Reserved On: 10.9.2025 vs State Of H.P. And Another on 25 September, 2025

[Cites 44, Cited by 0]

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Reserved On: 10.9.2025 vs State Of H.P. And Another on 25 September, 2025

2025:HHC:33346 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 848 of 2024 .

Reserved on: 10.9.2025 Date of Decision: 25.9.2025.

    Govind Ram                                                                    ...Petitioner

                                          Versus

    State of H.P. and another


    Coram
                            r                to                                  ...Respondents

Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Hemant Thakur, Advocate, vice Mr. T.K. Verma, Advocate.

For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General.

For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Lovneesh Singh Thakur, Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 3.10.2024, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 13.5.2024 and order of sentence dated 15.5.2024, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2025:HHC:33346 Court No.3, Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were as upheld and the appeal filed by the petitioner (accused before the learned .

Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the parties were known to each other. The complainant is owner of the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-65-1617. The complainant sold the vehicle to the accused on 1.6.2020 for ₹3,25,000/-. He delivered the possession of the vehicle to the accused. The accused issued three post dated cheques of ₹1.00 lac, ₹1.00 lac and ₹1.25 lacs as the sale consideration. The complainant presented the cheques to Punjab National Bank which were dishonoured with an endorsement 'funds insufficient'. The complainant served a notice upon the accused. This notice was sent to the accused by registered letter acknowledgment due on the correct address.

The acknowledgment was not received. The notice was also not ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:33346 returned undelivered. Hence the same is presumed to be served upon the accused within five days. The accused failed to pay the .

amount within 15 days from the due date of receipt. Hence the complaint was filed against the accused for taking action as per law.

3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The complainant examined himself (CW1), Chand Ram (CW2), Pushap Raj Sharma (CW3) and Komal Chand (CW4) to prove his case.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that the vehicle was purchased by him for ₹3,25,000/-. He admitted that he had issued the cheques. He claimed that the complainant had assured to transfer the ownership in his name but the ownership was not transferred and only an affidavit was executed. Subsequently, the ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:33346 complainant took away the car and he had no liability to pay any amount. He examined Rajesh Khana (DW1).

6. Learned Trial Court held that the issuance of the cheques was not disputed. Therefore, a presumption would arise that the cheques were issued in discharge of the liability. They were dishonoured with an endorsement 'funds insufficient'.

Notice was sent on the correct address and was duly served upon the accused. The accused failed to repay the amount. Hence the accused was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment till rising of the Court, pay a fine of ₹3,75,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 60 days.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused admitted the issuance of the cheques. Therefore, a presumption would arise that the cheques were issued in discharge of the ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 5 2025:HHC:33346 debt/liability for consideration. The cheques were dishonoured with an endorsement 'funds insufficient'. Notice was served .

upon the accused on the correct address and is deemed to be served. The accused did not pay the amount and the ingredients of the commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act were duly satisfied. Learned Trial Court had imposed a proper sentence and no interference was required with it.

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The accused had rebutted the presumption attached to the cheque. It was duly proved that the ownership of the vehicle was transferred in the name of accused and the sale was not completed. Learned Courts below erred in ignoring this evidence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set-aside.

9. I have heard Mr. Hemant Thakur, learned counsel representing the petitioner/accused, Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 6 2025:HHC:33346 learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State and Mr. Lovneesh Singh Thakur, learned counsel for respondent .

No.2/complainant.

10. Mr. Hemant Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below ignored the defence evidence that the ownership of the vehicle was not transferred in the name of the accused and the sale transaction was not completed. The notice was deemed to be served and there is no proof of the actual date of service, in absence of which the presumption that the notice was served within 30 days has to be applied. The complaint was barred by limitation. This aspect was ignored by the learned Courts below.

Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside.

11. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State, supported the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below and submitted that no interference is required with them.

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12. Mr. Lovneesh Singh Thakur, learned counsel representing the complainant, submitted that the plea regarding .

the limitation was not taken before the learned Courts below and this plea cannot be taken before this Court in the revision proceedings. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied and the learned Courts below had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

14. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:

(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -

"10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 8 2025:HHC:33346 of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order, .

recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:33346 face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the .

decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of a charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."

16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 :

(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : (Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27) "27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 10 2025:HHC:33346 jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of .

the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection, and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in a conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

*** 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

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2025:HHC:33346 *** 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even .

broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie."

17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.

16. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.

