Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Sri Venkata Rama Alluminium Co. And Ors. vs Boddu Narayanamma on 29 July, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1997(4)ALT485
Author: R. Bayupu Reddy
Bench: R. Bayapu Reddy
JUDGMENT R. Bayupu Reddy, J.
1. This revision is filed by the tenants questioning the orders of the appellate authority under Rent Control Act (Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry) dated 27-11-1995, by which R.C.A. 11/94 filed by the Landlady was allowed thereby setting aside the orders of the Rent Controller in R.C.C. 71/81 dated 7-7-1994 and directing the eviction of the petitioners herein on the ground of bonafide requirement of the demised building for her residential purpose.
2. The present respondent and her husband filed R.C.C.71/81 on the file of the Principal District Munsif-Cum-Rent Controller, Rajahmundry seeking eviction of the present petitioners from the demised premises which consists of residential building as well as non-residential building, on the ground, of bonafide requirement for residential purpose of their family, contending that they had fostered one Ramakrishna, who is the son of the brother of the husband of the present respondent and one Subbulakshmi who is the niece of the respondent, and they have been living along with the respondent and her husband since many years; that they are all residing as a single family in one house which belongs to the respondent and her husband; that the children of the above said foster son and daughter are since married and children also were born to them and they are grown up; that there are now number of persons in their family residing in the same house which they are now occupying; that the accommodation in the said house is not sufficient for all the family members; that they, therefore, require the demised building which was leased out to the petitioners herein for providing residential accommodation to the foster son and daughter and their children and grand children and that, therefore, the petitioners are liable to be evicted from the demised premises.
3. The first petitioner herein is a firm of which petitioners 2 to 5 are partners and they contested the petition before the Rent Controller, contending that the alleged requirement of the demised premises for residential purpose by the respondent is not bona fide; that the requirement of the foster son and daughter and their children cannot be considered as the requirement of the respondent; that the petition is filed for eviction only to seek enhancement of rent; that the demised premises consist of two separate portions, one leased out for residential purpose and the other for non-residential purpose; that the lease thus granted in their favour by the respondent is a composite lease and as such the petition filed for eviction under the provisions of the Rent Control Act seeking both the buildings for residential purpose is not maintainable, and that the petition may, therefore, be dismissed. The petitioners herein further alleged before the Rent Controller that the husband of the respondent herein, who was the first petitioner in the rent control petition, is not the owner of the premises and they are denying his title and as such, the petition was not maintainable. In view of such contention raised by the petitioners regarding the title, it was sought to be contended by the respondent and her husband before the Rent Controller that the petitioners are liable to be evicted on the ground of denial of title of the husband of the respondent herein.
4. On the basis of the evidence adduced before him, the learned Rent Controller held that the petitioners were not liable to be evicted on the alleged ground of denial of title. Even on the ground of bona fide requirement for residential purpose, the Rent Controller held that the respondent and her husband failed to prove that Ramakrishna and Subbalakshmi are their foster children and that their requirement of the building cannot be considered as requirement of the respondent and her husband. It was further held by the Rent Controller that the lease was a composite lease for residential as well as for non-residential purpose and that, therefore, the petition for eviction was not maintainable on that ground also. The Rent Controller, therefore, dismissed the said petition in view of such findings.
