Allahabad High Court
M/S Shakuntla Educational And Welfare ... vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others on 28 May, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 ALL 2713
Bench: Pankaj Mithal, Vipin Chandra Dixit
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Reserved on 14.01.2020 Delivered on 28.05.2020 In Chamber Case :- WRIT - C No. - 28968 of 2018 Petitioner :- M/S Shakuntla Educational And Welfare Society Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 68724 of 2015 Petitioner :- Medhanshu Tripathi Respondent :- Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority And 2 Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Amit Negi Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Suresh Singh With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 45929 of 2016 Petitioner :- Smt. Madhu Mittal Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Uma Nath Pandey Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Suresh Singh With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 46993 of 2016 Petitioner :- Udit Mittal Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Othrs. Counsel for Petitioner :- Uma Nath Pandey Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Suresh Singh With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 17609 of 2017 Petitioner :- M/S Ats Realty Private Limited Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Nipun Singh,Mr. Anurag Khanna,Navin Sinha Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,A.B.Singhal,Suresh Singh With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 23357 of 2017 Petitioner :- M/S Sds Infracon Pvt. Ltd. And Another Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Anand Kumar Yadav,C.B. Yadav,Nisheeth Yadav Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Suresh Singh With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 25359 of 2017 Petitioner :- Sds Housing Pvt. Ltd. And Another Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Anand Kumar Yadav,Nisheeth Yadav Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Suresh Singh With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 2452 of 2018 Petitioner :- Balraj Singh Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Vimal Kumar Kushwaha,Kaushlendra Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Pramod Jain With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 40702 of 2017 Petitioner :- Jaiprakash Associates Limited Respondent :- State Govt. Thru Prin. Secy. And Another Counsel for Petitioner :- Prashant Shukla,Bhavya Tewari,Navin Sinha,Rohan Gupta Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,P.K.Jain,Pramod Jain,Suresh Singh With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 52310 of 2017 Petitioner :- Residents Plot Owners Social Welfare Association Regd Respondent :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Petitioner :- Kunal Ravi Singh,Manjari Singh Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Pramod Jain With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 61882 of 2017 Petitioner :- Supertech Limited Respondent :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Petitioner :- Akshay Mohiley,Kali Azad Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,A.B. Singhal,Pramod Jain With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7142 of 2018 Petitioner :- M/S India Knowledge City Foundation Through Its Director Mr. Manohar Thairani Respondent :- State Of U.P Through Principal Secretary (Industrial Development) Govt. Of U.P And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 9247 of 2018 Petitioner :- M/S Ajnara India Ltd. Thru. Its.Authorized Signatory Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Nipun Singh,Mr.Anurag Khanna,Sr. Advocate Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 14730 of 2018 Petitioner :- M/S Mma Grain Mills Pvt. Ltd Through Director Mr. Basudeb Roy Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 20053 of 2018 Petitioner :- M/S Hps It Solution Pvt. Ltd. Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 20158 of 2018 Petitioner :- M/S Satilila Educational Foundation Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 20217 of 2018 Petitioner :- M/S Tyag Buildsapce Pvt. Ltd. Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 25994 of 2018 Petitioner :- M/S Chandralekha Constructions Pvt. Ltd. Respondent :- State Of U P And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 36669 of 2018 Petitioner :- G.L Bajaj Educational Trust Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal,Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi With Case :- WRIT - C No. - 28956 of 2018 Petitioner :- M/S Maruti Educational Trust Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aditya Bhushan Singhal Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal,J.
Hon'ble Vipin Chandra Dixit,J.
All the above writ petitions are based upon similar and identical facts and challenges the action of the State of U.P. and the Y.E.I.D.A.1 regarding demand of extra amount from the petitioners in respect of plots of land leased out to all of them separately and independently.
The Writ Petition No. 28968 of 2018 of M/s Shakuntla Educational and Welfare Society is taken as the lead case to which counsel for the parties have consented during the course of the arguments. Accordingly, we narrate below only the facts in relation to the said writ petition and proceeds to refer the petitioner therein as the sole petitioner.
The petitioner is an educational society registered under the Societies Act2. It had invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court for the quashing of the demand of additional amount in respect of the land leased out to it, the resolution of the Board of Y.E.I.D.A. dated 15.09.2014 and the Government Order dated 29.08.2014 whereby the aforesaid demand was permitted and was allowed to be recovered from the allottees. The petitioner has also sought a direction that the State as well as Y.E.I.D.A. be restrained from demanding any additional amount over and above the one mentioned in the lease deed.
In order to appreciate the controversy and the issues arising in the above petition(s), we consider it appropriate to narrate the facts in brief which have led to the impugned demand, passing of the resolution by the Board of Y.E.I.D.A. and the issuance of the Government Order dated 29.08.2014.
A vast area of land was acquired by the State of U.P. in district Gautam Budh Nagar for public purpose for the benefit of Y.E.I.D.A. After the acquisition was completed, Y.E.I.D.A. invited applications for the allotment of plots of land of 25 to 250 acres in the area developed by it. In response to the notice inviting applications for such allotment, the petitioner applied for allotment of 50 acres of the land within the institutional area for establishing a University.
The petitioner was informed vide letter dated 14.09.2009 that a plot of 50 acres has been reserved for it. Subsequently, a letter of allotment dated 10.12.2009 was issued to the petitioner allotting plot No.2 in sector 7-A having an area of 50 acres equivalent to 202350 sq. meters.
The aforesaid allotment letter in unequivocal terms provided that the premium of the land allotted is Rs.1055/- per sq. meters and the petitioner has to pay E.D.C.3 @ Rs.574/- per sq. meters.
It also mentioned that as the petitioner had deposited 10% of the premium amount the balance 90% shall be payable in monthly installments as specified in the chart contained therein.
