H N Roopeshkumar vs The State Of Karnataka on 22 April, 2025

[Cites 9, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

H N Roopeshkumar vs The State Of Karnataka on 22 April, 2025

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF APRIL, 2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

WRIT PETITION No.26089 OF 2023 (GM - TEN)
C/W
WRIT PETITION No.21940 OF 2022 (LB - BMP)
WRIT PETITION No.2935 OF 2023 (GM - TEN)
WRIT PETITION No.4301 OF 2023 (GM - TEN)
WRIT PETITION No.4308 OF 2023 (GM - TEN)
WRIT PETITION No.4477 OF 2023 (GM - TEN)
WRIT PETITION No.4698 OF 2023 (GM - TEN)
WRIT PETITION No.4987 OF 2023 (GM - TEN)
WRIT PETITION No.5071 OF 2023 (GM - TEN)
WRIT PETITION No.3913 OF 2024 (GM - TEN)
WRIT PETITION No.4069 OF 2024 (GM - TEN)

IN WRIT PETITION No.26089 OF 2023

BETWEEN:

SREE BANASHANKARI ENTERPRISES
NO.341, 11TH CROSS, 7TH MAIN
KAVERI NAGAR, BSK 2ND STAGE
BENGALURU - 560 070
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR
SRI PRASANNA KUMAR M.N.,
S/O MADILATI NARASAPPA.
... PETITIONER

(BY SRI R.S.RAVI, SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI AKARSH KUMAR GOWDA, ADVOCATE)
2

AND:

1. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
I FLOOR, UNI BUILDING, THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA, VASANT NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013.

2. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (TECH)
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
I FLOOR, UNI BUILDING, THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA, VASANT NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013.

3. BRUHATH BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE
PADMANABHA NAGAR DIVISION
KUMARASWAMY LAYOUT
OPP. SAGAR HOSPITAL - 560 052
REPRESENTED BY ITS
EXECUTIVE ENGINEER.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI K.SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W
SRI PRASANTH S.H., ADVOCATE)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
SHORT TERM TENDER NOTIFICATION DATED 16/11/2023, MADE IN
NO.EE(PN)/TEND/09/2023-24, VIDE ANNEXURE-B, ISSUED BY THE
R3.
3

IN WRIT PETITION No.21940 OF 2022

BETWEEN:

M/S. LAVA KUSHA TRANSPORT BY PROPRIETOR
SRINIVASA REDDY K. R.,
A PROPRIETOR CONCERN
S/O RAJAKRISHNA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
RESIDENT OF LAVA KUSHA NAGAR
KONAPPA AGRAHARA ELECTRONIC CITY POST
BENGALURU - 560 100
... PETITIONER

(BY SRI H.V.NAGARAJA RAO, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE COMMISSIONER
BRUHAT BENGALURU MAHANAGAR PALIKE
N.R.SQUARE, BENGALURU - 560 002.

2. ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
CHAMARAJPET SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
DIVISION, MYSURU ROAD
NEAR TOLL GATE
BENGALURU - 560 018.

3. M/S. MADHAVA ENTERPRISES
BY PROPRIETOR KUSUMA S.,
A PROPRIETOR CONCERN
NO.34, 5TH CROSS, 5TH MAIN
RANGANATHPURA, KAMAKSHIPALYA
BENGALURU - 560 079.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI K.SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W.,
SRI PRASHANTH S. H., ADVOCATE FOR R1 AND R2;
4

SRI P.CHANDRASHEKAR, ADVOCATE FOR C/R-3)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASHING
ANNEXURE-G VIDE ORDER NO.¸À.PÁ.¤Ã.D(WÀ.vÁå.¤)/ZÁ.¥ÉÃ/¦ Dgï/43/22-23
DATED 13.10.22 CANCELLING THE TENDER AWARDED IN FAVOR
OF THE PETITIONER AND AWARDING THE SAME IN FAVOUR OF
THE R3 AND ALLOW THE WRIT PETITION.

IN WRIT PETITION No.2935 OF 2023

BETWEEN:

1. H.N.ROOPESHKUMAR
S/O H.C.NARAYANA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
OCC: PARTNER
M/S. ANNAPOORNESHWARI ASSOCIATES
A REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP FIRM
NO.6/6D, VIVEKANANDA NAGAR
BEGUR ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 068.

2. K.R.SRINIVAS REDDY
S/O RAJAKRISHNA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
OCC: PROPRIETOR
M/S. LAVAKUSHA TRANSPORT
GROUND FLOOR, HOSUR ROAD
ELECTRONIC CITY ROAD
LAVA KUSH NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 100.

3. H.N.MANJU
S/O H.R.NYATH REDDY
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS
PROPRIETOR, SHRI LAKSHMI ENTERPRISES
NO.5, VMK REDDY BUILDING
HONGASANDRA BEGUR ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 068.
5

4. KARTHIK N.,
S/O NARASIMHA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
S.NO.1417, GOVERNMENT HIGH SCHOOL
NEAR BEGUR, BENGALURU - 560 068.
5. S.RAJU
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
S/O SRINIVASULU NAIDU
SAPTHAGIRI CLEANING SERVICE
NO.7, 1ST CROSS, 24TH MAIN
PUTTENAHALLI, J.P.NAGAR
7TH PHASE, BENGALURU - 560 070.

6. K.O.SRINIVAS
S/O LATE K.H.OBALESH
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
NO.42, CORPORATION LAYOUT
KASTURIBA NAGARA PIPE LINE
MYSORE ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 026.

7. A.L.SATISHKUMAR
S/O LATE ANCHI LINGAPPA
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
OCC: PROPRIETOR
S.P.T. ENTERPRISES
NO.41, K.H.ROAD (DOUBLE ROAD)
BENGALURU - 560 027.

8. C.RAVI NAIDU
S/O C.SRINIVASULU NAIDU
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
NO.1672, 5TH CROSS, 2ND BLOCK
BSK 2ND STAGE
BENGALURU - 560 050.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SR. ADVOCATE A/W
SRI MAHESH H., ADVOCATE)
6

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
REPRESENTED BY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
M.S.BUILDING, BENGALURU - 560 001.

2. BRUHAT BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER
N.R.SQUARE, BENGALURU
KARNATAKA - 560 002.

3. BENGALURU SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (TECH)
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REG. UNDER INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013
1ST FLOOR, UNI BUILDING
THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA
VASANTH NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052.

4. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER-1
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT-1
3RD FLOOR, ANNEX-2 BUILDING
BBMP HEAD OFFICE PREMISE
N.R.SQUARE, BENGALURU - 560 002.

5. BENGALURU MAHANAGARA SWACHATE MATTU LORRY
MALIKARA HAGOO GUTTHIGEDARARA SANGHA (REGD)
REG. UNDER THE KARNATAKA SOCIETIES
REGISTRATION ACT, 1960
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
NO.1, AGA GARDEN, FOOD GODOWN ROAD
A.T.HALLI LAYOUT, SHANTHINAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 027.
... RESPONDENTS
7

(BY SRI K.SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W.,
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, AGA FOR R1 AND
SRI S.N.PRASHANTH CHANDRA,
SMT. NAMITHA MAHESH B. G., ADVOCATES FOR R3 AND R4;
SRI B.L.SANJEEV, ADVOCATE FOR R2;
SRI P.PRASANNA KUMAR, ADVOCATE A/W.,
SRI RAHUL KRISHNA REDDY, ADVOCATE FOR R5)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED RFP
BEARING NO. CGM(TECH)/BSWML/TEND/02/2022-23 CALL-2 DTD.
21.01.2023 ISSUED BY THE R-3 BENGALURU SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT LTD. (ANNX-A) AND ETC.,

IN WRIT PETITION No.4301 OF 2023

BETWEEN:

1. SRP CLEAN ENVIRO ENGINEERS PVT. LTD.,
NO. 21, 1st 'B' CROSS
BEHIND SANDHYA THEATRE
BENGALURU - 546 068.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
MANAGING DIRECTOR
SRI VASIPALLI LOKESH
S/O V.VISHWANATH REDDY
REG. UNDER COMPANIES ACT, 1956.

2. SRI C.V.BHANUMURTHY REDDY
S/O C.V.VENUGOPAL REDDY
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS
PROPRIETOR
SWACHATHA CORPORATION
NO. 19, HSR LAYOUT, 2nd SECTOR
GARDEN LAYOUT, NEAR PURVA
FAIRMONT APARTMENT
HSR LAYOUT, 2nd SECTOR
8

BENGALURU - 560 102.

3. SRI B.S.KIRAN KUMAR
S/O B.R.SRINIVAS
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
PROPRIETOR
SRI LAKSHMI RANGANATHA SWAMY
ENTERPRISES,
NO. 2666, GROUND FLOOR
7th MAIN, 17th 'D' CROSS
OPPOSITE BANASHANKARI POST OFFICE
BSK 2nd STAGE, BENGALURU - 560 070.
... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI JAYAKUMAR S. PATIL, SR. ADVOCATE A/W.,
SRI MAHAMMED TAHIR A., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
VIKAS SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.

2. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
I FLOOR, UNI BUILDING,
THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA,
VASANT NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER
INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013

3. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (TECH)
9

BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
I FLOOR, UNI BUILDING,
THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA,
VASANT NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER
INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013.

4. SRI A.L.SATHISH KUMAR
S/O LATE ANCHI LINGAPPA
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
PROPRIETOR,
S.P.T ENTERPRISES
RESIDING AT NO. 41, K.H.ROAD
(DOUBLE ROAD),
BENGALURU - 560 027.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI K.SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W.,
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, AGA FOR R1 AND
SRI S.N.PRASHANTH CHANDRA,
SMT. NAMITHA MAHESH B.G., ADVOCATES FOR R2 AND R3;
SRI ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI MAHESH H., ADVOCATE FOR R4)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECTING THE
R-2 AND 3 TO EVALUATE THE BID SUBMITTED BY THE R-4 BY
CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-E TO J1
AND ANTI-BLACKLISTING AFFIDAVIT IN APPENDIX-VI OF THE RFP
ANNEXURE-C AND ETC.,
10

IN WRIT PETITION No.4308 OF 2023
BETWEEN:

1. MR. P.HARSHA VARDHANA REDDY
S/O P.JANARDHANA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 49 YERAS
NO. 401/4, 14th MAIN ROAD
VENKATESHWARA LAYOUT
MADIWLA, BENGALURU - 560 068.

2. SRP CLEAN ENVIRO ENGINEERS PVT. LTD.,
NO. 21, 1st 'B' CROSS
BEHIND SANDHYA THEATRE
BENGALURU - 560 068
REPRESENTED BY ITS
MANAGING DIRECTOR
SRI VASIPALLI LOKESH
S/O V.VISHWANATHA REDDY
REGISTERED UNDER COMPANIES ACT, 1956.
... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI JAYAKUMAR S. PATIL, SR. ADVOCATE A/W.,
SRI MAHAMMED TAHIR A., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
VIKAS SOUDHA, BENGALURU - 560 001.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINICIPAL SECRETARY.

2. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
I FLOOR, UNI BUILDING, THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA, VASANTH NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052.
11

3. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (TECH)
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANGEMENT LTD.,
I FLOOR, UNI BUILDING, THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA, VASANT NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052.

4. SRI RAJU S.,
S/O SRINIVASULU NAIDU
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
PROPRIETOR
SAPTHAGIRI CLEANING SERVICE
R/AT NO.7, 1st CROSS, 24th MAIN
PUTTENAHALLI, J.P.NAGAR
7th PHASE, BENGALURU - 560 027.
... RESPONDENTS

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECTING THE
R-2 AND 3 TO EVALUATE THE BID SUBMITTED BY THE R-4 BY
CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-F TO
G1 AND ANTI-BLACKLISTING AFFIDAVIT IN APPENDIX -VI OF THE
RFP AND ETC.,

IN WRIT PETITION No.4477 OF 2023

BETWEEN:

1. SRI B.S.KIRAN KUMAR
S/O B.R.SRINIVAS
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
PROPRIETOR
12

SRI LAKSHMI RANGANATHA SWAMY ENTERPRISES,
NO. 2666, GROUND FLOOR
7th MAIN, 17th 'D' CROSS
OPPOSITE BANASHANKARI
POST OFFICE, BSK 2nd STAGE
BENGALURU - 560 070.

2. C.V.RAJANIKANTH REDDY
S/O C.VENUGOPAL REDDY
NO. 19, 24th MAIN, GARDEN LAYOUT
HSR LAYOUT, 2nd SECTOR
BENGALURU - 560 102.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI JAYAKUMAR S. PATIL, SR. ADVOCATE A/W.,
SRI MAHAMMED TAHIR A., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
VIKAS SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.

2. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
1st FLOOR, UNI BUILDING
THIMMAIAH ROAD, MILLERS TANK BUND AREA
VASANT NAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 052.

3. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (TECH)
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
I FLOOR, UNI BUILDING, THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA, VASANT NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052.

4. SRI K.R.SRINIVAS REDDY
13

S/O RAJAKRISHNA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
PROPRIETOR
M/S. LAVAKUSHA TRANSPORT
GROUND FLOOR, HOSUR ROAD
ELECTRONIC CITY ROAD
LAVA KUSH NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 100.
... RESPONDENTS

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECTING THE
R-2 AND 3 TO EVALUATE THE BID SUBMITTED BY THE R-4 BY
CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-E TO
G1 AND ANTI-BLACKLISTING AFFIDAVIT IN APPENDIX-VI OF THE
RFP AND ETC.,

IN WRIT PETITION No.4698 OF 2023

BETWEEN:

1. SREE BANASHANKARI ENTERPRISES
NO. 341, 11TH CROSS, 7TH MAIN
KAVERI NAGAR, BSK 2ND STAGE
BENGALURU - 560 070
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR
SRI PRASANNA KUMAR M. N.,
S/O MADILATI NARASAPPA.

2. SRI SAI CHAITHANYA ENTERPRISES
NO.111, 8TH CROSS, ANAND NAGAR
14

VENKATAPPA LAYOUT, HOSAKEREHALLI
BSK 3RD STAGE, BENGALURU - 560 085
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR
SRI K.MADAVARAJU
S/O GOPAL.
... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI R.S.RAVI, SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI AKARSH KUMAR GOWDA, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
VIKAS SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.

2. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANGEMENT LTD.,
1ST FLOOR, UNI BUILDING
THIMMAIAH ROAD, MILLERS TANK BUND AREA
VASANT NAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 052.
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013.

3. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (TECH)
BANGLAORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
1ST FLOOR, UNI BUILDING, THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA, VASANT NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013.

4. M/S. VISION MANPOWER PVT. LTD.,
NO.1672, 5TH CROSS, 2ND BLOCK
BANASHANKARI 1ST STAGE
15

BENGALURU - 560 050
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
SRI C.RAVINAIDU.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI K.SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W.,
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, AGA FOR R1 AND
SRI S.N.PRASHANTH CHANDRA,
SMT. NAMITHA MAHESH B. G., ADVOCATES FOR R2 AND R3)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECT THE R-
2 AND R3 TO EVALUATE THE BID SUBMITTED BY THE R-4 BY
CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-E TO J1
AND ANTI-BLACKLISTING AFFIDAVIT IN APPENDIX-VI OF THE RFP
AND ETC.,

IN WRIT PETITION No.4987 OF 2023

BETWEEN:

1. MR. CHANDRA REDDY
S/O LATE VENKATARAMA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
PROPRIETOR
SRI MATHRU ENTERPRISES
NO.404/16, 18TH 'A' MAIN ROAD
13TH CROSS, VENKATESHWARA LAYOUT
MADIWALA, BENGALURU - 560 068.

2. SRI S.RAMACHANDRA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
S/O LATE H.ASHAMANNA REDDY
NO.15, GREEN VILLAS
HALANAYAKANAHALLI
BENGALURU - 560 035.
... PETITIONERS
16

(BY SRI JAYAKUMAR S.PATIL, SR. ADVOCATE A/W.,
SRI MAHAMMED TAHIR A., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
VIKAS SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.

2. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
1ST FLOOR, UNI BUILDING
THIMMAIAH ROAD, MILLERS TANK BUND AREA
VASANTH NAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 052
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013.

3. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (TECH)
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
1ST FLOOR, UNI BUILDING
THIMMAIAH ROAD, MILLERS TANK BUND AREA
VASANTH NAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 052
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER
INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013.

4. SRI ANAND REDDY
S/O MUNI REDDY
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
PROPRIETOR K.K.ENTERPRIES
NO.1668, 21ST MAIN
4TH CROSS ROAD, HSR LAYOUT
1ST SECTOR, BENGALURU - 560 102.
... RESPONDENTS
17

(BY SRI K.SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W.,
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, AGA FOR R1 AND
SRI S.N.PRASHANTH CHANDRA,
SMT. NAMITHA MAHESH B.G., ADVOCATES FOR R2 AND R3;
SRI MUNIRAJU K., ADVOCATE FOR R4)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECTING THE
R-2 AND 3 TO EVALUATE THE BID SUBMITTED BY THE R-4 BY
CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED AT ANNX-E TO F2 AND
ANTI-BLACKLISTING AFFIDAVIT IN APPENDIX-VI OF THE RFP AND
ETC.,

IN WRIT PETITION No.5071 OF 2023

BETWEEN:

MR. P.HARSHA VARDHANA REDDY
S/O P.JANARDHANA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
NO.401/4, 14TH MAIN ROAD
VENKATESHWARA LAYOUT
MADIWALA, BENGALURU - 560 068.
... PETITIONER

(BY SRI JAYAKUMAR S.PATIL, SR. ADVOCATE A/W.,
SRI MAHAMMED TAHIR A., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
VIKAS SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
18

2. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
1ST FLOOR, UNI BUILDING
THIMMAIAH ROAD,
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA,
VASANTH NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER
INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013.

3. THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (TECH)
BANGALORE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LTD.,
1ST FLOOR, UNI BUILDING
THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA
VASANTH NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 052
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
REGISTERED UNDER
INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 2013.

4. SRI K.O.SRINIVASA
S/O K.OBALESH
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
NO.42, CORPORATION LAYOUT
MYSORE ROAD, KASTURBA NAGARA
PIPELINE, BENGALURU - 560 026.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI K.SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W.,
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, AGA FOR R1 AND
SRI S.N.PRASHANTH CHANDRA,
SMT. NAMITHA MAHESH B. G., ADVOCATES FOR R2 AND R3;
SRI MUNIRAJU K., ADVOCATE FOR R4)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECTING THE
19

R-2 AND 3 TO EVALUATE THE BID SUBMITTED BY THE R-4 BY
CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED AT ANNX-E TO H1
AND ANTI-BLACKLISTING AFFIDAVIT IN APPENDIX-VI OF THE RFP
AND ETC.,

IN WRIT PETITION No.3913 OF 2024

BETWEEN:

M/S. BHARATH KUMAR ENTERPRISES
PROPRIETORSHIP CONCERN
REGISTERED UNDER THE KARNATAKA SHOPS
AND COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS ACT
NO.68, MRS PALYA, NANDIDURG ROAD
BENSON TOWN, BENGALURU - 560 046
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PROPRIETOR A.OBLESH.
... PETITIONER

(BY SRI N.S.VIJAYANTH BABU, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. BRUHATH BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE (BBMP)
N.R.SQUARE, BENGALURU - 560 002
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER
EMAIL: [email protected].

2. BENGALURU SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LIMITED
NO.30/1, UNI BUILDING, THIMMAIAH ROAD
MILLERS TANK BUND AREA, VASANTH NAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 051
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (TECH)

3. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER (EAST ZONE )
OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER (EAST)
BBMP, 18TH FLOOR, SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE
20

BUILDING, M.G. ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 002.

4. ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (AEE)
SWM, BBMP HEBBAL ZONE
V.NAGENAHALLI MAIN ROAD
HEBBAL, BENGALURU - 560 032.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI K.SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W.,
SRI PRASHANTH S.H., ADVOCATE FOR R1, R3 AND R4 AND
SRI S.N.PRASHANTH CHANDRA,
SMT. NAMITHA MAHESH B.G., ADVOCATES FOR R2)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
REASON GIVEN, VIDE ENDORSEMENT NO. BSWML/CGM(TECH)/
/2023-24 DATED 22/01/2024 (ANNEXURE-P) FOR DISQUALIFYING
THE PETITIONER, IN PACKAGES 11 AND 13 PERTAINING TO THE
TENDER NOTIFICATION DATED 21/01/2023, BEARING NO.
CGM(TECH)/BSWML/TEND/02/2022-23 CALL-2.

IN WRIT PETITION No.4069 OF 2024

BETWEEN:

1. SRI GANGADHARA SWAMY M.,
CONTRACTOR
C/O MUNIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.172
ISIRI NILAYA, NTI LAYOUT
1ST PHASE, RAJIV GANDHI NAGARA
NEAR NARAYANA OLYMPIAD SCHOOL
KODIGEHALLI, BENGALURU NORTH
BENGALURU - 560 092.

2. SRI M.VENKATESH
S/O M.MUNISWAMY
21

AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS
GOVT. LABOUR LICENCE S W RAILWAY
AND BBMP CONTRACTOR
NO.1809, 24TH MAIN
13TH CROSS, HSR LAYOUT
SECTOR - 1, BENGALURU - 560 102.

3. SRI KARTHIK N.,
S/O NARASIMHA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.1417
NEAR GOVERNMENT SCHOOL
BEGURU, BENGALURU - 560 068.

4. SRI K.O.SRINIVAS
S/O LATE K.H.OBALESH
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
LABOUR AND VEHICLE SUPPLY CONTRACTOR
RESIDING AT NO.42, CORPORATION LAYOUT
KASTURBA ROAD, PIPELINE, MYSURU ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 026.
... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI MITHUN G.A., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
M.S.BUILDNG, BENGALURU - 560 001.

2. BRUHAT BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER
N.R.SQUARE, BENGALURU - 560 002.

3. CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER (TECH)
BENGALURU SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT LIMITED
22

(B.S.W.M.L.) REGD. OFFICE NO.30/1
1ST AND 2ND FLOOR, UNI BUILDING
THIMMAIAH ROAD, MILLERS TANK BUND AREA
VASANTH NAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 051.

4. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
BENGALURU SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
LIMITED (B.S.W.M.L.)
3RD FLOOR, ANNEX-2 BUILDING
BBMP HEAD OFFICE PREMISE
N.R.SQUARE, BENGALURU - 560 002.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI K.SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W.,
SMT. ANUKANKSHA KALKERI, AGA FOR R1 AND
SRI PRASHANTH S.H., ADVOCATE FOR R2;
SRI S.N.PRASHANTH CHANDRA,
SMT. NAMITHA MAHESH B.G., ADVOCATES FOR R3 AND R4)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
ARBITRARY REJECTION OF TECHNICAL BIDS OF THE PETITIONERS
BY R-3 BY ITS TENDER EVALUATION COMMITTEE VIDE
ANNEXURES-B AND RTI REPLIES MENTIONING THE DATE OF
REJECTION OF THE TENDER OF PETITIONERS NO. 2 TO 4 AS
02.12.2023 BEARING NOS. B.S.W.M.L./S.J.M.(T)/95/2023 NOs.
B.S.W.M.L/S.J.M. (T)/93/2023 NOs. B.S.W.M.L/S.J.M.(T)/94/2023
DTD 24.01.2024 VIDE ANNEXURES-B2, B4 AND B6 AND ETC.,

THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
23

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioners in all these cases are participants in a tender

that was notified by the respondent/Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara

Palike (hereinafter referred to as 'the BBMP' for short) for the

purpose of solid waste management.

2. Heard Sri R S Ravi, learned senior counsel for petitioners in

W.P.Nos.26089 of 2023 and 4698 of 2023; Sri H.V.Nagaraja Rao,

learned counsel for petitioner and Sri P Chandrashekar, learned

counsel for C/R3 in W.P.No.21940 of 2022; Sri Ashok Haranahalli,

learned senior counsel for petitioner and Sri B L Sanjeev for

respondent No.2/BBMP in W.P.No.2935 of 2023; Sri Jayakumar S

Patil, learned senior counsel for petitioners in W.P.Nos.4301 of

2023, 4308 of 2023, 4477 of 2023, 4987 of 2023 and 5071 of

2023; Sri Ashok Haranahalli, learned senior counsel for respondent

No.4 in W.P.Nos.4301 of 2023, 4308 of 2023 and 4477 of 2023;

Sri Muniraju K, learned counsel for respondent No.4 in

W.P.Nos.4987 of 2023 and 5071 of 2023; Sri N.S.Vijayanth Babu,
24

learned counsel for petitioner in W.P.No.3913 of 2024; Sri Mithun

G A, learned counsel for petitioners in W.P.No.4069 of 2024; Sri K

Shashikiran Shetty, learned Advocate General for State; Sri S N

Prashanth Chandra and Smt Namitha Mahesh B G, learned counsels

for Solid Waste Management and Sri P Prasanna Kumar, learned

senior counsel for respondent No.5 in W.P.No.2935 of 2023.

3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-

The petitioners, in the cases at hand, are all contractors

handling collection, transportation and disposal of solid waste in

several wards of the BBMP. The Urban Development Department of

Government of Karnataka establishes a separate entity called the

Bangalore Solid Waste Management Limited, a Public Limited

Company ('the Company' for short) exclusively for handling solid

waste within the limits of BBMP. A request for Proposal

('RFP')/tender was notified by the Company on 22-08-2022 inviting

applications from service providers for 89 packages on certain

terms and conditions. The Company is said to have withdrawn the

RFP and notified a fresh RFP on 28-09-2022 for the same purpose.
25

This becomes the subject matter of challenge before this Court in

Writ Petition No.21876 of 2022 and connected cases. Validity of the

notification comes to be confirmed by this Court and a direction was

issued to conclude the tender expeditiously.

4. After the order was passed by this Court, it appears that

several of the contractors were blacklisted or their tenders were not

accepted on alleged frivolous grounds contrary to the Karnataka

Transparency in Public Procurements Act, 1999. All these

petitioners are those whose tenders have been declined to be

accepted on certain grounds. During the pendency of the subject

petitions the tender that was notified comes to be cancelled or

withdrawn. On such withdrawal, the learned Advocate General

representing the State has contended that no right of any party is

taken away, as no contract is awarded to any person. The matter

was at the stage of consideration of award of contract and there is

an interim order granted in few of the cases before this Court.

Therefore, the State thought it not economically viable to continue

the tender with the change in prices and wanted to bring a new

tender which can also be monitored by the Court.
26

5. The learned senior counsel Sri Jayakumar S. Patil and the

learned counsel Sri P.Prasanna Kumar who are participants in the

subject tender would vehemently oppose the submissions of the

learned Advocate General. The learned senior counsel would

contend that the earlier tender was also monitored by the Court. On

certain frivolous grounds the tenders were rejected. Those

rejections have been stayed and this Court had directed financial

bid to be opened and opening of the financial bid was made subject

to the result of the petitions. He would contend that this is not the

first time that the State is wanting to recall the tender and re-issue

the tender. It has been repeated for extraneous reasons. He would

contend that economic viability alone cannot be the reason for

cancellation of tender. It is a mala fide action on the part of the

State. He would, therefore, contend that the subject tender be

permitted to be taken to its logical conclusion. The learned counsel

Sri P.Prasanna Kumar would also toe the lines of the learned senior

counsel.
27

6. Learned senior counsel Sri Ashok Harnahallli and

Sri R.S. Ravi would in unison submit that they have no objection for

any new tender. It is their submission that a few of the contractors,

in the cases at hand, have been blacklisted deliberately and their

tenders are cancelled on frivolous grounds. Notwithstanding all

these, they must be permitted to participate in the new tenders

when notified. If that would be done, these petitioners have no

objection for cancellation of tender and issuing of new tender.

7. The learned Advocate General, in reply to the submissions

of all the learned senior counsel, would submit that except the

orders of blacklisting on gross misconduct or fraud, all other

tenderers will be permitted to participate, notwithstanding the

orders that are passed by the BBMP declining to accept such

tenders. In that light the matters come to be heard and reserved by

the following order:

"Heard the learned Senior counsel Sri. R.S. Ravi for
Sri. Akarsh Kumar Gowda, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners and Sri. K. Shashikiran Shetty, Advocate General
along with Sri. Prashanth S.H., learned counsel appearing for
the respondents.

The matters are reserved only on the issue whether
State could have cancelled the tender and also on the question
28

of whether such tender could have been cancelled after
notifying, calling for bids and identifying successful bidders.

Interim order granted earlier if subsisting in any of these
cases, is extended till the disposal of these petitions."

Since the issue is reserved only for the purpose of

consideration of tenability of withdrawal of the tender

notification and calling for a fresh tender, I deem it

appropriate to notice orders passed by this Court from time

to time.

On 28-11-2023, this Court passed the following order:

"This Court in writ petition No.2935/2023 from
07.02.2023 upto 27.02.2023, has passed a slew of orders. They
read as follows:

The order dated 07.02.2023:

"Heard Sri Ashok Haranahalli, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioners.

Learned Additional Government Advocate waives
notice for respondent No.1.

Learned senior counsel would submit that the issue
relates to a notice inviting tender for the solid waste
management along with the secondary transportation of
waste in segregated manner to designated locations. The
earlier tender was notified for the same purpose, which
became the subject matter in W.P.No.21876/2022 and the
said writ petition came to be dismissed in terms of the order
of this Court dated 21.11.2022.
29

The learned senior counsel now takes this Court
through the documents to demonstrate that the earlier
tender is cancelled and a new tender is in place, having
notified on 25.01.2023, for the very same purpose and for
the very same packages.
Learned Additional Government Advocate to secure
instructions as to what are the reasons behind the
withdrawal of the tender earlier notified and place on record
before this Court on the next date of hearing.
List the matter on 08.02.2023, at 2.30 p.m.
Respondents are restrained from proceeding further,
till 08.02.2023."

The order dated 08.02.2023:

"The subject writ petition calls in question a re-
tender notification issued for manifold reasons.

Learned senior counsel Sri.AshokHaranahalli
appearing for petitioners would submit that re-tender
is done deliberately and is contrary to law.

Learned senior counsel Sri.VikramHuilgol,
appearing for respondents 2 and 3 would seek to
justify the action of re-tender on several grounds
which are to be considered at a later point in time. He
would submit that none of the terms and conditions
of the tender that was earlier notified and upheld by
this Court in W.P.No.21876 of 2022 c/w
W.P.No.22412 of 2022 have been changed in the
subject tender.

The said submission is placed on record.

Therefore, the petitioners shall participate in
the now notified-impugned tender which would
remain subject to the result of the petition.

The respondents shall scrutinize the tenders
that are received by the tenderers and assess
qualification both technical and financial of those
tenderers, but not finalize any tender without the
leave of the Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
30

Learned senior counsel Sri.AshokHaranahalli at this
juncture would submit that the last date for filing of tenders
is today i.e., 08.02.2023 and would seek extension by
atleast 24 hours to submit their tenders. The submission
merits acceptance.
The petitioners shall submit their tenders on or
before 12.00 p.m. tomorrow i.e., 09.02.2023.
List the matter on 14.02.2023 at 2.30 p.m. for
further hearing."

The order dated 15.02.2023:
"This Court by an order dated 08.02.2023 had
permitted the petitioners to submit their bids in the
wake of the statement made by the learned senior
counsel representing the petitioners that extension
by 24 hours would enable the petitioners to submit
their tenders.
Learned senior counsel representing the
respondents would submit that the petitioners have
not submitted their bids in 24 hours, but other 9 bids
manually have been brought into the office of the
Authority.
The bids that have been filed on their own
volition need not be acted upon as they are not
pursuant to the order of the Court.

The bids of the petitioners if they are filed in
accordance with law shall be considered and further
proceedings shall be reported to this Court on the
next date of hearing.

List the matter on 27.02.2023 at 4.00 p.m. for
further hearing."
(Emphasis supplied)

The order dated 27.02.2023:

"Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners.
Learned Additional Government Advocate waives notice for
respondent No.1.

Sri Prashanth Chandra, learned counsel is directed to
accept notice on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 and 4.
31

Learned counsel for the petitioners to serve a copy of
the petition papers upon the aforesaid learned counsel,
forthwith and also permitted to serve a copy of the notice
upon the learned counsel who represents respondent Nos.2
and 5.

List the matter on 03.03.2023.

Interim order granted earlier, is extended till the
next date of hearing."

This Court on 17.03.2023 had clarified with regard to the
interim order, which reads as follows:

"The pendency of this petition will not come in the
way of the tender inviting authority proceeding further to
evaluate technical bids of all the tenderers.

List the matters on 30.03.2023."

In the light of the afore-quoted orders, it was directed the
Solid Waste Management Limited, who is the tender inviting
authority to evaluate the tenders qua technical bids of the
tenderers.

All the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
would in unison submit that no technical bids is even evaluated
pursuant to the directions of the Court.

Sri Vikram Huilgol, learned senior counsel would
submit that technical bids are in fact evaluated and
evaluation would be placed before this Court in a sealed
cover. It is rather surprising that though the direction is
issued on 07.02.2023, the tenders so called are not been
taken to its logical conclusion, as this Court had not
stalled the tender to take to its logical conclusion, while
directing evaluation of the technical bids.

The issue concerns the clearance of garbage in the
city of Bengaluru. Close to a year is now over directions
being given by this Court and nothing has proceeded
further.
32

Therefore, the Management Director of the Solid
Waste Management Limited shall file an affidavit before
this Court as to why the tenders that are called could not
be taken to its logical conclusion. The timeline be
specifically made known in the affidavit. The affidavit
shall be filed by the next date of hearing.

While the affidavit is filed, the concerned shall bear
in mind all the orders passed this Court in any of these
petitions from time to time.

List the matter on 13.12.2023, at 2.30 p.m."

(Emphasis supplied)

The afore-quoted order captures all the earlier orders that were

passed. Again on 10-01-2024, this Court passed the following

order:

"W.P.No.2935 of 2023:

This petition is preferred calling in question a tender
notification dated 21.1.2023 and seeks a direction by issuance
of a writ in the nature of mandamus to declare the result of the
technical bid in terms of Request for Proposal ('RFP' for short)
dated 28.09.2022 and proceed with the tender on the said
basis.

