Kerala High Court
Eldhose vs State Of Kerala on 9 February, 2012
Bench: R.Basant, K.Vinod Chandran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.BASANT
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN
THURSDAY, THE 9TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2012/20TH MAGHA 1933
CRA.No. 1124 of 2010 (A)
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SC.67/2005 of II ADDL.SESSIONS COURT,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/ACCUSED:
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ELDHOSE, S/O.VARKEY KURIAKOSE,
AGED 34, CHAKKUNGAL VEEDU, PALACHODE BHAGOM
NELLAD, MAZHUVANNOOR VILLAGE.
BY ADVS.SRI.MATHAI VARKEY MUTHIRENTHY
SMT.ANITHA MATHAI MUTHIRENTHY
SRI.K.S.PRAVEEN
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
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STATE OF KERALA, REP.BY
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.
R BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR GIKKU JACOB GEORGE
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 09-02-2012, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
R.BASANT & K.VINOD CHANDRAN, JJ.
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Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A
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Dated this the 9th day of February, 2012
JUDGMENT
BASANT, J.
(i) In the light of hostility of eye witness was the learned Sessions Judge justified in coming to the conclusion that the injuries on the deceased were intentionally inflicted by the appellant?
ii) Is the accused entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt?
iii) At any rate, is not the accused entitled to the mitigative protection of Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C?
iv) Does the impugned judgment warrant interference on any count?
These are the points raised for our consideration by Sri.Mathai Varkey Muthirenthy, the learned counsel for the appellant in this appeal.
Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 2
2. The appellant has been found guilty, convicted and sentenced for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. He faces the sentence of imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-. Default sentence is also imposed.
3. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, a 30 year old young man, had committed patricide, he having murdered his 72 year old father on 15.05.2003 at 2.30 p.m, consequent to a property dispute between them, by inflicting 6 injuries on the deceased with a weapon MO.1, three of them being fatal. A rubber plantation belonging to the appellant in which property the deceased father allegedly had a right to take usufructs is the venue of the crime.
4. Investigation commenced with the registration of Ext.P1(a) F.I.R on the basis of Ext.P1 F.I statement lodged by PW1, the brother in law of the accused - himself not an eye witness. Investigation was completed and the final Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 3 report/charge sheet was filed by PW13, Investigating Officer. The learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session after observing all legal formalities. The learned Sessions Judge took cognizance of the offence alleged against the appellant. The appellant denied the charge framed against him by the learned Sessions Judge. Thereupon the prosecution examined PWs 1 to 13 and proved Exts.P1 to P16. MOs.1 to 8 were also marked.
5. In the course of cross examination of witnesses and later when examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C, the accused did not dispute an incident between him and his deceased father at the scene of the crime. He did not dispute his possession of MO.1 knife. But according to him injuries were not intentionally inflicted by him on his deceased father. There was a scuffle when his father interfered with the appellant marking the rubber trees in his property for tapping. In the melee which ensued, the deceased must have suffered injuries. This in short is the Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 4 specific plea raised.
6. The appellant had examined DWs 1 and 2 as defence witnesses. No documents were proved on the side of the appellant.
7. The learned Sessions Judge on an anxious consideration of all the relevant inputs came to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the offence under Section 302 I.P.C against the appellant beyond doubt. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge proceeded to pass the impugned judgment.
8. Before us the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor have advanced their arguments. The learned counsel for the appellant raises the contention that the court below had erred in coming to the conclusion that the injuries found on the deceased were intentionally inflicted by the appellant. The appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. At any rate the appellant is entitled to the mitigative protection Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 5 under Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C, it is finally urged.
9. The learned Prosecutor on the contrary contends that the evidence establishes beyond doubt that the injuries found on the deceased were intentionally inflicted by the appellant. The appellant is not entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. He is not entitled to the protection of Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. In these circumstances, this appeal only deserves to be dismissed, contends the learned Prosecutor.
10. We have considered all the relevant inputs. This appellate judgment is; is intended to be read and must be read in continuation of the judgment of the trial court. In that view of the matter, we do not propose to re-narrate the oral and documentary evidence available before the court below. Suffice it to say that we have been taken in detail through the oral evidence of PWs 1 to 13 and DWs 1 and 2. We have also been taken through the contents of Exts.P1 to P16. We have perused the charge framed by the learned Sessions Judge against the Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 6 appellant. The answers given by the appellant in the course of his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C have also been read to us in detail by the learned counsel for the appellant. We shall specifically refer to relevant materials wherever necessary in the course of discussions.
