Bombay High Court
Monusingh Jagdishsingh Bavari vs The State Of Maharashtra And Another on 18 March, 2026
2026:BHC-AUG:12397
(1) 927ba1473.25
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
927 BAIL APPLICATION NO. 1473 OF 2025
MONUSINGH JAGDISHSINGH BAVARI
....Applicant
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER
.....Respondents
Mr. Jitendra Patil, Advocate for the applicant
Mr. C. V. Bhadane, APP for the respondents/State
CORAM : RAJNISH R. VYAS, J.
DATE : 18th MARCH, 2026
PER COURT :
1. Heard.
2. Only ground pressed in this bail application is regarding
long incarceration.
3. The learned Advocate for the applicant has contended
that offence in question was registered on 26-10-2022, so also the
arrest of the applicant. According to him, neither the charge was
framed when the bail application was filed nor any steps were taken
by the prosecution to take the prosecution logical end. He then
invited my attention to the order passed by this court on 18-02-2026
by which, the Registrar (Judicial) was requested to seek status report
from the concerned court. According to him, though now the charge
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is framed, the fact remains that since more than 60 witnesses are
cited by the prosecution in the charge-sheet which will further delay
the trial. He, therefore, submitted that his client be released on bail.
4. Per contra, the learned APP has submitted that in
compliance with the order dated 18-02-2026 the concerned court has
submitted its status report on 27-02-2026 and has categorically
stated that charge in the matter was framed on 06-11-2025 and
thereafter, the progress had taken place and consequently, the matter
was posted for the evidence on 09-03-2026. However, crime property
was not received.
5. It is in this background the learned APP submitted that
just because the applicant is behind the bar since last four years, that
would not be a ground ifso facto to release him on bail.
6. It is necessary to mention here that after registration of
the First Information Report on 26-10-2022, the applicant was
immediately arrested on that day. The bail application was filed
before this court on 25-07-2025. The report submitted by the District
& Additional Sessions Judge, Jalgaon dated 27-02-2026 shows that
out of the accused persons in the present crime, two accused
including present applicant were lodged in the jail. The jail authority
had applied to transfer the accused Monusingh/applicant to the
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Central Prison, Nashik as his activity in the jail was not proper.
Considering the said fact, the permission was granted for transferring
the applicant. The report further shows that on 06-11-2025, the
charges were framed and thereafter notice under Section 330 of the
Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita was given and on 07-02-20216 the
accused did not admit the relevant documents.
7. The prosecution then proceeded in accordance with law
and consequently case was fixed for evidence on 09-03-2026. The
report shows that on that day Muddemal was not produced and
therefore, program could not be fixed. Report further points out that
the till September, 2025, the accused persons were filing the bail
application one after another and on 26-09-2025 the accused No.1
did not press his application for bail. It was also stated that
considering the behavior of the accused in jail at Jalgaon, he was
shifted to the Central Prison, Nashik and again on 23-02-2026 a letter
was received from the District Prison, Jalgaon wherein a request was
made to transfer the present applicant to Central Prison, Nashik. It
was also stated that the not only Superintendent of Prison was
threatened with dire consequences but also his family. The report
shows that therefore, the concerned authorities had informed about
danger to their life.
8. At this stage, it is necessary to mention here that
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pendency of the bail application would not stop the court from
proceeding with the matter. The record of the case shows that the
applicant along with others are charge-sheeted for commission of
offences punishable under Sections 143, 147,148,149,302,307,326 of
the IPC and Section 3(I)(II), 3(2), 3(4) of the MCOC Act. As pointed
out by the learned APP that present applicant has more than 18
cases which are registered against him and said chart is reproduced
below :
Sr. Police Station Crime No. Sections
No.
