Orissa High Court
Mathuri Jena Dead Through His L Rs And ... vs Baban Sahu Dead Through His L Rs And ... on 19 March, 2018
Author: A.K.Rath
Bench: A.K.Rath
HIGH COURT OF ORISSA: CUTTACK
S.A.No.307 of 1985
From the judgment and decree dated 9.8.1985 and 23.8.1985
respectively passed by Shri N.N.Praharaj, learned Subordinate Judge,
Jajpur in T.A.No.29 of 1989 affirming the judgment and decree dated
3.5.1982 and 25.6.1982 respectively passed by the learned Munsif,
Jajpur in T.S.No.138 of 1976.
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Mathuri Jena (dead) through
his L.Rs and others .... Appellants
Versus
Baban Sahu (dead) through
his L.Rs and others .... Respondents
For Appellants -- Mr.N.K.Sahu,
Mr.Pranaya Swain,
Advocates
For Respondents -- None
JUDGMENT
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.RATH
Date of Hearing & Judgment:19.3.2018
Dr.A.K.RATH, J.Defendants are the appellants against a confirming judgment.
2. Plaintiffs-respondents 1 to 13 instituted the suit for permanent injunction. The case of the plaintiffs was that the suit land originally belonged to Nakhatra Malini Dei, the ex-intermediary. Plaintiff no.1, Laxman Sahu (father of plaintiff nos.2 and 3 and 2 husband of plaintiff no.4), Rama Chandra Sahu (father of plaintiff nos.5 and 6) and Muralidhar Pani (father of plaintiff nos.7 to 12 and husband of plaintiff no.13) were in cultivating possession of the suit schedule land as bhag tenants. They were paying bhag. While matter stood thus, the ex-intermediary leased out the suit land to them on 14.3.1943 on acceptance of salami. She executed an unregistered lease deed on 14.3.1943 in their favour and delivered possession. Since then the aforesaid persons jointly possessed the suit land. After vesting of the estate, plaintiff no.1, Laxman Sahu, Rama Chandra Sahu and Muralidhar Pani remained in possession of the suit land as occupancy tenants. They filed an application under Sec.8(1) of the O.E.A. Act before the Tahasildar, Jajpur for acceptance of rent, which was registered as Misc.Case No.77 of 1968. By order dated 31.10.1968, the Additional Tahasildar, Jajpur recognized the lessees and directed collection of rent from them. Thereafter, the lessees paid rent to the State Government as occupancy tenants. Since difficulty arose between the co-sharers, they applied to the Tahasildar on 18.2.1970 for division of the land. Pursuant to the order, an Amin went to the spot, measured the land and divided the same into four equal shares measuring A0.77 dec. each in presence of the local gentlemen. Accordingly, plots were allotted to the respective persons. After death of Laxman, Ram and Muralidhar, their legal heirs succeeded to the properties. The plaintiffs raised paddy crops on their respective land. The defendants who had no semblance of right, title and interest over the suit land threatened to dispossess them from the suit land. With this factual scenario, they instituted the suit seeking the relief mentioned supra.
33. Defendants 1, 2 to 10, 12 to 19, 21 and defendant no.3 (ka) filed written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. According to them, on the confluence of the river Budha and Kharasrota, the disputed land was formed by way of char about 35 years back. The total extent of the disputed plot is Ac.21.20 dec. Out of the same, the char lands are about Ac.9.00 dec. Plot nos.689 and 706 originally belonged to Brahmananda Biswal. He was in possession of the char lands. The same was contiguous to his plots. Defendant no.1 purchased the said plots from Brahmananda. The extent of the char lands in possession of defendant no.1 is about Ac.2.00 dec.. Brahamananda and defendant no.1 reclaimed the same. They acquired occupancy rights over Ac.2.00 dec. of land out of Ac.9.00 dec. The rest Ac.7.00 dec. of land including the disputed land were reclaimed by the defendants and their predecessors. They converted it into the agricultural land. The defendants are settled raiyats of village. Some of them are landless persons and some of them have small extent of lands. The defendants have acquired occupancy rights. After abolition of zamindari, the defendants are in continuous possession of the land. They are in peaceful and continuous possession of the land to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, Rabindra Panda and others, the ex-intermediary and the State of Orissa. They raised crops. The plaintiffs created disturbances in their possession. The lease deeds and rent receipts are fraudulent one. The plaintiffs created one antedated document in collusion with the intermediary to defeat the claim of defendants.
4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, learned trial court framed five issues. Parties led evidence, oral and documentary, to substantiate their cases. Learned trial court came to hold that the 4 plaintiffs have title over the suit land. They are in possession of the same. It negatived the plea of the defendants that they have acquired title by way of adverse possession. Held so, it decreed the suit. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants filed Title Appeal No.29 of 1982 before the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Jajpur, which was eventually dismissed. It is apt to state here that during pendency of this appeal, appellant nos.1, 4, 7, 11, 1(e) and 7/A died, whereafter the legal heirs of appellant nos.1, 7 and 11 have been substituted. Respondent nos.1, 2, 4, 13, 14, 20 and 27 died, whereafter the legal heirs of respondent nos.1, 14 and 27 have been substituted.