11. Prosecution had chosen to examine PWs 2 and 3 as eye witnesses to the occurrence. They are - a neighbour, an elderly woman aged 75 years and the mother of the appellant, also aged about 75 years on the date on which she tendered evidence. PW1 is the son in law of the deceased (brother in law of the appellant), who was not an eye witness. The prosecution alleged that a dying declaration was made by the deceased to PW1. PWs 4 and 5 are neighbours and both had not witnessed the occurrence. PW6 was examined by the prosecution to show that MO.1 belonged to the appellant, he having purchased the same on that morning from PW6. Prosecution further relied on the production of MO.2 blood stained shirt by the appellant when Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 7 he was arrested. He was allegedly wearing MO.2 at the time of occurrence. The prosecution also wanted to rely on recovery of MO.1 on the basis of the information furnished by the appellant to PW13 in the course of his confession statement. PWs 1 to 3 turned hostile to the prosecution. PWs 2 and 3, consistent with the stand taken by the accused, did not deny that an incident had occurred between the appellant and the deceased and that the appellant was in possession of MO.1 in the course of that incident. PW1 had turned hostile. He did not support the prosecution version about the dying declaration.
12. A careful scrutiny of the oral evidence of PWs 2 and 3 in the light of the case set up by the prosecution and the definite stand taken by the appellant in the course of his 313 examination can safely lead the court to a conclusion beyond doubt that there was an incident between the appellant and the deceased at about 2.30 p.m on15.05.2003 at the scene of the crime. The scene of the crime, it is now beyond doubt, is a property purchased Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 8 originally in the name of the appellant and the deceased. Consequent to strain in their relationship, the property had been partitioned/separated and a portion had been allotted/earmarked for the appellant. There was a rubber plantation in that property. The rubber trees had become ripe for tapping. A life interest appears to have been reserved in favour of the deceased. There was a dispute between the appellant and the deceased as to whether the appellant is entitled to tap the rubber trees which had become ripe for tapping. On account of the acrimony between the father and the son, the appellant son had to leave the house of his father and he was admittedly residing away from the house of his father. Indications galore to suggest that he was compelled to take up residence in that rubber plantation and he was cooking and eating in such rubber plantation. Though documentary evidence is not produced to prove rights in respect of the property, there is no dispute virtually on the above aspects.
Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 9
13. The evidence clearly establishes that at the relevant time the appellant had tried to mark the rubber trees in the property with MO.1. Deceased father objected to that course adopted by the appellant. The deceased assaulted the appellant consequent to that dispute. It is thereafter that the deceased suffered injuries. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3 indicate that there was an altercation between the two. We must note that both PWs 2 and 3 are hostile witnesses and it does not require the wisdom of Solomon to conclude that they had gone out of their way to support the appellant. Deceased father was no more and the soft approach of PW3, the mother of the appellant, to the appellant is natural and reasonable. No court will be imprudent in these circumstances to swallow completely the convenient version advanced by PWs 2 and 3 in favour of the appellant.
14. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3 clearly convey that there was an incident in the course of which the deceased had suffered Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 10 injuries with MO.1 weapon which the appellant was having in his possession. So much is very evident. It is in this context that one has to go back to Ext.P8 postmortem certificate issued by PW10. As many as 6 injuries were suffered by the deceased with a weapon like MO.1. 3 of the 6 injuries were fatal injuries. Laborious attempt is made by the learned counsel for the appellant to contend that these injuries must have been suffered accidentally in the course of a scuffle between the appellant and the deceased. Less said about this explanation, the better. The nature of injuries described in Ext.P8 and the evidence of PW10 leave no trace of doubt in our mind on the question whether these injuries were the result of intentional inflictions or the result of accidental contacts with a weapon like MO.1 in the course of a scuffle. For certainty and clarity on this aspect we give below the details of the 6 injuries suffered by the deceased described in Ext.P8.
Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 11
1. '.....' shaped incised penetrating wound horizontally placed on the front of middle of abdomen. Its horizontal limb measured 3.5 cm and vertical limbs 1.5 c.m each directed upwards. Inner vertical limb was 20 cm about the pubic symphysis Abdominal wall penetrated and the wound entered and terminated in the peritoneal cavity. Total minimus depth 4.5 c.m. Coils of intestine showed several cuts and were protruding out through the external wound.
2. '.....' shaped incised penetrating wound obliquely placed on the left side of the front of abdomen. Its horizontal limb was 3.5 cm long and vertical limbs 1.5 cm each directed inwards and downwards. Upper vertical limb was 28 c.m below the collar bone and 10 cm outer to the midline. Abdominal wall was penetrated and the wound Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 12 terminated in the abdominal cavity. Intestine showed multiple cuts and was protruding out through the external wound. Total minimum depth was 4.5 cm.
Abdominal cavity contained 1.9 litres of blood with clots.
3. '.....' shaped incised penetrating wound obliquely placed on the left side of the front of chest. Its horizontal limb measured 3.8 c.m. Vertical limbs 1.5 cm each directed medially and downwards. The upper vertical limb was 26 cm below the collar bone and 7 cm outer to the midline. Left chest cavity was penetrated by cutting the 9th rib and 8th intercostal space, and perforating the diaphragm the wound entered the abdominal cavity and terminated in the liver. Direction was backwards, downwards and to the right. Total minimum depth was 10 cm. Left chest cavity contained 800 ml of blood with clots. Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 13
4. '......' shaped incised wound horizontally placed on the front of left side of chest. Horizontal limb was 3.5X0.3X0.5 cm and vertical limbs 1.5X0.5X0.5 cm each directed upwards. Upper end of the inner vertical limb was 13 cm below the inner end of collar bone.
5. Incised wound 5X0.5X0.5 cm horizontally placed on the back of left elbow.
6. Incised wound 1X0.5 cm on the back of left shoulder 6 cm above the posterior fold of armpits."
The contention laboriously advanced to claim exoneration - that the injuries were accidental injuries and were suffered in the course of a scuffle must, in these circumstances, fall to the ground. We have no hesitation to concur with the conclusion of the court below that these injuries were suffered by the deceased at the hands of the appellant with MO.1 and that those Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 14 injuries were the result of intentional inflictions. At least in respect of the 3 fatal injuries, there can be no trace of doubt.
15. We have gone through the answers given by the appellant in the course of 313 examination. He admits that MO.1 knife belonged to him. He admits that he went away from the scene with MO.1 weapon. In these circumstances, we reckon it as unnecessary to advert in detail to the evidence of PW6, who stated that MO.1 was sold by him to the appellant on that morning. We do not also think it necessary to advert in detail to evidence of recovery of MO.1 under Ext.P7 and the oral evidence of PW9 as it is the admitted case of the appellant that he had run away from the scene with MO.1 weapon.
16. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that in the light of hostility of PWs 1 to 3, a safe conclusion about the guilt of the appellant cannot be drawn and the appellant must be conceded the benefit of doubt. We do not agree. Hostility of witnesses by itself cannot deliver any advantage to the indictee. Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 15 It being very clear from the totality of circumstances that the injuries on the deceased were suffered by him with MO.1 weapon which the appellant was holding at the time of occurrence and those injuries not being accidental injuries beyond doubt, we are not able to discover or invent any reasonable doubt in favour of the appellant.
17. There is no claim for any right of private defence. Such a plea is not raised. Deceased was unarmed. There is no indication whatsoever to suggest that the appellant could have reasonably perceived any apprehension to life or limb at the hands of his unarmed father. Though the burden under Section 105 of the Evidence Act rests squarely on the shoulders of the accused to bring his case within any of the general exceptions to criminality, courts shall not hesitate, and are bound to consider, the availability of such a plea, if the totality of circumstances point to the availability of such a plea. In the facts and circumstances of the case there is absolutely no need for the Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 16 court to delve deeper into that aspect. We note that the plea is not raised. The burden under Section 105 is not discharged. On facts we are convinced that such a plea is not available.