Learned senior counsel Sri.AshokHaranahalli representing
certain tenderers who have called in question certain articles of
RFP would submit that the petitioners are disqualified in the
technical stage itself on certain frivolous grounds. He would
submit that the grounds inter alia are that there is no
remittance of provident Fund and ESI contributions to the
respective authorities by the tenderers.

The learned senior counsel would submit that it is not the
tenderers fault, but the Corporation is responsible for delayed
33

payment of contribution to the provident fund and ESI. The said
submission would be considered at a later point in time.

All other petitions are in support of the subsequent tender
so notified by the Corporation.

This Court permitted all the present petitioners who are
tenderers to participate in the tender i.e., the subsequent
tender. The petitioners have all participated in the tender and
the technical evaluation is placed in a sealed cover before this
Court by the learned Advocate General.

The learned Advocate General would submit that let the
Corporation be permitted to proceed further with the tender qua
financial evaluation on the strength of the technical evaluation
that has happened.

The submission merits acceptance. The Corporation or the
respondents shall continue processing of the tender qua the
second tender notification impugned in W.P.No.2935 of 2023 to
be taken to its logical conclusion.

The contentions of the learned senior counsel
Sri.AshokHaranahalli would be considered prior to the
permission for declaration of issuance of work orders to the
respectful successful tenderers. In the light of the few of the
petitioners being disqualified on reasons which the learned
senior counsel Sri.Ashok Haranahalli would submit, the State
shall file a supporting document or affidavit with regard to the
34

reasons for such disqualification of few of the petitioners in the
said petition by the next date of hearing.

List the matters on 09.02.2024 at 2.30 p.m.

The evaluation of the final bid shall be undertaken by the
said date and placed before the Court. This would, however be,
without prejudice to the rights of the petitioners in W.P.No.2935
of 2023 or any other petitioners who are calling in question the
subsequent tender process.

The work orders be issued only after seeking leave from
the hands of this Court.

Interim order, granted earlier and if subsisting in any of
these cases, shall stand extended till the next date of hearing."

(Emphasis supplied)

On 09-07-2024, the following order came to be passed:

"Learned Advocate General, on instructions, would
submit that the BSWML has decided to withdraw the
subject tender and call for fresh tender.

He would submit that if fresh tender is permitted to
be called, the process of tender, awarding of contract and
beginning of execution of work will all begin within three
months from the date of notification of the said tender.

He would also submit that he would place on record
the decision to call off tender which is subject matter of
the petition and notify fresh tender and all other
incidental or attendant decision taken thereto by the
BSWML.

List the matters on 11.07.2024 at 4.00 p.m.
35

Interim order, granted earlier, if subsisting in any
of these cases, is extended till the next date of hearing."

(Emphasis supplied)

On 09-07-2024 the learned Advocate General on instructions

submitted that the Company has decided to withdraw the subject

tender and call for a fresh tender. After this date, on several

occasions, the matter was heard. On 03-12-2024 the matter was

reserved on the issue as afore-quoted.

8. In the light of the afore-quoted orders, what would

unmistakably emerge is, that the tender was not taken to its logical

conclusion when the matter was pending before this Court. The

respondent/BBMP then resolve to recall the tender and in

furtherance of which a Government Order comes to be issued on

02-09-2024. The Government Order reads as follows:

"ಕ ಾ ಟಕ ಸ ಾ ರದ ನಡವ ಗಳ

ಷಯ: ಬೃಹ ೆಂಗಳ ರು ಮ ಾನಗರ ಾ! ೆ "ಾ#$%ಯ!& Appointment of
Concessionaire on tipping fee basis to execute the
Comprehensive Integrated Solid Waste Management
(ISWM) facilities including Collection & Transportation of
MSW from door to door to the designated Secondary
Transfer stations and secondary transportation from
transfer stations to designated Processing Centers and
36

further processing the same in four packages" ಾಮ'ಾ('ೆ
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ಸಂ?ೆ#: ವ#.,( ೆಂ.ಘ.7ಾ#.,)/ $ಆA-263/23-24, ¢£ÁAPÀ: 27-02-2024.
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ಪ=V,ತ# 600 jP=n ಟC ಆA._.ಎo 7ಾ#ಜ#Lಂದ 11.5 j'ಾ"ಾ#p ದು# ಉ7ಾZLಸುವ ಘಟಕ
Hಾತ="ೇ 2ಾ3$ಸ/ಾ0ದುM, ಘಟಕವ` ಾ=ರಂqಕ ಹಂತದ!&ರುತ%1ೆ. ಉ ದಂ7ೆ ಕbಾರು ಒಪZಂದ
Hಾ_ ೊಳ mವ j|| 'ೇe ಸಂ2ೆ3ಯನುT ೊರತುಪ_l ಉ ದ ಎ/ಾ& ಸಂ2ೆ3ಗಳ ಳಂಬ rೋರ9ೆ
37

7ೋರುV%ದುM ಸದ( ಪ=2ಾ%ವ ೆಗಳನುT ರದುM'ೊ ಸಲು ಸsವ ಸಂಪ`ಟದ ಅನು*ೕದ ೆiಂL'ೆ
ಕ=ಮವaಸ/ಾ01ೆ.

F.F
F.ಎಂ
ಎಂ.$
ಎಂ $. "ಾ#$%ಯ!& ಧ ಾರಣಗ ಂದ 7ಾ#ಜ# ,ವ ಹ9ೆಯು ಬಹು1ೊಡv
ಸ"ಾ/ಾ0ರುವ`ದನುT ಸ ಾ ರವ` ಮನಗಂ_ರುತ%1ೆ.ೆ ಈ a ೆT/ೆಯ!&, 2024-25 ೇ 2ಾ!ನ ಆಯವ#ಯ
ಕಂ_ ೆ 266 ರ!& 'ಮ
ಮ ೆಗ ಂದ 7ಾ#ಜ# ಸಂಸ^ರ9ಾ ಘಟಕಗಳವbೆಗೂ 7ಾ#ಜ#ಗಳ /ೇ"ಾ(ಯನುT
ವ#ವl3ತ"ಾ0 ,ವ aಸಲು ೆಂಗಳ ರು ನಗರ x/ೆ&ಯನುT ಾಲು^ ವಲಯಗಳ ಾT0 ಂಗ_l,
ಂಗ_l
ಪ=Viಂದು ವಲಯಕೂ^ ನು(ತ ಸಂ2ೆ3ಯನುT ಾರದಶ ಕ"ಾ0 ೇ:ಸ/ಾಗುವ`ದು.
ೇ:ಸ/ಾಗುವ`ದು ನಗರದ
ೊರವಲಯದ
ೊರವಲಯದ ಾಲು^ ಕyೆಗಳ!& 50 (ಂದ 100 ಎಕbೆ ಜ:ೕನನುT ಗುರುVl ಮುಂLನ 30 ವಷ ಗಳ
ೆಳವX'ೆಯನುT ಗಮನದ!&ಟುO "ೈ]ಾ,ಕ 7ಾ#ಜ# /ೇ"ಾ('ೆ ಅವ ಾಶ ಕ!Zಸ/ಾಗುವ`ದು'
ಕ!Zಸ/ಾಗುವ`ದು ಎಂದು
zೂೕ{ಸ/ಾ01ೆ.
zೂೕ{ಸ/ಾ01ೆ

FಎGಡಬೂ&dಎಂಎe ಸಂ2ೆ3ಯ iೕಜ ಾ ಸHಾ/ೋಚಕbಾದ j।। bೈp| !:}ೆS
FಎGಡಬೂ&
ರವ('ೆ F.F
F.ಎಂ
ಎಂ.$
ಎಂ $. "ಾ#$%
"ಾ#$%ಯ!& ಸಮಗ= ಘನ 7ಾ#ಜ# ,ವ ಹ9ೆಯ ಸ~ತ J=[ಾiೕಜ ೆಯ
ಜ"ಾ ಾM(ಯನುT ವaಸ/ಾ0ರುತ%1ೆ.ೆ ಸದ( ಸಂ2ೆ3ಯು ತ[ಾ(lದ J=[ಾ iೕಜ ೆಯನುT FಎG
ಡಬೂ&dಎಂಎe ಸಂ2ೆ3ಯ ಾಲ^ ೇ ಐದ ೇ 7ಾಂV=ಕ ಸ:V ಾಗೂ ಉಪ ಸ:Vಯ!& ಸುLೕಘ "ಾ0
ಚs l.
l Hಾಪ _l HಾನದಂಡಗಳನುT ಅಳವ_l
ಅಳವ_l ೊಂಡು J=[ಾ iೕಜ ೆಯನುT
ಪ(ಷ^(ಸ/ಾ0ರುತ%1ೆ ಎಂದು ವ#ವ2ಾ3ಪಕ ,1ೇ ಶಕರು,
ಶಕರು FಎGಡಬೂ&
FಎGಡಬೂ&dಎಂಎe ರವರು ತಮ€ L ಾಂಕ:
ಾಂಕ
ರ ಪ=2ಾ%ವ ೆಯ!& V lರು7ಾ%bೆ.ೆ ಸದ( ಪ=2ಾ%ವ ೆಯನುT FಎGಡಬೂ&
27-02-2024ರ FಎGಡಬೂ&dಎಂಎe ಸಂ2ೆ3ಯ
13 ೇ ಆಡ ತ ಮಂಡ ಸDೆಯ!& ಮಂ_lದುM, ಪ=V ಟC 7ಾ#ಜ#
7ಾ#ಜ# ಸಂಗ=ಹ9ೆ ಮತು% 2ಾ'ಾX ೆ'ೆ
ರೂ.2343/-
ರೂ ಾಗೂ ಪ=V ಟC ಸಂಸ^ರ9ೆ ಾಗೂ /ೇ"ಾ('ೆ ರೂ.650/-
ರೂ ಗ 'ೆ ಸಹಮV
,ೕಡ/ಾ0ರುತ%zÉ.

ಈ a ೆT/ೆಯ!&, F.F.ಎಂ.$. "ಾ#$%ಯ!& ಉತZV%[ಾಗುವ 7ಾ#ಜ#ವನುT 25 ವಷ ಗಳ
ಅವ•'ೆ ಪ=VಟC 7ಾ#ಜ# ಸಂಗ=ಹ9ೆ ಾಗೂ ,ವ ಹ9ೆ'ೆ P$Zಂ‚ ƒೕ ಆrಾ(ತ"ಾ0 ಾಲು^ ಾ# ೇ8
ಗಳ!& }ೆಂಡA ,ವ aಸಲು ಸ ಾ ರದ ಅನು*ೕದ ೆ ,ೕಡುವಂ7ೆ ವ#ವ2ಾ3ಪಕ ,1ೇ ಶಕರು, FಎG
ಡಬೂ&dಎಂಎe ರವರು ೋ(ರು7ಾ%bೆ. ಸದ( }ೆಂಡA ಾಮ'ಾ(ಯು ರೂ.50.00 ೋPಗ 'ೆ
ಾಮ'ಾ([ಾ0ರುವ`ದ(ಂದ bಾಜ# }ೆಂಡA ಪ„ವ ಪ(...ೕಲ ಾ ಸ:V'ೆ ಅಂ1ಾಜು ಪPO ಮತು%
}ೆಂಡA ದ2ಾ%"ೇಜುಗಳನುT ಸ!&l ಸ:Vಯ ಸಲ ೆ ಮತು% ...†ಾರಸು|ಗಳನುT ಪyೆಯ/ಾ01ೆ.

F.F.ಎಂ.$. 'ೆ ಸಮಗ= ಘನ7ಾ#ಜ# ,ವ ಹ9ಾ ಘಟಕಗಳನುT 2ಾ3$ಸಲು ೆಲವ` ‡ಾಗಗಳನುT
ಗುರುVಸ/ಾ01ೆ. ಸದ( ಪ=1ೇಶಗಳನುT ಸ ಾ ರದ ಹಂತದ!& ಒಂದು ಸ:VಯನುT ರsl }ೆಂಡA
38

ಪ=J=ˆ ಮು0ಯುವ ಅವ•iಳ'ೆ ಸದ( ಪ=1ೇಶಗಳನುT FFಎಂ$ ಸುಪL 'ೆ ಪyೆಯಲು
ಕ=ಮವaಸ/ಾಗುವ`ದು ಎಂದು ಮುಖ# ಆಯುಕ%ರು, FFಎಂ$ರವರು V lರು7ಾ%bೆ.

ಮುಂದುವbೆದು, ಒಂದು "ೇ‰ೆ ಸ ಾ ರದ ಭೂ: ಲಭ# ಲ&LದM!& ಸೂಕ% ?ಾಸ0 ಜ:ೕನನುT
ನಗರದ ಾಲು^ LJ^ನ ೊರವಲಯದ!& ಸುHಾರು 100 ಎಕbೆ ಪ=V ಕyೆಯಂ7ೆ x/ಾ&• ಾ(ಗಳ
,ಗLಪ_lದ ೆ/ೆಯ!& F.F.ಎಂ.$. ‹ಂದ ಖ(ೕLಸಲು ಅನುಮV ೋರ/ಾ0ರುತ%1ೆ. ನಗರ ೆ^
ಹV%ರದ!& 7ಾ#ಜ# /ೇ"ಾ( ಘಟಕಗಳ 2ಾ3ಪ ೆಯು ದು"ಾ ಸ ೆ'ೆ ಾರಣ"ಾಗುV%ದುM, 2ಾವ ಜ,ಕ(ಂದ
Vೕವ` bೋಧ ವ#ಕ%"ಾಗುV%1ೆ. ಆದM(ಂದ ನಗರದ ೊರವಲಯದ!& 2ಾಕಷುO ಜನವಸV ಇರದ
Dಾಗಗಳ!& ೆಚುW ಪ=Hಾಣದ ಭೂ:ಯನುT ಖ(ೕLl, ಬಫA ‡ೋC ಅಳವ_l ೊಂಡು ಸಮಗ= 7ಾ#ಜ#
/ೇ"ಾ( ೈ'ೊಳ mವ`ದ(ಂದ jೕ/ೆ V ಸ/ಾದ ಸಮ2ೆ#ಯನುT ಪ(9ಾಮ ಾ([ಾ0 ಕ_j
Hಾಡಬಹುದಲ&1ೆ ಪ(ಸರ Hಾ!ನ#ವನುT ,ಯಂV=ಸಬಹು1ಾ01ೆ. ಪ=ಸು%ತ ೆಂಗಳ (ನ ಸುತ%ಮುತ%
ಪ=1ೇಶದ!& ಭೂ:ಯ ೆ/ೆಯು ಗಣ,ೕಯ"ಾ0 ಏರುV%ದುM ಈ ಹಂತದ!& ೆsWನ ಪ=Hಾಣದ ಭೂ
ಖ(ೕL‹ಂದ ಭ ಷ#ದ!& ಉ 7ಾಯ ೆ^ ಾರಣ"ಾಗ!1ೆ.

ಸ ಾ ರದ ಅನು*ೕದ ೆಯ ನಂತರ 7ಾ#ಜ# ಉ7ಾZದಕ(ಂದ/ೇ ಬಳ ೆ1ಾರರ ಶುಲ^ವನುT
ಸಂಗ=al ಆ *ತ%Lಂದ/ೇ P$Zಂ‚ ಶುಲ^ವನುT ಾವVಸ/ಾಗುವ`ದು ಎಂದು ಮುಖ# ಆಯುಕ%ರು,
FFಎಂ$ ರವರು V lರು7ಾ%bೆ. ಮುಂದುವbೆದು, P$Zಂ‚ ಶುಲ^ ಾವVಸುವ!& 7ಾ#ಜ# ಉ7ಾZದಕರ
ಬಳ ೆ1ಾರ ಶುಲ^Lಂದ ಸಂಗ=ಹ9ೆ'ೊಂಡ *ತ% ೆ^ ೋ!l1ಾಗ ೊರ7ೆ ಉಂ}ಾದ!& FFಎಂ$ಯ
ಸcಂತ ಅನು1ಾನLಂದ ಭ(ಸ/ಾಗುವ`ದು ಎಂದು ಸಹ V lರು7ಾ%bೆ.

}ೆಂಡAನ!& xಎo 2ೇಪ _ಸುವ`ದನುT ೈFಡ/ಾ01ೆ. ಸcಚŽ Dಾರ «ÄµÀ£ï 2.0 Cr
C£ÀÄªÉÆÃ¢vÀUÉÆAqÀ ªÉÆvÀÛªÀ£ÀÄß ©©JA¦/©J¸ïqÀ§ÆèöåJAಎe ನ ಘನ7ಾ#ಜ# ,ವ ಹ9ೆ
ಾಮ'ಾ(ಗ 'ೆ ಬಳl ೊಳm/ಾಗುವ`ದು. Concessionaire Agreement ಅನುT ,ೕV
ಆiೕಗ ಒದ0lದ Hಾದ(ಯ!& lದkಪ_lದುM, Exit and Force majeure ಅವ ಾಶಗಳ
ಸZಷO"ಾ0"ೆ ಎಂದು V lರು7ಾ%bೆ.

ಮುRå ಆಯುಕ%ರು, FFಎಂ$ ರವರ ಪ=2ಾ%ವ ೆಯನುT ಕೂಲಂಕಷ"ಾ0 ಪ(...ೕ!lದ
ಸ ಾ ರವ` ಈ ೆಳ0ನಂ7ೆ ಆ1ೇ...l1ೆ.