The allotment order categorically stated that the lease deed shall be executed and the possession of the land shall be handed over after completion of the acquisition proceedings, though the land is in possession of Y.E.I.D.A. On the basis of the aforesaid reservation and allotment letters, lease deed of the land was executed in favour of the petitioner on 22.01.2010 for a period of 90 years after the petitioner had substantially complied with the terms and conditions of the allotment and had deposited the necessary amounts. The lease deed in addition to the amounts payable by the petitioner as mentioned in the allotment letter further provided for the payment of 2.5% of the total premium of the plot per year as annual lease rent. The lease deed was very specific and reiterated that the premium amount was Rs.1055/- per sq. meter and E.D.C. as Rs.574/- per sq. meter as was mentioned in the allotment letter.
At the time of possession when the land was surveyed and measured it was found that the aforesaid plot allotted to the petitioner had an excess area of about 2 acres. This excess land was also leased out to the petitioner on the same terms and conditions and a supplementary lease deed in respect thereof was executed on 07.04.2010.
In the lease deed the petitioner was described as a Society under the Trust Act4 instead of under the Societies Act and as such a corrigendum deed was executed on 23.08.2010 providing that the petitioner is a Society registered under the Societies Act and not under the Trust Act.
The petitioner was given possession of the aforesaid land and on it a University known as Galgotia University was developed which establishes that the acquisition proceedings in respect thereof stood completed.
It may not be out of context to mention here that at one stage Y.E.I.D.A. came out with a policy and gave option to the petitioner to deposit the entire premium amount in lump-sum rather than in installments subject to certain rebate.
Accordingly, the lump-sum amount was worked out by the Y.E.I.D.A. and the same was paid by the petitioner with the understanding that in case due to any clerical error or miscalculation of the lump-sum amount if any demand arises in future the petitioner would pay the same. In this regard an undertaking of the petitioner on affidavit was taken on 07.06.2012. The said undertaking was only in respect of the lump-sum premium amount and had nothing to do with the demand of any additional amount of the premium.
It so happened that in respect of acquisition of land for the benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA a very large number of writ petitions were filed challenging the acquisition on various grounds inter alia that there was no urgency for acquiring the land and that the enquiry contemplated under Section 5A of the L.A. Act5 was incorrectly dispensed with.
All the said petitions came to be decided vide judgement and order dated 21.10.2011 passed in the leading case of Gajraj 6. The Full Bench of the Court though found that the urgency clause was illegally invoked and the farmers were unnecessarily denied opportunity to object to the acquisition but in view of the fact that the land had been developed and third party rights have accrued considered it appropriate to save the acquisition. Accordingly, on equity allowed payment of additional compensation of 64.7% plus some other benefits to certain class of farmers. The said benefits were not extended to all the farmers. It was not granted in all the writ petitions and most of them were dismissed after the court noticed that there was no equity in favour of the farmers or the petitioners therein.
The aforesaid additional compensation of 64.7% was permitted to be paid in view of the fact that in respect of one of the villages i.e. Patwari, the NOIDA itself had entered into negotiations with the farmers and had extended the benefit of additional compensation at the above rate over and above the compensation awarded.
The aforesaid judgement and order of the Full Court of the High Court was approved by the Supreme Court in the case Savitri Devi7 on the concession of the parties, but it was observed that as the additional amount granted by the Full Bench was under the special and peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the same should not be treated as a precedent.
It may be noteworthy that the acquisition of the land which was allotted to the petitioner was completed earlier and even the lease deed in favour of the petitioner was executed in the year 2010 much before the judgement of Gajraj and Savitri Devi have come into existence.
Since the farmers whose lands were acquired for NOIDA and Greater NOIDA were allowed to receive 64.7% additional amount, it appears that there was some unrest amongst the farmers whose land was acquired for the Y.E.I.D.A. The Chief Executive Officer of Y.E.I.D.A. in such a situation wrote a letter dated 10.04.2013 to the State Government requesting to hold meetings with the farmers and to pacify them. The State Government acting upon the said letter instructed the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut vide letter dated 10.04.2013 to take necessary action and to hold meetings with the farmers.
The Commissioner held meeting with the various groups of farmers in association with the concerned District Magistrates and on 16.07.2013 submitted a report to the State Government recommending for constituting a high level committee.
The State Government accordingly, vide office memo dated 03.09.2013 constituted a high level committee under the Chairmanship of Sri Rajendra Chaudhary, Minister of Prison, State of U.P. with the Commissioners and the District Magistrates as it members for resolving the issue with the farmers. The said committee submitted it recommendations to the State Government inter alia recommending for the payment of 64.7% additional amount as "no litigation incentive" to the farmers and for its reimbursement from the allottees in the appropriate proportion. It further provided that the costing of the land remaining for the allotment be done accordingly keeping in mind the above benefits also.
The State Government accepted the aforesaid recommendations of the Committee and issued a Government Order dated 29.08.2014 inter alia mentioning that looking to the agitation of the farmers and the legal complications, it is necessary for an out of court settlement with the farmers by offering 64.7% additional amount provided they withdraw their petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings and undertakes not to institute any litigation and create any hindrance in the development work of the Y.E.I.D.A. Thus, Government directed for the payment of 64.7% additional amount to the farmers and to recover it from the allottees making it clear that the burden of this additional amount would be borne by the Y.E.I.D.A. from its own sources and the Government would not provide any financial aid in that regard.
It would be relevant at this juncture alone to point out that there is no material on record to establish that there was any challenge to the acquisition proceedings of the land acquired for the benefit of Y.E.I.D.A. The Government Order probably proceeds on the incorrect assumption that some litigation challenging the acquisition is pending so as to issue the direction for payment of aforesaid additional amount subject to the farmers withdrawing their petitions challenging the acquisition.