18. We now come to the nature of the offence proved. We are satisfied that any one who inflicts such injuries as are described in Ext.P8 with a weapon like MO.1 on the deceased can safely be assumed to have intended to cause the death of the deceased. Under clause firstly of Section 300 I.P.C, the offence of murder defined under Section 300 I.P.C is thus established. If not under clause firstly of Section 300, definitely under clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C, the offence of murder is clearly established. We have already come to the conclusion that the injuries suffered were inflicted intentionally. The injuries objectively assessed are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Therefore under clause thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C ( if not under clause firstly of Section 300 I.P.C), the offence of murder defined under Section 300 I.P.C is clearly Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 17 established.
19. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that in any view of the matter, the appellant is entitled to the mitigative protection of Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C.
20. We now come to the claim for mitigative protection under Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. The law is well settled that the following ingredients must be shown to be established to attract Exception 4.
(i) There must be no premediation.
(ii) There must have been a sudden fight upon a sudden quarrel.
(iii) The act must have been committed in the heat of passion.
(iv) The offender must not have
(a) taken undue advantage; or
(b) acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Each ingredient must be established. They must be shown to Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 18 exist simultaneously and cumulatively. It is only on proof of all the 4 requisites that a successful claim for protection of exception 4 can be raised.
21. We take note of the specific facts. That there was no pre-mediation is evident. The evidence suggests that MO.1 was purchased by the appellant from PW6 on the morning of 15.05.2003. But such purchase cannot even remotely suggest any premediation on the part of the appellant to commit the crime. The rubber trees had become ripe for tapping. They stood in the property of the appellant. He wanted the rubber trees to be marked for tapping. For this, he had to use MO.1. That he possessed MO.1 at the scene of the crime cannot, in these circumstances, at all indicate any pre mediation.
22. The evidence clearly suggests that there was an exchange of words between the appellant and the deceased. The bone of contention evidently was the right of the appellant to mark the rubber trees in his property for tapping. This was Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 19 evidently a sudden quarrel. When the appellant tried to mark the rubber trees for tapping, the deceased objected to it on the ground that he has a life interest to take usufructs from the property. That sudden quarrel led to a sudden fight. The deceased allegedly assaulted the appellant then. An altercation followed and we do, in these circumstances, find it easy to conclude that there was a sudden fight upon a sudden quarrel.
23. Was the act committed in the heat of passion? This is the next question to be considered. Totality of inputs will have to be taken into consideration. It was a property purchased in the joint names of the father and the son. Consequent to acrimony between them regarding enjoyment of the common property, document was executed (though the document is not produced before the court) earmarking one part of the property to the son. In that property the rubber trees in question were grown and they had become ripe for tapping. Because of the difference of opinion between the father and the son, the Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 20 son/appellant could not continue residence in his father's house. He was forced to shift from the house to the property ear marked for him. Going by the version of PWs 2 and 3, in the course of the incident the appellant had queried whether he was to eat soil and survive. Totality of inputs clearly suggests that the act must have been committed in the heat of passion. There was no time gap between the commencement of the incident and the infliction of the injury to assume that there was time for passion to die down and reason to return.
24. Did the offender/appellant take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner? This is the next question to be considered. Though we note that a rubber tapping knife like MO.1, which was handy and available with the appellant at the time of occurrence, was used by the appellant against his father and though we note that plurality of injuries were inflicted, in the circumstances of this case we are unable to hold that the appellant had taken undue advantage or acted in any cruel or Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 21 unusual manner of an exceptional variety which alone can take his case out of the sweep of Exception 4.
25. In this view of the matter we take the view that the appellant is, at any rate, entitled to the mitigative protection of Exception 4. The appeal can succeed only to the above extent.