5. After disposal of the rent control case by the Rent Controller, the husband of the respondent herein expired and as such, the respondent, who was the second petitioner in the rent control petition, alone filed R.C.A. No. 11/94 before the Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry questioning the orders of the Rent Controller. The appellate authority allowed the appeal thereby reversing the findings of the Rent Controller, holding that Ramakrishna and Subbalakshmi are the foster son and daughter of the respondent and her husband; that all of them have been living together as one family in the same house belonging to the respondent; that the said house is insufficient for accommodating the entire family consisting of the children and grand children of the foster son and daughter who were all living together in the same house along with the respondent; that the requirement of the children and grand children of the foster children of the respondent can be said to be the requirement of the respondent; that such requirement of the building by the respondent for the residence of the children and grand children of the foster son and daughter is bona fide and that, therefore, the petitioners are liable to be evicted from the demised premises. The appellate Court also held that the petition is maintainable for seeking eviction from both the residential and non-residential buildings, which are the subject matter of composite lease in favour of the petitioners even though the petition is filed only for eviction on the ground of requirement for residential purpose. Regarding the alleged denial of title of the husband of the respondent by the petitioners, the appellate Court agreed with the view expressed by the Rent Controller. The present revision is filed by the petitioners, who are the tenants, questioning the findings given and orders of eviction passed by the appellate authority.
6. The points that arise for consideration in the present revision are:
(1) whether Ramakrishna and Subbalakshmi are the foster son and daughter of the present respondent and her deceased husband and whether the requirement of the demised buildings by the respondent is bona fide and whether eviction can be ordered for such requirement to accommodate the children and grand children of the foster son and daughter of the respondent? And (2) whether the eviction petition filed for requirement of the demised premises for residential purpose is not maintainable as the lease granted in favour of the petitioners is a composite lease?
7. Point No. 1: The petition for eviction was filed by the present respondent and her husband, who was the first petitioner in the rent control petition. It is seen from a perusal of the judgment of the appellate Court and the evidence placed on record, both oral and documentary, that the finding given by the appellate Court that Ramakrishna is the foster son and Subbalakshmi is the foster daughter of the respondent and her deceased husband, cannot be interfered with, as the learned Subordinate Judge has given valid and convincing reasons in support of such finding after discussing the entire evidence placed on record. Ramakrishna is the son of the brother of the deceased husband of the respondent while Subbalakshmi is the niece of the respondent. Even in the rent control petition, it was specifically averred that the respondent and her husband are seeking eviction of the petitioners from the demised building as it is required for residential purpose of the children and grand children of their foster son and daughter. It is, however, to be seen from the counter filed in the rent control petition by the petitioners herein that except making a general denial regarding all the allegations made in the petition, they did not specifically deny that the respondent and her husband are having foster son and daughter. Apart from that, it is clear from the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 as well as the admissions made by R.W.I himself that the respondent and her husband have got such foster son and daughter and that Subbalakshmi who is the foster daughter and her children as well as grand children are all residing since a long time with the respondent and her husband in their building which is separate from the demised premises. R.W.1 who is the second petitioner herein has categorically admitted in his cross-examination that the sons of Subbalakshmi are residing in the house of the respondent herein along with her family. P.W. 3 is no other than the husband of Subbalakshmi and he has also deposed that their family is residing along with the respondent and her husband in the house belonging to them. The contents of Ex.B-3 and B-5, which were filed on behalf of the petitioners herein, also reveal that Subbalakshmi and her husband as well as their children are residing along with the respondent and her husband in their house since a long time. In view of such evidence, the appellate Court rightly came to the conclusion that Ramakrishna and Subbalakshmi are the foster son and daughter of the respondent and her husband and that they along with their children and grand children are residing along with the respondent and her husband in their house as one family since a long time. Such a finding given by the appellate Court, after giving valid and convincing reasons in support of such finding, cannot be interfered with in the present revision and there are also no valid reasons to do so.