The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:33346 the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not .

be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law.

If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC."

16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 :

(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : (Amit Kapoor case [Amit ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 13 2025:HHC:33346 Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27) "27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under .

these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in a ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 14 2025:HHC:33346 conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

*** .

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

*** 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie."

17. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed on page 169:

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2025:HHC:33346 "12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of .

Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) "5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ..."

13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 16 2025:HHC:33346 order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) .

"14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."

14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis.

18. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

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2025:HHC:33346 "16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to .

re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative."

19. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

20. The ingredients of offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act were explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2019 as under: -

5.1.1. In K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana(2003) 8 SCC 300, this Court enlisted the components, aspects and the acts, the concatenation of which would make the offence under Section 138 of the Act complete, to be these (i) drawing of the cheque by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker, for payment to another person from out of that account for discharge in whole/in part of any debt or liability, (ii) presentation of the cheque by the payee or the holder in due course to the bank, (iii) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank for want of sufficient funds to the credit of the drawer or any arrangement with the banker to pay the sum covered by the cheque, (iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of information by the payee ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:33346 from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid demanding payment of the cheque amount, and

(v) failure of the drawer to make payment to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, of the amount .

covered by the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.

21. Mr. Hemant Thakur, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner submitted that the complaint was premature and a period of 30 days had to be provided of deemed service of the accused. This submission has to be accepted as correct. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 689:

(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 834: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1174 that where a notice was sent by registered post acknowledge due, the presumption of service of notice can be raised within a reasonable time and it would be deemed to have been served within thirty days from the date of the issuance. It was observed at page 699:

"23. Thirty days ordinarily must be held to be sufficient for service of notice. In fact, when the service of notice is sought to be effected by speed post, ordinarily the service takes place within a few days. Even under Order 5 Rule 9(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a summons is presumed to be served if it does not come back within thirty days. In a situation of this nature, there was no occasion for the Court to hold that service of notice could not be effected within a period of thirty days."

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22. The Jharkhand High Court considered this question in Manoj Kumar Nag v. State of Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine Jhar .

458 and held that when there is no evidence regarding the service, the presumption regarding the delivery of the notice can be made after thirty days of the issuance. It was observed:

"22. This Court finds that there is no material on record regarding the service of legal notice dated 03.03.2008 dispatched by registry on 04.03.2008 upon the petitioner and it is not the case of the complainant that the legal notice was returned unserved or returned for any other reason. This court is also of the considered view that presumption regarding service of notice sent through registered cover can be drawn only upon expiry of 30 days from the date of dispatch of notice as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2008) 13 SCC 689 (Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Sah). In the said judgment the notice was sent through speed post and although the actual date of service of notice was not known, the Complainant proceeded on the basis that the same was served within the reasonable period. It was held that if the presumption of notice within the reasonable period is raised, the deemed service at best can be taken to be 30 days from the date of its issuance and the accused was required to make payment in terms of the said notice within 15 days thereafter and the complaint petition therefore could have been filed after expiry of 15 days given to the accused for payment of money after receipt of notice."

23. A similar view was taken in Anil Kumar Goel v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 410 wherein it was observed:

18. Coming to the facts of the present case, the notice having been sent on 19.09.2012, if the presumption of ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:33346 service of notice within a reasonable time is raised, shall be deemed to have been served, at best within a period of 30 days from the date of issuance thereof i.e. 19.09.2012.

The applicant was required to make payment in terms of .

the said notice within 15 days thereafter i.e. on or about 3.11.2012. The complaint, therefore, should have been filed by 03.12.12, Admittedly, the complaint was filed on 19.11.2012 and therefore, at this stage, it cannot be said that no proceedings under Section 138 of the Act could be drawn against the applicant."

24. The complainant asserted in the complaint that a letter would be deemed to be served within a period of five days from the issuance, however, there is no proof of this fact. The complainant, Kuldeep Negi, did not state in his affidavit that the letter sent from Mandi is delivered in Baggi within five days. He has not examined any person from the Postal Department to prove this fact. Therefore, the presumption that it was served within a period of 30 days will apply. The postal receipt (Ex.CW1/M) shows that the letter was registered on 25.9.2020. It was addressed to Govind Ram, Mandi, PIN-175027, Baggi, SO.

The tracking details were also provided but the tracking report was not produced on record. Thus the Court has to proceed based on the presumption of the service.