5. The Second Appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law enumerated in ground nos.A, B and C of the appeal memo. The same are :
"A. For that the learned courts below committed a serious error of record in holding that D.W.4 had admitted that the suit strip of land had came out of the river before the flood of 1955 and that therefore, the land to them other of the suit having come out after 1940-41 and having become the property of the plaintiffs who are occupancy tenants of the land in the northern bank of the river, the suit strip of land which had came out later would also belong to the plaintiffs by reason of accretion although in the floods of 1955, the lands intervening between the suit land the plaintiffs land on the river tank was submerged on the river and was therefore, lost to the plaintiffs on the basis of Sec.4 of the Bengal Regulation 1825 (Bengal Regulation XI of 1825) B. For that on the other hand, the defence witnesses having deposed and many P.Ws. having admitted that although the land to the northern side of the suit land in between the suit land and the land belonging to the plaintiff on the river bank had emerged out of the river during 1940-45. In the flood of 1955, that intervening land was submerged in the river and became Jamunda Nala and by the very same flood of 1955, the suit land emerged in the river as an island of Char surrounded 5 on all sides by the river and therefore, the suit land is governed by 5.4.(thirdly) of the aforesaid Regulation and the title inhered in the crown (Govt.) and the plaintiffs not admittedly having applied to the Government for lease of the suit land under the Govt. land settlement Act had not acquired any title to the suit land and after the ex-proprietors including Nakshatramali had no title to the aforesaid char land ( suit land) and alleged oral lease taken by the plaintiff from Nakhatramali, had changed no title to them.
C. For that it being well established in law that S.8 O.E.A.Act is merely a declaratory provision and does not contemplates any proceeding, the order passed by the O.E.A. Collector (Ext.8) thereunder, has not conveyed any title to the plaintiffs and since Nakhatramali (one of the co-sharer ex- proprietors) had not acquired any title to the suit land having come out in the 1955 floods as an island since the land to the north had been submerged by the very same flood and title having thus inherited in the Govt. the ex-proprietorship could not convey any tile to the plaintiffs by the alleged oral lease and the title to the suit land having intended in the Govt. and no lease having been prayed for from the Government (under Govt. land settlement Act) or granted in favour of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have acquired no title to the suit land and since on the date of vesting the suit land had belonged to the State Govt. O.E.A. Act including S.8 thereof had no application and both the learned courts below have completely misunderstood and misconstrued the correct legal position in finding that the plaintiffs had acquired title to the suit land from Nakhatramali."
6. Heard Mr.N.K.Sahu, learned Advocate along with Mr.Pranaya Swain, learned Advocate for the appellants. None appears for the respondents.
7. Mr.Sahu, learned Advocate for the appellants submits that the suit schedule land is a river bed. After coming into operation of the O.E.A.Act, the land vested in the State. The ex-intermediary had no right to execute a lease deed in respect of a river bed. Further, the so-called lease deed is an unregistered one. Thus, no 6 title has passed to the plaintiffs. He further submits that the application filed under Sec.8 (1) of O.E.A. Act is misconceived. Sec.8 (1) does not contemplate any application. Any order passed by the Tahasildar is void. He further submits that the defendants are in possession of the suit land for more than twelve years and, as such, have acquired occupancy rights.
8. On the confluence of river Budha and Kharasrota, the disputed land was formed by alluvial deposits of the river. The suit land originally belonged to ex-intermediary-Nakhatra Malini Dei and other co-sharers.
9. Sec.5 of the O.E.A .Act provides for consequences of vesting of an estate in the State. Sec.5 (a) provides that:
"(a) Subject to the sequent provisions of this Chapter the entire estate including all communal lands and porambokes, other non-raiyati lands, waste lands, trees, orchards, pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals (whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether being worked or not inclusive of rights in respect of any lease of mines and minerals) quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and other irrigation works, water channels, fisheries, ferries, hats and bazaars, and building or structures together with the land on which they stand shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and such Intermediary shall cease to have any interest in such estate other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act."
On a conspectus of the aforesaid section, it is evident that after coming into operation of O.E.A. Act, the river vested in the State. The ex-intermediary had no right to lease out the river bed in favour of the plaintiffs.
710. The alleged lease deed said to have been executed by Nakhatra Malini Dei on 14.3.1943 in favour of the ancestors of the plaintiffs is an unregistered one. The same requires compulsory registration. In Ram Nath Mandal and others v. Jojan Mandal and others, AIR 1964 Pat-1, the Full Bench of the Patna High Court held that under Sec.117 of the T.P.Act, a lease for agricultural purposes is not necessary to be made by a written instrument and it may be effected by an oral agreement in which case the question of registration will not arise. However, if the transaction is reduced to writing, then in the case of a lease from year to year or for any term exceeding a year or reserving a yearly rent, registration would be required under Sec.17 of the Registration Act, and if unregistered the lease will be inadmissible in evidence under Sec.49 of the Registration Act and other evidence of its terms will be precluded under Sec.91 of the Evidence Act. In that case, the claim of creation of tenancy on the basis of rent receipts in pursuance of an oral agreement was negatived on the ground that no such case had been put forward by the plaintiff in the plaint.
11. Further Sec.8 of the O.E.A. Act does not contemplate any proceeding. Thus, the order passed by the Additional Tahasildar in Misc. Case No.77 of 1968 is a nullity. The courts below committed a patent illegality in holding that the plaintiffs have title over the suit land.
12. The kissam of the land is river. The entire natural resources of the State belong to the public and Government is a trustee. In M.C.Mehta v. Kamal Nath and others, (1997) 1 SCC 388, the apex Court held that the doctrine of Public Trust primarily rests 8 on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial purposes. Our legal system- based on English Common Law- includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.
13. In Anathula Sudhakar v. P.Buchi Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs & Ors, AIR 2008 SC 2033, the apex held that where a cloud is raised over plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. In view of the same, the simple suit for permanent injunction was not maintainable. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly.
914. On an analysis of the evidence on record and pleadings, the courts below rightly came to a conclusion that the defendants had failed to substantiate the plea of occupancy rights.
15. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and that of the learned trial court is modified to the extent that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants have any right, title and interest in respect of the suit property. Accordingly, the suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed. No costs.
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Dr.A.K.Rath, J.
Orissa High Court, Cuttack, The 19th March, 2018/CRB 10 11