The aforesaid Government Order was placed before the Board meeting of Y.E.I.D.A. on 15.09.2014 at item No.151/4 and the same was approved in the fifty-first meeting of the Board on the said date itself.
It is in pursuant to the above that demand notices initially on 15.12.2014 and then on 09.02.2018 were issued to the petitioner demanding additional premium @ Rs.600/- per sq. meters for the land allotted and leased out, totaling to Rs.12,14,10,000/- and directing the petitioner to pay the same in four installments as specified therein.
It is in the aforesaid background that the petitioner has preferred this writ petition for the quashing of the demand notice dated 15.12.2014, Board resolution dated 15.09.2014 and the Government Order dated 29.08.2014.
We have heard S/Sri Sunil Gupta, Navin Sinha and Anurag Khanna, all the Senior Counsel for the petitioners in various writ petitions. Sri Ajit Singh, Additional Advocate General, assisted by Sri J.N. Maurya, on behalf of the State of U.P. and Sri Ravikant & Sri M.C. Chaturvedi both Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Aditya Bhushan Singhal for the Y.E.I.D.A. were heard in opposition.
The primary contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the decision in the case of Gajraj and others is not applicable in respect of acquisition of land for Y.E.I.D.A. as it was in relation to the acquisition of land for NOIDA and Greater NOIDA only. The said decision is subsequent to the completion of the acquisition proceedings in respect of land acquired for Y.E.I.D.A. and finalisation of the contract of lease of the petitioner with Y.E.I.D.A. The Government could not have directed for extending any additional benefit to the farmers in respect of the land acquired for Y.E.I.D.A. on the basis of the decision of Gajraj. At least, the burden to realise this additional amount could not have been shifted upon the allottees. The Government was concerned only with the demand of the farmers and in considering the same is not justified in putting the burden to satisfy the said demand upon the allottees. Y.E.I.D.A. cannot legally realise any amount over and above that was mentioned in the allotment letter or the lease deed which brings about a binding contract between the parties.
Sri Ajit Singh, on behalf of the State placed reliance upon the short-counter affidavit filed by the State in Writ Petition No.52310 of 2017 and submitted that as the decision of the Supreme Court in Savitri Devi's case had come later on, the decision of Gajraj was taken as the precedent in accepting the recommendations of the high level committee and in issuing Government Order dated 29.08.2014.
The aforesaid Government Order is neither illegal nor arbitrary and is binding upon all concerned. Since dispute arises out of a concluded contract the petitioners have a remedy of a civil suit before the Civil Court.
Sri Ravikant, Senior Counsel supplemented the defence arguments by contending that by demanding additional amount as per the aforesaid Government Order, the concluded contract which had come into existence between the parties, had not been disturbed rather the Government has exercised its power of eminent domain in issuing the above Government Order so as to enhance the compensation payable to the farmers. Since the enhancement of compensation has been done in exercise of powers of eminent domain the petitioners who are making huge profits from the land allotted to them are equally responsible to share the burden.
The aforesaid Government Order is a policy decision and is binding upon all concerned in view of Section 41 of the Urban Planning Act.8 There is no illegality or any arbitrariness in the policy decision taken by the Government keeping in mind the agitation of the farmers which may otherwise would have the effect of killing the acquisition as a whole.
There is actually no change in the premium amount mentioned in the lease deeds and the demand is only to meet out the additional burden of extra payment due to exercise of powers of eminent domain.
Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, Senior Counsel submitted that the petitioners have an alternative remedy under Section 41(3) of the Urban Planning Act and that several writ petitions of similar nature have been disposed of by the Court relegating the petitioners to the said remedy.
The petitioners if aggrieved, may institute a civil suit and the writ petitions are not maintainable.
Having noted the brief facts and the respective submissions of the parties, we begin with the effect and impact of the decision in the case of Gajraj.
The impugned Government Order, resolution of the Board and the demand for additional compensation have been issued, passed and raised basically on account of the decision in the case of Gajraj directing in equity to pay farmers additional compensation over and above that was admissible to them under the provisions of the L.A. Act. It must be remembered that the directions in the Gajraj's case were issued in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case so as to save the acquisition which otherwise was not legally tenable. The said decision was in respect of the acquisition of land in Noida and Greater Noida and the petitioners who were before the court. It was not mandated to be applied in respect of other acquisitions of land viz. that of Y.E.I.D.A. covered by separate notifications and to persons who were not present before the court.
Thus, one of the questions which falls for our consideration is whether the directions in the case of Gajraj are applicable to the farmers or villagers whose land were acquired for Y.E.I.D.A.; who were not even parties in the writ petitions decided along with Gajraj and who had their land acquired under the different notifications other than which were the subject matter of challenge in those petitions so as to entitle them for additional benefit of 64.7% as has been granted to the farmers therein.
In order to address the above question it is important to consider the directions of the Gajraj's case and to find out upon whom they apply.
In the case of Gajraj, the writ petitions challenging the notifications of land acquisition proceedings of land situate in different villages of Greater Noida and Noida which were acquired for those two Authorities were decided and were disposed of in terms of the following directions :-
"481. As noticed above, the land has been acquired of large number of villagers in different villages of Greater Noida and Noida. Some of the petitioners had earlier come to this Court and their writ petitions have been dismissed as noticed above upholding the notifications which judgments have become final between them. Some of the petitioners may not have come to the Court and have left themselves in the hand of the Authority and State under belief that the State and Authority shall do the best for them as per law. We cannot loose sight of the fact that the above farmers and agriculturers/owners whose land has been acquired are equally affected by taking of their land. As far as consequence and effect of the acquisition it equally affects on all land losers. Thus land owners whose writ petitions have earlier been dismissed upholding the notifications may have grievances that the additional compensation which was a subsequent event granted by the Authority may also be extended to them and for the aforesaid, further spate of litigation may start in so far as payment of additional compensation is concerned. In the circumstances, we leave it to the Authority to take a decision as to whether the benefit of additional compensation shall also be extended to those with regard to whom the notifications of acquisition have been upheld or those who have not filed any writ petitions. We leave this in the discretion of the Authority/State which may be exercised keeping in view the principles enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
"482. In view of the foregoing conclusions we order as follows:
1. The Writ Petitions..............................................................
........................................................................................
which have been filed with inordinate delay and laches are dismissed.