25. The letter was registered on 25.9.2020 and would be deemed to be served on 24.10.2020. The accused had 15 days ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 21 2025:HHC:33346 thereafter to make the payment and the complaint could be filed within 30 days thereafter. However, the complaint was filed .

before the learned Trial Court on 29.10.2020 before the period of 15 days to pay the amount had expired. Therefore, the complaint was premature.

26. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gajanand Burange v. Laxmi Chand Goyal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1711 that no action can be taken on premature complaint and the same is liable to be dismissed. It was observed:

5. The issue which is raised in this appeal is no longer res integra and is covered by a three-judge bench decision of this Court in Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey (2014) 10 SCC 713. Two issues were formulated for decision before the three-judge Bench, which were:

"1.1. (i) Can cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 be taken on the basis of a complaint filed before the expiry of the period of 15 days stipulated in the notice required to be served upon the drawer of the cheque in terms of Section 138(c) of the Act aforementioned? And, 1.2. (ii) If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, can the complainant be permitted to present the complaint again notwithstanding the fact that the period of one month stipulated under Section 142(b) for the filing of such a complaint has expired?"

6. The first issue was resolved by paragraph 35 of the judgment, which is extracted below:

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2025:HHC:33346 "35. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be said to have been committed when the period provided in clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2(d) of the Code defines "complaint". According to .

this definition, a complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking action against a person who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognizance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eye of the law. It is not the question of prematurity of the complaint where it is filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on him, it is no complaint at all under law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia, creates a legal bar on the court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint.

Since a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint in the eye of the law, obviously, no cognizance of an offence can be taken on the basis of such complaint. Merely because at the time of taking cognizance by the court, the period of 15 days has expired from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 on a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque."

7. In the present case, while the notice was received by the appellant on 8 November 2005, the complaint was filed ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 23 2025:HHC:33346 before the period of fifteen days was complete. The complaint could have been filed only after 23 November 2005 but was filed on 22 November 2005. In view of the legal bar which is created by Section 142 of the NI Act, as .

explained in the three-judge Bench decision of this Court, taking of cognizance by the Court was contrary to the law and the complaint was not maintainable before the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the date of its receipt by the appellant.

27. The record shows that PNB issued the memo of dishonour (Ex.CW1/G), (Ex.CW1/E), (Ex.CW1/H) and (Ex.CW1/K).

These are not signed by any person. An endorsement has been made "This is a computer generated advice - does not require signature."

28. It was laid down by this Court in Rajinder Singh Verma vs. B.K. Hanchnmani (30.04.2019 - HPHC): MANU/HP/0437/2019 that a computer-generated memo of dishonour not having the official seal is inadmissible. It was observed: -

"9. Even if, assumingly, the complainant may, upon recoursing to an appropriate remedy, be cast under the provisions of Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, rather could therethrough strive to prove the afore- mentioned cheque, borne in Ex. CW1/A, carrying the authentic signatures of the accused, (a) and, thereafter it, was permissible for the complainant, to rely upon the statutory provisions, cast under the provisions of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, qua his holding it in discharge, of, a contractual or other legal liabilities, arising inter se him, and, the accused. Nonetheless, dehors, the aforecurative recoursings, for, hence, ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 24 2025:HHC:33346 dispelling the effect of Ex. CW1/A, rather than being feigned, in the testification rendered hence by the complainant, to, hence assuredly contain the signatures of the accused, also, the mandate, of Section 146 of the .

Negotiable Instrument Act, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter, was, also vis-a-vis, Ex. CW1/B, the purported return memo given, Ex. CW1/A, hence enjoined, to be cogently satiated.

"146. Bank's slip prima facie evidence of certain facts. The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of a bank's slip or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved.

Even though, the court is statutorily empowered, to, qua the apposite return memo hence enunciating, the, declining to honour the negotiable instrument concerned, rather avail the apposite therewith presumption, as, engrafted therein, (a) yet the afore presumption would be aptly galvanized, upon, the memo evidently carrying thereon, the official mark, and, seal, of the bank concerned. However, the afore presumption, as occurring therein, and, with a statutory coinage, "unless and until such fact is disproved", is, rebuttable, only upon, adduction into evidence, the return memo, (b) whereupon hence, it would also stand proven qua it not carrying the official mark or seal of the bank concerned. The evidence in consonance with the afore-mentioned statutory coinage, occurring in the last part of Section 146 of the N.I. Act is, prima facie, rather upsurging, given, Ex. CW1/B evidently not carrying the seal or official mark of the bank concerned, (I) AND, with one Naresh Kumar, Accounts Officer from ICICI Bank, The Mall Shimla, upon his stepping into the witness box, rather showing his inability to bring the original of Ex. CW1/B, given, it not being traceable in the apposite records, (ii) and, when only on production, of the original in the Court of EX.

