Allahabad High Court
Smt. Sanju Singh And Ors. vs The New India Assurance Co. ... on 22 May, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 871 of 2014
Smt. Sanju Singh and Ors. ..Appellant(s)
Versus
The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.Throu.Branch Manager and Anr...Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
Qazi Mohd. Ahmad,
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Jay Krishna Shukla, Jitendra Narain Mishra, Zaki Mohammad Ahmad
Along with :
(1) First Appeal From Order No. 1133 of 2012
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Sanju Singh and others
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Jitendra Narain Mishra
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Jay Krishna Shukla, S.K.Srivastava,
Sumit Kr. Srivastava
(2) First Appeal From Order No. 1135 of 201
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Urmila Singh and others
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Jitendra Narain Mishra
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Akash Deep Singh, Jay Krishna Shukla,
Qazi Mohd.Ahmad, Sachindra Dwivedi
(3) First Appeal From Order No. 24 of 2016
Smt. Urmila Singh and Ors. Vs.The New India Assurance Company Ltd. and others
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Sachindra Dwivedi, Akash Deep Singh,
Anurag Singh, Harsh Vardhan Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Jay Krishna Shukla, Jitendra Narain
Mishra
Court No. - 19
HON'BLE SYED QAMAR HASAN RIZVI, J.
1. Sri Jitendra Narain Mishra, learned counsel for The New India Assurance Company Ltd and Sri Qazi Mohd. Ahmad, learned counsel appearing for the claimants in FAFO No. 871 of 2014 and in FAFO No. 1133 of 2012 and Sri Akash Deep Singh, learned counsel for the claimants in FAFO No. 24 of 2016 and in FAFO No. 1135 of 2012; and Sri Jay Krishna Shukla, learned counsel for owner of the Vehicle/respondent in the leading and connected appeals, are present.
2. Since, all the four captioned Appeals arise out of the same accident occurring on the same date and time, involving the same offending vehicle and having common issues involved for adjudication; they are being disposed of by this common judgment.
3. By means of the present Appeals filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Insurance Company), as well as the Claimants, have assailed the common judgment and award dated 13.03.2012 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge / Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Court No. 5, Pratapgarh (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in Claim Petition No. 48 of 2007 (Smt. Sanju Singh and others versus Ram Chandra Shukla and another) and Claim Petition No. 49 of 2007 (Smt. Urmila Singh and others versus The New India Assurance Company Limited and another).
4. The aforesaid impugned judgment dated 13.03.2012 has been assailed by the Insurance Company by means of Appeals having No. FAFO No. 1133 of 2012 and FAFO No.1135 of 2012.
5. The facts of the case as culled out from the pleadings are that a road accident occurred on 02.03.2007 at approximately 10:30 P.M. at the Patti-Pratapgarh Road near Village Devanmau, Police Station Kandhai, District Pratapgarh, wherein two persons namely Nagendra Pratap Singh and Surendra Pratap Singh lost their lives. As per the pleadings the deceased Nagendra Pratap Singh was riding his motorcycle (bearing registration No. UP 54 E 0395) where as Surendra Pratap Singh was the pillion rider moving from Pratapgarh to Patti (West to East), when a Tata Sumo (Jeep) bearing registration number MH 31BB8871 (hereinafter referred to as the offending vehicle), owned by the respondent namely, Ram Chandra Shukla and duly insured by the Insurance Company; coming from the opposite direction i.e., from Patti to Pratapgarh (East to West), caused the accident by hitting the aforementioned motorcycle. As a result thereof, both the rider and the pillion rider of the motorcycle sustained grievous injuries. Consequently, Surendra Pratap Singh succumbed to death at District Hospital, Pratapgarh while Nagendra Pratap Singh was referred to Medical College, Allahabad where he also died.
6. Two separate Claim Petitions, being Claim Petition No. 48 of 2007 and Claim Petition No. 49 of 2007 were filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, before the Learned Tribunal, inter-alia claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 27,00,000/- (C.P. 48/2007) and Rs. 32,30,000/- (C.P. 49/2007) respectively. While deciding the aforesaid Claim petitions the Learned Tribunal, framed the following common issues for determination. For ready reference, the issues as framed in both the Claim Petitions are reproduced herein below:
"1. क्या दिनांक 2.3.07 को समय 10.30 बजे रात बहद ग्राम देवनमऊ प्रतापगढ़ पट्टी जाने वाली सड़क पर अन्तर्गत थाना कन्धई जिला प्रतापगढ़ में वाहन स्वामी राम चन्द्र शुक्ला की टाटा सूमो एम.एच.31बी.बी./8871 के ड्राइवर द्वारा वाहन को तेजी व लापरवाही से असावधानीपूर्वक चलाते हुये नागेन्द्र प्रताप सिंह की मोटर साइकिल जिसमें सुरेन्द्र बहादुर सिंह भी पीछे बैठे थे में टक्कर मारी जिससे नागेन्द्र प्रताप सिंह व सुरेन्द्र बहादुर सिंह दोनों को गम्भीर चोटें आयी और उनमें से सुरेन्द्र बहादुर सिंह की मौके पर ही मृत्यु हो गयी?