2. (i) The writ petitions.............................................................
...........................................................................................
are allowed and the notifications dated 26.5.2009 and 22.6.2009 and all consequential actions are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled for restoration of their land subject to deposit of compensation which they had received under agreement/award before the authority/Collector.
2(ii) Writ petition ................................................relating to village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi is allowed. Notifications dated 10.4.2006 and 6.9.2007 and all consequential actions are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled for restoration of their land subject to return of compensation received by them under agreement/award to the Collector.
2(iii) Writ Petition..................................................... relating to village Asdullapur is allowed. The notification dated 27.1.2010 and 4.2.2010 as well as all subsequent proceedings are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled to restoration of their land.
3. All other writ petitions except as mentioned above at (1) and (2) are disposed of with following directions:
(a) The petitioners shall be entitled for payment of additional compensation to the extent of same ratio (i.e. 64.70%) as paid for village Patwari in addition to the compensation received by them under 1997 Rules/award which payment shall be ensured by the Authority at an early date. It may be open for Authority to take a decision as to what proportion of additional compensation be asked to be paid by allottees. Those petitioners who have not yet been paid compensation may be paid the compensation as well as additional compensation as ordered above. The payment of additional compensation shall be without any prejudice to rights of land owners under section 18 of the Act, if any.
(b) All the petitioners shall be entitled for allotment of developed Abadi plot to the extent of 10% of their acquired land subject to maximum of 2500 square meters. We however, leave it open to the Authority in cases where allotment of abadi plot to the extent of 6% or 8% have already been made either to make allotment of the balance of the area or may compensate the land owners by payment of the amount equivalent to balance area as per average rate of allotment made of developed residential plots.
4.The Authority may also take a decision as to whether benefit of additional compensation and allotment of abadi plot to the extent of 10% be also given to;
(a) those land holders whose earlier writ petition challenging the notifications have been dismissed upholding the notifications; and
(b) those land holders who have not come to the Court, relating to the notifications which are subject matter of challenge in writ petitions mentioned at direction No.3.
5......................................................................................
6......................................................................................"
The above directions explicitly permits only a few categories of the petitioners mentioned in sub-paragraph 3(a) of paragraph 482 of the decision in Gajraj's case to be entitled to additional compensation to the extent of 64.7% in addition to the compensation already received by them and some other benefits and to no others.
It may be pertinent to note that there was no direction for grant of payment of additional compensation or for conferment of other benefits by the Authority in respect of those persons whose land had not been acquired in terms of notifications which were subject matter of challenge in the case of Gajraj and connected bunch of writ petitions. There was no specific direction that the additional compensation so directed to be paid is recoverable from the allottees rather the matter was left to be decided by State or the Authority concern in accordance with law.
The judgment in the case of Gajraj was challenged before the Supreme Court in the case of Savitri Devi. One of the argument of the authorities was that the award of additional compensation by the High Court is against the statute. The Apex Court though agreeing with the above submission but on account of the concession of the counsel for the parties, left the decision of the High Court undisturbed taking notice of the facts of the case that the High Court was faced with a peculiar situation where, on one hand, invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17 of the L. A. Act and dispensing with the right to file objections under Section 5 - A of the L. A. Act were both illegal and on the other hand, there was a situation where because of delay in challenging the acquisitions by the landowners, development had taken place in the villages and in most of the cases, third party rights had been created.
The Supreme Court in the case of Savitri Devi clearly observed that directions in Gajraj were issued by the High Court in the peculiar circumstances of the case and therefore would not form a precedent for future cases. The relevant extracts from the judgment in the case of Savitri Devi are reproduced herein below:-
"44. We have also to keep in mind another important feature. Many residents of Patwari village had entered into agreement with the authorities agreeing to accept enhanced compensation @ 64.7%. This additional compensation was, however, agreed to be paid by the authorities only in respect of landowners of Patwari village. The High Court has bound the authorities with the said agreement by applying the same to all the land owners thereby benefiting them with 64.7% additional compensation. There could have been argument that the authorities cannot be fastened with this additional compensation, more particularly, when machinery for determination for just and fair compensation is provided under the Land Acquisition Act and the land owners had, in fact, invoked the said machinery by seeking reference Under Section 18 thereof. Likewise, the scheme for allotment of land to the land owners provides for 5% and 6% developed land in Noida and Greater Noida respectively. As against that, the High Court has enhanced the said entitlement to 10%. Again, we find that it could be an arguable case as to whether High Court could grant additional land contrary to the policy. Notwithstanding the same, the Noida authority have now accepted this part of the High Court judgment after the dismissal of the appeals filed by the Noida authority, and a statement to that effect was made by Mr. Rao.
45. ...................................
46. Thus, we have a scenario where, on the one hand, invocation of urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with the right to file objection under Section 5A of the Act, is found to be illegal. On the other hand, we have a situation where because of delay in challenging these acquisitions by the landowners, developments have taken place in these villages and in most of the cases, third party rights have been created. Faced with this situation, the High Court going by the spirit behind the judgment of this Court in Bondu Ramaswamy came out with the solution which is equitable to both sides. We are, thus, of the view that the High Court considered the ground realities of the matter and arrived at a more practical and workable solution by adequately compensating the land owners in the form of compensation as well as allotment of developed Abadi land at a higher rate i.e. 10% of the land acquired of each of the landowners against the eligibility and to (sic under) the policy to the extent of 5% and 6% of Noida and Greater Noida land respectively.