8. The next aspect to be considered is whether the respondent herein is bona fide in requiring the demised premises for residential accommodation of her foster children and their children and grand children. Even on this aspect, the appellate Court, after discussing the entire evidence on record, came to the conclusion that such requirement of the respondent is bonafide. It is to be seen from the evidence adduced that Subbalakshmi, who is the foster daughter of the respondent and her children and grand children are residing since a long time in the house belonging to the respondent along with the respondent and her deceased husband in their house. It is also now proved from the evidence that the daughter of the foster son Ramakrishna is given in marriage to the son of Subbalakshmi, who is the foster daughter and the said entire family is residing in the same house in which the respondent is now residing. The husband of the respondent, who is the first petitioner in the rent control petition, was having one daughter through his first wife and the said daughter was already married and is said to be staying with her husband at some other place. After that, the first wife appears to have deserted the husband of the respondent and after such desertion, he married the respondent as his second wife and admittedly there are no children to them. Under such circumstances, they fostered Ramakrishna and Subbalakshmi so that they may be of some assistance to them as they were alone and had no children of their own. As already stated above, they were all living together in the same house as one family right from the time when Ramakrishna and Subbalakshmi were brought as their foster children. Inasmuch as Subbalakshmi and Ramakrishna are already married and their children also are married and grand children are born, it is only just and reasonable to think that the said family requires additional accommodation, so that the children and grand children of the foster children can live in comfort as the house in which they are presently living is evidently insufficient to accommodate all of them. As a matter of fact, it is clear from Ex.A-1 and A-4, which are also referred to by the appellate Court in its judgment, that as the petitioners, who are the tenants, had promised to vacate the building under Ex.A-1 agreement by the end of December, 1981, the husband of the respondent had obtained permission from the Municipality for constructing a new building in the place of the demised premises after acquiring possession of the same. Ex.A-4 is the plan approved by the Municipality in that regard. Under these circumstances, it can clearly be said, as rightly found by the appellate Court, that there are bona fides on the part of the respondent and her husband in requiring the demised building for residential purpose and there are no valid reasons to interfere with such finding of fact arrived at by the appellate Court.
9. The next contention raised by the petitioners before the lower Court, as also before this Court, is that the requirement of the foster children of the respondent cannot be considered as the requirement of the respondent, who alone is the owner of the premises and that, therefore, the petition filed for eviction is not maintainable. The learned Counsel for the petitioners tried to rely upon the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Satyavathi v. Srirama Murthy, 1982 (2) ALT 255 in support of such contention. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent tried to rely upon another Division Bench decision of this Court reported in M.S. Malpani v. A.D. Asaws, 1986 (2) ALT 492 in support of his contention that the requirement of the foster children and their family can be considered as the requirement of the respondent in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and as such, the eviction can be ordered. Both these decisions were cited before the appellate authority also and the learned Subordinate Judge negatived the contention of the petitioners herein and agreed with the contention of the respondent in view of the observations contained in the decision reported in M.S. Malpani v. A.D. Asaws. In the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Satyavathi v. Srirama Murthy (1 supra) it was observed that a foster daughter of the landlord, who is neither a member of the joint family nor a legal dependent on the landlord, and between whom law has not recognised any jural relationship, cannot fall within the scope of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the A.P. Rent Control Act. In that particular case, the eviction was sought for the purpose of business of the foster daughter and it was not for the purpose of residential accommodation of the family consisting of the landlord and his foster daughter. Under those circumstances, it was observed by Their Lordships in that decision that the foster daughter is not a dependent of the petitioner-landlady and as such, the eviction petition filed for eviction relating to a non-residential building for the purpose of a foster daughter to enable her to set up private practice in medicine and open a Clinic in the said premises cannot be allowed. Such observations made in the said decision cannot be made applicable to the present case in which the requirement is for residential purpose of all the family members of the foster children of the respondent and all of whom are living as one family in a single house, which is now found insufficient to accommodate all of them. In the case concerned in the other Division Bench decision of this Court reported in M.S. Malpani v. A.D. Asaws, on which the appellate authority placed reliance, the building concerned was a residential building which was owned by the landlady who was the respondent in that revision. She came forward with the plea that her family consists of seven members including herself and her husband, brother of her husband and his wife and three children and that the demised building is required for residential purpose of all such members of her family. The tenant in that case tried to contend that the "family" of the landlady can be said to consist only of herself and her husband and not the brother of her husband and his wife and children, that the entire demised building consisting of ground floor and upstairs cannot be said to be required to accommodate the landlady and her husband alone and that the requirement of the brother of the husband and his wife and children cannot be said to be the requirement of the landlady and her husband for the purpose of residential accommodation. Their Lordships after negativing such contentions raised on behalf of the tenant, have observed in para-8 of the Judgment as follows:-
"In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to try to lay down exhaustively who are all included within this expression. The expression has to be understood and construed in a reasonable and realistic manner. It is a question of fact to be decided in each given case, having regard to the facts of the case, in the course of which, social, cultural, religious, financial and even emotional ties have to be taken into account. What has to be decided in each case, having regard to the pleadings and proof, is who can be said to be members of the landlord's family. Parents, dependent relatives, others upon whom the landlord is dependent or those who have been living since quite some time as members of the family of the landlord can be included within this expression. The need of such persons by itself is not relevant. They come in and their need becomes relevant because they are the members of the landlord's family. Since the landlord cannot be dissociated from his family, his family's need is treated as his need. It goes without saying that it is for the landlord to plead and prove all the necessary facts. It is for him to show why another person (apart from wife and children) is to be treated as member of his family."