2. क्या मोटर साइकिल के चालक नागेन्द्र प्रताप सिंह ने तेजी व लापरवाही से मोटर साइकिलि चलाते हुये टाटा सूमो से हुई दुर्घटना में अंशदायी उपेक्षा की ? यदि हाँ तो प्रभाव ?
3. क्या याचीगण ने मोटर साइकिल जिससे मृतक सुरेन्द्र प्रताप सिंह दुर्घटना के समय यात्रा कर रहा था मोटर साइकिल के स्वामी को पक्षकार न बनाने से याचिका में पक्षकारों के असंयोजन का दोष है?
4. क्या उक्त टाटा सूमो नं.एम.एच.31बी.वी./8871 ड्राइवर के पास दुर्घटना के दिनांक को वैध व प्रभावी ड्राइविंग लाइसेंस था ?
5. क्या कथित दुर्घटना करने वाले वाहन के स्वामी के पास दुर्घटना के दिनांक को वाहन का वैध व प्रभावी बीमा था तथा कागजात वैध थे?
6. क्या याचीगण प्रतिकर पाने के अधिकारी है? यदि हाँ तो कितना और किस पक्ष से ?"
7. However, in addition to the above, the following issues were also framed in Claim Petition No. 48 of 2007. For a ready reference, the issues, as framed, are reproduced herein below:
6. क्या कथित दुर्घटना के समय मोटर साइकिल चालक के पास बैध एवं प्रभावी ड्राइविंग लाइसेंस था ?
7. क्या कथित दुर्घटना के समय उक्त मोटर साइकिल का बैध एवं प्रभावी बीमा था ?
8- क्या याचीगण किसी अनुतोष को पाने का अधिकारी है?
8. The Learned Tribunal, vide its judgment dated 13.03.2012, awarded compensation to a tune of Rs. 8,42,224/- to the claimants in Clam Petition No. 48/2007 and Rs. 5,23,312/- to the claimants in Claim Petition No. 49/2007 along with simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum. While deciding the issue of negligence, the Learned Tribunal held the driver of the offending vehicle solely responsible for the accident.
9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and award dated 13.03.2012, the Insurance Company preferred appeals having FAFO No. 1133 of 2012 and FAFO No. 1135 of 2012. Conversely, the claimants also challenged the same judgment and award by filing appeals having FAFO No. 871 of 2014 and FAFO No. 24 of 2016 respectively; primarily seeking enhancement of the awarded amount of compensation.
10. While assailing the impugned judgment and award dated 13.03.2012 the learned counsel for the Insurance Company pressed the following arguments.
10.1. His first assertion is that the Learned Tribunal has recorded an erroneous finding in the impugned judgment, to the extent that the accident was caused entirely due to the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. The contention of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company is that since, it was a case of "head-on collision" between two vehicles on a wide road, common prudence dictates that it is caused due to the negligence of drivers of both the vehicles involved in the accident and had if one of them been cautious, the accident in question could have been avoided. Therefore, the liability could not be fastened upon the driver of the offending vehicle alone.
10.2. His next contention is that the compensation awarded by the Learned Tribunal is not just and proper as, the deceased Nagendra Pratap Singh was working as an employee in the department of Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti, Mau and the deceased Surendra Pratap Singh was working in the department of Ganna Vibhag, Faizabad. After their death, their sons were given compassionate appointments in place of their deceased father. Therefore, taking into consideration that the claimants have been given compassionate appointment under dying in harness scheme, they cannot be permitted to profiteer and receive "double benefit" on account of the death of their deceased father, as they have not suffered financial loss to the extent of the compensation already granted by the Learned Tribunal under various other heads, vide the awarded dated 13.03.2012.
10.3. The Learned Counsel also urged that the purpose of awarding compensation is to put the claimants in the same financial position as they would have been if the accident did not have taken place, and the pecuniary advantage gained through these compassionate appointments must be considered to prevent unjust enrichment. To substantiate his argument learned counsel pointed out that during the cross-examination, PW-3 (Accounts Officer) stated that the deceased Nagendra Pratap Singh was earning Rs. 6,533/- per month at the time of his death, while his son Shailendra Pratap after getting compassionate appointment in place of his deceased father earned Rs. 13,155/- per month. Similarly, PW-2/Gyanendra Pratap Singh son of (late) Surendra Pratap Singh admitted in cross-examination that he was given compassionate appointment on account of death of his father and was earning Rs. 10,500/- per month. That goes to show that by getting higher salary, the claimants can not be said to have suffered any financial loss, rather they were placed in a better financial condition.
10.4. It was further argued on behalf of the Insurance Company that the revision of pay under the recommendations of the VIth Pay Commission was made effective in the year 2010, whereas the accident occurred in 2007, therefore, the benefit of the said revision of pay which came into effect after the date of death of deceased cannot be extended to the claimants for determining the compensation, especially, when the son(s) of the deceased(s) after procuring compassionate appointment got the benefits of the said revised pay scale. It has also been urged by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company that in the instant case, future prospects are not liable to be added while determining the compensation, since, the son(s) of deceased(s) had been given compassionate appointment in place of their (late) father to secure the unprecedented economic crises of the family. The addition of future prospects would be in derogation of the settled law that the compensation should not be a source of profit.