47. Insofar as allegation of some of the Appellants that their abadi land was acquired, we find that this allegation is specifically denied disputing its correctness. There is specific averment made by the NOIDA Authority at so many places that village abadi land was not acquired. It is mentioned that abadi area is what was found in the survey conducted prior to Section 4 Notification and not what is alleged or that which is far away from the dense village abadi. It is also mentioned that as a consequence of the acquisition, the Authority spends crores and crores of rupees in developing the infrastructure such as road, drainage, sewer, electric and water lines etc. in the unacquired portion of the village abadi. During the course of hearing, Chart No. 2 in respect of each village of Greater Noida was handed over for the consideration of this Court, wherein the amount spent by the Authority on the development, including village development (which is the unacquired village abadi), has been given in Column No. 4 thereof. It has been the consistent stand of the NOIDA Authority that prior to the issuance of Section 4 Notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, survey was conducted and the abadi found in that survey was not acquired. In fact, affidavits in this respect have also been filed not only in this Court but also in the High Court. We have mentioned that there has been a long gap between acquisition of the land and filing of the writ petitions in the High Court by these Appellants challenging the acquisition. If they have undertaken some construction during this period they cannot be allowed to take advantage thereof. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the argument of the Appellants based on parity with three villages in respect of which the High Court has given relief by quashing the acquisition.
48. To sum up, following benefits are accorded to the land owners:
48.1- increasing the compensation by 64.7%;
48.2- directing allotment of developed abadi land to the extent of 10% of the land acquired of each of the land owners;
48.3- compensation which is increased at the rate of 64.7% is payable immediately without taking away the rights of the landowners to claim higher compensation under the machinery provided in the Land Acquisition Act wherein the matter would be examined on the basis of the evidence produced to arrive at just and fair market value.
49. This, according to us, provides substantial justice to the Appellants.
Conclusion
50. Keeping in view all these peculiar circumstances, we are of the opinion that these are not the cases where this Court should interfere Under Article 136 of the Constitution. However, we make it clear that directions of the High Court are given in the aforesaid unique and peculiar/specific background and, therefore, it would not form precedent for future cases.
51. We may record that some of the Appellants had tried to point out certain clerical mistakes pertaining to their specific cases. For example, it was argued by one Appellant that his land falls in a village in Noida but wrongly included in Greater Noida. These Appellants, for getting such clerical mistakes rectified, can always approach the High Court.
52. The Full Bench judgment of the High Court is, accordingly, affirmed and all these appeals are disposed of in terms of the said judgment of the Full Bench."
Thus, from the above directions and observations, it is quite implicit that judgment in Gajraj was rendered in the peculiar facts & circumstances of that case and is not a binding precedent. The award of 64.7% additional compensation over and above admissible under the L.A. Act is not by way of any legal principle but only for adjusting the equities. It at the same time gave no direction for grant of additional compensation to those persons whose land was not covered by the notifications of acquisition under challenge in those bunch of petitions. The directions therein were not in rem and were not meant to be applied to notifications issued for acquiring land elsewhere or in respect of acquisition for Y.E.I.D.A. or to persons who were not party to the proceedings before the court in any form.
The submission that the Supreme Court decision in Savitri Devi had come later on by which time a conscious decision was already taken by the Government and the Board to follow the directions of Gajraj and therefore the observation in Savitri Devi that the directions in Gajraj would not be treated as precedent does not affect the decision of the Government/Board is bereft of any merit. The directions given in Gajraj could not have been applied in the present case concerning acquisition of land for the benefit of Y.E.I.D.A. for two specific reasons. First, it was not a judgement in rem. It was not applicable to other acquisitions such as for Y.E.I.D.A. which were not the subject matter of challenge in Gajraj. Secondly, the directions issued in Gajraj were not in the nature of binding precedent from day one. The mere specific declaration subsequently that the directions are not by way of precedent would not mean those directions had the binding precedent earlier and ceased to be binding later on. If the directions are not binding precedents they happen to be so from the inception irrespective of the declaration by the court subsequently. The declaration in Savitri that directions in Gajraj are not binding makes the directions non-applicable from day one irrespective of the date of the decision of Savitri's case. Even, assuming that the decision to hold those directions as not binding may have come subsequently nonetheless it cannot be applied to the acquisition of land for Y.I.E.D.A. due to first reason mentioned above. This apart even the decision in Gajraj's case make it abundantly clear that the directions have to be applied in a limited manner as aforesaid therein. It no where directed to grant additional benefit of compensation to persons whose acquisition of land was not the subject matter of the bunch petitions along with Gajraj.
In Mange @ Mange Ram9, the petitioners therein claimed the same relief as was granted in Gajraj and upheld in Savitri Devi. The claim raised therein was turned down by the court recording that the benefit granted by Gajraj cannot be extended to the petitioners therein though they may be similarly situated as the Authority had not taken a decision to extend all the benefits of Gajraj to every similarly situate person. It was held that all benefits of Gajraj cannot be extended to the petitioners therein, even though they may be similarly situated and their land had been acquired under the same notification.
The aforesaid decision in Mange @ Mange Ram was subjected to challenge before the Supreme Court in Khatoon & Others10. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners therein have no legal right to claim all benefits of Gajraj. The L.A. Act does not provide for grant of such reliefs when the State has already paid the statutory compensation. The reliefs in Gajraj were granted by the High Court by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. They were confined only to the land owners, who had filed their petitions. The Supreme Court in Savitri Devi case has already held that the directions given in Gajraj are not to be treated as precedent for being adopted in other cases in future and they be treated as confined to the case of Gajraj only. Thus, the view taken by the High Court in Mange Ram was approved and the petitions were dismissed.
