Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Apseb And Ors. vs Uni Metal Alloys Limited on 1 May, 2003
Equivalent citations: AIR2003AP506, 2003(4)ALD319, 2003(5)ALT523
Author: Bilal Nazki
Bench: Bilal Nazki
JUDGMENT G. Yethirajulu, J.
1. The A.P. State Electricity Board and its officers representing the Board preferred this appeal against the order of a learned Single Judge of this High Court dated 23-10-1998 in W.P. No. 17129 of 1988 winch was filed by the respondent herein under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the appellants in withdrawing 25% power rebate to the Mini Steel Plants (MSPs) by including them in the list of non-eligible industries as illegal, arbitrary, unjust and to further declare that the petitioner industry is entitled for 25% power rebate till the completion of initial period of three (3) years as per the policy decision of the Government of Andhra Pradesh.
2. The writ petitioner is a Mini Steel Plant (MSP) engaged in the manufacture of steel ingets, billets etc., and was registered as a small scale industry situated in Ranga Reddy District. The petitioner unit is a High Tension consumer with a CMD of 3250 KVA with a capacity of 100 MT per day. The petitioner industry is a power intensive unit and requires considerable power. It was commissioned in the year 1985 and has gone into regular commercial production with effect from 1-2-1985. The Government of Andhra Pradesh from time to time announced certain incentives for new industries to ensure the rapid industrial growth including an incentive of 25% power rebate for the initial period of three (3) years. In pursuance of the incentives offered by the Government, the petitioner and other similar units have come into existence under small scale industries sector. The District Manager, District Industries Centre, Ranga Reddy District issued an eligibility certificate to the petitioner for claiming 25% rebate on power tariff for initial three years through his certificate No. EC No. 2366/ F/85 dated 21-3-1985. As per the said eligibility certificate the petitioner is entitled for 25% rebate from 1-2-1985 to 31-1-1988. Basing on the said certificate the 1st appellant-Electricity Board extended the benefit of 25% rebate with effect from. 1-2-1985. The 1st appellant Electricity Board issued an order in B.P. Ms. No. 946 dated 14-10-1987 amending B.P. Ms. No. 152 (Commercial) dated 13-2-1978 bringing the petitioner unit and other MSPs into the list of non-eligible industries for the rebate of 25% power consumed by the industry. The above amendment was given with effect from 15-10-1987. Accordingly in the last week of October, 1987 the 1st appellant directed all its subordinates to discontinue the 25% power rebate to MSPs and on filing writ petitions by those MSPs the High Court directed the Electricity Board to continue the power rebate till completion of initial three years. The petitioner industry was allowed to have the rebate of 25% till 31-1-1998 i.e., the date on which the initial three years period was completed as per eligibility. But, the 2nd appellant issued notice No. SC/O/OC/HT4/OMAL/2376 dated 3-11-1988 to the petitioner directing to pay a sum of Rs. 6,65,875-97 ps. within seven (7) days by stating that the 25% rebate was withdrawn to the petitioner with effect from 15-10-1987. In pursuance of the Memo issued by the 1st appellant, including the petitioner industry in the list of 65 non-eligible industries. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said notice filed the writ petition for the reliefs mentioned above.
3. The petitioner contends that since the Government granted the rebate as a matter of policy, the Board has no power to withdraw the same unless and until the Government chooses to withdraw the rebate. The Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 379, Industries and Commerce (I.A.) Department, dated 27-7-1989 withdrawing the rebate of 25% given to the MSPs, but by the date of issuance of the said Government Order the petitioner has already completed the initial period of three years. It is further contended by the petitioner that the Board is estopped from recovering the amount of power subsidy granted to it by the principle of promissory estoppel.
4. The appellants contended before the learned Single Judge that the Electricity Board has power to withdraw me rebate, therefore, the notice dated 3-11-1988 issued by it is valid and the petitioner is liable to pay the difference of amount as indicated therein, being the cost of 25% of the electricity consumed by the petitioner.
5. The learned Single Judge relying on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in V.K. Ferro Alloys Industries Pvt., Ltd. v. The A.P. State Electricity Board, , held that the petitioner was entitled to power subsidy for the full period of three years, which ended on 31-1-1988. The Division Bench, in the decision referred supra, held that the policy decision taken by the Government in regard to the entitlement of power concession to industries and the orders issued in that behalf by the State Government are binding on the Electricity Board in view of Section 78-A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 {'the Act' for brevity} and the Board has no power to withdraw such concession contrary to the orders of the Government.