10.5. Lastly, the learned Counsel submitted that the imposition of liability to pay interest from the date of filing of the claim petitions is also unjust, as the Insurance Company, without any delay, filed its written statement. Therefore, any delay in the adjudication of the said claim petitions is not attributable to the Insurance Company. Rather, the same was on account of the delaying tactics on the part of the claimants.
11. Per Contra, confronting the contentions of learned counsel for the Insurance Company; the assertions of the learned counsel for the respective counsel for the claimants, advanced the following arguments:
11.1. The first argument placed by the learned counsel appearing for the claimants is that compassionate appointment cannot be treated as a pecuniary advantage while determining the compensation award payable under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It is urged by the learned counsel that Learned Tribunal has very correctly ignored the aspect relating to the factum of the grant of compassionate appointment to the son(s) of deceased(s) while adjudicating the claim petition filed by the family members of the deceased(s).
11.2. The next argument as advanced by the learned counsel for the claimants is that the amount of compensation as awarded by the Learned Tribunal is on the lower side. He urged that the Learned Tribunal while deciding the claims in question could not have appreciated the fact that the deceased at the time of death were entitled to the revised Pay Scale as per the recommednations of the VIth Pay Commission owing to the fact that the same was implemented with retrospective effect from 01.01.2006. But the Learned Tribunal has erroneously considered the deceaseds unrevised salary as the earning for the purposes of determination of claim, thereby arrived at a wrong determination while making the impugned award.
11.3. Further, it is contended by the learned counsel, that the Learned Tribunal has erred in law by not awarding any amount towards future prospects. His submission is that in the light of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the cases of National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Pranay Sethi and others reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Versus Urmila Shukla and Others reported in (2021) SCC OnLine SC 822; keeping in view the ages of the deceased, their heirs/family members are entitled for future prospects at the rate of 50% in the case of (Late) Nagendra Pratap Singh and 15% in the case of (Late) Surendra Pratap Singh, respectively.
11.4. It is vehemently argued that the Learned Tribunal has erred in law while deducting one-third (1/3rd) toward the personal and living expenses from the annual income of the deceased in both the aforementioned cases. He submitted that since the deceased Nagendra Pratap Singh left seven (7) dependents while the deceased Surendra Pratap Singh left six (6) dependents at the time of their death therefore, as per the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Sarla Verma and others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 the said deduction should be one-fifth (1/5th) and one-fourth(1/4th), respectively.
11.5. It is also contended on behalf of the claimants that the Learned Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 6,000/- only under conventional heads while the claimants are entitled for an amount to a tune of Rs. 70,000/- in the light of the judgment passed by the Honble Apex Court in the case of Pranay Sethi (Supra).
11.6. It is urged by the learned counsel that the Learned Tribunal while passing the award has fixed 6% simple interest per annum which is much less and should have been at least 9% per annum in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case.
12. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the material available on record.
13. In view of the above, the foremost question falling for consideration before this Court is whether the Learned Tribunal was justified in holding that the driver of the offending vehicle solely responsible for the accident. The relevant part of the findings recorded by the Learned Tribunal is extracted herein below, for convenience:
..याचीगण की ओर से कथित दुर्घटना के साक्षी श्री ज्ञानेन्द्र प्रताप सिंह को पी.डबलू 2 के रुप में परीक्षित कराया गया है जिस ने अपने सशपथ बयान में कहा है कि कथित घटना दो मार्च 2007 की है। लगभग 10.30 बजे रात का समय था । घटना ग्राम देवनमर् जो प्रतापगढ से पट्टी सडक पर पडता है, वहीं पर हुई थी। उसके पिता मृतक उसके चचेरे भाई नागेन्द्र सिंह के साथ मोटर साइकिल पर पीछे बैठ कर घर आ रहे थे वह दूसरी मोटर साइकिल पर पीछे बाल मुकुन्द शर्मा को बैठा कर के पिता जी के साथ सब लोग घर जा रहे थे । आगे चचेरे भाई की मोटर साइकिल थी पीछे मेरी मोटर साइकिल थी। हम लोग सड़क पर एकदम बायी पटरी से जा रहे थे कि सामने से सोमो जीप जिसका नम्बर एम.एच.31बी.वी./8871 था जिसका ड्राइबर जीप को बहुत तेजी रफतार व लापरवाहीपूर्वक लहराते हुये आया और आगे मेरे भाई के मोटर साइकिल में टक्कर मारां । टक्कर से दोनों लोग सडक पर गिर गये और जीपका दाहिना अगला टायर टक्कर से फट गया । उसके पिता एवं चचेरे भाई को कुचलते हुये उसे भी बगल से टक्कर मारा। वह छिटक कर के दूर बैठे बालमुकुन्द को भी गम्भीर चोट आयी । पिता व भाई को मरणासन्न स्थित में सदर अस्पताल प्रतापगढ ले जाया गया जहाँ पहुँचते पहुँचते उसके पिता जी कहीं मृत्यु हो गयी । चचेरे भाई को इलाहाबाद रिफर कर दिया गया वहाँ पहुँचते पहुँचते उनकी मृत्यु हो गयी । उसके पिता जी गन्ना विभाग में गन्ना आयुक्त कार्यालय फेजाबाद में लिपिक के पद पर कार्यरत थे। उनकी उम्र 50 वर्ष के आसपास थी। वह लगभग 12000 रुपये तनख्वाह पाते थे। इसके अलावों घर पर खेतीबारी, पशुपालन आदि का काम करते थे, इससे तीन चार हजार रुपये कि उसके पिता जी की जगह पर वह उक्त कार्यालय में लिपिक के पद पर कार्यरत है।