26. It will not be inapposite in this context to refer to a submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant points out that the appellant had initially engaged a counsel of his own before the committal court. Subsequently after the matter was committed to the Court of Session and the appellant was produced before the learned Sessions Judge on 11.02.05, the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant speaking irrelevant facts. The learned Judge felt that there was some mental abnormality. The appellant was sent for psychiatric treatment and initially it was reported that the appellant was not fit to stand trial. Later he was reported to be fit to stand trial and the proceedings continued. At that stage on Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 22 01.07.2005 the appellant filed an application to engage a counsel to defend his case and accordingly service of a legal aid counsel was made available to the appellant by the learned Sessions Judge. Trial commenced long later on 14.12.2005. The trial had commenced only after the learned Sessions Judge had satisfied himself by the examination of CW2 and the marking of Ext.C2 that the appellant was fit to stand trial. Till PW9 was examined, the trial proceeded smoothly. After examination of PW9, the appellant asserted that he should be allowed to conduct his own case. He filed a written submission to that effect before the learned Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge reluctantly, it would appear, permitted the appellant to conduct his own case on 06.02.2005 and 07.02.2005. PWs 10 to 13 were examined thereafter and they were cross examined by the accused himself, it is evident. At that stage he did not avail the services of a legal practitioner which was offered to him by the court. The matter was thereupon posted to 14.02.2005 on which day the learned Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 23 Sessions Judge appointed another counsel to afford legal aid and assistance to the appellant. Engagement continued till 18.02.2006 on which day the appellant reiterated that he did not want the services of a lawyer. It was thus that the trial was completed and the learned Judge proceeded to pass the impugned judgment.
27. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been denied fair trial. Inasmuch as he was not represented by any counsel when PWs 10 to 13 were examined it must be noted that he has been denied fair trial. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that at this length of time the appellant does not want to raise that as a ground of defence. However, the counsel points out that it was incumbent on the learned Judge at that stage at least to again verify whether the appellant was in a fit state of mind to stand trial.
28. The learned counsel for the appellant does not raise this as a ground. He raises no contention that the appellant is Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 24 entitled to the defence of legal insanity under Section 84 of the I.P.C. He does not raise a contention that the appellant was not fit to stand trial. We are convinced on facts that the appellant cannot claim exoneration under Section 84 of the I.P.C. We are satisfied that the appellant was fit to stand trial throughout. But we have adverted to this aspect to satisfy ourselves that there is no denial of the principles of a fair trial. Just as an indictee is entitled to the assistance of a legal counsel, it is open to him to assert before court that he does not require the assistance of a legal counsel. In this case it is evidently not a case where the appellant was not denied or was not given advantage of assistance by legal counsel. He did not want to avail the services of a legal counsel. The right of a person to assert that he does not need the assistance of a counsel and must be permitted to defend himself will certainty have to be recognised by law. Of course we have no hesitation to agree that it would have been ideal for the court, in the backdrop of facts to get the appellant Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 25 again referred to a medical expert to confirm that it was an informed decision by the appellant that he does not want the services of a legal counsel. In this case there is no reason to doubt the capacity of the accused to stand trial. Such capacity is not questioned also. We need only observe that ideally, before accepting the submission of an accused that he does not want to avail of the services of a counsel, the court must doubly assure that it is an informed decision of the accused. This is more so in a case like the instant one where the indictee was found to be not fit to stand trial at one stage. Nothing stands in the way of a court appointing an amicus curiae to help it to come to a correct conclusion in such situations. Such power of the court to appoint a counsel as amicus curiae is not affected or fettered even by the informed assertion of an indictee that he does not want the services of any legal practitioner.
29. Be that as it may, we are satisfied that there has been no denial of the principles of a fair trial against the appellant. Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 26 That ground has not been raised specifically before us. We are not persuaded on facts considered objectively to hold that there has been any infraction of the principles of a fair trial. The learned counsel for the appellant points out that acceptance of such a ground may entail long drawn out further proceedings which may ultimately hurt the interests of the appellant. In any view of the matter, we are satisfied that there is no reason to conclude that the principles of fair trial have been violated in the trial held against the appellant.
30. We now come back to the sentence to be imposed. We take note of the totality of circumstances. We are satisfied that a sentence of R.I for a period of 8 years and fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand only) shall meet the ends of justice eminently in the facts and circumstances of this case. In coming to this conclusion, we have taken note of the totality of inputs available in this case. The verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence will accordingly stand modified and altered. Crl.Appeal No.1124 of 2010-A 27
31. In the result:
a) This appeal is allowed in part;
b) The verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C is modified and altered to Section 304(i) I.P.C. He is sentenced to undergo R.I for a period of 8 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand only). In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo R.I for a period of 6 months.
32. The Registry shall communicate this judgment to the court below and the court below shall issue revised warrant of commitment forthwith.
(R.BASANT, JUDGE) (K.VINOD CHANDRAN, JUDGE) rtr/