9. Their Lordships also referred to various decisions of this Court as well as other Courts in support of the opinion expressed by them in that decision. In the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Balaiah v. Lachaiah, 1965 (2) ALT 252 the non-residential building in question belonged to the joint family. It was required for the son of the Kartha for starting a new business. The Division Bench while considering the meaning of the words "for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on or which the landlord bona fide proposes to commence", occurring in the relevant section, has observed that the need of the landlord need not necessarily be confined to the physical requirement of the landlord himself; that the said expression and similar other expressions should be liberally construed, and that the said expression is capable of a wide meaning and includes the landlord's family dependents and such person or persons who may be essential and necessary for occupation". Observing that in determining such question, the Court must bear in mind the context of social order, the habits and ideas of living and the social and religious customs of the community to which the concerned individual belongs, the following test was enunciated:
"Broadly stated, however, these phrases not only include the members of the landlord's family but also all those persons who are socially or economically dependent on him and whose responsibilities he has accepted. This is based on the necessity of realising that the family in India whether joint or separate is the social unit of Indian civilization and it is of greater public importance to keep it together..........."
The Bench further observed in that decision that whether the need of a particular person is the need of the Landlord or not has to be decided in the given circumstances of each case.
11. The Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Satyavathi v. Srirama Murthy (1 supra), which is sought to be relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners herein, was also referred to in the above said Division Bench decision reported in M.S. Malpani v. A.D. Asaws (2 supra). It is observed by the Division Bench in the said decision that the reasoning given by the Division Bench in the decision reported in Satyavathi v. Srirama Murthy (1 supra) must be understood in the context of the facts of that case and that it would not be permissible to read the observations therein divorced from the context and facts of that case or to read them in such a manner as to defeat the very object and purpose of the enactment.
12. The decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Nanalal Goverdhan Das & Company v. Samratbai, was also considered by the Division Bench in the above cited decision reported in M.S. Malpani v. A.D. Asaws (2 supra). The building in the case concerned in that decision of the Bombay High Court was owned by the landlady and she required the premises for expanding the business carried on by her son. After considering several decisions of the Indian High Courts, the learned Judge in the said decision of the Bombay High Court enunciated the following propositions, which are extracted in the above cited decision of this Court reported in M.S. Malpani v. A.D. Aswas (2 supra):
"(1) The requirement mentioned in Section 13 (1) (g) must be the requirement by the landlord and not the requirement by somebody else.
(2) The words "for occupation by himself" do not restrict the proposed occupation to the occupation of landlord alone, but may include the occupation by members of his family.
(3) When there is a dependant of the landlord the requirement for his occupation may be the requirement by the landlord.
(4) In a given case members of the family of the landlord may not be joint in residence but the condition of the requirement for occupation by himself is satisfied if the members are joint in estate.