निस्तारण वाद बिन्दु संख्या 2 याचीगण के विद्वान अधिवक्ता का तर्क है कि उपरोक्त कथित दुर्घटना में सम्पूर्ण गल्ती जीप चालक की थी क्योंकि मोटर साइकिल चालक नियमानुसार मोटर साइकिल को अपनी बायी पटरी पर चला रहा था जब कि जीप के चालक ने जीप को तेजी व लापरवाही से चलाते हुये एकदम दाहिने गलत साइड में आकर मोटर साइकिल में टक्कर मारी जिसके फलस्वरुप कथित दुर्घटना घटित हुई। दूसरी ओर विपक्षी के विद्वान अधिवक्ता का तर्क है कि कथित दुर्घटना में मोटर साइकिल चालक की भी गलती है।
उपरोक्त तर्को के सन्दर्भ में पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध प्रमाणित प्रति नक्शा नजरी घटना स्थल कागज संख्या 4012 के अवलोकन से विदित होता है कि कथित दुर्घटना के समय मोटर साइकिल चालक नियमानुसार अपनी बाथी पटरी पर प्रतापगढ से पट्टी की ओर जा रहा था जब कि जीप चालक पट्टी सेप्रतापगढ की ओरन जाते हुये अपनी दायी पटरी पर मुड गया तथा मोटर साइकिल में सामने से टक्कर भारी। अतः स्पष्ट हैकि कथित दुर्घटना जीप चालक की, असावधानी व उतावलेपन के कारण हुई है। फलस्वरुप वाद बिन्दु संख्या 2 नकारात्मक रुप से निर्णीत किया जाता है।.
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
14. Upon careful appraisal of the above finding and the material available on record, this Court finds that it is necessary to consider the site plan/Naksha Nazri alongside the testimony of the eyewitness PW-2 (Gyanendra Pratap Singh). A close examination of the same reveals that the motorcycle was moving ahead on extreme left side (बायी पटरी) of the road, whereas the offending vehicle was coming from the opposite direction i.e., from Patti to Pratapgarh (East to West), at a high speed in zigzag manner (लहराते हुये), and suddenly swerved to the wrong side (right side) of the road and caused head-on hit to the motorcycle. It is relevant to note that mere involvement of two vehicles coming from opposite directions does not ipso facto establish contributory negligence, where evidence clearly demonstrates that the offending vehicle deviated from its permitted lane i.e. left side of the road and encroached upon the wrong lane. In the present case, the driver of the offending vehicle, DW-2 (Mohd. Farooq), could not discredit this unprecedented trajectory during cross-examination. Therefore, taking into consideration the said facts in its totality, this Court is of the view that the finding returned by the Learned Tribunal fastening sole negligence upon the driver of the offending vehicle, is perfectly justified and requires no interference.
15. The second issue that warrants consideration by this Court is whether the revision of salary pursuant to the recommendations of the VIth Pay Commission, with effect from 01.01.2006, can be taken into account for the purpose of determining compensation.
16. In order to determine this issue, this Court finds it relevant to mention that the Honbe Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Roshani Devi and Others versus P.S. Malhotra, reported in 2017 SCC OnLine All 5152 while relying upon judgment passed by the Honble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh & Others versus Rajbir Singh & Others reported in (2013) 9 SCC 54 has held that the benefit of revision of pay announced subsequent to the death of the deceased, but made effective retrospectively prior to the death of the deceased, is be taken into account while granting compensation to the claimants. For a ready reference, paragraphs 10 and 11 of the aforesaid judgment passed in the case of Roshani Devi and Others (supra) are extracted herein below:
10. The appellants have relied upon para 22 of the judgment of Rajesh (Supra) wherein the Apex Court has granted the benefit of Sixth Pay Commission benefits which were announced subsequent to death of deceased making it operative retrospectively from 01.01.2006.
11. Thus, applying the ratio laid down in the case of Rajesh (Supra) that benefit of revision of pay announced subsequent to death of deceased but made it effective retrospectively prior to death of deceased, we set-aside the finding of the Tribunal refusing to grant benefit of revision of pay. From record we find that the appellants has filed salary certificate indicating the salary of deceased fixed at Rs. 11,814/- per month after revision of pay which has not been rebutted by Insurance Company, therefore, we hold that Rs. 11,814/- per month be treated as income of deceased for calculating compensation.
17. Upon perusal of the record, it emerges that the claimants had brought on record the salary certificates (Paper No. 49 Ka-1 and 52 Ga-1) indicating that the revised salaries, after the implementation of the VIth Pay Commission recommendations, in respect of the deceased(s) namely, Nagendra Pratap Singh and Surendra Pratap Singh, stood at Rs. 8,786/- and Rs. 10,770/- per month, respectively. Therefore, in the light of the judgment passed by the Honble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh (Supra) and also the judgment passed by the Honble Division Bench of this Court in Roshani Devi (supra) wherein the Honble Courts granted the benefits of the VIth Pay Commission, even though the same were made operative subsequent to the death of the deceased, but retrospectively with effect from 01.01.2006 in the present case, this Court finds the judgment and award dated 13.03.2012 passed by the Learned Tribunal erroneous in so far as it refused to grant the benefit of revision of pay to the claimants. Therefore, it is imperative in the instant case the aforesaid revised salaries are liable to be treated as the income of the deceased for the purpose of assessing just and equitable compensation.