ಸ ಾ ರದ ಆ1ೇಶ ಸಂ?ೆ#: ಇ) .
ಸಂ?ೆ# ನಅಇ 155 ಎಂಎC ªÉÊ2024 (ಇ
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ:: 02-09-2024.

ಪ=2ಾ%ವ ೆಯ!& ವ(lರುವ ಅಂಶಗಳ a ೆT/ೆಯ!&
ೆT/ೆಯ!&, ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡ ಅಂಶಗ 'ೆ ಸ ಾ ರದ
ಅನು*ೕದ ೆ ,ೕ_ ಆ1ೇ...l1ೆ.
ಆ1ೇ...l1ೆ
39

1. ಬೃಹ ೆಂಗಳ ರು ಮ ಾನಗರ ಾ! ೆಯ!& ಾಲು^,
ಾಲು^ ಾ# ೇ8UÀ¼À°è PÀgÉAiÀÄ¯ÁUÀÄªÀ
Appointment of Concessionaire on Tipping Fee basis to
Execute the Comprehensive integrated Solid Waste
Management Facilities Including Collection & Transportation
of MSW from Door to Door to designated Secondary Transfer
Stations and Secondary Transportation from Transfer
Stations to designated Processing Centers and further
Processing the same in Four Packages ಾಮ'ಾ('ೆ ಅಗತ# ಪ=Hಾಣದ
ಜ:ೕನು ಋಣDಾರ,
ಋಣDಾರ "ಾ#ಜ# ಮತು% ಸ3 ೕಯ "ಾದಗ ಂದ ಮುಕ%"ಾ0ದುM, F.F
F.ಎಂ
ಎಂ.$
ಎಂ $.ಯ
ಯ
ಸುಪL ಯ!& ಸಂಪ„ಣ "ಾ0 ಇ1ೆ ಎಂದು ಖsತ"ಾದ ಬ ಕವ'ೆO }ೆಂಡA
}ೆಂಡAನ!& ಆˆ^'ೊಂಡ
ಸಂ2ೆ3iಂL'ೆ ಒಪZಂದ Hಾ_ ೊಳ mವ ಷರV%'ೆ ಒಳಪಟುO }ೆಂಡA ಕbೆಯುವ`ದು;
ಕbೆಯುವ`ದು

2. ಾಮ'ಾ(ಗ 'ೆ }ೆಂಡA ಕbೆಯುವ ಮುನT bಾಜ# }ೆಂಡA ಪ„ವ ಪ(...ೕಲ ಾ ಸ:Vಯು
ಪ=2ಾ%ವ ೆ ಬ'ೆ- ,ೕ_ರುವ ಅq ಾ=ಯ/ಸಲ
ಾ=ಯ ಸಲ ೆಯನುT ಕyಾvಯ"ಾ0 ಾ!l ಅನು ಾಲ ಾ
ವರLಯನುT F.F
F.ಎಂ
ಎಂ.$
ಎಂ $ ಯು ಸ!&ಸುವ`ದು;
ುವ`ದು

3. iೕಜ ೆ'ೆ ಅಗತ# ರುವ ಜ:ೕನನುT ಇತbೆ ಇ/ಾ?ೆಗ ಂದ ತು7ಾ 0 F.F.ಎಂ.$.'ೆ ಹ2ಾ%ಂತರ
Hಾಡಲು ಸ ಾ ರದ ಮು'ಯ ಾಯ ದ... ಯವರ ಅಧ#U7ೆಯ!& F ೆಳಕಂಡ
ಅ• ಾ(ಗಳ ೊTಳ'ೊಂಡಂ7ೆ ಒಂದು ಸಮನcಯ ಸ:VಯನುT ರsಸುವ`ದು;

1 ಸ ಾ ರದ ಮುಖ# ಾಯ ದ... ಗಳ . ಅಧ#Uರು.
2 ಸ ಾ ರದ ಅಪರ ಮುಖ# ಾಯ ದ... , ನಗbಾqವೃLk ಇ/ಾ?ೆ. ಸದಸ#ರು.

3 ಸ ಾ ರದ ಅಪರ ಮುಖ# ಾಯ ದ... , ಆ" ಕ ಇ/ಾ?ೆ. ಸದಸ#ರು.
4 ಮುಖ# ಆಯುಕ%ರು. ಸದಸ# ಾಯ ದ... .
©.©.JA.¦. / ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀ ¤zÉÃð±ÀPÀgÀÄ,
F.ಎG.ಡಬೂ&d.ಎಂ.ಎe

fೇಷ ಆ ಾc,ತರು:
5 ಸ ಾ ರದ ಅಪರ ಮುಖ# ಾಯ ದ... , ಇಂಧನ ಇ/ಾ?ೆ.
6 ಸ ಾ ರದ ಪ=rಾನ ಾಯ ದ... . /ೋ ೋಪiೕ0 ಇ/ಾ?ೆ.
7 ಸ ಾ ರದ ಪ=rಾನ ಾಯ ದ... , ಕಂ1ಾಯ ಇ/ಾ?ೆ.
8 ಅಧ#Uರ ಅಪZ9ೆ jೕbೆ'ೆ ಇತbೆ [ಾವ`1ೇ ಅ• ಾ(ಗಳ
40

4. ಸ ಾ ರದ ಭೂ: ಲಭ# ಲ&LದM!& ಸೂಕ% ?ಾಸ0 ಜ:ೕನನುT ನಗರದ ಾಲು^ LJ^ನ ೊರ
ವಲಯದ!& ಸುHಾರು 100 ಎಕbೆ ಪ=V PÀqÉAiÀÄAvÉ x/ಾ&• ಾ(ಗಳ ,ಗLಪ_lದ ೆ/ೆಯ!&
ಖ(ೕLಸುವ`ದ ೆ^ F.F.ಎಂ.$.'ೆ ಅನುಮVl1ೆ;

5. ಘನ7ಾ#ಜ# ,ವ ಹ9ಾ ,ಯಮಗಳ , 2016 ಮತು% hಾ!%ಯ!&ರುವ ೇಂL=ೕಯ Hಾ!ನ#
,ಯಂತ=9ಾ ಮಂಡ ಯ Hಾಗ ಸೂsಗಳನುT F.F.ಎಂ$/ F.ಎG.ಡಬೂ&d.ಎಂ.ಎe. ಕಟುO,}ಾO0
ಅನುಸರ9ೆ Hಾಡುವ`ದು.

ಷರತು%ಗಳ :

1) ೆP$$ ಾˆM ಮತು% ,ಯಮಗಳ , ಕ ಾ ಟಕ ಆ" ಕ ಸಂa7ೆ-1958, 2ಾ•/ಾcರು "ೆಚW ೈ$_
ಅ•,ಯಮ ಾಗೂ ಾಲ ಾಲ ೆ^ hಾ!%ಯ!&ರುವ ಎ/ಾ& ಾˆM ,ಯಮಗಳನು2ಾರ
ಕ=ಮವaಸತಕ^ದುM.

ಈ ಆ1ೇಶವನುT L ಾಂಕ: 22-08-2024 ರಂದು ನyೆದ ಸsವ ಸಂಪ`ಟ ಸDೆಯ ಷಯ ಸಂ?ೆ#: l:
444/2024ರ ,ಣ ಯದಂ7ೆ ೊರ_ಸ/ಾ01ೆ.

ಕ ಾ ಟಕ bಾಜ# ಾಲರ ಆ]ಾನು2ಾರ
ಮತು%
ಅವರ ೆಸ(ನ!&

¸À»/-
(ಲ---ೕ2ಾಗA ಎC. ೆ.)
ಸ ಾ ರದ ಅ•ೕನ ಾಯ ದ...
ನಗbಾqವೃLk ಇ/ಾ?ೆ (FFಎಂ$)"

(Emphasis supplied)

Subsequent to the Government Order, a tender notification is also

issued on 07-11-2024. It reads as follows:

"NODGM-1/BSWML/TEND/08/2024-25 Date: 07.11.2004
41

INVITATION FOR BIDS (IFT) (Only through GOK KPP Portal Only)

1. The Deputy General Manager-1 (Technical), Bengaluru Solid
Waste Management Limited (BSWML), on behalf of
Managing Director BSWML invites proposals for
"Appointment of Concessionaire on Tipping Fee basis to
execute the Comprehensive integrated Solid Waste
Management facilities including Collection and
Transportation of MSW from Door-to-Door to designated
Secondary Transfer Stations, Secondary Transportation
from Transfer Stations to designated Processing Centrse
and further Processing and Disposal of the same in
following packages" (herein referred as "The Project") of
BBMP and Bengaluru Urban District jurisdiction by seeking
private sector participation on Public Private Partnership
["PPP mode-DBFOT Model).

Approx. Estimated capital
cost of the project in INR
in Crores (Excluding GST) Stipulated
completion
EMD
For For period
Sl. (Armount in
Name of the work Collection Processing (including
No. Rs.)
& & monsoon
Transporta Disposal period)
tion (C&T) (P&D)

01 Appointment of 134.95 523.00 Rs.1,00,000/ 24 Months
Concessionaire on through e-
Tipping Fee Basis payment
to Execute the under one of
Comprehensive the following
Integrated Solid i.e.,
Waste online/RTGS/
Management NEFT/ OTC
(ISWM) including and the
collection & balance
transportation of Rs.3,28,00,0
MSW From door- 00/- by Bank
to door to the Guarantee/
designated FDR issued
secondary by
Transfer station Nationalized/
and secondary Scheduled
transportation Bank
from transfer
42

station to
designated
processing
centres and
further processing
in Package 1
(Yelahanka &
Desarahalli
Zone)

02. Appointment of 204.68 378.00 Rs.1,00,000/
Concessionaire on - through e- 24 Months
Tipping Fee Basis payment
to Execute the under one of
Comprehensive the following
integrated Solid i.e.,
Waste online/RTGS
Management /NEFT/OTC
(ISWM) including and the
collection & balance
transportation of Rs.2.91,00,0
MSW From door- 00/- by Bank
to door to the Guarantee/
designated FDR issued
secondary transfer by
station and Nationalized
secondary / Scheduled
transportation, Bank
from transsfer
station to
designated
processing centres
and Further
processing in
Package 2 (RR
Nagar zone &
West Zone)

03. Appointment of 160.22 500.00 Rs.
Concessionaire on 1,00,000/- 24 Months
Tipping Fee Basis through e-
to Execute the payment
Comprehensive under one of
Integrated Solid the following
Waste i.e.,
Management online/RTGS
(ISWM) including /NEFT/OTG
43

collection & and the
transportation of balance
MSW From 03. Rs.3,75,00,
door- to door to 000/- by
the designated Bank
secondary Guarantee /
transfer station FDR issued
and secondary by
transportation Nationalized
from transter /Scheduled
station to Bank
designated
processing
centres and
further processing
in Package 3
(Esat zone &
Mahadevapura
Zone)

04 Appointment of 201.42 656.00 24 Months
Concessionaire on Rs.1,00,000/
Tipping Fee Basis - through e-
to Execute the payment
Comprehensive under one of
Integrated Solid the
Waste following.i.e.
Management ,
(ISWM) including online/RTGS
collection & /NEFT/OTC
transportation of and the
MSW From door- balance Rs
to door to the 4,28,00,000/
designated - by Bank
secondary Guarantee
transfer station /FDR issued
and secondary by
transportation Nationalized
from transfer /Scheduled
station to Bank
designated
processing
centres and
further processing
in Package 4
[South zone &
44

Bommanahalli
Zone)

NOTE: 1) RFP documents may be downioaded from Government of
Karnataka Portal website
http://kppp.karnataka.gov.in/#/portal/portal-home under tenders'
section. The tender document can be downloaded in the portal as per
prescribed date and time published in the portal. Only Interested
Service Provider who wishes to participate should remit online
transaction fee for tender after registering in the portal. The
transaction fee /Bid document/Tender Document fee is non-
refundable. 2) Bidders shall quote & submit the bids only online. 3)
The quoted rates of tipping fee shall be excluding GST. 4) The BSWML,
has invited separate tenders for appointment of agencies for Collection
and Transportation of MSW from the BBMP limits (225 wards). Hence,
the scope of work of Collection and Transportation of MSW mentioned
in article 2 of DCA (Draft Concessionare Agreement) will be executed
through such agencies for whom work order will be issued in future.
These shall be valid for a period of 5 years only from the date of award
of work. Soon after expiry of 5 years period or in cases of early
termination of any of such other agencies of C & T due to any reasons,
the package agencies of this tender shall take over the work of C&T
immediately. Hence, the bidders of the ISWM packages shall critically
review the scope mentioned in Article 2 of DCA and submit their bids
accordingly. 5) Other details can be seen in the RFP/Tender
documents, 6) Calendar of events:

Pre Bid meeting 25.11.2024 at 15:00 hrs at
above mentioned office

Last date of Receipt of 24.12.2024 at 16:00 hrs
Tender
Opening of Technical Bid 26.12.2024 after 16:30 hrs

More detaile can be downloaded from website-
http://kppp.kamataka.gov.in

Sd/-
Deputy General Manager-1
BSWML"

(Emphasis supplied)
45

9. The issue now would be, whether the tender that came

up to the stage of identification of successful tenderer could

be cancelled and a fresh tender could be notified?

10. The reason for issue of fresh notification is borne out in

the affidavit filed by the Chief Engineer and Chief General Manager

(Technical), on behalf of the Company. I deem it appropriate to

quote the reasons so rendered in the affidavit. They read as

follows:

".... .... ....

6. I state that, accordingly, the first tender was issued on
28.09.2022 vide Tender Notification No: CGM (TECH)/
TEND/02/2022-23. The scope of work of the said tender mainly
included the following:

• Door to Door Collection & Transportation of
Wet / Dry and Sani waste from House Holds
and small commercial establishments (up to
100 Kgs) in a single Auto Tipper with
Compartments for Wet Waste/ Dry waste
/Sanitary waste collection to ensure proper
segregation at waste generation itself.

• Transfer the segregated waste to secondary
transfer points/Transfer stations and tipping
to Compactors. The compactors to transport
the collected solid waste to the waste
processing plants assigned to a particular
compactor or to the landfill in case its mixed
waste.
46

• Clearing of Litter bins from road sides and
small commercial establishments

• Clearing of Garbage Vulnerable points form
road sides etc

• Collection and transport of tree/ shrub
cuttings from de-weeding operation.

• Collection & Transportation of dead animals
as needed.

7. I state that, the aforesaid tender also contemplated
use of following different type of vehicles for collection of dry,
wet and sanitary waste in segregated manner separately which
will run every day.

• Push cart with 3-4 Bins for smaller lanes where
auto cant move;

• 1 Cum 3-wheeler Auto Tipper (Compartmentalized
for collection of both Wet & Dry waste);

• 2 Cum 4-Wheeler vehicle (Compartmentalized for
collection of both Wet & Dry waste);

• 5 Cum 4-Wheeler vehicle (Compartmentalized for
collection of both Wet & Dry waste) and

• 5 Cum 4-Wheeler open type vehicle for Street
swept, C & D and Black spot waste collection.

• Brand New Compactor with 14 cum capacity BS-VI
Engine (Diesel) Vehicles for secondary transport
vehciles.

8. I state that, upon issuing such tender dated
28.09.2022, no competitive bids came to be received in the first
call and many agencies did not submit proper documents for
technical qualifications, and therefore, the tender was recalled.
47

9. I further state that, the second call for the same tender
was called vide Notification dated 21-01-2023 and the technical
bids of second call tender were opened on 10-02-2023.

10. I state that, in the meantime, some of the
contractors/ agencies have approached this Hon'ble
Court by filing a Writ Petition in WP No. 2935/2023
seeking for declaration of result of the technical bid in
terms of Request for Proposal ('RFP' for short) dated
28.09.2022 and proceed with the tender on the said
basis. Subsequently, many other connected cases were
bought under WP No. 2935/2023.

11. I state that, subsequent to the above cases
being filed in the High Court, the technical bids of the
aforementioned tender were subjected to a detailed
evaluation process. The evaluation statement was
presented before the Technical and Financial Evaluation
Committee of BSWML. The proceedings of the committee
were submitted to the Hon'ble High Court in a sealed
cover for consideration on 10/02/2023.

12. I state that, thereafter, few of the technically
disqualified agencies have filed appeals before the
appellant authority challenging the technical evaluation
proceedings. There are about 17 appeals filed before the
tender appellate authority. The hearing for the same by
the appellant authority i.e. Urban Development
Department is pending because the matter is still being
heard by this Hon'ble Court and may become sub-judice.

13. I state that, further this Hon'ble Court vide its Order
dated 10.01.2024 held as follows:

"This petition is preferred calling in question a tender
notification dated 21.1.2023 and seeks a direction by issuance
of a writ in the nature of mandamus to declare the result of the
technical bid in terms of Request for Proposal ('RFP' for short)
dated 28.09.2022 and proceed with the tender on the said
basis.

Learned senior counsel Sri. Ashok Haranahalli
representing certain tenderers who have called in question
48

certain articles of RFP would submit that the petitioners are
disqualified in the technical stage itself on certain frivolous
grounds. He would submit that the grounds inter alia are that
there is no remittance of provident Fund and ESI contributions
to the respective authorities by the tenderers.

The learned senior counsel would submit that it is not
the tenderer's fault, but the Corporation is responsible for
delayed payment of contribution to the provident fund and ESI.
The said submission would be considered at a later point in
time.