1. Jhilhapeth PS 161/2013 294,323,336,337,427,510,506 of the IPC
2. MIDC PS 304/2017 306,452,143,147,149,504,506 & 427 of
the IPC
3. MIDC PS 203/2018 324,323,504,506 & 34 IPC
4. MIDC PS 228/2018 454,457 & 380 IPC
5. MIDC PS 277/2018 380,454 IPC
6. MIDC 711/2018 309,294,427 & 506 IPC
7. Jhilhapeth PS 295/2019 380,457,411 & 34 IPC
8. MIDC PS 355/2019 307, 143,147 IPC
9. Jhilhapeth PS 414/2019 309,511 IPC
10. MIDC PS 558/2019 380,454,457 IPC
11. MIDC PS 729/2019 380,454,457 IPC
12. Jalgaon City PS 42/2020 309, 294, 427, 506 IPC
13. MIDC PS 61/2020 380,457,34 IPC
14. MIDC PS 162/2020 399,402 IPC & 3/25 Arms Act
15. MIDC PS 973/2020 142 Mah. Police Act
16. MIDC PS 1051/2020 395,397,456,393 IPC & 142 Mah. Police
Act
17. Muktainagar PS 357/2021 380, 457 IPC
18. MIDC 769/2022 302,307,326,147,149, 120(b) IPC and 3(i)
(ii), 3(2), 3(4) MCOC
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9. So aforesaid chart speaks volume for itself. As far as
incident in question is concerned, the prosecution has categorically
stated that the applicant No. 2 along with accused No. 1, on the day
of incident, had assaulted one Sanjay Tak by means of knife. Three
more persons were also injured including one Baggasing. The
incident dated 25-10-2022 was out come of earlier incident dated 24-
10-2022. The incident dated 24-10-2022 pertains to bursting of
crackers by the accused party and dispute to that effect. Thus, the
fact of applicant assaulting the injured/ the deceased is clear from the
various statements brought on record. It is well settled principle of
law that not only the rights of accused are required to be honored,
but also due regard is to be shown to the victim of the crime.
10. The learned Advocate for the applicant has relied upon
the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Javed Gulam
Nabi Shaikh Vs State of Maharashtra in Appeal No. 2787/2024 dated
03-07-2024 decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court more particularly,
para 8,9,10 and 11 which reads as under:
8. Having regard to the aforesaid, we wonder by what
period of time, the trial will ultimately conclude.
Howsoever serious a crime may be, an Accused has a
right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution
of India.
9. Over a period of time, the trial courts and the High
Courts have forgotten a very well settled principle of law
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that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment.
10. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial
courts and the High Courts of what came to be observed
by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu and Ors. v.
Public Prosecutor, High Court reported in
MANU/SC/0089/1977MANU/SC/0089/1977 :
1977:INSC:232 : (1978) 1 SCC 240. We quote:
What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants
reminder, is the object to keep a person in judicial
custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal. Lord
Russel, C.J., said [R v. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox]:
I observe that in this case bail was refused for the
prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the,
magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld
as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are
merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.
11. The same principle has been reiterated by this Court
in Gurbaksh Singh Sibba v. State of Punjab reported in
MANU/SC/0215/1980MANU/SC/0215/1980 :
1980:INSC:68 : (1980) 2 SCC 565 that the object of bail
is to secure the attendance of the Accused at the trial,
that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the
question whether bail should be granted or refused is
whether it is probable that the party will appear to take
his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment.
11. The learned Advocate for the applicant has contended
that pre-trial custody cannot be by way of punishment. Gist of the
aforesaid judgment is the same that howsoever serious a crime may
be an accused has a right to speedy trial under the Constitution of
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India. Second judgment which is relied upon by the counsel for the
applicant is Union of India Vs K. A. Najeeb in Criminal Appeal No.98
of 2021 decided on 01-02-2021 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court more
particularly para 18 which reads as under:
18. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory
restrictions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA perse does not
oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on
grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution.
Indeed, both the restrictions under a Statue as well as
the powers exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction
can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of
proceedings, Courts are expected to appreciate the
legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of
such provisions will melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable
time and the period of incarceration already undergone
has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed
sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the
possibility of provisions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA
being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for
wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.
12. The crux of the aforesaid judgment is that the long
incarceration of the accused is not in the interest of justice and
constitutional court, can exercise their powers to direct the release of
the applicant on that ground. The learned Advocate for the applicant
has also invited my attention to the judgment passed by the
coordinate bench of this court in the case of Vikas Chandrakant Patil
Vs State of Maharashtra in Bail Application No. 1963/2025 decided
on 09-05-2025, more particularly, para 34.1 to 34.9 which reads as
under:
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34.1. In the case of Avinash Ashok Torane Vs. The
State of Maharashtra8, this Court (Coram: N.J.
Jamadar, J.) while dealing with a bail application
for offence under Section 302 of IPC considering
parity with another co-accused who was enlarged
on bail considered the unlikelihood of completion
of trial coupled with the period of long
incarceration of 1 year 3 months of the Applicant
and enlarged him on bail.
34.2. In the case of Sonu Parmeshwar Jha Vs. The
State of Maharashtra9 this Court (Coram: M.S.