(5) In a given case the landlord may be dependent upon a person for whose use and occupation the premises are sought to be recovered. In such a case the condition in Section 13 (1) (g) can be said to be satisfied if it could be shown that it was necessary for the landlord that the other person should occupy the premises. Implicit in this proposition is the case of an old person requiring the presence of some person in or near the premises which is occupied.
(6) Even if emotionally the landlord feels that a relation of his, such as his daughter or son-in-law, should stay with him, it can be regarded as the requirement by the landlord of the premises for occupation by himself.
(7) In case of non-residential premises if the landlord's interests are shown to be linked with the occupation of those premises by some one, for whom he is seeking the possession of the suit premises such as a partner, then it can be said that the requirement of the landlord for occupation by himself is established within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (g).
(8) If there is a moral or legal obligation on the landlord to provide accommodation to a particular person than the requirement by the landlord for occupation of that person may squarely fall Under Section 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act."
An unreported decision of Chagla, CJ., was also considered in the above cited decision of the Bombay High Court and the observations made by Chagla, CJ., in that unreported decision are as follows:-
"It is immaterial whether they were members of a joint family or not. But if members of a family live together, mess together and look upon themselves as a unit, the Court is entitled to consider their requirements as requirement of the landlord who is seeking to eject the tenant........The position might have been different if a member of the family who is not a dependent wanted for the first time to come and stay with the plaintiff and if the plaintiff wanted additional accommodation for the benefit of the member of the family. But when we have a case as we have here of all the members staying together, then the members of the family are in the same position as the dependents of the landlord.........."
After extracting the above said passage, it is observed by the Division Bench in the decision reported in M.S. Malpcmi v. A.D. Asaws (2 supra) that it is in full agreement with such proposition in so far as it is applicable to a residential building. After referring to the various decisions of various High Courts, it is observed by the Division Bench that while examining the authorities of other Courts, the language of the section construed must be kept in view; that our Rent Control Act makes and maintains a clear distinction between a residential and a non-residential building (other than a garage); that for evicting the tenant from a residential building, it must be required by the landlord for his own occupation, which expression must be understood as explained in the said decision. In the case concerned in that Division Bench of this Court, the landlady was living with her husband and his brother's family as one family unit since many years. Under such circumstances, it was observed in that decision that as it would not be reasonable to disrupt such family unit or to dissociate the landlady from the other members of the family as a precondition for evicting the tenant, the need of such family must be treated as the need of the landlady. In the present case also, as already found by the appellate Court, the respondent and her husband have been living with their foster children and their children and grand children as one family unit since many years. The respondent and her husband fostered one son and one daughter only with the intention of having some assistance for them during their old age especially as they had no children. Under such circumstances, it will not be just and proper to divide such family unit as a pre-condition for seeking eviction of the respondent. The need of the present respondent, especially after the death of her husband, to have the assistance of her foster children and their children and grand children cannot be over emphasised. As the building which is now occupied by them is not sufficient to accommodate such family which is grown in number with the passage of time, the respondent has chosen to file a petition for eviction on the ground of personal requirement for residential purpose of the family of the foster children and as such, the requirement of the family of the foster children can be considered as the requirement of the respondent and such requirement is clearly bonafide. Therefore, finding of the lower appellate authority in this regard cannot be interfered with. The first point is answered accordingly.