The other submission of the learned senior counsel is
that the other grounds on which certain petitioners are now
sought to be non-suited at the technical stage are also
untenable. He would submit that the untenability is
demonstrated in the pleadings and the documents appended to
the petition. Even this ground would merit consideration at a
later stage. All other petitions are in support of the subsequent
tender so notified by the Corporation. This Court permitted all
the present petitioners who are tenderers to participate in the
tender i.e., the subsequent tender. The petitioners have all
participated in the tender and the technical evaluation is placed
in a sealed cover before this Court by the learned Advocate
General. The learned Advocate General would submit that let
the Corporation be permitted to proceed further with the tender
qua financial evaluation on the strength of the technical
evaluation that has happened.

The submission merits acceptance. The Corporation or
respondents shall continue processing of the tender qua
the second tender notification impugned in W.P.No.2935
of 2023 to be taken to its logical conclusion.

The logical conclusion shall stop a step before it,
which would mean that the respondents are at liberty to
assess the tender qua the financial bid, but not issue the
work order without the leave of the Court and place the
financial bids also before this Court in a sealed cover. The
contentions of the learned senior counsel Sri.Ashok Haranahalli
would be considered prior to the permission for declaration of
issuance of work orders to the respectful successful tenderers.
In the light of the few of the petitioners being disqualified on
reasons which the learned senior counsel Sri. Ashok Haranahalli
would submit, the State shall file a supporting document or
affidavit with regard to the reasons for such disqualification of
49

few of the petitioners in the said petition by the next date of
hearing.

List the matters on 09.02.2024 at 2.30 p.m.

The evaluation of the final bid shall be undertaken
by the said date and placed before the Court. This would,
however be, without prejudice to the rights of the petitioners in
W.P.No.2935 of 2023 or any other petitioners who are calling in
question the subsequent tender process.

The work orders be issued only after seeking leave
from the hands of this Court.

Interim order, granted earlier and if subsisting in any of
these cases, shall stand extended till the next date of hearing".

14. I state that, thereafter, the financial bids of the
technically qualified bidders were opened on 15/02/2024. The
statements of financial bids, along with comparisons and
identification of the lowest bidders, were placed before the
Hon'ble High Court in a sealed cover. Copy of the Chart
showing the Range of Financial Bids as compared to
Amount put to Tender (for the 89 packages) is attached
herewith as Document No. 1.

15. I state that, after evaluating the financial bids, it was
observed that the financial quotes of the lowest bidders ranged
from 12% above to 82% above the amount put to bid,
averaging approximately 45% above the tendered
amount. This significant increase over the approved rates
would result in substantial financial implications for the State,
rendering the bids financially unviable. Moreover, the
percentages, when compared with the amount put to bid in each
package as per the tender and the amounts quoted by agencies,
were higher by more than 40% to 50% in almost all packages.
Hence, BBMP/Govt may not be in a position to either negotiate
or approve such high Tender premium tenders which may again
delay the whole process.

16. I state that, furthermore, the financial bids which was
produced to the Hon'ble Court is re-produced herewith. The said
chart of financial bid-evaluation clearly shows that in each of the
50

packages, the lowest bidder is on a higher side to an extent of
40-45% (average). Upon a detailed examination of the financial
bids, the distribution of the percentage increases over the
amount put to bid across the various packages is as follows:

• Range greater than 10% and less than 20%
above the tendered amount: There are 5
packages in this category.

• Range greater than 20% and less than 30%
above the tendered amount: There are 3
packages.

• Range greater than 30% and less than 40%
above the tendered amount: There is 1
package in this category.

• Range greater than 40% and less than 50%
above the tendered amount: This is the largest
category, comprising 43 packages.

• Range greater than 50% and less than 60%
above the tendered amount: There are 31
packages in this category.

• Range greater than 60% and less than 70%
above the tendered amount: There are 3
packages in this category.

• Range greater than 80% above the tendered
amount: There is 1 package in this category.

• No technically qualified bids received: There
are 2 packages, being Package Numbers 63 and
89.

17. I further state that, from the above data, it is evident
that a substantial majority of the packages-77 out of 89-have
bids that are more than 40% above the amount put to bid.
Specifically, 43 packages fall within the 40% to 50% range,
and 31 packages fall within the 50% to 60% range. This
clustering of bids within narrow percentage ranges indicates a
consistent pattern of high overbidding across most packages.
51

Thus, making it unviable to disqualify all of these and consider
only those bids in the greater than 10% and lesser than 20%
range above the tendered amount, as there are only 5 such
bids, and no packages with bids less than 10% above the
tendered amount.

18. I further state that such uniformity in the
percentage increases is atypical in competitive bidding
processes. In a normal scenario, one would expect a
wider dispersion of bid percentages due to variations in
bidders' cost structures, operational efficiencies, and
strategic pricing. The lack of significant variance suggests
that the bidders may not have prepared their bids
independently based on their actual costs and
capabilities. this unusual pattern raises serious concerns
about the competitiveness and fairness of the bidding
process. The close proximity of bid percentages across
numerous packages could potentially indicate the bids
having been placed within the same ring, coordinating
their bid prices to artificially inflate the costs and
eliminate genuine competition. Such practices are
detrimental to the principles of transparency and fairness
in public procurement and can lead to substantial
financial losses for the State.

19. I hence state that, accepting these inflated bids would
result in the State incurring costs significantly higher than the
estimated budget, which is neither sustainable nor in the public
interest. The average increase of approximately 45% over
the tendered amount across the packages would impose an
undue financial burden on the State exchequer, diverting
resources that could be utilized for other essential public
services.

20. I further state that, as per Clause 2.17 of the
tender document, which reads as follows, "The Bid shall be
valid for a period not less than 180 days (One hundred
and eighty) days from the Bid Due Date. The Validity of
the Bids may be extended by mutual consent of the
respective Bidders and the Authority." The bid validity of all
the packages was 180 days from the date of opening of the
tenders and the same has already expired, and after opening of
the technical bids on 10.02.2023 till now i.e. 08.07.2024 more
52

than 500 days have elapsed, and the rates quoted or bid itself
may become invalid. Copy of Relevant Clauses of Tender
Document dated 21.01.2023 as issued by the BSWML
during the 2nd Call for Tender is produced herewith as
Document No. 2.

21. I further state that, as per the Circular dated
30.07.2022 as issued by the Department of Finance,
Government of Karnataka, the Tender issuing authority cannot
accept the bids quoting more than 5% of the tender premium
amount, and hence, on this ground also the bids as received
under the tender in question could not have been accepted.
Copy of the Circular dated 30.07.2022 as issued by the
Department of Finance is produced herewith as Document
No. 3.

22. I further state that, the contractual framework
established by the tender document itself provides a solid
foundation for BSWML's decision. Clause 2.5.1 of the
tender document explicitly states as follows "2.5.1.
Notwithstanding anything contained in this RFP, the
Authority reserves the right to accept or reject any Bid
and to annul the Bidding Process and reject all Bids, at
any time without any liability or any obligation for such
acceptance, rejection or annulment, and without
assigning any reasons therefore. In the event that the
Authority rejects or annuls all the Bids, it may, in its
discretion, invite all eligible Bidders to submit fresh
Bids." Thus, Clause 2.5.1 of the tender document
establishes BSWML's right to annul the bidding process
and reject all bids at any time, without the obligation to
provide reasons. This clause effectively grants BSWML
the contractual authority to cancel the tender, a provision
that is standard in public procurement processes and are
designed to protect the public interest by allowing
authorities the flexibility to respond to changing
circumstances or unforeseen issues that may arise during
the tender process. Copy of the Tender Document dated
21.01.2023 as issued by the BSWML during the 2nd Call
for Tender is produced herewith as Document No. 2.

23. I further state that, the reasoning provided in
the Board Resolution dated 06/07/2024 (signed on
53

08/07/2024) offers a comprehensive rationale for the
tender cancellation. The Board's decision (as extracted
above), was informed by several critical factors, including
the significant time elapsed since the initiation of the
tender process, the excessively high tender premiums
quoted by bidders (ranging from 12% to 82% above the
tendered amount), the expiry of the bid validity period,
changes in market conditions rendering initial quoted
rates potentially invalid, and the pressing need for timely
and effective solid waste management. Copy of the
aforesaid Board Resolution dated 06/07/2024 (signed on
08/07/2024) and Subsequent Office Order dated
08.07.2024 cancelling the 2nd Tender Notification, as
issued by the BSWML is produced herewith as Document
No. 4 & 5.

24. I further state that, it is pertinent to note that BSWML
has promptly bought its decision to cancel the tender to the
attention of the Hon'ble High Court. As evidenced by the
interim order of the Hon'ble High Court on 09/07/2024 in
WP No. 26089/2023 wherein it is shown to have been
formally submitted to the court that BSWML had decided to
withdraw the subject tender and call for fresh tenders. The
same is recorded as follows:

"09/07/2024

Learned Advocate General, on instructions, would
submit that the BSWML has decided to withdraw the
subject tender and call for fresh tender.

He would submit that if fresh tender is permitted to
be called, the process of tender, awarding of contract
and beginning of execution of work will all begin within
three months from the date of notification of the said
tender.

Interim order, granted earlier, if subsisting in any of
these cases, is extended till the next date of hearing."

(Emphasis added)

The affidavit captures in great detail as to why the tender had to be

recalled. One such reason was validity of the tender itself was for

180 days. The affidavit also narrates the nuances of execution of

new tender. The affidavit insofar as the commitment to conclude

the tender within a time frame is germane to be noticed. It reads

as follows:

".... .... ....

26. I further state that, BSWML is committed to
conducting the new tender process within a strict
timeframe and in an organized and expedited manner to
ensure the timely implementation of effective solid waste
management services. To this end, a tentative revised
schedule for the new tender has been formulated as
follows:

• Revision of Rates based on Present Schedule
of Rates (SR)/Market Rates and Approval:
This initial phase involves updating the rates to
reflect current market conditions and obtaining the
necessary administrative approvals. This will be
completed within 30 days, bringing the cumulative
timeline to 30 days.

• Invitation of Tenders, Pre-Bid Meeting,
Proceedings of Pre-Bid, and Receipt of
Tenders: The tender will be officially invited, and a
pre-bid meeting will be held to address any queries
from potential bidders. Proceedings from the pre-
55

bid meeting will be documented, and tenders will
be received. This phase will also take 30 days,
cumulative 60 days.

• Evaluation of Tenders-Technical Evaluation:
All submitted tenders will undergo a thorough
technical evaluation, including confirmation of
certificates and compliance with tender
requirements. The evaluation results will be placed
before the relevant committees for approval. This
stage will be completed in the next 30 days,
cumulative 90 days.

• Financial Bid Evaluation and Submission to
Government for Approval: The financial bids of
technically qualified bidders will be evaluated, and
the results will be forwarded to the Government for
approval. This will take an additional 30 days,
cumulative 120 days.

• Approval of Tenders at Government Level: The
Government will review and approve the tender
evaluations. This is scheduled to be completed
within the next 30 days, cumulative 150 days.

• Issuance of Work Order: Following Government
approval, work orders will be issued to the
successful bidders. This final phase will be
completed within 30 days, bringing the total
cumulative timeline to 180 days.

27. Thus, I state that the approximate total time
required for the award of the new tender is six months.
BSWML will adhere strictly to this schedule to ensure that
the new tendering process is conducted efficiently and
without unnecessary delays. This structured timeline
reflects our commitment to expediting the procurement
process while maintaining transparency, fairness, and
compliance with all legal and regulatory requirements. By
doing so, we aim to facilitate the commencement of
improved solid waste management services at the
56

earliest, thereby serving the larger interest of the city
and its residents."
(Emphasis added)

Various other assurances are held out in the affidavit with regard to

conclusion of tender. Admittedly, the participants in the tender have

not been awarded any contract. Their final bids were opened and

placed before this Court. It was not even notified. Who was the

successful bidders was again in the sealed cover and not notified,

but the process had gone up to that stage. In the light of the issue

that requires determination, it is necessary to notice the stream of

judgments of the Apex Court or other High Courts with regard to

cancellation of tender.

11. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners have relied

upon judgments in the cases of: (i) SUBODH KUMAR SINGH

RATHOUR v. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER1, (ii) S.N.

CHANDRASHEKAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA2, (iii) KISHORE

KUMAR KHAITAN v. PRAVEEN KUMAR SINGH3, (iv) ABL

INTERNATIONAL LIMITED v. EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEE

1
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1682
2
(2006) 3 SCC 208
3
(2006) 3 SCC 312
57

CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED4, (v) STATE OF UTTAR

PRADESH v. DEOMAN UPADHYAYA5 and (vi) LACHHMAN DASS

v. STATE OF PUNJAB6. The latest of the judgment relied on is, in

the case of SUBODH KUMAR SINGH RATHOUR supra. The Apex

Court, in the said judgment, has held as follows:

".... .... ....

35. Earlier, the position of law was that any dispute
arising out of a contract entered into with the State or its
instrumentalities could not be adjudicated by the court
under its writ jurisdiction, as in all such cases, it could be
said that the 'real grievance' was essentially only one
being that of breach of a contract for which the
appropriate remedy would be an ordinary suit and not a
writ petition. One of the earliest judicial pronouncements in
this regard is the decision of this Court in Radhakrishna
Agarwal v. State of Bihar reported in (1977) 3 SCC 457 wherein
the following relevant observations were made:--

"19. [...] None of these cases lays down that, when
the State or its officers purport to operate within the
contractual field and the only grievance of the citizen could
be that the contract between the parties is broken by the
action complained of, the appropriate remedy is by way of a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and not an
ordinary suit. There is a formidable array of authority
against any such a proposition. [...]"
(Emphasis supplied)

36. It was further explained by this Court
in Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra) that once the State or its
instrumentalities enter into a contract, any dispute arising out of
that contract cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction as their
relations no longer remain governed by the constitutional

4
(2004) 3 SCC 553
5
AIR 1960 SC 1125
6
1962 SCC OnLine SC 33
58

provisions, and it is only the contract which thereafter
determines the rights and obligations of the parties. Any claim
to a right flowing from a contract cannot be redressed through
the writ jurisdiction except where some statute steps in and
confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State
in the contractual field or if the agreement is in the nature of a
statutory contract. The relevant observations read as under:--

"10. [...] But, after the State or its agents have
entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are
no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by
the legally valid contract which determines rights and
obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of
violation of Article 14 or of any other constitutional
provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act
within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can
only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are
bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute
steps in and confers some special statutory power or
obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart
from contract.

11. In the cases before us the contracts do not
contain any statutory terms or obligations and no statutory
power or obligation which could attract the application of
Article 14 of the Constitution is involved here. Even in cases
where the question is of choice or consideration of
competing claims before an entry into the field of contract
facts have to be investigated and found before the question
of a violation of Article 14 could arise. If those facts are
disputed and require assessment of evidence the
correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by
talking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, the case could not be
conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Such proceedings are
summary proceedings reserved for extraordinary cases
where the exceptional and what are described as, perhaps
not quite accurately, "prerogative" powers of the Court are
invoked. We are certain that the cases before us are not
such in which powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution could be invoked."
(Emphasis supplied)

37. Similar view as above, was reiterated by this Court
in Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development reported in (1980)
59

2 SCC 129 at para 8 and in Divisional Forest
Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd. reported in (1981) 3 SCC
238 wherein it was held that any right to relief flowing from a
breach of contract cannot be entertained under the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the court, even if the action of
the State or its instrumentality was unauthorized in law. The
relevant observations read as under:--

"9. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is
complained of, a party complaining of such breach may sue
for specific performance of the contract, if contract is
capable of being specifically performed, or the party may
sue for damages. Such a suit would ordinarily be cognizable
by the civil court. The High Court in its extraordinary
jurisdiction would not entertain a petition either for specific
performance of contract or for recovering damages. A right
to relief flowing from a contract has to be claimed in a civil
court where a suit for specific performance of contract or for
damages could be filed. This is so well-settled that no
authority is needed.

10. In substance, this was a suit for refund of a
royalty alleged to be unauthorisedly recovered and that
could hardly be entertained in exercise of the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court."
(Emphasis supplied)

38. We do not propose to dwell any further, on the
position of law that existed earlier, and leave it at rest with one
last reference to the decision of this Court in Bareilly
Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh reported in (1989) 2
SCC 116, wherein this Court once again reiterated that no writ
can be issued in contractual disputes between the State and an
aggrieved party where the rights or claims arise or stem only
from the terms of the contract. The relevant observations read
as under:--

"22. There is a line of decisions where the contract
entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved
is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are
governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order
can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of
contract pure and simple [...]"
(Emphasis supplied)
60

39. Thus, for a period of time the courts recognized that
there was a clear brightline distinction between when a State or
its instrumentalities could be said to be acting in its executive
capacity and when it could be said to be acting in its private
capacity, with the existence of a 'contractual relation' inter-
se the parties being the determinative factor. Wherever, there
was a contract, the State's relations and all its actions were said
to be within the field of a contract i.e., within the realm of
private law, and the courts would resile from interfering with the
same under their writ jurisdiction or embarking upon a judicial
review of such actions.