::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 25

2025:HHC:33346 CW1/B, and, evident existence thereon, of the afore statutorily mandated requirements, of it, hence carrying the official mark or seal of the bank concerned, would, hence enable, the, marshalling, of, the statutory .

presumption qua the apposite cheque being declined, to be honoured, to, rather hold the fullest conclusivity or sway, (iii) besides it would benumb any endeavour of the defence, to rely, upon the afore statutory coinage, occurring in the last part of Section 146 of the N.I. Act, (iv) reiteratedly for want of production of the original of Ex. CW1/B, this court is constrained to conclude qua the statutory requirement of Ex. CW1/B on its presentation, for its being honoured, hence, being declined to be honoured, rather remaining, within the ambit of Section 146 of the N;l. Act, to be hence, disproven.

29. Madhya Pradesh High Court has also held in Satyendra Tiwari v. State of M.P., 2014 SCC OnLine MP 6786: ILR 2014 MP 1679: (2014) 3 MP LJ 574 that when the memo of dishonour does not bear the banker's seal, the same is not valid.

It was observed on page 1685: -

"Endorsement Memo

29. Another reason given by the learned court to acquit the accused was that the complainant failed to prove the submission of the cheque (Ex. P-1) in the bank.

30. When a cheque is drawn by a person on an account maintained by him for payment of any amount or discharge of liability or debt and is returned by the bank with endorsement like (i) refer to drawer, (ii) exceeds arrangement, (iii) instruction for stoppage of payment;

(iv) fund insufficient and like other usual endorsements, it amounts to dishonour within the meaning of section 138 of the N.I. Act.

::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 26

2025:HHC:33346

31. Cheque to be presented within six months from the date of the cheque to the bank on which it was drawn, and if it is presented beyond that time complaint is not maintainable. In this case in hand the cheque (Ex.P-1) .

was presented within time.

32. In fact, the learned trial Court initially committed a grave mistake while issuing summons for the appearance of the accused on the assumption that the case had been disclosed, while the bankers' seal was totally missing of the bankers written memo in such circumstances the summons was not required to issue against the accused.

33. Learned trial Court after scrutinising the statement of the complainant in this regard and after examining the cheque (Ex. P-1) with returning endorsement (Ex. P-2), found that there is a lack of a banker's seal on the endorsement memo (Ex. P-2).

34. It is pertinent to mention here that even after committing initial error learned trial Court given appropriate opportunity to the complainant to examine Manager or any authorized Officer of the Punjab and Sindh Bank, the Banker's who returned the Cheque (Ex.P.-1) vide their endorsement memo (Ex.P.-2) under the caption "Fund Insufficient", but the complainant fail to comply. In such a situation, endorsement memo (Ex.P.-2) has no evidentiary value as a public document, but a mere piece of paper."

30. It was held in Krishnapal v. Hari Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine MP 2516 that the Bank is required to prove the seal and the signatures on the cheque returning memo as per the guidelines issued by the RBI and in the absence of the seal and the signatures, the memo does not carry a presumption under Section 146 of the NI Act. It was observed: -

::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 27

2025:HHC:33346 "5. Having gone through the record, it is found that the said document Ex-P/2 has no seal of the said bank and signature of the authority; therefore, it is in violation of guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India vide its .

letter No. RBI/2011-12/121 DPSS.CO. CHD NO. 120/03.06.01/2011-12 dated 25.07.2011. The said guidelines are required to be and are hereby reproduced hereunder:--

"RBI/2011-12/121 DPSS.CO. CHD.No. 120/03.06.01/2011-12 July 25, 2011 The Chairman and Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer All Scheduled Commercial Banks, including RRBs /Urban Co-operative Banks/State Co-operative Banks/ District Central Co-operative Banks Madam/Dear Sir, Dishonour/Return of Cheques - Need to Sign/Initial the Cheque Return Memo Please refer to our circular DPSS. CO. CHD. No. 485/03.06.01/2010-11 dated September 1, 2010 on Dishonour/Return of Cheques - Need to Mention the 'Date of Return' in the Cheque Return Memo, wherein citing the criticality of the document in case of recourse to legal action, it has been indicated that instruments returned unpaid should have a signed/initialed objection slip on which a definite and valid reason for refusing payment must be stated, as prescribed in Rule 6 of the Uniform Regulations and Rules for Bankers' Clearing Houses (URRBCH).