Karnik, J.) was dealing with a bail application for
offences under Sections 302 and 304(b) of IPC
and considering circumstantial evidence against
the accused as well as long incarceration of
accused of 1 year 7 months enlarged him on bail.
34.3. In the case of Rup Bahadur Magar @ Sanki
@ Rabin Vs. State of West Bengal10, in a case
under Sections 394, 395, 397, 307 read with 120-
B of IPC, the Supreme Court granted bail to the
accused considering long incarceration undergone
by him of 2 years and 9 months.
34.4. In the case of Santosh Ramprasad Hairijan
Vs. The State of Maharashtra11, in a case under
Section 302 of IPC this Court taking into account
long period of incarceration undergone by accused
of 3 years 4 months granted him bail.
34.5. In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh
(supra), the Supreme Court while granting bail to
accused incarcerated for 4 years in paragraph Nos.
16 and 17 held as under:-
"16. Criminals are not born but made. The
human potential in everyone is good and so, never
write off any criminal as beyond redemption. This
humanist fundamental is often missed when
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dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult.
Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a
future. When a crime is committed, a variety of
factors is responsible for making the offender
commit the crime. Those factors may be social and
economic, may be, the result of value erosion or
parental neglect; may be, because of the stress of
circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations
in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence
or other privations.
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency
including the court concerned has no wherewithal
to provide or protect the fundamental right of an
accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under
Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any
other prosecuting agency should not oppose the
plea for bail on the ground that the crime
committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution
applies irrespective of the nature of the crime."
34.6. In the case of Balwinder Singh Vs. State of
Punjab and Anr.12, in a case under Sections 302
and 307 of IPC the Supreme Court granted bail to
the accused who was behind bars for 4 years citing
unlikelihood of completion of trial in the near
future as also on parity with the co-accused.
34.7. In the case of Roland Victor Monterio Vs.
State of Maharashtra13, this Court (Coram: N.J.
Jamadar, J.) in a case under Sections 302, 304-B
and 498-A of the IPC granted bail to the accused
on account of his long incarceration of 4 years.
Similarly in the case of Naresh Harishchandra Mali
Vs. The State of Maharashtra14, this Court
(Coram: N.J. Jamadar, J.) in a case under Sections
302 and 307 of IPC granted bail to the accused as
he was in prison for a period of more than 5 years.
34.8. Recently, the Delhi High Court in the case of
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Raghvendr Singh Vs. State of NCT of Delhi
MANU/DE/0032/2025MANU/DE/0032/2025
granted bail to the Accused who was indicted for
offence of murder citing his long incarceration for
a period of 5 and half years and enlarged him on
bail.
34.9. In the case of Chintan Vidyasagar Upadhyay
Vs. The State of Maharashtra15, in a case under
Sections 302 and 396 of IPC the Supreme Court
granted bail to the accused who had undergone 6
years of pre-trial incarceration. Similarly in the
case of Indrani Pratim Mukerjea Vs. Central
Bureau of Investigation16 the Supreme Court in a
case under Section 302 of IPC granted bail to the
accused, she having undergone pre-trial
incarceration of 6 and a half years.
13. The learned Advocate for the applicant has argued that
this court by taking into consideration the length of sentence which is
undergone, released the applicant therein on bail. Sum and substance
of the argument of the applicant is that long incarceration creates a
right in his favour to seek a bail. He submits that there is no fault on
the part of the applicant for delaying the trial and therefore, in the
aforesaid background he be released on bail.
14. So far as the prima facie case is concerned i.e. it is
already discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. So far as long
incarceration is concerned, it is also observed that though the speedy
trial is right of the accused at the same time agony of the victim
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cannot be ignored, balance approach will have to be taken. In this
regard, it is necessary to mention here that Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Neeraj Sehrawat Vs State of NCT of Delhi reported in 2025
SCC OnLine Del 107 has held that long incarceration cannot be the
only factor for granting of bail. Prima facie criminal, antecedents will
also have to be looked into. Relevant observations are as follows:
19. Upon applying its mind to the submissions made by
the parties, as well as what is borne-out from the record,
in the opinion of this court the following inferences
clearly arise :
19.1. The petitioner‟s contention that his history-
sheet or criminal antecedents cannot be the
prevailing criterion to deny him regular bail, is hard
to accept. As pointed-out by the State despite the
petitioner having been acquitted or discharged in
several other cases, the chronology of events shows
that the 03 cases in which he was convicted relate
to offences which the petitioner committed while he
was on bail in other cases. This is proof-positive
that the petitioner has serious proclivity to commit
offences and the apprehension of the State in that
regard is not merely speculative or hypothetical but
the petitioner has shown it to be so by his own
conduct.