18. The third issue that requires consideration by this Court is that whether the compassionate appointment of the sons of the deceased(s) affect the determination of compensation especially with regards to the future prospects.
19. On the aforesaid issue the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company has very emphatically asserted that the compassionate appointments granted to the sons of the deceased(s) must be factored in to reduce the compensation granted to the claimants as they have not suffered economic loss to the extent of the compensation granted by the Learned Tribunal and in view of the same, claimants cannot be permitted to profiteer and receive "double benefit" on account of the death of their family members.
20. The above mentioned issue is no longer res integra. As the same, has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. versus Rekhaben & Others reported in (2017) 13 SCC 547 wherein the Honble Court while distinguishing between the compensation liable to be paid by the tortfeasor and salary earned by the claimant through compassionate appointment observed that,
14. What needs to be considered is whether compassionate appointment offered to the dependants of the deceased or the injured, by the employer of the deceased/injured, who is not the tortfeasor, can be deducted from the compensation receivable by him on account of the accident from the tortfeasor. Certainly, it cannot be that the one liable to compensate the claimants for the loss of income due to the accident, can have his liability reduced by the amount which the claimants earn as a result of compassionate appointment offered by another viz. the employer.
...
22. In the present cases, the claimants were offered compassionate employment. The claimants were not offered any sum of money equal to the income of the deceased. In fact, they were not offered any sum of money at all. They were offered employment and the money they receive in the form of their salary, would be earned from such employment. The loss of income in such cases cannot be said to be set off because the claimants would be earning their living. Therefore, we are of the view that the amount earned by the claimants from compassionate appointments cannot be deducted from the quantum of compensation receivable by them under the Act.
23. In the cases before us, compensation is claimed from the owner of the offending vehicle who is different from the employer who has offered employment on compassionate grounds to the dependants of the deceased/injured. The Source from which compensation on account of the accident is claimed and the source from which the compassionate employment is offered, are completely separate and there is no co-relation between these two sources. Since the tort feasor has not offered the compassionate appointment, we are of the view that an amount which a claimant earns by his labour or by offering his services, whether by reason of compassionate appointment or otherwise is not liable to be deducted from the compensation which the claimant is entitled to receive from a tort feasor under the Act. In such a situation, we are of the view that the financial benefit of the compassionate employment is not liable to be deducted at all from the compensation amount which is liable to be paid either by the owner/the driver of the offending vehicle or the insurer. Hence, we find no merit in these appeals and they are dismissed accordingly.
21. As far as the contention of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company regarding pecuniary advantage availed by the claimants through compassionate appointment is concerned, it may be noted that the similar question also came up for consideration before the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Vimal Kanwar and Others versus Kishore Dan and Others reported in (2013) 7 SCC 476 wherein the Honble Court while answering the question as to whether the salary receivable by the claimant after getting job on compassionate appointment comes within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as Pecuniary Advantageliable for deduction; has held that compassionate appointment can be one of the conditions of service of an employee, if a scheme to that effect is framed by the employer. This cannot be stated to be an advantage receivable by the heirs on account of ones death and have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned on account of accidental death. Compassionate appointment may have nexus with the death of an employee while in service, but it is not necessary that it should have a correlation with the accidental death. An employee dies in harness even in normal course, due to illness and to maintain the family of the deceased one of the dependents may be entitled for compassionate appointment but that cannot be termed as Pecuniary Advantage that comes under the periphery of Motor Vehicles Act and any amount received on such appointment is not liable for deduction for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.
22. Further, it is also well settled in law that deductions cannot be allowed from the amount of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act either on account of insurance, or on account of pensionary benefits or gratuity or grant of employment to kin of the deceased. The main reason is that all these amounts are earned by the deceased on account of contractual relations entered into by the deceased with others. It cannot be said that these amounts accrued to the dependents or the legal heirs of the deceased on account of his death in a motor vehicle accident. The claimants/dependents are entitled to just compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act as a result of the death of the deceased in a motor vehicle accident. Therefore, the natural corollary is that the advantage which accrues to the estate of the deceased or to his dependents as a result of some contract or act which the deceased performedin his lifetime cannot be said to be the outcome or result of the death of the deceased even though these amounts may go into the hands of the dependents only after his death.
23. In view of what has been discussed in the proceeding paragraphs, it is abundantly clear that compassionate appointment or any post retiral dues given to the dependents of the deceased, cannot be counted towards compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on account of accidental death. Accordingly, the argument raised by the learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company regarding the reduction of compensation on the said ground, stands demolished and thus, turned down.
24. Now coming to the issue of determination of future prospects, in the given facts and circumstances of the present case, this court upon a perusal of the impugned judgment and award, finds that the Learned Tribunal has not made any addition toward future prospects. The said issue has been considered by the Honble Supreme Court in catena of judgments and conveyed that the future prospects would mean advancement in future career, earnings and progression in one's life. The promotional avenues, career progression, grant of selection grades, etc. are some of the features for considering one's future prospects. Harmonizing the said connotation with the objective of the compensation granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 leads to a possible conclusion that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained by balancing the loss caused to the claimants future pecuniary benefit and the pecuniary advantage coming from whatever source on account of the death, in other words, the balance between the extent of loss caused due to the death and the support by way of compensation to the family members of the deceased.