40. Such reluctance on the part of the courts stemmed
from its understanding that State or any of its instrumentalities
must have the flexibility or the discretion to take decisions that
are in the best interest of the public and efficient governance.
Government being the decision-maker of the State is said to be
the best judge of when a contract or an agreement is in its
interest and by its extension in the interest of the public, and as
such the courts should not interfere in the State's discretion to
award or terminate contracts. One another reason why
contractual disputes were precluded from being espoused under
the writ jurisdiction of the courts was due to the summary
nature of such proceedings, which do not allow for an
exhaustive review unlike civil suits. [See : Radhakrishna
Agarwal (supra) at para 11]

41. This simplistic approach of the courts in deeming
every act and action of the State which was complained of as
nothing more than a 'contractual dispute' or a case of 'breach of
contract' often led to the State abusing its position and acting
unfairly under the misconceived notion, that all its actions such
as award of contracts or tenders were nothing but a 'largess' - a
generosity bestowed upon its citizens, which it can at its own
whims choose to deny, alter, modify, or take away without any
consequences. This often led to a conflation of power with duty,
and resulted in every arbitrary exercise of power by the State
under the guise of a 'contractual dispute' to remain unchecked
and undisputable before the courts and out of the reach of
judicial review, undermining the rights of the citizen to have
their interests safeguarded and protected. We may in this
61

regard refer to Indian Medicines Pharmaceuticals Corp
Ltd. v. Kerala Ayurvedic Co-operative Society Ltd. reported
in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 5 wherein this Court speaking eruditely
through one of us, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI made the
following pertinent observations:--

"11 The welfare State plays a crucial role in aiding
the realisation of the socioeconomic rights which are
recognised by the Constitution. Social welfare benefits
provided by the State under the rubric of its constitutional
obligations are commonly understood in the language of
'largesse', a term used to describe a generous
donation. Terming all actions of government, ranging from
social security benefits, jobs, occupational licenses,
contracts and use of public resources - as government
largesse results in doctrinal misconceptions. The reason is
that this conflates the State's power with duty. The
Constitution recognises the pursuit of the well-being of
citizens as a desirable goal. In doing this the Constitution
entrusts the State with a duty to ensure the well-being of
citizens. Government actions aimed at ensuring the well-
being of citizens cannot be perceived through the lens of a
'largess'. The use of such terminology belittles the sanctity
of the social contract that the 'people of India' entered into
with the State to protect and safeguard their interests.

xxx xxx xxx

13. In the early 1950', judicial review of the process
of concluding contracts by government was limited. The
courts allowed the State due deference on the ground of
governmental policy. In C.K Achuthan v. State of
Kerala, AIR 1959 SC 490 a Constitution Bench of this Court
held that it is open to the Government 'to choose a person
to their liking, to fulfil contracts which they wish to be
performed.' The Court observed that when one party is
chosen over another, the aggrieved party cannot claim the
protection of Article 14 since the government has the
discretion to choose with whom it will contract."

(Emphasis supplied)

42. Before proceeding further to discuss how the scope of
judicial review came to be evolved, we would like to refer to the
observations made by this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of
62

India reported in (1987) 1 SCC 395 which are significant, and
read as under:--

"31. [...] Law has to grow in order to satisfy the
needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with
the economic developments taking place in the country.
As new situations arise the law has to be evolved in order
to meet the challenge of such new situations. Law cannot
afford to remain static. We have to evolve new principles
and lay down new norms which would adequately deal
with the new problems which arise in a highly
industrialised economy. [...]"
(Emphasis supplied)

b. Concept of 'Public Law' Element : Scope of Judicial
Review in Contractual Matters.

43. Over a period of time the courts recognized the
crucial role of judicial oversight in preventing the abuse
of power and maintaining public confidence in the
administrative process. Courts developed various
doctrines and principles to guide their review, such as the
principles of natural justice, reasonableness and
proportionality. These principles ensured that the
administrative actions are not arbitrary, discriminatory or
capricious. By enforcing such standards, the courts also
ensured that the rule of law was maintained and the
individual rights were protected.

44. The interplay between judicial review and
administrative discretion has been a dynamic process. As
new challenges and complexities kept on arising before
the courts as regards the State's actions and governance,
it continued to refine its approach. This ongoing dialogue
between the courts and the executive branch contributed
to the development of a more accountable and
transparent administrative framework, paving the way
for the exercise of judicial review even in the realm of
contractual disputes to achieve a fine balance between
efficiency and fairness in policy decisions on the one hand
and the rights of individuals and overall public interest on
the other.
63

45. In Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil
Corporation reported in (1990) 3 SCC 752, this Court
expressed doubts over the correctness of the earlier
position of law, that actions of the State in the private
contractual field cannot be questioned in writ jurisdiction.
This Court further held that even if the inter-se relation of
parties with the State is governed purely by a contract,
the method, motive and decision of the State would be
subject to judicial review on the grounds of relevance and
reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and
non-discrimination. The relevant observations read as
under:--

"12. [...] It appears to us that rule of reason and rule
against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play
and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in
situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with
citizens in a situation like the present one. Even though the
rights of the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights,
the manner, the method and motive of a decision of
entering or not entering into a contract, are subject to
judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and
reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and non-
discrimination in the type of the transactions and nature of
the dealing as in the present case.

13. The existence of the power of judicial review
however depends upon the nature and right involved in the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. It is well
settled that there can be "malice in law". Existence of such
"malice in law" is part of the critical apparatus of a
particular action in administrative law. Indeed "malice in
law" is part of the dimension of the rule of relevance and
reason as well as the rule of fair play in action.
Xxx xxx xxx

20. [...] we are of the opinion that it would be
appropriate to state that in cases where the instrumentality
of the state enters the contractual field, it should be
governed by the incidence of the contract. It is true that it
may not be necessary to give reasons but, in our opinion, in
the field of this nature fairness must be there to the parties
concerned, and having regard to the large number or the
long period and the nature of the dealings between the
parties, the appellant should have been taken into
64

confidence. Equality and fairness at least demands this
much from an instrumentality of the State dealing with a
right of the State not to treat the contract as subsisting. We
must, however, evolve such process which will work."

(Emphasis supplied)

[See also : DwarkadasMarfatia& Sons v. Board of Trustees
of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 at para 27.]

46. In LIC v. Consumer Education & Research
Centre reported in (1995) 5 SCC 482, the Court held that the
law as it stood earlier that a State or its instrumentality whose
action is hedged with public element cannot be called into
question because such action was in the field of private law is no
longer a good law. The relevant observations read as under:--

"23. Every action of the public authority or the
person acting in public interest or any act that gives rise to
public element, should be guided by public interest. It is the
exercise of the public power or action hedged with public
element (sic that) becomes open to challenge. If it is shown
that the exercise of the power is arbitrary, unjust and
unfair, it should be no answer for the State, its
instrumentality, public authority or person whose acts have
the insignia of public element to say that their actions are in
the field of private law and they are free to prescribe any
conditions or limitations in their actions as private citizens,
simpliciter do in the field of private law. Its actions must be
based on some rational and relevant principles. It must not
be guided by irrational or irrelevant considerations. Every
administrative decision must be hedged by reasons. [...]
xxx xxx xxx

26. This Court has rejected the contention of an
instrumentality or the State that its action is in the private
law field and would be immuned from satisfying the tests
laid under Article 14. The dichotomy between public law and
private law rights and remedies, though may not be
obliterated by any strait-jacket formula, it would depend
upon the factual matrix. The adjudication of the dispute
arising out of a contract would, therefore, depend upon
facts and circumstances in a given case. The distinction
between public law remedy and private law field cannot be
demarcated with precision. Each case will be examined on
its facts and circumstances to find out the nature of the
65

activity, scope and nature of the controversy. The
distinction between public law and private law remedy has
now become too thin and practicably obliterated."

(Emphasis supplied)

47. This Court in Consumer Education & Research
Centre (supra) further held that the writ jurisdiction of
the courts cannot be shackled by technicalities and that
any action of the State which has a public law element or
a public character, such actions by their nature are
required to be just, fair, reasonable & in the interest of
public, and as such they would be amenable to judicial
review. As to what is meant by actions bearing insignia of
public law element, this Court held that wherever the
action of a State or its instrumentality in the sphere of
contractual relations is enjoined with a duty or an
obligation to the public, such actions could be said to
bear the insignia of a public element. The relevant
observation reads as under:--

"27. In the sphere of contractual relations the State,
its instrumentality, public authorities or those whose acts
bear insignia of public element, action to public duty or
obligation are enjoined to act in a manner i.e. fair, just and
equitable, after taking objectively all the relevant options
into consideration and in a manner that is reasonable,
relevant and germane to effectuate the purpose for public
good and in general public interest and it must not take any
irrelevant or irrational factors into consideration or appear
arbitrary in its decision. Duty to act fairly is part of fair
procedure envisaged under Articles 14 and 21. Every
activity of the public authority or those under public duty or
obligation must be informed by reason and guided by the
public interest.
xxx xxx xxx

29. [...] The arms of the High Court are not shackled
with technical rules or procedure. The actions of the State,
its instrumentality, any public authority or person whose
actions bear insignia of public law element or public
character are amenable to judicial review and the validity of
such an action would be tested on the anvil of Article 14.
While exercising the power under Article 226 the Court
would be circumspect to adjudicate the disputes arising out
66

of the contract depending on the facts and circumstances in
a given case. The distinction between the public law remedy
and private law field cannot be demarcated with precision.
Each case has to be examined on its own facts and
circumstances to find out the nature of the activity or scope
and nature of the controversy. The distinction between
public law and private law remedy is now narrowed down.
[...]"
(Emphasis supplied)

48. In another decision of this Court in ShrilekhaVidyarthi
(Kumari) v. State of U.P. reported in (1991) 1 SCC 212 it was
held that every action of the State that has some degree
of impact on the public interest, can be challenged under
writ jurisdiction to the extent that they are arbitrary,
unfair or unreasonable, irrespective of the fact that the
dispute falls within the domain of contractual obligations.
It was further held, that it is the nature of a government
body's personality which characterizes the action as
having a public law element, and not the field of law
where such action is taken. The relevant observation reads
as under:--

"22. There is an obvious difference in the contracts
between private parties and contracts to which the State
is a party. Private parties are concerned only with their
personal interest whereas the State while exercising its
powers and discharging its functions, acts indubitably, as
is expected of it, for public good and in public
interest. The impact of every State action is also on public
interest. This factor alone is sufficient to import at least
the minimal requirements of public law obligations and
impress with this character the contracts made by the
State or its instrumentality. It is a different matter that
the scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling
within the domain of contractual obligations may be more
limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated
to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies
provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes.
However, to the extent, challenge is made on the ground
of violation of Article 14 by alleging that the impugned act
is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the fact that the
dispute also falls within the domain of contractual
obligations would not relieve the State of its obligation to
comply with the basic requirements of Article 14. To this
67

extent, the obligation is of a public character invariably in
every case irrespective of there being any other right or
obligation in addition thereto. An additional contractual
obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee
under Article 14 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of the
State in any of its actions.
Xxx xxx xxx

24. The State cannot be attributed the split
personality of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in the contractual
field so as to impress on it all the characteristics of the
State at the threshold while making a contract requiring it
to fulfil the obligation of Article 14 of the Constitution and
thereafter permitting it to cast off its garb of State to
adorn the new robe of a private body during the
subsistence of the contract enabling it to act arbitrarily
subject only to the contractual obligations and remedies
flowing from it. It is really the nature of its personality as
State which is significant and must characterize all its
actions, in whatever field, and not the nature of function,
contractual or otherwise, which is decisive of the nature of
scrutiny permitted for examining the validity of its act.
The requirement of Article 14 being the duty to act fairly,
justly and reasonably, there is nothing which militates
against the concept of requiring the State always to so
act, even in contractual matters. There is a basic
difference between the acts of the State which must
invariably be in pubic interest and those of a private
individual, engaged in similar activities, being primarily for
personal gain, which may or may not promote public
interest. Viewed in this manner, in which we find no
conceptual difficulty or anachronism, we find no reason
why the requirement of Article 14 should not extend even
in the sphere of contractual matters for regulating the
conduct of the State activity.

Xxx xxx xxx

28. Even assuming that it is necessary to import
the concept of presence of some public element in a State
action to attract Article 14 and permit judicial review, we
have no hesitation in saying that the ultimate impact of all
actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on
public interest, the requisite public element for this
purpose is present also in contractual matters. We,
therefore, find it difficult and unrealistic to exclude the
State actions in contractual matters, after the contract has
68

been made, from the purview of judicial review to test its
validity on the anvil of Article 14."
(Emphasis supplied)

49. In Verigamto Naveen v. Govt. of A.P. reported
in (2001) 8 SCC 344 this Court held that where a breach of
contract involves the decision-making authority exceeding its
power or violating the principles of nature justice or its decision
being borne out of perversity, then such cancellation of contract
can certainly be scrutinized under the writ jurisdiction. This is
because such an exercise of power by the authority is apart
from the contract. The relevant observation reads as under:--

"21. [...] Though there is one set of cases rendered
by this Court of the type arising in Radhakrishna Agarwal
case [(1977) 3 SCC 457 : AIR 1977 SC 1496] much water
has flown in the stream of judicial review in contractual
field. In cases where the decision-making authority
exceeded its statutory power or committed breach of rules
or principles of natural justice in exercise of such power or
its decision is perverse or passed an irrational order, this
Court has interceded even after the contract was entered
into between the parties and the Government and its
agencies. [...] Where the breach of contract involves breach
of statutory obligation when the order complained of was
made in exercise of statutory power by a statutory
authority, though cause of action arises out of or
pertains to contract, brings it within the sphere of
public law because the power exercised is apart from
contract. The freedom of the Government to enter into
business with anybody it likes is subject to the condition of
reasonableness and fair play as well as public interest. After
entering into a contract, in cancelling the contract which is
subject to terms of the statutory provisions, as in the
present case, it cannot be said that the matter falls purely
in a contractual field. Therefore, we do not think it would be
appropriate to suggest that the case on hand is a matter
arising purely out of a contract and, therefore, interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution is not called for. This
contention also stands rejected."
(Emphasis supplied)

50. Similarly in Binny Ltd. v. Sadasivan reported
in (2005) 6 SCC 657 this Court in view of the increasing trend
of the State and its instrumentalities to use contracts as a
69

means for dispensing their regulatory functions, held that
whenever a contract is used for a public purpose, it will be
amenable to judicial review. The relevant observations read as
under:--

"30. A contract would not become statutory simply
because it is for construction of a public utility and it has
been awarded by a statutory body. But nevertheless, it may
be noticed that the Government or government authorities
at all levels are increasingly employing contractual
techniques to achieve their regulatory aims. It cannot be
said that the exercise of those powers are free from the
zone of judicial review and that there would be no limits to
the exercise of such powers, but in normal circumstances,
judicial review principles cannot be used to enforce
contractual obligations. When that contractual power is
being used for public purpose, it is certainly amenable to
judicial review. The power must be used for lawful purposes
and not unreasonably."
(Emphasis supplied)

51. The decision of this Court in ABL International
Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India
Ltd. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 553 is significant and was the
turning point in the scope of judicial review in contractual
matters. In this landmark ruling, this Court decisively laid down
and approved that a relief against a State or its
instrumentalities in matters related to contractual obligations
can be sought under the writ jurisdiction. The relevant
observations read as under:--

"23. It is clear from the above observations of this
Court, once the State or an instrumentality of the State is a
party of the contract, it has an obligation in law to act fairly,
justly and reasonably which is the requirement of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if by the
impugned repudiation of the claim of the appellants the first
respondent as an instrumentality of the State has acted in
contravention of the abovesaid requirement of Article 14,
then we have no hesitation in holding that a writ court can
issue suitable directions to set right the arbitrary actions of
the first respondent.

xxx xxx xxx
70

27. From the above discussion of ours, the following
legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ
petition:

(a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a
State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a
contractual obligation is maintainable.

(b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise
for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse
to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of
rule.

(Emphasis supplied)

52. At the same time, this Court in ABL (supra) cautioned
that the power to issue writs under Article 226 being
discretionary and plenary, the same should only be exercised to
set right the arbitrary actions of the State or its instrumentality
in matters related to contractual obligations. The relevant
observations read as under:--

"28. However, while entertaining an objection as to
the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the
fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under
Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is
not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The
High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a
discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition.
The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the
exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of
Trade Marks) And this plenary right of the High Court to
issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by
the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies
unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is
arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the
constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and
legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary
to exercise the said jurisdiction."
(Emphasis supplied)
71

53. In Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa reported
in (2006) 10 SCC 236 this Court for the purposes of judicial
review of contractual disputes recognized a distinction between
a matter where the contract is at the threshold and at the stage
of breach. It held that at the threshold, the court's scrutiny is
more intrusive & expansive while at the stage of breach it is
discretionary except where the action is found to be arbitrary or
unreasonable. The relevant observations read as under:--

"15. It is trite that if an action on the part of the State is
violative of the equality clause contained in Article 14 of
the Constitution of India, a writ petition would be maintainable
even in the contractual field. A distinction indisputably must be
made between a matter which is at the threshold of a contract
and a breach of contract; whereas in the former the court's
scrutiny would be more intrusive, in the latter the court may
not ordinarily exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of judicial
review, unless it is found to be violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution. While exercising contractual powers also, the
government bodies may be subjected to judicial review in order
to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism on their
part. Indisputably, inherent limitations exist, but it would not
be correct to opine that under no circumstances a writ will lie
only because it involves a contractual matter."