19.2. The petitioner‟s argument that the Supreme
Court has set-
down the judicial trend that prolonged incarceration
cannot be permitted to become punishment without
trial; and that „bail is the rule and jail is the exception‟
regardless of the seriousness of the crime alleged, is also
facetious, since in applying those principles the court
must bear in mind the fate of the family of the victims
and the faith of the community in the process of justice.
Though it is true that a court must lean towards
constitutionalism, and the right of an accused to a
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speedy trial as derived from Article 21 of the
Constitution, is an overarching and sacrosanct
consideration, mere delay in trial is not sufficient to
warrant a finding that the petitioner has been deprived
of his right to speedy trial; and delay is only one of the
factors to be considered before deciding to enlarge the
petitioner on bail, and that factor is to be weighed
against several other factors. 17 In the present case, the
delay in conducting trial has been occasioned inter-alia
by the fact that 03 of the co-accused persons had
absconded while on bail; which is certainly a factor to be
considered by this court. 19.3. Though in the present
case the petitioner has suffered judicial custody of over
09 years as an undertrial, and it is not clear as to how
long the trial would take to conclude, as contended by
the State, the petitioner is stated to be the head of the
dreaded „Neeraj Bawania Gang‟, and therefore,
regardless of how long Ranjan Dwivedi (supra) he may
have been in jail in the present case, this court is not
persuaded to accept that if enlarged on bail, the
petitioner would not indulge in criminality again and
would not be a threat to the society at large. Moreover,
by his past conduct the petitioner has demonstrated that
even conditions imposed while granting him bail would
not dissuade him from indulging in criminality.
19.4. There is also no doubt that the well-worn
principles for grant of bail are not to be applied blindly
or mindlessly, and the court must use its discretion to
grant or deny bail in a judicious manner and not as a
matter of course; and the petitioner‟s fundamental right
to liberty must be balanced against the interests of the
society,18 since even constitutional rights are not
absolute.
19.5. When viewed through this prism, it would be naïve
of this court to take a unidimensional view of the matter
- focusing only on the petitioner‟s right to a speedy trial,
while ignoring other extremely germane factors and
considerations as discussed above - and to grant to the
petitioner regular bail based only on the period of
custody undergone as an undertrial in case FIR
No.1683/2015.
19.6. The court cannot ignore that though there has
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been delay in conducting trial in the subject FIR, that
notwithstanding, the Chandrakeshwar Prasad (supra)
length of delay is only one of the factors to be
considered and that factor must be weighed against
other factors.19 19.7. Insofar as the argument that the
interests of the society can be balanced with the
petitioner‟s right to liberty by imposing requisite
conditions while enlarging the petitioner on regular bail,
it must be appreciated, that as aptly observed by the
Supreme Court in Ash Mohammad (supra), there needs
to be a proper analysis of the criminal antecedents of an
accused and the question of imposing conditions is a
matter that is subsequent to the decision to grant bail.
20. In the present case the record shows that the
petitioner has committed heinous offences while he was
on bail in other cases; and he has been convicted in the
offences committed while on bail. When there is a long
list of serious criminal involvements, including
convictions for offences committed while on bail in other
cases, the apprehension that the petitioner suffers from
recidivism cannot be dismissed as imaginary. In that
view of the matter, the petitioner‟s submission that he
has served sentence for those crimes offers scant comfort
to the court that no one else will be harmed by the
petitioner if he is enlarged on bail this time.
21. It is also settled law, that bail can justifiably be
denied when there is real risk of repeat offences being
committed. Sections 437 and 439 of the Cr.P.C.
contemplate that contingency.
15. Though in the charge-sheet 60 witnesses are cited it is
not even the case of the prosecution that all 60 witnesses would be
examined. The offences are punishable with death and record shows
that there is no delay in conducting the trial. Since charges are
already framed, I am not inclined to entertain the present
application. At the same time, the right of the accused is also required
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to be protected. In that view of the matter, following order is passed:
ORDER
a] The application is rejected.
b] The trial court is directed to submit the status report every six months to this court.
[RAJNISH R. VYAS, J. ] VishalK/927ba1473.25 14 of 14