13. Point No. 2: The demised premises consists of two portions of the building bearing two separate door numbers. The building bearing door No: 19-76/A is a residential building while the other building bearing door No: 19-76/A1 is a non-residential building. It is now admitted that the lease granted in favour of the petitioners by the respondent and her husband is a composite lease relating to both the said residential and non-residential portions of the building. It is also now admitted that the petition for eviction is filed by the respondent and her husband seeking both residential and non-residential buildings covered by the composite lease on the ground that the buildings are bonafide required for residential purpose. The contention of the petitioners, who are the tenants, is that as the lease was a composite lease relating to both residential and non-residential buildings and as the petition is filed only for residential purpose requiring both the buildings, such a petition is not maintainable under the Rent Control Act, as there is no provision in the Act covering such circumstances. They have tried to rely upon the decision of this Court reported in Dr. Madhusudan Mahuli v. L. Indira Bai, 1987 (2) ALT 504 which was also relied upon on their behalf before the appellate authority also. In the case concerned in that decision there was a composite lease relating to the premises which was leased out for residential as well as non-residential purpose and one portion bearing one door number was exclusively being used for residential purpose while the other portion bearing another door number was being used for non-residential purpose as per the terms of the lease. The petition for eviction was filed by the landlord seeking eviction of the tenant from the premises used by the tenant for non-residential purpose on the ground of bona fide requirement for residential purpose. After referring to various decisions including the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Miss. S. Samyal v. Gian Chand, it was observed in the said decision by Rama Rao, J. as follows.-
"In view of dichotomy maintained Under Section 10(3)(a)ofthe Act between respective requirements and causes of action for filing eviction petition for residential and non-residential premises, the requirement for residence cannot be availed of for eviction from non-residential premises and equally the requirement for non-residential purpose cannot be pressed into service for eviction from residential premises. There is no provision under the Rent Control Act for eviction based upon bonafide personal requirement in respect of premises let out for mixed purpose of residential and non-residential. The bonafide personal requirement is founded upon the legitimate necessity of the landlord and in the event of composite lease, the landlord is deprived of the remedy under the Rent Control Act. The ingredients for eviction for residential and non-residential are distinct and separate though there are certain similar features and in the absence of any provision in respect of premises bearing composite lease it is not possible to lead Section 10 (3) (a) with a provision for eviction in respect of premises having composite lease."
14. In the case concerned in the above cited decision of the Supreme Court reported in Miss. S. Samyal v. Gain Chand (6 Supra), the tenant was occupying the premises, a part of which was used for a school and the rest for residential purpose. The petition for eviction was filed by the landlord on the ground of requirement of the house bona fide for his residence. The High Court of Punjab, in the revision petition filed before it, held that on the basis of the finding of the appellate Court a decree for ejectment of the portion used for residential purposes alone can be passed even though the lease was a composite lease, and remanded the case to the Trial Court with necessary directions for passing a decree for ejectment relating to the residential portion. While considering the said orders of the Punjab High Court, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
"In the present case the First Appellate Court held that the house was "let out for running a school and for residence". The High Court held that where there is a composite letting it is open to the Court to disintegrate the contract of tenancy and if the landlord proves his case of bona fide requirement for his own occupation to pass a decree in ejectment limited to that part which is being used by the tenant for residential purposes. In so holding, in our judgment, the High Court erred. The jurisdiction of the Court may be exercised Under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act only when the premises are let for residential purposes and not when the premises being let for composite purposes are used in specific portions for purposes residential and non-residential. The contract of tenancy is a single and indivisible contract, and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect, it is not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts-one of letting for residential purposes and the other for non-residential purposes and to grant relief Under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act limited to the portion of the demised property which "is being used" for residential purposes."
It is clear from such observations made by the Supreme Court in the said decision on which reliance was placed by this Court in the above cited decision reported in Dr. Madhusudan Mahuli v. Indira Bai (5 supra) that when the lease is composite lease relating to a residential as well as a non-residential premises, the landlord cannot file a petition for eviction for residential purposes relating to the residential portion. Such a petition for residential purposes cannot be said to be maintainable relating to the premises which are subject matter of composite lease even if the prayer for eviction relates to both residential and non-residential portions. In the present case also, the lease admittedly is a composite lease relating to residential portion as well as non-residential portion of the premises, and the eviction petition is filed for residential purposes relating to both the premises let out for residential purpose as well as for non-residential purpose. Such petition for eviction from the residential as well as non-residential premises cannot be said to be maintainable when the ground of eviction is only for residential purpose. The appellate Court has, therefore, erred in negativing such contention of the petitioners and holding that the petition is maintainable.
