree of reliability expected of an incumbent, would be a value judgment of the authorities concerned which, if arrived at bona fide, reasonably and rationally, was not open to interference by the court." (emphasis added)
50. The difference in pay scale and wages for work charge employees and those engaged in regular establishment has been upheld in State of Punjab and others Vs. Gurdeep Kumar Uppal and others, AIR 2001 SC 2691, State of Punjab and others Vs. Ishar Singh and others, AIR 2002 SC 2422 and Punjab State Electricity Board and others Vs. Jagjiwan Ram and others, JT 2009 (3) SC 400.
51. In Deb Narayan Shyam and others Vs. State of West Bengal and others, 2005(2) SCC 286, the Court summarized as to when doctrine of equal pay for equal work would apply in the light of exposition of law laid down in catena of its earlier decisions and said:
"Large number of decisions have been cited before us with regard to the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' by both sides. We need not deal with the said decisions to overburden this judgment. Suffice it to say that the principle is settled that if the two categories of posts perform the same duties and function and carry the same qualification, then there should not be any distinction in pay scale between the two categories of posts similarly situated. But when they are different and perform different duties and qualifications for recruitment being different, then they cannot be said to be equated so as to qualify for equal pay for equal work." (emphasis added)
52. The above dictum has been followed in Union of India and Another Vs. Mahajabeen Akhtar, AIR 2008 SC 435.
53. In Haryana State Electricity Board and another Vs. Gulshan Lal and others, JT 2009(9) SC 95, Court observed that same or similar nature of work, by itself, does not entitle an employee to invoke doctrine of equal pay for equal work. Qualification, experience and other factors would be relevant for the said purpose.
54. A three Judge Bench of Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others Vs. Charanjit Singh and others, AIR 2006 SC 161 said that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course the qualities and characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that a person has not gone through the process of recruitment in certain cases make a difference. If the the educational qualifications are different then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justify a difference in pay scales. The earlier nomenclature designating a person as a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he was doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsmen in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility.
55. The above view has been followed in Union of India and others Vs. Dineshan K. K., AIR 2008 SC 1026, Haryana State Minor Irrigation Tubewells Corporation and others Vs. G.S. Uppal and others, AIR 2008 SC 2152 and Food Corporation of India and others Vs. Ashish Kumar Ganguli and others, 2009(8) SCALE 218.
56. Recently in State of Punjab and another Vs. Surjit Singh and others, 2009(9) SCC 514, after referring to its earlier judgments, the Court has summarized dictum, in the following manner:
"In our opinion fixing pay scales by courts by applying the principle of equal pay for equal work upsets the high constitutional principle of separation of powers between the three organs of the State. Realising this, this Court has in recent years avoided applying the principle of equal pay for equal work, unless there is complete and wholesale identity between the two groups (and there too the matter should be sent for examination by an Expert Committee appointed by the government instead of the court itself granting higher pay)." (emphasis added)
57. It further says that grant of benefit of doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" depends upon a large number of factors including equal work, equal value, source and manner of appointment, equal identity of group and wholesale or complete identity. The Apex Court in Surjit Singh (supra) also stressed upon that the principle has undergone a sea change and the matter should be examined strictly on the basis of the pleadings and proof available before the Court to find out whether the distinction between two based on any relevant factor or not. The onus to prove lie on the person who alleges discrimination and claims enforcement of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.
58. In State of Punjab Vs. Surjit Singh (supra), the Court said that Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those, who are left out, of course, qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay. A mere nomenclature designating a person say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. A party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal.
59. In State of Madhya Pradesh and others Vs. Ramesh Chandra Bajpai, 2009(13) SCC 635 the Court said that it is well settled that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be invoked only when the employees are similarly situated. Similarity in designation or nature or equation of work is not determinative for equality in the matter of pay scales. The Court has to consider the factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment, qualifications, nature of work, the value thereof, responsibility, reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need, etc. In other words the equality clause can be invoked in the matter of pay scale only when there is a whole sale identity between the two posts.
60. In A.K.Behra Vs. Union of India & Anr., JT 2010 (5) SC 290, the Court, in paras 84 and 85, said:
"84. The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
85. The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognize even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive."
61. In State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Daya Lal & Ors., 2011 (2) SCC 429, the Court culled down following principles:
"Part time temporary employees in government run institutions cannot claim parity in salary with regular employees of the government on the principle of equal pay for equal work. Nor can employees in private employment, even if serving full time, seek parity in salary with government employees. The right to claim a particular salary against the State must arise under a contract or under a statute."
62. This decision has been followed in Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh and Ors. v. Mrs. Manju Mathur and Anr., JT 2011 (3) SC 179.
63. In Hukam Chand Gupta vs. Director General, I.C.A.R. and Ors. AIR 2013 SC 547, the Court observed that in order to attract doctrine of "equal pay for equal work", assessment of the nature and quality of duties performed and responsibilities shouldered by the incumbents is necessary. Even if, the two persons are working on two posts having same nomenclature, it would not lead to the necessary inference that the posts are identical in every manner.
64. Recently also the above principles, discussed in detail, have been reiterated and followed in S. H. Baig and Ors. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., (2018)10SCC621; General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Ors. vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019)10SCC674; and, Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. vs. Jaggu and Ors., (2019)7SCC658.
65. Applying above principles to the facts of present case, it is not in dispute that size of different Mandi Samities in different areas are different having different quantity of transactions dealing different strength of people, quantum of revenue is largely differs and, therefore, degree and responsibility also differs based on size and structure of Mandi Samiti. Therefore, categorization of Mandi Samities, per se, if not initially bad, the offers posted looking to size of Mandi Samiti concerned and for that purpose categorizing in different ways per se cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable or irrational.
66. When the question of parity in work, performance and responsibility of are seen in the light of above exposition of law, atleast we have no hesitation in holding that there cannot be any parity in the matter of pay scale as all the four posts cannot be equated and atleast nothing has been brought on record to show that the same are similar in all respect.
67. In view of above, relief prayed by petitioners based on principle of equal pay for equal work to claim parity in the matter of pay scale cannot be granted.
68. In the result, the writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Order Date :- 24.02.2020 Arshad/AK