Certain instances of banks not signing the Cheque Return Memos stating that the Memos are computer- generated and therefore no signature is necessary ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 28 2025:HHC:33346 have been brought to our notice. Such practices are a violation of instructions contained in Uniform Regulations and Rules for Bankers' Clearing Houses (URRBCH), which is issued under the Payment and .

Settlement Systems Act, 2007, read with Payment and Settlement Systems Regulations 2008.

Banks are, therefore, advised to strictly adhere to the instructions and sign/initial the Cheque Return Memos as laid down in Rule 6 of URRBCH.

Yours faithfully, (Pankaj Ekka) Deputy General Manager"

6. In view of the guidelines, it can be predicated that not signing the cheque return memo by the Bankers and issuing them without any signature will be a violation of the instructions contained in the uniform regulations and rules of bankers. Hence, the petitioner cannot benefit from the law laid down in Guneet Bhasin (Supra). On this aspect, the learned trial Court, relying upon the judgment of this Court rendered in Satyendra Tiwari (Supra), opined that a dishonour memo of a bank without a seal has no evidentiary value as a public document and it would be treated as only a mere piece of paper. The aforesaid law laid down in Satyendra Tiwari (Supra) still holds the field, hence the contentions of the petitioner as to accepting the endorsement memo (Ex. P/2) are evidently found without merit."

31. Bombay High Court held in Vandana v. Abhilasha, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2086: (2019) 2 Mah LJ 645: 2018 ACD 950:

(2018) 4 Bom CR (Cri) 774 that a computer generated document requires a certificate under Section 65(b)(4) and in the absence ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 29 2025:HHC:33346 of the certificate, the memo is not admissible. It was observed at page 649: -

.

"9. In this context, section 146 of the aforesaid Act is relevant, which reads as follows:

"146. Bank's slip prima facie evidence of certain facts.

-- The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of a bank's slip or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved."

10. The said provision states the manner in which a complainant can prove dishonour of a cheque. The complainant is required to produce a slip or memo having an official mark on it, denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured. If such a document is placed on record by the complainant, it constitutes prima facie evidence of dishonour and a presumption operates about the fact of the dishonour of the cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved. Thus, once such a memo or slip issued by the bank bearing its official mark concerning dishonour of a cheque is placed on record by the complainant, the burden is clearly on the accused to disprove the fact of dishonour of a cheque.

11. But, there cannot be any doubt about the fact that section 146 of the said Act provides for one of the modes of proving dishonour of cheques, and it certainly cannot be the only mode of proving the same. In the present case, the memo purportedly issued by the bank showing dishonour of cheque, admittedly, does not bear the official mark of the bank. It was for this reason that the said document was not exhibited during the evidence. Thus, the mode specified in section 146 of the said Act was not satisfied in the present case, and consequently, no presumption arose about the dishonour of the cheque in question. In such a situation, the appellant claims that the dishonour of the cheque was proved because a ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 30 2025:HHC:33346 statutory notice was issued by her to the respondent. It was pointed out that specific pleadings were made in the complaint filed before the Court stating dishonour of the said cheque and that when the respondent had failed to .

adduce any evidence in support of her defence, the statements made by the appellant in this statutory notice and the complaint were enough to prove dishonour of the cheque. It was submitted that when there was no denial on the part of the respondent about the deposit and dishonour of the cheque in question, the trial Court could not have held that the appellant had failed to prove the fact of dishonour of the cheque. It was further contended that when the findings were rendered on the question of discharge of legal debt and it was found by the trial Court that the appellant had indeed advanced hand loan for the amount stated in the cheque to the respondent, there was no reason why the trial Court could have held that the fact of dishonour of cheque was not proved by the appellant.