6. The appellants cited a decision of the Supreme Court in Real Food Products Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board, , wherein the question whether a direction under Section 78-A of the Act by the State Government is binding on the Board or whether such directions are merely of guidance and the Board in formulating tariffs would yet be required to apply its mind independently to all the relevant criterion. The said question arose before the Supreme Court in the context of the direction issued by the State Government to the Electricity Board to fix the concessional tariff for agricultural pump sets at flat rate at Horse Power which was accepted by the Board. In that fact situation of the matter, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
The Direction of the State Government does relate to a question of policy, which the Board must follow in indicating the specific rate in a given case, the action of the State Government may be in excess of the power of giving a direction on the question of policy which the Board, if its conclusion be different, may not be obliged to be bound by it. But, where the Board considers even the rate suggested by the State Government and finds it to be acceptable in the discharge of its function of fixing the tariffs, the ultimate decision of the Board would not be vitiated merely because it has accepted the opinion of the State Government even about the specific rate. In such a case, the Board accepts the suggested rate because that appears to be appropriate on its own view. If the view expressed by the State Government in its direction exceeds the area of policy, the Board may not be bound by it unless it takes the same view on merits itself. (Para 8)
7. The learned Counsel for the appellants sought to rely on the above decision, which is in no way helpful to the case of appellants.
8. A similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Singareni Steels Pvt., Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board, order dated 14-8-1996 in WP No. 5746 of 1988, wherein the Division Bench allowed the writ petition holding that the claim made by the petitioner is squarely covered by the decision of another Division Bench of this Court in V.K.Ferro Alloys (supra).
9. In A.P.S.E.B. v. Venus Hotel, Khamman, AIR 1999 AP 333, a Division Bench of this Court while considering Section 78-A of the Act held as follows:
It is the just expectation of the citizen that the policy-decision of the State would be carried out by all its instrumentalities without any reservation and if they have got any difficulty they will approach the appropriate authority for its modification. Thus where it was a policy-decision of State providing concessional sale of electricity to the consumers of the notified area and such decision was traceable to Electricity Act under Section 78-A of the Act, mere non-mentioning of a statutory provision in a policy-decision would not render the policy voidable ab initio or unenforceable in law. The only ground that it was not adopted by the Electricity Board does not denude the said consumer from the right to the concession on the basis of which he has established the industry nor it would be a ground for the Electricity Board to decline the concession to which the said consumer is entitled as a State Policy. (Para 5)
10. The learned Counsel for the appellants Board also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Chittoor Zilla Vyavasayadarula Sangham v. A.P.S.E. Board, AIR 2001 SC 107, wherein the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Sections 49, 59 and 78-A of the Act held as follows:
The Board and the State Government both are statutory functionaries under the Central Act. They have to perform their obligations within the limits they have been entrusted with. Section 78-A empowers the State Government to issue directions to the Board on question of policy, on the other hand, the Board has to perform its statutory obligations under the Act and with reference to the fixation of tariff it has to act in term of what is contained in Sections 49 and 59. But this field of policy direction is not unlimited. There cannot be any policy direction which pushes the Board to perform its obligations beyond limits of the said two sections. Any policy direction, which in its due performance keep the Board within its permissible statutory limitations would be binding on the Board. So, both State and the Board have to maintain its cordiality and co-ordination in terms of the statutory sanctions. If any policy direction pushes the Board in its compliance beyond statutory limitations, it cannot be a direction within the meaning of Section 78-A... (para 20)
11. We are in complete agreement with the principle laid down by the Supreme Court, but the above principle was laid down on the circumstances, which are different from the facts of the case on hand.
12. Regarding the plea of promissory estoppel, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pawan Alloys and Casting Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P.S.E.B., , wherein the Supreme Court held that when a concession is offered by way of a promise by the State Government under Section 78-A of the Act and the new industries acting upon such promise, thus by altering their position irretrievably, the Board would be bound by the principle of promissory estoppel not to resile from its promise or representation before expiry of the period of three years. The contention that the function of granting rebate was legislative and hence could be assailed only on ground of unreasonableness or arbitrariness and principle of promissory estoppel would be excluded is not sustainable.