25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Basheer Ahamed & Others versus Mohammed Jameel & Another reported in (2009) 2 SCC 225 has been pleased to observe that section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; enjoins the Learned Tribunal to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be just. However, the objective factors, which may constitute the basis of compensation appearing as just, have not been indicated in the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, the expression which appears to be just bestows a wide discretion upon the Learned Tribunal in the matter of determination of compensation. For a ready reference Section 168 of the Act of 1988 is reproduced herein below:
168. Award of the Claims Tribunal.(1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be: Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.
(3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct.
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
26. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides power to the Learned Tribunal to grant just compensation to the claimants. However, the word just is of a very wide amplitude and requires consideration on the case-to-case basis, in a manner which meets the object of the Motor Vehicles Act.
27. Further, the Learned Tribunal constituted under the Act, while passing an award determines the amount of compensation, which must be just and reasonable. Although, this Court is mindful of the fact that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same time, it must be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. The object of providing compensation is to financially place the claimant as far as possible in the same position as he was before the accident. Broadly speaking, in the case of death, the basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss, expenses etc. The object to award compensation is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives due to the sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Therefore, compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor deficient.
28. The aforesaid view is further strengthened by the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Controller, KSRTC versus Mahadeva Shetty & Another reported in (2003) 7 SCC 197 wherein the Honble Court while interpreting the meaning of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, held that the compensation awarded in the case of motor vehicle accident should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor deficient. For a ready reference, paragraph 10 and 12 of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow,
10. .. Compensation is an act which a court orders to be done, or money which a court orders to be paid, by a person whose acts or omissions have caused loss or injury to another in order that thereby the person damnified may receive equal value for his loss; or be made whole in respect of his injury; something given or obtained as an equivalent; rendering of equivalent in value or amount..
12. .. . Justice requires that it should be equal in value, although not alike in kind. The object of providing compensation is to place the claimant as far as possible in the same position financially as he was before the accident. Broadly speaking, in the case of death the basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependants of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss, expenses etc. and loss to the estate. The object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives due to the sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor deficient.
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
29. The Honble Supreme Court while deciding the case of Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Kanta Aggarwal and Others reported in (2008) 11 SCC 366 has observed as under:
13. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment and additionally submitted that appeal of Respondent 1 is pending. In normal course, when two appeals are directed against the common judgment, both the appeals should be heard by the same Bench of the High Court. But we find that the High Court had lost sight of the fact that the benefits which the claimant receives on account of the death or injury have to be duly considered while fixing the compensation. It is pointed out that Respondent 1 was getting Rs 4700 p.m. and a residence has been provided to her and actually the compassionate appointment was given immediately after the accident.
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
30. Similarly, in the case of Gobald Motor Service Ltd. And another v. R.M.K. Veluswami and others reported in (1962) 1 SCR 929, the Honble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe as follows:
"7. "The general rule which has always prevailed in regard to the assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts is well settled, namely, that any benefit accruing to a dependant by reason of the relevant death must be taken into account. Under those Acts the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be ascertained, the position of each dependant being considered separately: "
31. As has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is well settled in law that compassionate appointments are given to heir of the deceased so that they may be able to maintain the family of the deceased. It is trite in law that compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of appointment in the public services and is in favour of the dependents of a deceased dying in harness and leaving his family in penury and without any means of livelihood, and in such cases, out of pure humanitarian consideration taking into account the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided , the family would not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made in the rules to provide gainful employment to one of the dependents who may be eligible for such employment. The whole object of granting compassionate appointments is, thus, to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. At the same time, its effect on the determination of compensation also requires consideration. In the present case, the son(s) of the deceased(s) have been given compassionate appointments. In this manner, the deceaseds son(s) have stepped into the shoes of their deceased father(s) to the extent of securing the future prospects. Therefore, the present case where the son(s) of the deceased(s) are given compassionate appointment is distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the case of Pranay Sethi (supra), to this extent. It may be noted that in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra), the dependants were not given employment under the dying in harness scheme and were not benefitted by the compassionate appointment.
32. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court on the issue of just compensation and the scope and ambit of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, this Court is of the considered opinion that no addition towards future prospects is required to be granted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. Moreover, since the claimants deceaseds son(s) are earning monthly salary on revised pay scale, this Court is of the considered opinion that Learned Tribunal was right in not taking into consideration the addition toward the future prospects looking to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, in view of what has been narrated herein above any addition towards future prospects would not subserve the principle of just compensation and may result in awarding compensation beyond what can be termed fair, reasonable and equitable.
33. Now coming the other issue raised by the claimants is with regard to the percentage of the deduction of the deceased's income toward the personal and living expenses. The said issue has been dealt with in detail by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma (supra). The said judgment has been upheld by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. versus Pranay Sethi and Others, reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680, and, later on, followed in the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. versus Satinder Kaur alias Satwinder Kaur and others, reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 410. Accordingly, it would be apt to quote the relevant portion of the judgment passed by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to hold that:
"30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4 SCC 362], the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependent family members exceeds six."