12. While examining the said contentions raised on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary to keep in mind that the present case concerns criminal liability alleged against the respondent. Although proceedings under the aforesaid Act are quasi criminal in nature, the fact is that when the offence under section 138 of the said Act is said to have been proved, criminal liability is fixed upon the accused (respondent in the present case) and therefore, the evidence on record and the burden of proof have to be analyzed on the touchstone of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof clearly lies upon the appellant in the present case to prove basic facts that would constitute an offence under section 138 of the aforesaid Act. Under the said provision, the offence is deemed to have been committed the moment the cheque in question is returned by the bank unpaid. Therefore, it is necessary that there is proof of return or dishonour of the cheque in question before it can be said that an offence under section 138 of the Act has been committed.

13. When the complainant (appellant in the present case) asserted that the cheque was returned or dishonoured, it ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 31 2025:HHC:33346 was for her to prove this basic fact, section 146 of the said Act provides that if the complainant places on record a slip or memo issued by the bank having official mark of the bank thereon, denoting that the cheque was .

dishonoured, it would be presumed that such cheque was dishonoured until such fact was disproved. Thus, if such a document were placed on record by the appellant in the present case, it would constitute prima facie evidence of dishonour of the cheque, and the burden would have been entirely on the respondent to disprove such a fact. But, when the memo produced in the present case by the appellant did not bear the official mark of the bank, there was no document as contemplated under section 146 of the said Act to presume that the fact of dishonour of the cheque had been proved by the appellant. The burden continued to lie on the appellant to prove the basic fact of dishonour of the cheque, in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

14. In such a situation, a mere statement made in the statutory notice and the complaint filed before the Court would not constitute proof of dishonour of cheque, unless further evidence to corroborate the same was placed on record on behalf of the appellant. The appellant is not justified in claiming that such statements would suffice as proof of dishonour of the cheque because the respondent failed to enter the witness box in support of her defence. As the complainant, it was for the appellant to prove the fact of dishonour of the cheque by cogent evidence. The appellant could have examined the bank official to prove that the cheque had indeed been dishonoured, but she failed to do so.

15. The appellant could have placed on record a certificate contemplated under section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in respect of the memo of the Bank, which was allegedly a computer-generated electronic record. But no such evidence was placed on record. The trial Court has also held that there was a lack of evidence to show even the deposit of the cheque because the deposit slip was not placed on record by the appellant. But, a perusal of the ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 32 2025:HHC:33346 cheque in question (Exhibit-21) does show that the stamp of the bank in which the cheque was deposited is very much present on the cheque. To that extent, the trial Court was not right in holding that even the proof of .

deposit of the cheque was not on record. Yet, this fact alone does not take the case of the appellant any further because the stamp affixed on the cheque shows only the name of the bank, and there is nothing to signify the date on which the cheque was deposited in the bank. Even as per the case of the appellant, the cheque in question was deposited twice, and it is clear that there is no cogent evidence placed on record by the appellant to show dishonour of the said cheque.

16. When the basic fact of dishonour of cheque was not proved by the appellant and the burden was not discharged offence under section 138 of the said Act could not be said to have been committed by the respondent. Another important aspect of the present case is that when there is lack of evidence to show dishonour of cheque and consequently the date when the cheque was dishonoured, there is no reference point to ascertain as to whether the notice for demand of payment was issued by the appellant to the respondent within the period of 30 days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of cheque as unpaid, as provided under proviso (b) to section 138 of the said Act. This is the reason why the trial Court has held that the appellant failed to prove that she made a demand for payment of the amount within the statutory period, as the statutory period could not be computed in the facts of the present case.

17. Analysis of the provisions of the said Act, particularly sections 138, 142 and 146 thereof, shows that cognizance of the offence under section 142 of the said Act could not have been taken by the Court in the present case because the basic fact of dishonour of cheque could not be proved by the appellant. The appellant failed to prove dishonour of the cheque by any mode other than the one provided under section 146 of the said Act. The memo of return of cheque in the present case admittedly did not bear the ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 33 2025:HHC:33346 official mark of the Bank, due to which presumption in favour of the appellant did not arise. Therefore, the complaint in the present case was correctly rejected by the trial Court, thereby acquitting the respondent.

32. It was laid down in Tejendrasingh v. Ravindrakumar, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 60: (2019) 3 Mah LJ 612: 2019 ACD 229:

(2019) 2 RCR (Cri) 475: PLR (2019) 193 IJ 14: (2019) 1 Bom CR (Cri) 900 that when the document does not bear the official mark/ seal, the presumption under Section 146 of the NI Act cannot be drawn. It was observed:

"ii. Admittedly, the UCO Bank representative is not examined. The Trial Court refused to accept the bank memo issued by that bank. It does not bear the seal of the bank. I agree with the trial Court. The presumption under section 146 of the N.I. Act will not come to his rescue. There has to be a seal on the bank slip before the presumption as to dishonour can be drawn. I could have given the benefit of this lacuna even if a proper person from SBI, that is the signatory of the letter, could have been examined. It seems that while conducting the prosecution, these minor procedural aspects are overlooked."