13. The learned Counsel for the appellants' cited certain decisions on this aspect. In A.P. Steel Corporation Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board and Ors., , the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Section 78-A of the Act held that the grant of concession by the Government in the tariff and subsequent withdrawal of the same do not attract the principles of natural justice in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In the case covered by the above decision, the plea of promissory estoppel was considered and the Supreme Court observed as under:
..... With regard to this plea, it would be seen that it is not the case of the appellants that they established their mini plants after the grant of concessional tariff by the two Government Orders referred to above and but for the grant of such concessional tariff they would not have established their mini plants. The necessary facts so as to sustain the plea of promissory estoppel are not, in our opinion, to be found to have been either pleaded or established by the appellants. (para 14)
14. In A.P. State Electricity Board v. Sarada Ferro Alloys Ltd., , the Supreme Court in the case of rebate granted by the State Electricity Board in demand and energy charges from the date of going into regular production held as follows:
Where in exercise of its powers under Section 49 the AP. State Electricity Board issued order granting rebate of 25% in demand and energy charges for High Tension Industries and it was specifically mentioned therein that the rebate was to be allowed from the date of going into regular production, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied when the Board had withdrawn the incentive given previously and the Company started its commercial production subsequent to that date. The promise or representation made by the Board, if any, was directly linked with the date of commencement of production by the company. In such a case, it cannot be said that as once the company started the process of setting up an industry and had incurred expenditure, the Board was bound to keep its incentive open for the company till it started production. Only those industries were entitled to the benefit of the incentive who fulfilled the requirements during the period the incentive was operative. (Para 11)
15. But, in the case on hand, the Government of Andhra Pradesh has withdrawn the rebate with effect from 27-7-1989 and the unit started functioning with effect from 1-2-1985. The principle laid down in the above decision is applicable only to the units which started production subsequent to the date of withdrawal of the rebate by the Government i.e., subsequent to 27-7-1989.
16. The promise or representation held out by the State Government or its instrumentality should not be statutorily prohibited or against legislative or quasi-legislative power or authority or is not opposed to public policy. Promise should have acted upon such promise or representation and by doing so it should have changed its position not necessarily to its detriment. In such event, if the promise or representation is intended to offer it for a specific period, the State or its instrumentality would be bound by the principle of promissory estoppel not to resile from the same, at least for that period.
17. In the counter-affidavit, the 1st appellant submitted that the Board had sanctioned a rebate of 25% in power tariff to the petitioner basing on the eligibility certificate granted by the District Manager, District Industries Centre, Ranga Reddy District, for a period of three years commencing from 1-2-1985. As on the date of the said order, the petitioner industry was not in the list of 65 industries, which were made not eligible for 25% rebate, as notified in B.P. Ms. No. 152 (Commercial) dated 13-2-1978. It was further mentioned in the counter that the Board in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 49 of the Act has notified an amendment to the list of the non-eligible industries notified earlier by adding MSPs, thus making the list of the said industries to 66, vide B.P. Ms. No. 946 dated 14-10-1987, which came into force from 15-10-1987. It was further mentioned in the counter that as the Electricity Board issued the proceedings touching upon the tariffs, there is no question of violation of Section 78-A of the Act.
18. G.O. Ms. No. 379 dated 27-7-1989 indicates that when the appellant made a suggestion to the Government of Andhra Pradesh to include MSPs, including the petitioner industry, in the list of 65 industries not eligible for 25% power subsidy, the Government accepted the same, and directed eight (8) more industries be added to the list of 65 categories of industries mentioned in G.O. Ms. No. 654, Industries and Commerce (II & CP) Department, dated 13-7-1976. It was laid down by the Board that the granting of rebate in power tariff is a concession of the State Government to encourage the industrial growth and for establishing of the new industries by granting rebate for a period of three years. The policy decision of the Government was initially accepted by the A.P. State Electricity Board and implemented the same, but, subsequently, the Board having recommended to the Government for inclusion of MSPs in the list of ineligible industries for power rebate, hurriedly issued an order withdrawing the power rebate to the MSPs, which the Board is not expected to do by itself. The Electricity Board is bound to follow the policy direction given by the State Government under Section 78-A of the Act. The withdrawal of concession made by the State Government in G.O. Ms. No. 379 dated 27-7-1989, the petitioner-industry is entitled to have the power rebate for the first three years period. Since the first three years period of the petitioner-industry was completed by 31-1-1998, much earlier to the order issued by the Government, the learned Single Judge rightly held that the petitioner industry was entitled for the power subsidy for the full period of three years, which ended on 31-1-1988. The learned Single Judge, in the light of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in V.K. Ferro Alloys (supra), which is a direct decision on the issue, did not go into the aspect regarding the promissory estoppel. After carefully going through the factual aspects, legal position and the judgment of the learned Single Judge, we are in complete agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge and we do not find any merits in the appeal.