15. The learned Counsel for the respondent has tried to rely upon some decisions of this Court in support of his contention that the petition for eviction in the present case is maintainable even though the lease is a composite lease. He tried to rely upon the decision reported in Yeshpal Roy v. G. Dinesh Kumar, which was rendered by Mothilal B. Naik, J. It is seen from the facts of that case that the petition for eviction was filed on the ground of additional accommodation, both for the purposes of residential and non-residential. In view of such circumstances, it was observed that even though the lease is a composite lease, the petition for eviction was maintainable as the ground of eviction was for residential purpose as well as for non-residential purpose. In the present case, the eviction petition is filed only on the ground of residential purpose, whereas the lease is a composite lease relating to both residential as well as non-residential purposes. The said decision is, therefore, not of any assistance for the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent.
16. The next decision, on which the learned Counsel for the respondent tried to rely upon is the decision rendered by S. Dasaradharama Reddy, J. reported in Amtual Hafeez v. D. Mohammed Ibrahim, . In that case, the tenant was occupying the building for residential purpose. The Landlord filed eviction petition on the ground that the building is required for starting carpet business by his son in the said building. The petition was opposed by the tenant on the ground that as the building occupied by him was a residential building, the petition filed for eviction on the ground of requirement for non-residential purpose is not maintainable. Such contention of the tenant was negatived in that decision observing that residential building need not be let out for residential purpose only, but can be let out for non-residential purpose if the structure of the building permits such use and continues to be residential building as long as it is not converted into non-residential building Under Section18 of the Act. It was further observed in that decision that on the other hand, a non-residential premises can be let out only for non-residential purpose and will always remain as non-residential premises and can never be treated, as residential premises unless its structure is altered and eviction from such premises can be sought only on the ground of requirement for business. Such observations made in that decision are against the contention of the Counsel for the respondent in the present case inasmuch as the portion of the building being used for non-residential purpose is also sought to be required by the respondent for residential purpose. Therefore, the said decision is also not of any assistance for him.
17. He then tried to rely upon the decision rendered by V. Bhaskar Rao, J. reported in Godavari Metal Rolling Mills v. D.S. Viswanadha Anji Prakash, . In that case also, as in the present case, there were two portions of the building, one used for residential purpose and the other used for non-residential purpose, and the lease was a composite lease. The petition for eviction was filed by the landlord seeking eviction, from both the premises on the ground that he wants to use one portion for his residence and other portion for his business. Under such circumstances, it was observed that eviction petition in respect of a composite lease is maintainable before the Rent Controller in a single proceeding if a residential portion as well as the non-residential portion are bona fide required by the landlord for his occupation. As already stated above, in the said case also, the landlord required both the residential as well as non-residential premises for his residential purpose as well as non-residential purpose and as such, the above said observations were made holding that the petition is maintainable. But in the present case, the petition for eviction is made only for residential purpose even though the demised premises relates to a composite lease covering residential as well as non-residential premises. Therefore, that decision also is not of any assistance for the contention of the respondent.
18. He has also next tried to rely upon another decision of this Court rendered by S. Dasaradharama Reddy, J. reported in K. Mothilal v. Mohd. Jahiruddin, . In the said case, the tenant was in occupation of a portion of the building used for residence and the other portion used for non-residential purpose and the lease was a composite lease. The landlord filed eviction petition on the ground that he requires both the premises for the purpose of his business. After referring to the decisions reported in Dr. Madhusudan Mahitli v. L Indira Bai (5 supra); S. Samyal v. Gian Chand (6 supra); Firm Panjumal Daulatram v. Sakhi Gopal, AIR 1997 Sc 2079; Amtual Hafeez v. D. Mohammed Ibrahim (8 supra) and some other decisions it is observed in para-5 of the decision as follows:-
"Thus, in case of composite lease, the landlord can seek eviction from the residential portion and non-residential portions on the grounds permitted under the Act in respect of each portion. But he cannot seek eviction of any one of the portions only as it will amount to splitting " of contract into two. Applying this to the facts of this case, the petitioner is seeking eviction of tenant on the ground that he requires both the portions for his business purposes. As far as the portion occupied by the tenant for business purpose is concerned, there is no difficulty in holding that the petitioner can ask for eviction on the ground that he requires it for business. Now the question remains whether the petitioner can seek eviction from residential portion for his business purpose."