The question of admissibility of the benefit of the directions contained in the Gajraj for providing additional compensation of 64.70% and other benefits came up for consideration before a coordinate Division Bench of this court in the case of Rajeshwari and 3 others11 decided on 03.05.2017 and it was held that the relief which was granted in Gajraj's case and as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Savitri Devi can not be made applicable to the acquisition proceedings which were not assailed and were not the subject matter of adjudication before the Full Bench. The directions of the Full Bench of Gajraj do not stand attracted in the case of persons whose lands were not acquired in terms of the notifications under challenge in the case of Gajraj.
A similar view was taken in a recent case by another Division Bench in Ramesh and others12 and it was held that the directions of the Gajraj case were not in respect of those persons whose lands were acquired under different notifications other than which were under challenge in the case of Gajraj.
The judgment and order of Gajraj as repeatedly observed has been rendered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case in equity alone without laying down any principle of law. It is well settled that mere direction in a judgment without laying down any principle of law is not a precedent having any binding effect.13 Accordingly, in our opinion the equitable directions for payment of additional compensation as contained in the case of Gajraj were not meant to be applied to other land acquisition proceedings other than for Noida or Greater Noida, particularly for the land acquired for Y.E.I.D.A. by separate and different notifications.
The next question which arises for our consideration is whether the State Government or the Board of Y.E.I.D.A. were justified in granting the benefit of additional compensation of 64.7% to the farmers whose land was acquired for Y.E.I.D.A. on the basis of the directions contained in the Gajraj's case by issuing the Government Order dated 29.08.2014. In short the issue is about the validity of the aforesaid Government Order.
We have already discussed and opined that the directions for additional compensation given in Gajraj's case were not of general application and were meant to be applied in limited cases as described therein i.e. in respect of acquisition of land of Noida and Greater Noida that too in respect of those persons only who were covered under sub-paragraph 3(a) of paragraph 482 of the aforesaid judgement.
The notifications to acquire the land for Y.E.I.D.A. was totally independent to the acquisition proceedings which were subject matter in Gajraj and the farmers whose land were acquired for Y.E.I.D.A. were not even parties before the High Court in the aforesaid cases and as such the directions given therein for payment of additional compensation as already held were not applicable for extending any benefit to the farmers whose land was acquired for Y.E.I.D.A. Therefore, the issuance of the Government Order and its acceptance by Y.E.I.D.A. is patently illegal as the very basis for its issuance is faulty.
It is tirite to mention here that the L.A. Act provides for a complete machinery and mechanism for the determination of the compensation admissible and payable to the farmers/land owners whose land is acquired and therefore, no additional benefit over and above what is prescribed under law can be extended to farmers/the land owners.
It is important to note that the L.A. Act is a self-contained code and provides the procedure to be followed for acquisition of the land as well as for the assessment of its market value for the purposes of payment of just and fair compensation to the land owners. In addition to the market value it also provides for payment of 30% solatium, 12% additional compensation and interest @ 9% and 15%. A person not satisfied by the compensation so determined and offered has a right to seek reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act and a further appeal under Section 54 of the L.A. Act before the High Court for getting it enhanced. Therefore, the Act ensures payment of fair and reasonable compensation to all the land holders. The Act however, does not provide for payment of any thing over and above the amount of compensation as mentioned above or for granting any other benefit to the land holders. Thus, in the absence of any statutory provision no land owner is entitle to any additional benefit on account of the acquisition of his land much less additional compensation as has been offered under the Government Order and accepted by Y.E.I.D.A. The question as to whether any claim for additional benefit can be raised as a matter of right over and above the compensation admissible and payable under the L.A. Act was the subject of consideration before a Full Bench of this court in the case of Ravindra Kumar14. In the said case it was held that whatever compensation has to be given is provided under the L.A. Act itself which is a self-contained code. Any Government Order which provide for any further benefit not mentioned in the Act would be inconsistent with the intention of the parliament and hence such a Government Order would be invalid and violative of Article 16 of the Constitution and accordingly it has to be ignored by the authorities.
In view of the above discussion, the Government Order dated 29.08.2014 which provide for additional compensation of 64.70% to the farmers is violative of the provisions of the L.A. Act and is invalid.
Once the aforesaid Government Order is ignored, the resolution of Y.E.I.D.A. passed in its meeting on 15.09.2014 accepting the same becomes meaningless.
An ancillary argument which arises is that the government in equity can provide for the payment of higher compensation and that there is no illegality in making such higher payment.
The submission may appear to be a little attractive that the government may in order to adjust equities, provide for payment of compensation higher than the amount prescribed under law but the question is whether the government is possessed with such equitable jurisdiction.
The exercise of equitable jurisdiction is an ornament of the courts of law and cannot be exercised by the government. If the government is permitted to exercise the same, it may result in a chaotic conditions and the government would start picking and choosing cases so as to grant relief in equity in complete violation of the law leaving the field open for nepotism.
The State Government in issuing any Government Order has to act strictly in accordance with law or statutory provisions. It cannot act arbitrarily or in an unfair manner in breach of specific provisions of law.
The equitable relief can only be granted by the courts specially the High Courts in exercise of their extra ordinary jurisdiction if at all the facts and circumstances of the case so permits but not by the Government by issuing a Government Order. The Government in issuing the above Government Order cannot be allowed to usurp the jurisdiction of the courts which otherwise is not vested with the Government. In view of this also the impugned Government Order cannot be sustained and has to be ignored.
It is pertinent to mention here that equity always follows the law. It cannot override the statutory provisions, therefore, where statutory provisions exist for the assessment and determination of the compensation for the acquired land, the compensation has to be awarded accordingly and cannot be awarded by adjusting the equities.