Writ Appeal No. 264 of 199919. The respondents 1 to 3-Electricity Board in W.P. No. 12087 of 1989 preferred this writ appeal challenging the order dated 22-12-1998 of a learned Single Judge, of this Court wherein the learned Judge allowed the writ petition holding that the issue involved in the writ petition is squarely covered by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in V.K.Ferro Alloys (supra).
20. The writ petitioner-industry filed the above writ petition praying the Court to issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, direction or order commanding the respondents to give the benefit of 25% rebate in electricity charges to the petitioner from 24-10-1988 for a period of three years.
21. The affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, in brief, reads thus:
22. The petitioner industry was registered as a small scale industry for manufacturing Ferro Silicon and other Alloys at Kondamadugu Village, Bibinagar Mandal, Nalgonda District vide Provisional Certificate No. 01/15/03178/Pro/SSI/RIP/86 dated 26-8-1986 issued by the Industries Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, and the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Nalgonda also issued registration certificate for availing Central subsidy vide Lr.No. 1173/5017/B/86 dated 26-8-1986. The petitioner industry applied to the 1st respondent Board for grant of High Tension (H.T.) power for the purpose of its industrial unit in 1986 and after complying with the formalities H.T. supply was released to the petitioner for a contracted demand of 4750 KVA under H.T, Category-I. The unit commenced its production with effect from 24-10-1988. After commencement of production on commercial basis, it requested the authorities of the 1st respondent Board to give 25% rebate on power tariff as is being given to the new industries for a period of three years. But, the 2nd respondent through letter No. SE/Q/KMM/CRS/HT03/ D.No. 805/89 dated 21-3-1989 directed it to produce the certificate of the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Nalgonda for processing its application for 25% rebate on power tariff. The said certificate has no relevance to the issuance of giving rebate and there is no such requirement mentioned in the relevant Board's proceedings. The only condition required to be complied is that the industry should be set up after 20-10-1975. This fact was informed to the 2nd respondent. The enquiries revealed that the Board moved the Government for amending G.O. Ms. No. 654, Industries and Commerce Department, dated 13-7-1976 by including eight more industries in the list of industries which are ineligible for 25% rebate and the Government have issued G.O. Ms. No. 379 Industries and Commerce dated 27-7-1989 amending the annexure to G.O. Ms. No. 654 dated 13-7-1976 and by reason of the amendment, Ferro Silicon Industries are put in the ineligible category. Apprehending that the Board will deny the petitioner industry 25% rebate relying on the amended Government Order, it preferred the writ petition praying for the reliefs mentioned above.
23. The respondents-Board conceded in their counter that the petitioner industry registered its unit with Industries Department on 26-8-1989 and gave its requisition for supply during 1986 and the supply was released on 24-9-1988. The respondents further stated that the Board has issued two more proceedings adding eight more industries to the list which are ineligible for 25% rebate in power tariff and by the time the petitioner unit started functioning, it has come under ineligible units for 25% rebate. The respondents further contended that the Board having statutory power as per the Act, added eight more industries to the list of ineligible industries in its proceedings vide B.P. Ms. No. 946, dated 14-10-1987 and B.P. Ms. No. 1098 (Comml.), dated 18-12-1987 before release of power supply to the petitioner industry and the Government also issued G.O. Ms. No. 379, Industries and Commerce, dated 27-7-1989 amending the annexure to G.O. Ms. No. 654, Industries and Commerce dated 13-7-1976 by adding eight more industries in the list of ineligible industries for 25% rebate on power tariff. The respondents contended that the petitioner industry was set up after the issuance of B.P. Ms. No. 948 dated 14-10-1987 and the proceedings shall have retrospective effect, therefore, the petitioner industry is not entitled for 25% rebate on power tariff.