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
34. In the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma (supra), this Court is of the opinion that in the present case the Learned Tribunal erred in deducting 1/3rd of the annual income of the deceased's income towards personal and living expenses whereas the deceased Nagendra Pratap Singh (Claim Petition No. 48 of 2007) had left behind seven (7) dependents while the deceased Surendra Pratap Singh (Claim Petition No. 49 of 2007) left behind six (6) dependents. Therefore, it would be lawful to hold that the said deduction should have been only 1/5th in the facts of Claim Petition No. 48 of 2007 and 1/4th in the case of Claim Petition No. 49 of 2007.
35. On the issue regrading the calculations of damages, loss of consortium under the conventional heads has been dealt with in detail by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. versus Pranay Sethi and Others reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680 and subsequently in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. versus Nanu Ram and others, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 130. In the case of Pranay Sethi (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the amount under the conventional head needs to be appositely determined and thereby the Hon'ble Apex Court revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. For ready reference, Paragraph 52 of the judgment passed in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra) is reproduced herein-below, "52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . It has granted Rs 25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167] , it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads."
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
36. Subsequently, the principles governing award of compensation under conventional heads with regard to award for loss of consortium, have been crystallized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nanu Ram (supra). For a ready reference, Paragraph 21 of Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. versus Nanu Ram and others: (2018) 18 SCC 130 is reproduced herein below, "21. In legal parlance, "consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses "spousal consortium", "parental consortium", and "filial consortium". The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse: [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of "company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation". [Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn., 1979).] 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training".
22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. ...
23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. Parental consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Act. A few High Courts have awarded compensation on this count [Rajasthan High Court in Jagmala Ram v. Sohi Ram, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3848 : (2017) 4 RLW 3368; Uttarakhand High Court in Rita Rana v. Pradeep Kumar, 2013 SCC OnLine Utt 2435 : (2014) 3 UC 1687; Karnataka High Court in Lakshman v. Susheela Chand Choudhary, 1996 SCC OnLine Kar 74 : (1996) 3 Kant LJ 570]. However, there was no clarity with respect to the principles on which compensation could be awarded on loss of filial consortium.
24. The amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under "loss of consortium" as laid down in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205].
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
37. Now, as the principles regarding the calculation of damages, loss of consortium and the multiplier under the conventional head of the Second Schedule appended with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are well settled and have been encapsulated above, the same can be applied in the facts of the present case. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, namely loss of consortium, loss of estate, and funeral expenses; this Court is of the opinion that in the light of the principles enshrined by the Hon'ble Apex Court as discussed hereinabove, for ensuring consistency and fairness in compensation, it is appropriate to enhance the amount falling under the Conventional Heads to Rs. 40,000/- to each claimant for loss of consortium, Rs. 15,000/- for loss of estate, and Rs. 15,000/- for funeral expenses.
38. On the issue of application of multiplier, based on the age bracket of the deceased, the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma (supra) has laid down the categorical table. The said table regarding the application of multiplier, based on the age bracket of the deceased, has been affirmed by the Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra). Subsequently, the Honble Supreme Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Satinder Kaur alias Satwinder Kaur reported in 2021 11 SCC 780 has been pleased to hold as under:
"(b) Determination of Multiplier
41. With respect to the multiplier, the Court in Sarla Verma (supra), prepared a chart for fixing the applicable multiplier in accordance with the age of the deceased, after considering the judgments in General Manager, Kerala S.R.T.C., Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176, U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie, (2005) 10 SCC 720.
42. The relevant extract from the said chart i.e. Column 4 has been set out hereinbelow for ready reference:--
Age of the deceased Multiplier (Column 4) Upto 15 years
-
15 to 20 years 18 21 to 25 years 18 26 to 30 years 17 31 to 35 years 16 36 to 40 years 15 41 to 45 years 14 46 to 50 years 13 51 to 55 years 11 56 to 60 years 9 61 to 65 years 7 Above 65 years 5
44. In Reshma Kumari (supra), this Court affirmed Column 4 of the chart prepared in Sarla Verma (supra), and held that this would provide uniformity and consistency in determining the multiplier to be applied. The Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi (supra) affirmed the chart fixing the multiplier as expounded in Sarla Verma (supra), and held:--
"44. At this stage, we must immediately say that insofar as the aforesaid multiplicand/multiplier is concerned, it has to be accepted on the basis of income established by the legal representatives of the deceased. Future prospects are to be added to the sum on the percentage basis and "income" means actual income less than the tax paid. The multiplier has already been fixed in Sarla Verma which has been approved in Reshma Kumari with which we concur.
...
59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that judgment.
(emphasis supplied)
39. As is evident from the impugned judgment and award dated 13.03.2012 the deceased Nagendra Pratap Singh was of 39 years and Surendra Pratap Singh was of 56 years of age, their cases would fall in the age brackets of 36-40 years and 56-60 years, respectively, for which multipliers of fifteen (15) and nine (9) are prescribed as per the above quoted judgments. However, the Learned Tribunal has fixed the multipliers of sixteen (16) and eight (8) respectively, having adopted the multipliers as per the Schedule-II appended to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. However, the Learned Tribunal failed to adhere to the principle laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra) holding therein that the appropriate multiplier to apply would be by reference to the table in Paragraph No. 42 of the decision in Sarla Verma (supra). Therefore, the multipliers applied by the Learned Tribunal are incorrect and the correct multipliers in the present case will be fifteen (15) and nine (9).