The courts administer justice according to law. Equity and fair play therefore, must yield to clear and express provisions of law.15 It must also be remembered that it is not permissible to bend law for adjusting equity.16 In nutshell, the courts ought not to be guided by humanitarian considerations, sympathy & compassion in the matter of dispensation of justice as it would amount to altering, amending or re-writing the statutory provisions. The equity considerations are not applicable in case of clear statutory provisions and the courts are not supposed to pass orders contrary to law.
The above principles apply with much greater force to the State Government that, in fact, has no authority to exercise equity jurisdiction.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the issuance of the Government Order dated 29.08.2014 is not only illegal and against the statutory provision but is also without jurisdiction.
Now we take the next step and come to the issue of exercise of power of "eminent domain" by the State Government in extending the benefit of additional compensation to the farmers and in directing the financial burden so arising to be realised from the allottees.
The power of "eminent domain" is exerciseable by the government to take away the private property of a citizen specially land for public use subject to payment of reasonable compensation.
According to Black's Law Dictionary Eighth Edition the inherent power of the government to take over privately owned property amounts to exercise of power of "eminent domain".
In view of the meaning of "eminent domain" as given above it is a power which is exerciseable for the purposes of taking possession of the private property for public use subject to payment of reasonable compensation. The case at hand is not one of exercising the aforesaid power inasmuch as here the property of the farmers has been taken away not in exercise of "eminent domain" but in exercise of the provisions of the L.A. Act subject to payment of compensation as provided therein.
The aforesaid power of "eminent domain" may be an incident of sovereignty or an offspring of political necessity but it cannot be exercised where specific provisions exist for acquiring private land for public purpose.
The expression "eminent domain" as explained in Soora Ram Pratap Reddy17 cuts no ice in favour of Y.E.I.D.A. It only says that "eminent domain" is an inherent political right or power of a Sovereign State to take private property for public use without the consent of the owner upon payment of compensation. There is no denial to the above legal proposition but the fact remains here the property of the petitioner is not being taken rather the private properties of the villagers have already been taken over and the controversy is only with regard to recovering of the additional compensation payable to the farmers from the petitioner who happens to be the subsequent owner of the property. This recovering or realisation of any part of the compensation from the petitioner is not within the ambit of exercise of power of "eminent domain".
Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the grant of additional compensation and its realisation from the petitioner or the allottees cannot be associated with the exercise of power of "eminent domain".
The next argument is that the government order dated 29.08.2014 had been issued as matter of public policy and therefore, the court need not interfere with the same.
True it is that ordinarily in the matter of public policy the courts keep their hands away and do not intervene with the policy decision.
Nonetheless, the policy has to be tested on the anvil of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. If it is found to be unfair, arbitrary or unreasonable, the courts can exercise its power of judicial review so as to interfere with it.
Even in Express News paper 18 it has been observed that writ petition challenging the executive action inter alia on the ground of violation of Articles 14 & 19 of the Constitution is maintainable and it is only in respect of civil rights flowing from the contract that it was held that the same can be decided in civil proceedings.
The decision in Bondu Ramaswamy19 cited to canvass that the Supreme Court therein had also directed the B.D.A.20 to give option to landowners to accept allotment of 15% of land acquired in lieu of compensation etc. is of no use as the said directions were also issued to avoid hardship to B.D.A. in case of salvage of acquisition. The observations of the court were to have a re-look to the policy of the Government in the matter of payment of compensation for the acquired land. The observation of the Supreme Court were followed and the L.A. Act has been replaced by the New Act.
Similarly, the observation of the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority21that the amount usually offered by way an award of Collector under the L.A. Act is way below the market value, does not mean that that the landholders can be allowed extra amount in addition to the amount determined by the court by an executive fiat or by a policy decision.
The aforesaid Government Order dated 29.08.2014 is in two parts. First part confers additional benefits to the farmers which otherwise are not available to them in law. The second part permits the Y.E.I.D.A. to realise this additional financial burden on account of payment of additional compensation to the farmers from the allottees.
As far as the first part of the aforesaid Government Order and the policy of the government in that regard for payment of additional compensation to the farmers, there may not be any dispute to enable the court to exercise judicial review. The government is free to adopt any policy which is fair and reasonable for payment of higher compensation, without offending the rights of third parties or the other stake holders.
The petitioner is only aggrieved by the second part of the government order or the policy of the government in permitting realisation of the additional amount of compensation so payable from the allottees inasmuch as it amounts to reopening of the terms and conditions of the lease deed which is final and binding upon the parties.
Any rights, on the basis of a concluded or final contract or lease, which have been crystallized in favour of any party cannot be taken away by framing a policy on some later date. A policy so framed would be prospective in nature and cannot affect the contracts already finalised. Any such policy which is unilaterally framed disturbing the rights which have accrued to a party would clearly be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Lease is one of the modes of transfer of the property as per the T.P. Act22. It is defined under Section 105 of the T.P. Act as under:-
"A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.
Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined.--The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent."
A simple reading of the above definition of the lease would indicate that it is a transfer of property for a specified time or in perpetuity on consideration which may be in shape of lease rent and premium amount. The consideration mentioned in the instrument of sale or lease is a solemn amount and cannot be subjected to any change or alteration subsequent to the execution and registration of the lease deed.
In other words, a sale consideration agreed upon and mentioned in the lease deed is beyond any change unless agreed upon by both parties and a proper instrument in this regard is executed between them.
The issuance of the impugned demand amounts to increasing the premium or the consideration mentioned in the lease deed which is not permissible in law unless there is a conscious act of parties to the lease to agree and change the same by entering into an instrument in accordance with law. This amount of premium or sale consideration is not liable to change without the consent of the parties or in a unilateral manner.
There is nothing on record which may establish that the parties have ever entered into any negotiation and agreed for the change/alteration of the premium or the consideration mentioned in the lease deed. No document in this regard has been executed and got registered.