After making such observations, His Lordship referred to his own earlier decision reported in Amtual Hafeez v. D. Mohammed Ibrahim (8 supra) and observed that as the petitioner before him was claiming the eviction of the two portions together and as the petitioner satisfies the ingredients in respect of each portion, the eviction petition is maintainable. Again referring to the decision of this Court reported in Dr. Madhusudan Mahuli v. Lambu Indira Bai (5 supra) it is observed in para-6 of the decision as follows:-
"The decision in Madhusudan Mahuli case (1 supra) is distinguishable since it is a case where landlord sought eviction of composite premises for residential purpose. It is well settled that eviction of non-residential building cannot be sought on the ground of residential occupation. As the lower appellate Court found that the landlord requires the premises bona fide for business purposes, the petitioner is entitled to order of eviction."
It is clear from such observation made in that decision that His Lordship is agreeing with the proposition laid down in the decision reported in Madhusudan Mahuli case (5 supra) that eviction of non-residential building cannot be sought for on the ground of residential occupation. As the petition for eviction in that case reported in K. Mothilal v. Mohd. Jahiniddin (10 supra) was on the ground of requirement for non-residential purpose, it was observed by His Lordship that such a petition is maintainable even though the leased out premises consisted of a residential as well as non-residential portions. It is clear from the observations in that decision that the same cannot however be held if the eviction petition is based on the ground of residential occupation when the premises from which eviction is sought for consists of residential portion as well as non residential portion. Therefore, the above decision also is not of any assistance for the contention of the respondent.
19. He has also tried to rely upon another decision rendered by Krishna Saran Shrivastav, J. reported in Sona Optics v. Shyant Sunder Bhargava, . A perusal of the said decision clearly shows that it has no application to the present case inasmuch as it was a case where the petition was filed Under Section 10 (3) (c) and not Under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Rent Control Act. In that petition filed Under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act for eviction, it was observed that the landlord cannot seek eviction of tenant from accommodation let out for non-residential purpose for bona fide requirement for residential use unless both are occupying portions of the same building are covered by Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. In the present case, the building which is now occupied by the respondent and her family members for their residence is admittedly far away and different from the premises which were let out to the petitioners. Therefore, the above said decision does not at all apply to the present case.
20. It is clear from the above said circumstances that the lower appellate Court has erred in rejecting the contention of the petitioners by relying upon the decision reported in Yeshpal Roy v. G. Dinesh Kumar (7 supra) which is already referred to above, even though the facts of the said case are different from the present facts, as already discussed above, and in refusing to rely upon the decision reported in Dr. Madhusndan Mahuli v. L. Indira Bai (5 supra), the observations in which are clearly applicable to the present facts. In the present case, the lease is a composite lease consisting of a residential as well as a non-residential premises and the petition for eviction is filed seeking eviction from both the premises only on the ground of requirement for residential occupation. Such a petition filed for eviction for residential purpose relating to a composite lease consisting of residential as well as non-residential buildings cannot be said to be maintainable. On this ground, the orders of the lower appellate authority are liable to be set aside thereby upholding the findings of the Rent Controller and dismissing the petition filed for eviction.
21. In the result, the revision is allowed but without costs and the orders of the appellate authority are set aside and the rent control case is dismissed on the ground that the petition for eviction as prayed for is not maintainable under the provisions of A.P. Rent Control Act.