33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1:

(2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 1: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 1: (2020) 2 SCC (L&S) 587:

2020 SCC OnLine SC 571 that the certificate under Section 65(b) (4) of the Indian Evidence Act is mandatory, in the absence of ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 34 2025:HHC:33346 which the computer-generated document cannot be relied upon.

It was observed at page 27: -

.

"23. Section 65-B(1) opens with a non obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, and shall be admissible in any proceedings without further proof of production of the original, as evidence of the contents of the original or of any facts stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that "document" as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include electronic records.

24. Section 65-B(2) then refers to the conditions that must be satisfied in respect of a computer output, and states that the test for being included in conditions 65- B(2)(a) to 65-B(2)(d) is that the computer be regularly used to store or process information for purposes of activities regularly carried on in the period in question. The conditions mentioned in sub-sections (2)(a) to (2)(d) must be satisfied cumulatively.

25. Under sub-section (4), a certificate is to be produced that identifies the electronic record containing the statement and describes the manner in which it is produced, or gives particulars of the device involved in the production of the electronic record to show that the electronic record was produced by a computer, by either a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device; or a person who is in the management of "relevant activities"

-- whichever is appropriate. What is also of importance is that it shall be sufficient for such matter to be stated to the "best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it". Here, "doing any of the following things ..." must be read as doing all of the following things, it being well settled that the expression "any" can mean "all"

::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 35

2025:HHC:33346 given the context (see, for example, this Court's judgments in Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar [Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar, (1962) 1 SCR 33: AIR 1961 SC 849: (1961) 2 Cri LJ 12: "3. The first .

contention is based on an assumption that the word "any one" in Section 76 means only "one of the directors, and only one of the shareholders". This question as regards the interpretation of the word "any one" in Section 76 was raised in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 1and it has been decided there that the word "any one" should be interpreted there as "every one". Thus, under Section 76, every one of the shareholders of a private company owning the mine, and every one of the directors of a public company owning the mine, is liable to prosecution. No question of violation of Article 14 therefore arises." (SCR p. 35: AIR p. 850, para 3) (emphasis supplied)] and Om Parkash v. Union of India [Om Parkash v. Union of India, (2010) 4 SCC 17 :

(2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 1, "70. Perusal of the opinion of the Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-1 [Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 227: AIR 1987 Del 239] would clearly indicate with regard to interpretation of the word "any" in Explanation 1 to the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act which expands the scope of stay order granted in one case of landowners to be automatically extended to all those landowners, whose lands are covered under the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether there was any separate order of stay or not as regards their lands. The logic assigned by the Full Bench, the relevant portions whereof have been reproduced hereinabove, appears to be reasonable, apt, legal and proper." (SCC p. 43, para 70)(emphasis supplied)] ). This being the case, the conditions mentioned in Section 65-

B(4) must also be interpreted as being cumulative.

34. In the present case, the memo of dishonour specifically mentions that they are computer-generated documents and do not require signatures. They do not bear any ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 36 2025:HHC:33346 certificate or the official seal of the bank; hence, they cannot be admitted in evidence to conclude that the cheques were .

dishonoured.

35. Therefore, the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Sction 138 of the NI Act that the cheque were dishonoured with an endorsement 'funds insufficient' was also not satisfied.

36. These aspects were ignored by the learned Courts below, therefore, the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below cannot be sustained.

37. In view of the above, the present revision is allowed, and the judgment of conviction dated 13.5.2024 and order of sentence dated 15.5.2024, passed by the learned Trial Court, affirmed by the learned Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No. 70 of 2023, dated 3.10.2024, are ordered to be set aside. The complaint is dismissed and the accused is acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. The fine amount be refunded.

38. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS 37 2025:HHC:33346 Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/-with one surety in the like amount to the .

satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

39. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 25th September, 2025 (Chander) ::: Downloaded on - 25/09/2025 21:29:48 :::CIS

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Reserved On: 10.9.2025 vs State Of H.P. And Another on 25 September, 2025