24. The Government of Andhra Pradesh through its G.O. Ms. No. 375 dated 23-8-1985 announced certain incentives to new industries, which are going to be set up in the intensive industrial development areas. The management of the petitioner industry and the managements of other industries being lured by the incentives announced by the Government have decided to establish small scale industries in Nalgonda District with a legitimate expectation that the incentives announced by the Government would be extended to them for the periods mentioned in the Government Order. The petitioner industry was constructed between 1986 to 1988 and it commenced production with effect from 24-10-1988. After commencement of production on commercial basis, the petitioner requested the 1st respondent Board to give 25% rebate on power tariff as is being given to other new industries for a period of three years, but me 2nd respondent through the letter dated 21-3-1989 directed the petitioner to produce a certificate of the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Nalgonda for processing its application for 25% rebate on power tariff. The petitioner did not produce the said certificate by contending that it has no relevancy for giving the rebate. The 1st respondent moved the Government for amending G.O. Ms. No. 654 dated 13-7-1976 for including eight more industries in the list of industries which are not eligible for 25% rebate of electricity and in pursuance of the said request, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 379 dated 27-7-1989. The petitioner instead of producing the eligibility certificate from the District Manager, District Industries Centre, approached this Court apprehending that the concessions given to the petitioner industry are likely to be withdrawn. Since the industry was established and commenced its production before the Government took a decision to include it and other similar industries in the list of ineligible industries for 25% rebate of electricity charges, the Electricity Board cannot stop extending the said rebate. The authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Sarada Ferro Alloys (supra) is lending support to this view. Since G.O. Ms. No. 379 dated 27-7-1989 has no retrospective effect, the petitioner industry is entitled for the rebate for the period of three years from the date of commencement of production and the Electricity Board shall extend the said benefit on production of the eligibility certificate by the petitioner industry from the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Nalgonda. When the said Government Order was not given retrospective effect, the Electricity Board cannot deny the benefit of rebate to the petitioner industry by giving retrospective effect to its orders without approval of the Government. The learned Single Judge has therefore rightly concluded that the issue involved in the writ petition is clearly covered by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in V.K. Ferro Alloys (supra). After going through the entire record, we have no hesitation to hold that there are no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge and we find no merits in the appeal.
Writ Appeal No. 1151 of 199925. The respondents 1 to 3-Electricity Board in W.P. No. 1242 of 1989 preferred this writ appeal challenging the order dated 30-9-1992 of a learned Single Judge of this Court wherein the learned Judge allowed the writ petition in part directing the Electricity Board to grant 25% rebate for the first three years after the petitioner went into production and rejected the rest of the claim made in the writ petition.
26. The writ petitioner-industry filed the above writ petition praying the Court to issue a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in refusing 25% rebate to the petitioner unit as highly illegal, unjust, void and to further declare that the petitioner is entitled for 25% rebate till the completion of the initial five years as enunciated in G.O. Ms. No. 375, Industries and Commerce (I.A.) Department, dated 23-8-1985.
27. The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are as under:
28. The petitioner is a manufacturer of Steel Casting, which started operations in January 1988, established in the industrially backward area in Anantapur District. The petitioner claims the benefit under G.O. Ms. No. 375 dated 23-8-1985, which was issued announcing certain incentives to the new industries, which are being set up in the intensive industrial development areas. Some of such incentives are 15% cash subsidy on the fixed assets of land and buildings and machinery, 25% power tariff concession for the first five years, out of which the first three years will be granted by the Electricity Board, and the remaining two years by the Department of Industries, Government of Andhra Pradesh. In pursuance of the incentives offered by the Government, the petitioner unit was established at Anantapur District, which is an industrially backward area. The General Manager, District Industries Centre, Anantapur granted the eligibility certificate on 24-7-1987 and the petitioner fulfilled all conditions that are necessary for availing the State incentives, including the 25% power rebate from the respondents. After commencing the unit, the petitioner approached the respondents for grant of 25% rebate and the said request was rejected by the 2nd respondent on the ground that as per B.P. MS. No. 946 dated 14-10-1987 issued by the Electricity Board, the Mini Steel Plants are not eligible for the 25% rebate from 15-10-1987.
29. It is the contention of the petitioner that if the Government takes a policy decision, the same is binding on the respondents under Section 78-A of the Act, the petitioner industry was established particularly lured by the incentives offered by the Government and the establishment of the industry was done much prior to the issuance of B.P. Ms. No. 946 dated 15-10-1987 and the eligibility certificate was issued even prior to the issuance of the above proceedings, therefore, the action of the respondents rejecting its application by applying B.P. Ms. No. 946 dated 15-10-1987 is illegal and it is not open to the respondents and the Government to resile from the promises and withdraw the concession.