(Emphasis supplied)

54. The law on the subject with which we are dealing was
laid down exhaustively by this Court in its decision in Joshi
Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India reported
in (2015) 7 SCC 728, and the position was summarised as
under:--

"69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid
principles has to be understood in the context of discussion
that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per
this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the
maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual
matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or
even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time,
discretion lies with the High Court which under certain
circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that
under the following circumstances, "normally", the Court
would not exercise such a discretion:
72

69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless
the action has some public law character attached to it.

69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of
dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would
refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of
the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of
settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be
resorted to through the means of arbitration.

69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of
fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence
for their determination.

69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of
contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained
except in exceptional circumstances.

70. Further, the legal position which emerges from
various judgments of this Court dealing with different
situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the
State/public authority with private parties, can be
summarised as under:

70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the
State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by
the obligations of fairness.

70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the
contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot
practise some discriminations.

70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or
consideration of competing claims before entering into the
field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found
before the question of a violation of Article 14 of
the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and
require assessment of evidence the correctness of which
can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence,
involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses,
the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided
in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such
cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to
alternate remedy of civil suit, etc.
73

70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate
avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred.

70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid
contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty,
inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions
agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not
complying with the terms of contract which the parties had
accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee
can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so :
and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed
to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to
conduct his business.

70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is
complained of, the party complaining of such breach may
sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is
capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the
party may sue for damages.

70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive
action unsupported by law or even in respect of a
corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal
protection of law or if it can be shown that action of the
public authorities was without giving any hearing and
violation of principles of natural justice after holding that
action could not have been taken without observing
principles of natural justice.

70.8. If the contract between private party and the
State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under
the realm of a private law and there is no element of public
law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke
the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than
approaching the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India and invoking its extraordinary
jurisdiction.

70.9. The distinction between public law and private
law element in the contract with the State is getting
blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and
where the matter falls purely in private field of contract, this
Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not
maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and
private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual
matrix of each case and the distinction between the public
74

law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated
with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its
facts whether the contractual relations between the parties
bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a
particular case it is found that nature of the activity or
controversy involves public law element, then the matter
can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action
of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is
fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken
into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into
the decision making process or that the decision is not
arbitrary.

70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of
a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct
enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due
weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is
how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate
expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness.

70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of
disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations
may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may
be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to
remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual
disputes."
(Emphasis supplied)

55. Thereafter, this Court in its decision in M.P. Power
Management Co. Ltd., Jabalpur v. Sky Power Southeast Solar
India Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2023) 2 SCC 703 exhaustively
delineated the scope of judicial review of the courts in
contractual disputes concerning public authorities. The aforesaid
decision is in the following parts:--

[...](i) Scope of Judicial Review in matters pertaining to
Contractual Disputes:--

This Court held that the earlier position of law that all
rights against any action of the State in a non-statutory
contract would be governed by the contract alone and thus
not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the courts is no
longer a good law in view of the subsequent rulings.
Although writ jurisdiction is a public law remedy, yet a relief
would still lie under it if it is sought against an arbitrary
75

action or inaction of the State, even if they arise from a non-
statutory contract. The relevant observations read as under:--

"53. [...] when the offending party is the State. In
other words, the contention is that the law in this field has
witnessed an evolution and, what is more, a revolution of
sorts and a transformatory change with a growing
realisation of the true ambit of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. The State, he points out, cannot play the Dr. Jekyll
and Hyde game anymore. Its nature is cast in stone. Its
character is inflexible. This is irrespective of the activity it
indulges in. It will continue to be haunted by the mandate
of Article 14 to act fairly. There has been a stunning
expansion of the frontiers of the Court's jurisdiction to strike
at State action in matters arising out of contract, based,
undoubtedly, on the facts of each case. It remains open to
the Court to refuse to reject a case, involving State action,
on the basis that the action is, per se, arbitrary.

i. It is, undoubtedly, true that the writ jurisdiction is a
public law remedy. A matter, which lies entirely
within a private realm of affairs of public body, may
not lend itself for being dealt with under the writ
jurisdiction of the Court.

ii. The principle laid down in Bareilly Development
Authority (supra) that in the case of a non statutory
contract the rights are governed only by the terms of
the contract and the decisions, which are purported
to be followed, including Radhakrishna
Agarwal (supra), may not continue to hold good, in
the light of what has been laid down in ABL (supra)
and as followed in the recent judgment in Sudhir
Kumar Singh (supra).

iii. The mere fact that relief is sought under a contract
which is not statutory, will not entitle the
respondent-State in a case by itself to ward-off
scrutiny of its action or inaction under the contract, if
the complaining party is able to establish that the
action/inaction is, per se, arbitrary."

(Emphasis supplied)

(ii) Exercise of Writ Jurisdiction in disputes at the stage
prior to the Award of Contract:--
76

An action under a writ will lie even at the stage prior
to the award of a contract by the State wherever such
award of contract is imbued with procedural impropriety,
arbitrariness, favouritism or without any application of
mind. In doing so, the courts may set-aside the decision
which is found to be vitiated for the reasons stated above
but cannot substitute the same with its own decision. The
relevant observations read as under:--

iv. An action will lie, undoubtedly, when the State
purports to award any largesse and, undoubtedly, this
relates to the stage prior to the contract being entered into
[See R.D. Shetty (supra)]. This scrutiny, no doubt, would be
undertaken within the nature of the judicial review, which
has been declared in the decision in Tata Cellular v. Union of
India."
(Emphasis supplied)

(iii) Exercise of Writ Jurisdiction after the Contract comes
into Existence:--

This court held that even after the contract comes into
existence an action may lie by way of a writ to either (I) obviate
an arbitrary or unreasonable action on part of the State or (II) to
call upon it to honour its obligations unless there is a serious or
genuine dispute as regards the liability of the State from honouring
such obligation. Existence of an alternative remedy or a disputed
question of fact may be a ground to not entertain the parties in a
writ as long as it is not being used as smokescreen to defeat
genuine claims of public law remedy. The relevant observations
read as under:--

"v. After the contract is entered into, there can be a
variety of circumstances, which may provide a cause of
action to a party to the contract with the State, to seek
relief by filing a Writ Petition.

vi. Without intending to be exhaustive, it may
include the relief of seeking payment of amounts due to the
aggrieved party from the State. The State can, indeed, be
called upon to honour its obligations of making payment,
unless it be that there is a serious and genuine dispute
raised relating to the liability of the State to make the
payment. Such dispute, ordinarily, would include the
contention that the aggrieved party has not fulfilled its
obligations and the Court finds that such a contention by
the State is not a mere ruse or a pretence.
77

vii. The existence of an alternate remedy, is,
undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief
in a Writ Petition in a contractual matter. Again, the
question as to whether the Writ Petitioner must be told off
the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and
relief sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would
have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there
are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is
necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the
relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in
the Writ Court even deciding disputed particularly when
questions the dispute of fact, surrounds demystifying of
documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the
remedy by way of a civil suit.

viii. The existence of a provision for arbitration,
which is a forum intended to quicken the pace of dispute
resolution, is viewed as a near bar to the entertainment of a
Writ Petition (See in this regard, the view of this Court even
in ABL (supra) explaining how it distinguished the decision
of this Court in State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co., by its
observations in paragraph-14 in ABL (supra)].

ix. The need to deal with disputed questions of fact,
cannot be made a smokescreen to guillotine a genuine claim
raised in a Writ Petition, when actually the resolution of a
disputed question of fact is unnecessary to grant relief to a
writ applicant.

x. The reach of Article 14 enables a Writ Court to
deal with arbitrary State action even after a contract is
entered into by the State. A wide variety of circumstances
can generate causes of action for invoking Article 14. The
Court's approach in dealing with the same, would be guided
by, undoubtedly, the overwhelming need to obviate
arbitrary State action, in cases where the Writ remedy
provides an effective and fair means of preventing
miscarriage of justice arising from palpably unreasonable
action by the State."
(Emphasis supplied)

(iv) Exercise of Writ Jurisdiction after Termination or
Breach of the Contract:--

A relief by way of a writ under Article 226 of
the Constitution will also lie against a termination or a breach of a
78

contract, wherever such action is found to either be palpably
unauthorized or arbitrary. Before turning away the parties to the
remedy of civil suit, the courts must be mindful to see whether
such termination or breach was within the contractual domain or
whether the State was merely purporting to exercise powers under
the contract for any ulterior motive. Any action of the State to
cancel or terminate a contract which is beyond the terms agreed
thereunder will be amenable to the writ jurisdiction to ascertain if
such decision is imbued with arbitrariness or influenced by any
extraneous considerations. The relevant observations read as
under:--

xi. Termination of contract can again arise in a wide
variety of situations. If for instance, a contract is
terminated, by a person, who is demonstrated, without any
need for any argument, to be the person, who is completely
unauthorised to cancel the contract, there may not be any
necessity to drive the party to the unnecessary ordeal of a
prolix and avoidable round of litigation. The intervention by
the High Court, in such a case, where there is no dispute to
be resolved, would also be conducive in public interest,
apart from ensuring the Fundamental Right of the petitioner
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. When it comes
to a challenge to the termination of a contract by the State,
which is a non-statutory body, which is acting in purported
exercise of the powers/rights under such a contract, it
would be over simplifying a complex issue to lay down any
inflexible Rule in favour of the Court turning away the
petitioner to alternate Fora. Ordinarily, the cases of
termination of contract by the State, acting within its
contractual domain, may not lend itself for appropriate
redress by the Writ Court. This is, undoubtedly, so if the
Court is duty-bound to arrive at findings, which involve
untying knots, which are presented by disputed questions of
facts. Undoubtedly, in view of ABL Limited (supra), if
resolving the dispute, in a case of repudiation of a contract,
involves only appreciating the true scope of documentary
material in the light of pleadings, the Court may still grant
relief to an applicant. We must enter a caveat. The Courts
are today reeling under the weight of a docket explosion,
which is truly alarming. If a case involves a large body of
documents and the Court is called upon to enter upon
findings of facts and involves merely the construction of the
document, it may not be an unsound discretion to relegate
the party to the alternate remedy. This is not to deprive the
Court of its constitutional power as laid down
in ABL (supra). It all depends upon the facts of each case as
79

to whether, having regard to the scope of the dispute to be
resolved, whether the Court will still entertain the petition.

xii. In a case the State is a party to the contract and
a breach of a contract is alleged against the State, a civil
action in the appropriate Forum is, undoubtedly,
maintainable. But this is not the end of the matter. Having
regard to the position of the State and its duty to act fairly
and to eschew arbitrariness in all its actions, resort to the
constitutional remedy on the cause of action, that the action
is arbitrary, is permissible (See in this regard Kumari
ShrilekhaVidyarthi v. State of U.P.). However, it must be
made clear that every case involving breach of contract by
the State, cannot be dressed up and disguised as a case of
arbitrary State action. While the concept of an arbitrary
action or inaction cannot be cribbed or confined to any
immutable mantra, and must be laid bare, with reference to
the facts of each case, it cannot be a mere allegation of
breach of contract that would suffice. What must be
involved in the case must be action/inaction, which must be
palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of
any principle. An action, which is completely malafide, can
hardly be described as a fair action and may, depending on
the facts, amount to arbitrary action. The question must be
posed and answered by the Court and all we intend to lay
down is that there is a discretion available to the Court to
grant relief in appropriate cases."
(Emphasis supplied)

(v) Other relevant considerations for Exercise of Writ
Jurisdiction:-- Lastly, this Court held that the courts may
entertain a contractual dispute under its writ jurisdiction
where (I) there is any violation of natural justice or (II) where
doing so would serve the public interest or (III) where though the
facts are convoluted or disputed, but the courts have already
undertaken an in-depth scrutiny of the same provided that the it
was pursuant to a sound exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The
relevant observations read as under:--

xiii. A lodestar, which may illumine the path of the
Court, would be the dimension of public interest subserved
by the Court interfering in the matter, rather than
relegating the matter to the alternate Forum.

xiv. Another relevant criteria is, if the Court has
entertained the matter, then, while it is not tabooed that
the Court should not relegate the party at a later stage,
80

ordinarily, it would be a germane consideration, which may
persuade the Court to complete what it had started,
provided it is otherwise a sound exercise of jurisdiction to
decide the matter on merits in the Writ Petition itself.

xv. Violation of natural justice has been recognised
as a ground signifying the presence of a public law element
and can found a cause of action premised on breach of
Article 14. [See Sudhir Kumar Singh (supra)]."

(Emphasis supplied)

56. What can be discerned from the above is that there has
been a considerable shift in the scope of judicial review of the court
when it comes to contractual disputes where one of the parties is
the State or its instrumentalities. In view of the law laid down by
this Court in >ABL (supra), Joshi Technologies (supra) and in M.P.
Power (supra), it is difficult to accept the contention of the
respondent that the writ petition filed by the appellant before the
High Court was not maintainable and the relief prayed for was
rightly declined by the High Court in exercise of its Writ
jurisdiction. Where State action is challenged on the ground of
being arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the State would be under
an obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Article 14 of
the Constitution and not act in an arbitrary, unfair and
unreasonable manner. This is the constitutional limit of their
authority. There is a jural postulate of good faith in business
relations and undertakings which is given effect to by preventing
arbitrary exercise of powers by the public functionaries in
contractual matters with private individuals. With the rise of the
Social Service State more and more public-private partnerships
continue to emerge, which makes it all the more imperative for the
courts to protect the sanctity of such relations."

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court considers entire spectrum of law and holds that the

scope of judicial review of the action of the State in the realm of

contract is extremely limited, except in cases where the action of

the State would depict arbitrariness. The Apex Court would hold
81

that every action of public Authority or acting in public interest that

gives rise to public element should be guided by public interest.

While there can be no qualm about the principles so laid down by

the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment, since the contract is

not awarded to any person today, no right of any person has got

crystallized for a contention that the contract should be awarded to

him. While it is no law that the contract should be awarded to the

highest bidder or the lowest bidder as the case would be, the action

of the State must not be arbitrary. This is only golden thread that

runs through the entire tender process as observed in plethora of

judgments of the Apex Court.

12. On the issue whether cancellation could be done or not

and can such cancellation could have attributes of arbitrariness, the

Apex Court in a later judgment in the case of INDORE VIKAS

PRAADHIKARAN v. SHRI HUMUD JAIN SAMAJ TRUST7 has

held as follows:

".... .... ....

3. The facts of the case reveal that the appellant Indore
Vikas Praadhikaran (IDA), hereinafter referred to as "IDA"
7
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3511
82

issued an advertisement inviting bids for leasing out land
admeasuring 3382 sq. meters situated at Scheme No. 74-C,
Sector C, Indore, on 17.07.2020 and the terms and conditions
were specified in the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT). The reserve
price was fixed at Rs. 21,120/- per square meter. The IDA
pursuant to the NIT dated 17.07.2020 received three bids and
the bid of respondent No. 1-Shri Humud Jain Samaj Trust was
the highest as a bid of Rs. 25,671.90/- per square meter was
offered in the matter. The bids were opened on 09.09.2020.
The Tender Committee while it was finalizing the bids
noticed that in respect of the land in question, a property
tax demand to the tune of Rs. 1.25 crores was
outstanding and the same was not taken into account
while fixing the base price and, therefore, the Tender
Committee arrived at a conclusion not to accept any of
the bids and to issue a fresh tender with a reserve price
of Rs. 26,000/- per square meter. The matter was placed
before the Board of IDA and on 27.07.2021, the Board
accepted the recommendation of the Tender Committee.
The bid of respondent No. 1 was rejected and it was
resolved to issue a fresh NIT in the matter. Respondent
No. 1 was informed on 23.08.2021 about the rejection of
bid of respondent No. 1 and on 01.10.2021, the earnest
money was also refunded. On 18.10.2021, the IDA passed
a resolution for issuance of a fresh NIT with a reserve
price of Rs. 26,000/- per square meter and thereafter, a
fresh NIT was issued on 17.11.2021. Respondent No. 1
after issuance of the fresh NIT preferred a writ petition
on 24.11.2021 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
inter alia, challenging resolution dated 27.07.2021
rejecting the bid as well as being aggrieved by the
issuance of fresh NIT dated 17.11.2021.

4. It is pertinent to note that respondent No. 1 did not
participate in the subsequent NIT issued on 17.11.2021.
Respondent No. 1 before the High Court stated that by no
stretch of imagination, his bid could have been cancelled as he
was the highest bidder. It was further stated by respondent No.
1 before the learned Single Judge that he is ready to negotiate
in the matter and the bid has been cancelled without assigning
any reason.
83

5. The IDA did file a detailed and exhaustive reply before
the learned Single Judge and reliance was placed upon the
terms and conditions of the NIT. Heavy reliance was placed
upon Condition No. 6 which empowered the IDA to accept or
reject any or all bids. Learned Single Judge after hearing the
parties at length arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner
Trust is not entitled to any relief as no contract was executed at
any point of time nor any letter of allotment was issued in its
favour. Learned Single Judge also held that the highest
bidder does not acquire any vested right to have the
auction concluded in his favour and the IDA was justified
in issuing fresh NIT in the matter.