40. In view of the findings recorded by this Court and in the light of the law as discussed herein above, the judgment and award dated 13.03.2012 passed by the Learned Tribunal deserves to be modified to ensure the grant of just compensation. From the facts and figures emerged from the records as is available before this court, the compensation is recalculated in the following manner:
A. Calculation for Nagendra Pratap Singh (C.P. No. 48 of 2007 / FAFO No. 871 of 2014) S. No. Head Award by Learned Tribunal Enhanced Award by this Court
(i) Monthly Income Rs. 6,533/- per month Rs. 8,786/- per month After taking into consideration the revised salary admissible to the deceased as per VI th. Pay Commission which was made operational with effect from 01.01.2006
(ii) Annual Income Rs. 78,396/-
Rs. 1,05,432/- (8,786 12) Based on revised salary
(iii) Deduction towards Personal Expenses 1/3rd deducted 1/5th deducted Deceased left behind 7 dependents. Deductions made in the light of the judgment of Sarla Verma (supra) and; Pranay Sethi(supra)
(iv) Annual Dependency after deduction for personal and living expense.
Rs. 52,264/-
Rs. 84,346/-
Annual Income minus Deduction towards Personal Expenses 1,05,432 21,086 = 84,346
(v) Multiplier Applied 16 15 Age of deceased: 39 years; applicable multiplier: 15 Pranay Sethi (supra)
(vi) Loss of Dependency Rs. 12,65,190/- (84,346 15) Recomputed as per multiplier
(vii) Conventional Heads Rs. 6,000/-
Rs. 3,10,000/-
Consortium @ Rs. 40,000 7 dependents = Rs. 2,80,000/- + Rs. 15,000/- loss of estate + Rs. 15,000/- funeral expenses. Pranay Sethi (supra); Nanu Ram (supra)
(viii) Total Compensation Rs. 8,42,224/-
Rs. 15,75,190/-
Just compensation B. Calculation for Surendra Pratap Singh (C.P. No. 49 of 2007 / FAFO No. 24 of 2016) S. No. Head Award by Learned Tribunal Enhanced Award by this Court
(i) Monthly Income Lower unrevised pay scale considered Rs. 10,770/- per month After taking into consideration the revised salary admissible to the deceased as per VI th. Pay Commission which was made operational with effect from 01.01.2006
(ii) Annual Income Rs. 1,29,240/- (10,770 12) Based on revised salary.
(iii) Deduction towards Personal Expenses 1/3rd deducted 1/4th deducted Deceased left behind 6 dependents. Deductions made in the light of the judgment of Sarla Verma (supra) and; Pranay Sethi (supra)
(iv) Annual Dependency after deduction for personal and living expense.
Rs. 96,930/-
Annual Income minus Deduction towards Personal Expenses 1,29,240 32,310 = 96,930
(v) Multiplier Applied 8 9 Age of deceased: 56 years; applicable multiplier: 9 Pranay Sethi (supra)
(vi) Loss of Dependency Rs. 8,72,370/- (96,930 9) Recomputed as per settled multiplier.
(vii) Conventional Heads Rs. 6,000/-
Rs. 2,70,000/-
Consortium @ Rs. 40,000 6 dependents = Rs. 2,40,000/- + Rs. 15,000/- loss of estate + Rs. 15,000/- funeral expenses. Pranay Sethi (Supra); Nanu Ram (supra)
(viii) Total Compensation Rs. 5,23,312/-
Rs. 11,42,370/-
Just compensation
41. In light of all that has been discussed herein above, the judgment and award dated 13.03.2012 passed by the Learned Tribunal in Claim Petition No. 48 of 2007 is modified and the compensation awarded is enhanced to a total amount of Rs. 15,75,190/- (Rupees Fifteen Lacs Seventy Five Thousand One Hundred Ninety only). Similarly, the judgment and award dated 13.03.2012 passed in Claim Petition No. 49 of 2007 is modified and enhanced to a total amount of Rs. 11,42,370/- (Rupees Eleven Lacs Forty Two Thousand Three Hundred Seventy only).
42. The total compensation in both cases shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the respective Claim Petitions until realization of the said amount. However, any sum of money already deposited (paid or invested in terms of the judgment and award dated 13.03.2012 or interim orders of this Court) shall be accordingly adjusted.
43. It is provided that the New India Assurance Company Ltd would be entitled to recover the enhanced amount of compensation to be paid by it, from owner of the offending vehicle involved in the accident. Therefore both the appeals preferred by the claimants, being FAFO No. 871 of 2014 and FAFO No. 24 of 2016 are partly allowed whereas, the appeals preferred by the Insurance Company, being FAFO No. 1133 of 2012 and FAFO No. 1135 of 2012, are disposed of accordingly. The impugned judgment and award dated 13.03.2012 is hereby modified accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
44. The original records of the Claim Petitions be transmitted back to the Tribunal concerned at the earliest.
(Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, J.) May 22, 2026 Manoj K.
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