It is trite to mention here that a lease deed is required to be registered both under the provisions of T.P. Act and under the Registration Act. The amount of premium or the sale consideration mentioned therein as such is not liable to any change otherwise than by execution another registered instrument.
Our attention has been drawn to Clause G of part V of the lease deed dated 22.01.2010. The aforesaid Clause reads as under:-
"The Chief Executive Officer or the lessor resources the right to make such additions and alterations or modifications in these terms and conditions as may be considered just and expedient."
On the basis of the aforesaid Clause it has been canvassed that the Y.E.I.D.A. or its Chief Executive Officer is fully empowered to increase or decrease the premium amount mentioned in the lease deed.
The submission on the face of it has no merit. The language of the said Clause clearly shows that the Chief Executive Officer or the Y.E.I.D.A. reserves the right to make additions, alterations and modifications in "these terms and conditions" and not the premium amount or the consideration.
The word ''these' used therein is of great significance. It qualifies the terms and conditions mentioned in part V of the lease deed which do not pertain to the premium amount or the consideration. Even otherwise the reference to the terms and conditions which are subject to alteration, modification and addition is to the general terms regarding the term of the lease, the mode of payment and the penalty clause etc but does not refer to the consideration part of the lease mentioned in the lease deed. The consideration part is contained in part-1 of the lease deed which is independent to the terms and conditions of the lease which have been provided in part-III, IV and V of the lease deed.
In view of above, in our opinion the right to modify, alter or add any terms and conditions of the lease does not permit change in the consideration or the premium amount.
It may be important to mention here that in the event Y.E.I.D.A. feels that the consideration / premium in the lease deed was low or inadequately and deserves to be increased the proper remedy for it was to increase the same by the mutual consent of the parties by executing a proper registered document or by filing a civil suit for the revocation/cancellation of the lease deed on the ground of inadequate consideration.
The Y.E.I.D.A. not having availed either of the two remedies cannot unilaterally be permitted to enhance the consideration/premium amount mentioned in the lease deed.
A feeble attempt has been made to assert that the directions of the government are binding upon the Y.E.I.D.A. and therefore, if it had demanded extra amount from the petitioner on the directions of the government it had not committed any illegality.
Admittedly, Y.E.I.D.A. is an ''authority' constituted under Section 3 of the Industrial Development Act23 and one of its functions as enumerated under Section 6 of the said Act is to allocate and transfer either by way of sale or lease or otherwise plots of land for industrial, commercial or residential purposes. It is in furtherance of its above proclaimed activities that the petitioner has been leased out the land in question.
There may not be any quarrel that according to the provisions of Section 41 of the Urban Planning Act, Authority is bound carry out directions of the State Government which are issued from time to time for the efficient administration of the Act i.e. Urban Planning Act. In view of the above, the authority is obliged to carry out the directions of the State Government subject to the conditions that the directions are in accordance with law. If however, the directions are ex facie illegal or held to be illegal by any competent court of law, it is not incumbent upon the Authority to follow those directions. Since the directions of the State Government as contained in the Government Order dated 29.08.2014 have been held to be illegal rather the Government Order itself has been found to be without jurisdiction, the Y.E.I.D.A. is not bound by the directions of the State Government contained therein.
This take us to the last limb of the argument that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the alternate remedy available to the petitioner under Section 41(3) of the Urban Act24 or for the reason that it could have filed a civil suit.
Section 41(3) of the Urban Act reads as under:-
"The State Government may, at any time, either on its own motion or on application made to it in this behalf, call for the records of any case disposed of or order passed by the [Authority or the Chairman) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed or direction issued and may pass such order or issue such direction in relation thereto as it may think fit:
Provided that the State Government shall not pass an order prejudicial to any person without affording such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
The aforesaid provision provides for a revision against the order passed by the Authority or the Chairman to adjudge the legality or the propriety of any direction issued by them.
In the case at hand no order of the Authority or the Chairman has been impugned in the present petition.
The petition apart from actions of the Y.E.I.D.A. consequent to the government order assails the Government Order itself. The challenge is virtually to the government order which is not reviseable. The actions based on the said government order are only consequential in nature and cannot exist independently. The validity of the Government Order can not be adjudicated upon by the Government itself.
Therefore, so called remedy of revision is simply illusory in nature and sham.
Moreover, we do not find any order passed by the Y.E.I.D.A. or its Chairman which may have been questioned in this petition rather it is only a demand notice issued by the Special Executive Officer, who is neither the Chairman or the Authority that has been challenged. Therefore, the plea of alternative remedy is of no avail.
This apart as the issues raised in this petition are all of legal nature and are not dependent upon any disputed facts, we see no good reason to relegate the petitioner to alternate remedy instead of answering the questions on the judicial side.
In the end, we conclude as under:-
(i) The decision in the case of Gajraj as approved by Savitri Devi is not a judgement in rem which could have been applied to proceedings for acquiring the land under different notifications or for Y.E.I.D.A.;
(ii) the issuance of the Government Order dated 29.08.2014 and its acceptance by Y.E.I.D.A. is patently illegal. It is violative of the provisions of the L.A. Act and is otherwise without jurisdiction as no such Government Order is liable to be issued in equity by the Government and that the policy behind it is unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary which is in violation of the provisions of the T.P. Act; and
(iii) the aforesaid Government Order dated 29.08.2014 as such is held to be invalid and liable to be ignored. Consequentially, all actions and demands of the Y.E.I.D.A. based upon it are held to be illegal.
In view of above facts and circumstances, the impugned Government Order dated 29.08.2014 is declared to be illegal and without jurisdiction and consequently all demands raised on its basis are quashed.
The Writ Petitions are allowed with no orders as to costs.
Order Date :- 28.05.2020 piyush