6. Respondent aggrieved by the orders passed by the
learned Single Judge preferred a writ appeal and the Division
Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore Bench
allowed the writ appeal directing the IDA to allot the plot to
respondent in case he is ready to pay the price of the land in
question at Rs. 26,000/- per square meter. Para 6, 7 and 8 of
the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court reads
as under:

"6. The dates and events of the case are not in
dispute. In the first NIT, the base price of the land was Rs.
21,000/- per sq. meter as fixed by the Indore Development
Authority. Out of three bidders, the petitioner offered the
highest bid. Rs. 25671.90/-. The property tax on land to the
Municipal Corporation is payable by IDA. The resolution has
been passed with the hope that the IDA might fetch higher
prices than the price received in the first round of NIT.
Unfortunately in the second round not, a single bidder had
participated and the tender proceedings have resulted in an
unsuccessful attempt. In all bona fide, the petitioner has
submitted that the petitioner is still ready to match the base
price fixed by the Indore Development Authority in the
second tender by paying the amount of Rs. 26,000/- per sq.
meter.

7. Had the Indore Development Authority received
an offer in the second NIT more than Rs. 26,000/- per sq.
meter certainly the petitioner would not have any case
before this court. But in the second round of NIT, the Indore
Development Authority has failed to receive any bid hence
the right of the petitioner is still survived to claim the
allotment being a successful bidder. The petitioner had
84

approached this court by way of the writ petition before
issuance of the second NIT and immediately after dismissal
of the writ petition the writ appeal has been filed therefore,
the cause for the petitioner is still survived. The Indore
Development Authority has wasted public money by
cancelling the first NIT and going for the second NIT.
Learned counsel or the Indore Development Authority
submitted that has the petitioner/appellant participated in
the subsequent tented process the allotment would have
been done on quoting the price of Rs. 26000/- it means the
Indore Development Authority has no issue in giving the
land to the petitioner/appellant but same will not be given
through the court as it is beyond judicial review. For this
approach of the Indore Development Authority, a cost is
liable to be imposed.

8. Accordingly, the writ appeal is allowed, and the
order passed by the writ court is set aside. If the petitioner
is ready to pay the price of the in question land @Rs.
26,000/- per sq. meter the land in question be allotted to
the appellant."

7. Hon'ble Division Bench while allowing the writ appeal
has held that the respondent was the highest bidder as in the
first round of the tendering process, the base price of the land
was fixed at Rs. 21,120/- per square meter and the respondent
No. 1 offered a bid of Rs. 25,671.90/- per square meter. In the
second round while issuing fresh NIT, the IDA has fixed the base
price at Rs. 26,000/- per square meter and no offer was
received by the IDA in the second round of more than Rs.
26,000/- per square meter and, therefore, the Division Bench
held that in case the respondent is willing to pay the amount at
the rate of Rs. 26,000/- per square meter, the land in question
should be allotted to the respondent No. 1.

8. The IDA being aggrieved by the order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore,
dated 08.02.2022, has preferred the present appeal....
.... .... ....

12. In the present case, the undisputed facts reveal
that first NIT was issued on 17.07.2020 and respondent
No. 1 was certainly the highest bidder by offering a bid of
Rs. 25,671.90/- per square meter. The Tender Evaluation
85

Committee after examining the bid arrived at a
conclusion to cancel the tender as it came to its notice
that an outstanding property tax demand amounting to
Rs. 1,25,82,262/- was not taken into account while fixing
the base price. It was resolved to issue a fresh NIT and,
therefore, a fresh NIT was issued on 17.11.2021 and for
the reasons best known to the respondent No. 1, it did
not participate in the second NIT and instead preferred a
writ petition on 24.11.2021 before the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh. Learned Single Judge was justified in
dismissing the writ petition on the ground that merely by
offering highest bid, the respondent No. 1 did not acquire
any vested right for the execution of the contract in its
favour. The Division Bench of the High Court, however,
allowed the writ appeal and has gone to the extent in
directing the IDA to accept the offer of respondent No. 1
which was made before the Court for an amount of Rs.
26,000/- per square meter in respect of the land in
question, and further directing IDA to allot the land in
question to respondent No. 1. This Court in the case
of State of Jharkhand v. CWE-SOMA Consortium (supra)
while dealing with the similar issue of annulment of
tender process, in paras 21, 22 and 23 has held as under:

"21. Observing that while exercising power of judicial
review, the Court does not sit as appellate court over the
decision of the Government but merely reviews the manner
in which the decision was made, in Tata Cellular v. Union of
India [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651],
SCC in para 70 it was held as under : (SCC p. 675)

"70. It cannot be denied that the principles of
judicial review would apply to the exercise of
contractual powers by government bodies in order to
prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it
must be clearly stated that there are inherent
limitations in exercise of that power of judicial
review. Government is the guardian of the finances
of the State. It is expected to protect the financial
interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest
or any other tender is always available to the
Government. But, the principles laid down in
Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view
while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no
86

question of infringement of Article 14 if the
Government tries to get the best person or the best
quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered
to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power
is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of
that power will be struck down."

22. The Government must have freedom of contract.
In Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson (P)
Ltd. [Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson (P)
Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 138], SCC in para 12 this Court held as under :
(SCC p. 147)

"12. After an exhaustive consideration of a
large number of decisions and standard books on
administrative law, the Court enunciated the
principle that the modern trend points to judicial
restraint in administrative action. The court does not
sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the
manner in which the decision was made. The court
does not have the expertise to correct the
administrative decision. If a review of the
administrative decision is permitted it will be
substituting its own decision, without the necessary
expertise, which itself may be fallible. The
Government must have freedom of contract. In other
words, fair play in the joints is a necessary
concomitant for an administrative body functioning in
an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative
sphere. However, the decision must not only be
tested by the application of Wednesbury principles of
reasonableness but also must be free from
arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by
mala fides. It was also pointed out that quashing
decisions may impose heavy administrative burden
on the administration and lead to increased and
unbudgeted expenditure. (See para 113 of the
Report, SCC para 94.)"

The Court does not have the expertise to correct the
administrative decision as held in Laxmikant v. Satyawan
[Laxmikant v. Satyawan, (1996) 4 SCC 208], the
Government must have freedom of contract.

23. The right to refuse the lowest or any other
tender is always available to the Government. In the case in
hand, the respondent has neither pleaded nor established
87

mala fide exercise of power by the appellant. While so, the
decision of the Tender Committee ought not to have been
interfered with by the High Court. In our considered view,
the High Court erred in sitting in appeal over the decision of
the appellant to cancel the tender and float a fresh tender.
Equally, the High Court was not right in going into the
financial implication of a fresh tender."

13. This Court in the aforesaid case has held that
while exercising power of judicial review, the Court does
not sit as an appellate Court over the decision of the
government but merely reviews the manner in which the
decision was made [Tata Cellular v. Union of
India, (1994) 6 SCC 651]. In the considered opinion of
this Court, the Division Bench should not have interfered
in the matter and could not have gone to the extent of
fixing the base price/modifying the offer made by
respondent and, therefore, in light of the aforesaid
judgment as the High Court has virtually passed an order
sitting in appeal over the decision of the government in
absence of any mala fide exercise of power by the IDA,
the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court deserves to be set aside and is, accordingly set
aside. This Court in the case of Haryana Urban
Development Authority v. Orchid Infrastructure
Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) again dealing with the
cancellation of a bid of the highest bidder, in paragraphs
12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 30 has held as under:

"12. Firstly, we examine the question whether there
being no concluded contract in the absence of acceptance of
bid and issuance of allotment letter, the suit could be said
to be maintainable for the declaratory relief and mandatory
injunction sought by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has prayed
for a declaration that rejection of the bid was illegal. Merely
by that, the plaintiff could not have become entitled for
consequential mandatory injunction for issuance of formal
letter of allotment. The court while exercising judicial review
could not have accepted the bid. The bid had never been
accepted by the authorities concerned. It was not a case of
cancellation of bid after being accepted. Thus, even
assuming as per the plaintiff's case that the Administrator
was not equipped with the power and the Chief
Administrator had the power to accept or refuse the bid,
there had been no decision by the Chief Administrator.
88

Thus, merely by declaration that rejection of the bid by the
Administrator was illegal, the plaintiff could not have
become entitled to consequential relief of issuance of
allotment letter. Thus the suit, in the form it was filed, was
not maintainable for relief sought in view of the fact that
there was no concluded contract in the absence of allotment
letter being issued to the plaintiff, which was a sine qua non
for filing the civil suit.

13. It is a settled law that the highest bidder has no
vested right to have the auction concluded in his favour.
The Government or its authority could validly retain power
to accept or reject the highest bid in the interest of public
revenue. We are of the considered opinion that there was
no right acquired and no vested right accrued in favour of
the plaintiff merely because his bid amount was highest and
had deposited 10% of the bid amount. As per Regulation
6(2) of the 1978 Regulations, allotment letter has to be
issued on acceptance of the bid by the Chief Administrator
and within 30 days thereof, the successful bidder has to
deposit another 15% of the bid amount. In the instant case,
allotment letter has never been issued to the petitioner as
per Regulation 6(2) in view of non-acceptance of the bid.
Thus, there was no concluded contract. Regulation 6 of the
1978 Regulations is extracted hereunder:

"6. Sale of lease of land or building by
auction.--(1) In the case of sale or lease by auction,
the price/premium to be charged shall be such
reserve price/premium as may be determined taking
into consideration the various factors as indicated in
sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 4 or any higher
amount determined as a result of bidding in open
auction.

(2) 10 per cent of the highest bid shall be
paid on the spot by the highest bidder in cash or by
means of a demand draft in the manner specified in
sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 5. The successful
bidder shall be issued allotment letter in Form CC or
C-II by registered post and another 15 per cent of
the bid accepted shall be payable by the successful
bidder, in the manner indicated, within thirty days of
the date of allotment letter conveying acceptance of
the bid by the Chief Administrator; failing which the
10 per cent amount already deposited shall stand
89

forfeited to the authority and the successful bidder
shall have no claim to the land or building auctioned.

(3) The payment of balance of the
price/premium, rate of interest chargeable and the
recovery of interest shall be in the same manner as
provided in sub-regulations (6) and (7) of Regulation
5.

(4) The general terms and conditions of the
auction shall be such as may be framed by the Chief
Administrator from time to time and announced to
the public before auction on the spot."

14. We are fortified in our view by a decision of this
Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Om Prakash
Sharma [U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Om Prakash
Sharma, (2013) 5 SCC 182 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 737],
wherein the questions arose for its consideration that :
whether there is any vested right upon the plaintiff
bidder until the bid is accepted by the competent
authority in relation to the property in question? Merely
because the plaintiff is the highest bidder by depositing
20% of the bid amount without there being approval of
the same by the competent authority and it amounts to a
concluded contract in relation to the plot in question; and
whether the plaintiff could have maintained the suit in
the absence of a concluded contract? Considering the
aforesaid questions, this Court has discussed the matter
thus : (SCC pp. 195-97, paras 30-31)

"30. In support of the said proposition, the learned
Senior Counsel for the defendant, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi has
also placed reliance upon another decision of this Court
in State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh [State of
U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh, (1982) 2 SCC 365]. The
learned Senior Counsel has rightly placed reliance upon the
judgment of this Court in Rajasthan Housing Board case
[Rajasthan Housing Board v. G.S. Investments, (2007) 1
SCC 477] which reads as under : (SCC p. 483, para 9)

'9. This being the settled legal position, the
respondent acquired no right to claim that the
auction be concluded in its favour and the High Court
clearly erred in entertaining the writ petition and in
90

not only issuing a direction for consideration of the
representation but also issuing a further direction to
the appellant to issue a demand note of the balance
amount. The direction relating to issuance of the
demand note for balance amount virtually amounted
to confirmation of the auction in favour of the
respondent which was not the function of the High
Court.'

In State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal [State of
Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal, (1972) 2 SCC 36] case,
relevant paragraph of which reads as under : (SCC pp. 44-
45, para 13)

'13. ... There is no concluded contract till the
bid is accepted. Before there was a concluded
contract, it was open to the bidders to withdraw their
bids (see Union of India v. Bhim Sen Walaiti Ram
[Union of India v. Bhim Sen Walaiti Ram, (1969) 3
SCC 146] ). [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks
has been emphasised in Avam Evam Vikas Parishad
case, (2013) 5 SCC 182.] By merely giving bids, the
bidders had not acquired any vested rights [Ed. :
The matter between two asterisks has been
emphasised in Avam Evam Vikas Parishad
case, (2013) 5 SCC 182.]'.

31. In view of the law laid down by this Court
in the aforesaid decisions, the learned Senior
Counsel Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi has rightly placed
reliance upon the same in support of the case of the
first defendant, which would clearly go to show that
the plaintiff had not acquired any right and no vested
right has been accrued in his favour in respect of the
plot in question merely because his bid amount is
highest and he had deposited 20% of the highest bid
amount along with the earnest money with the
Board. In the absence of acceptance of bid offered
by the plaintiff to the competent authority of the first
defendant, there is no concluded contract in respect
of the plot in question, which is evident from letters
dated 26-5-1977 and 8-7-1977 wherein the third
defendant had rejected the bid amount deposited by
the plaintiff and the same was refunded to him by
way of demand draft, which is an undisputed fact
and it is also not his case that the then Assistant
91

Housing Commissioner who has conducted the public
auction had accepted the bid of the plaintiff."

15. This Court in Om Prakash Sharma case [U.P. Avas
Evam Vikas Parishad v. Om Prakash Sharma, (2013) 5 SCC
182 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 737] has held that in the absence of a
concluded contract which takes place by issuance of allotment
letter, suit could not be said to be maintainable as there is no
vested right in the plaintiff without approval of the bid by the
competent authority. Thus, in the wake of the aforesaid
decision, in the absence of a concluded contract, the suit could
not have been decreed for mandatory injunction. It amounted to
enforcing of contract in the absence thereof."

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court holds that unless contract is awarded in anybody's

favour, it cannot be said that the Tender Inviting Authority had no

right to cancel the tender. The Apex Court elucidates the very issue

as the bid of a tenderer could be cancelled, notwithstanding the fact

that he was notified to be the highest bidder and the tender was

cancelled without assigning any reasons.

13. The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgments,

reiterates the law laid down in the cases of HARYANA URBAN

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and EVA AGRO FEEDS and has held

that fixing of price could be a matter on which the tender could be

cancelled. No right of any bidder is taken away merely because he
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has been declared to be the highest bidder or the lowest bidder as

the case would be. Unless a contract is signed between the parties,

no tenderer would get any right. In the case at hand, still no

tenderer was notified to be the successful tenderer. One of the

reasons for that is pendency of these petitions and an interim order

granted. Therefore, the plea put forth by the learned senior counsel

Sri Jayakumar S.Patil and Sri P. Prasanna Kumar is unacceptable ,

as there is no concluded contract between the parties to contend

that tender could not be withdrawn. If the withdrawal was bereft of

reasons, it would have been an all together different circumstance.

Elaborate deliberation in the meetings held by the BBMP is also

placed before Court. It nowhere indicates that it is bereft of reasons

or without application of mind. The entire Government order is

quoted supra which details reasons to recall or cancel the earlier

tender. Therefore, cancellation of tender cannot be held to be

arbitrary, as is sought to be contended by the learned counsel.

Therefore, the petitions in the form that they are presented before

the Court, would be unnecessary to be adjudicated upon, in the

light of fresh tender notification.
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14. As submitted by the learned Advocate General that every

tenderer or every contractor who are parties to the present

petitions would be eligible to participate in the new tender, I find no

reason to obliterate the new tender and permit the old tender to be

taken to its logical conclusion, notwithstanding elaborate reasons

rendered by the Authorities for recall of the tender. The learned

senior counsel Sri Jayakumar S. Patil takes this court through the

counter affidavit filed, the affidavit of the State to contend that the

reasons projected for cancellation of tender with particular

reference to economic viability is a ruse to recall the earlier tender

and continue with the fresh tender. He wants this Court to assess

the price quoted earlier and now - the reserve price then and the

reserve price now. All these would be in the jurisdiction of the

Tender Inviting Authority. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution would not sit in the arm chair

of experts to assess the price bids that had come about earlier or

the reserve price. The only examination in the cases at hand was

qua tenability of cancellation of tender. I find that cancellation of
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tender is based on sound reasoning and does not suffer from

palpable or demonstrable arbitrariness.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER

(i) All the Writ Petitions stand disposed.

(ii) The new tender that is issued during the subsistence of the subject petitions are sustained, finding no illegality.

(iii) The petitioners are permitted to participate in the fresh tender that is now notified.

(iv) The State shall redraw the timeline for completion of the process of tender at an outer limit of 4 months, if not earlier. The timeline shall be filed before this Court, by way of an affidavit, for its strict adherence.

(v) As undertaken by the learned Advocate General, the petitioners who have challenged rejection of their tender or disqualification, would not come in the way their participation in the tender nor that would weigh in the mind of the Tender Scrutiny Committee while scrutinizing the bids of those petitioners.

(vi) Liberty is reserved to the petitioners to move the Court in the event of breach of timeline and if there is breach of timeline, the matter would be viewed seriously.

Interim order, if any operating in these cases, shall stand dissolved.

Pending applications if any, also stand disposed, as a consequence.

Sd/-

(M. NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE bkp CT:SS

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