30. The respondents filed a counter contending that the Board issued B.P. Ms. No. 689 dated 17-9-1975 providing for rebate of 25% on power tariff, declaring 65 industries ineligible for the rebate. It is their case that though the list of ineligible industries was prepared in consultation with the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the Board by virtue of the powers vested in it under Section 49 of the Act issued the said proceedings giving 25% rebate to the industries other than those 65 industries excluded for this purpose. The respondents submitted that the Board having further examined the issue, issued B.P. Ms. No. 946 dated 14-10-1987 amending the annexure to B.P. Ms. No. 152 by adding Mini Steel Plant at S.No. 66 to the list of ineligible industries. By way of subsequent amendments to the said proceedings, under B.P. Ms. No. 1098 dated 8-12-1987, seven more industries, including Ferro Silicon, were also added to the list of ineligible industries. The respondents submitted that the Board had been granting 25% rebate even prior to issuance of a policy decision by the Government. The Government has not issued G.O. Ms. No. 375 dated 23-8-1985 invoking the powers under Section 78-A of the Act. In the said Government Order, the Government has declared 25% rebate to the small scale industries for the initial period of five years, and in fact the Board is extending the rebate for the first three years whereas the Government declared rebate for the next two years by agreeing to meet the liability by itself. It is the contention of the respondents that the Board having declared the incentive has every power to withdraw the same or restrict it to a particular class of industries. Under Section 49 of the Act the Board has power to supply electricity to its consumers on such terms and conditions as it deems fit and the Board, which declared tariff rebate is empowered to withdraw the same. The respondents referred to Clause 3(a)(iii) of the G.O. Ms. No. 375 wherein it was dealt with the word 'power'. They reproduced Clause 9 of the Government Order and mentioned that the Government to facilitate implementation of the Government Order in relation to power tariff rebate, streamlined the procedure by issuing a Memo No. 2487/ DSK-10/81/87, dated 9-3-1988 wherein it is provided inter alia that the industry claiming rebate during the 4th and 5th years shall apply to the District Industries Center in a proforma approved by the State Level Committee constituted under the said Government Order, along with a certificate issued by the General Manager, District Industries Center concerned forwarding the application with the necessary documents to the Commissioner of Industries with his recommendations. The Commissioner sanctions and disburses the amount towards rebate. The respondents contend that the petitioner without following this procedure cannot get the rebate for the 4th and 5th years even from the Government. The question of the Board granting rebate for this period therefore does not arise.
31. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition in part observing:
The question involved in this writ petition is covered by the judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 8932 of 1991 dated 8-11-1991, wherein this Court held that the industry located in the backward area is entitled for 25% tariff concession for the first three years after going into production, from the Electricity Board and for the next two years from the State Government. The writ petition was allowed by this Court granting 25% rebate on tariff concession for the first three years from the Electricity Board. Following the said decision, this writ petition has to be allowed so far as the first three years is concerned.
32. Regarding the granting of 25% rebate for the 4th and 5th years, the learned Single Judge observed thus:
The prayer in the writ petition covers the first five years after the petitioner went into production. The first respondent-Electricity Board and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the officials of the Board. As relief can be granted only for the first three years against the Electricity Board, the rest of the claim has to be rejected, as no direction can be given to the Board in respect of the rest of two years. It is open to the petitioner to file a fresh writ petition seeking 25% rebate under G.O. Ms. No. 375, dated 23-8-1985 against the Government. So far as this writ petition is concerned, there is no point in keeping the writ petition pending by impleading the Government and other officials as respondents.
33. The learned Single Judge ultimately allowed the writ petition in part directing the Electricity Board to grant 25% rebate for the first three years after the petitioner went into production and rejected the rest of the claim of the petitioner. By virtue of an interim direction of this Court, the Board granted the rebate beyond the period of three years as contemplated in the G.O., but, since the relief in the writ petition was confined only to the first three years, the learned Single Judge observed that the excess rebate granted to the petitioner pursuant to the interim orders will have to be refunded by the petitioner and accordingly directed the Electricity Board to issue a notice stating that the amount to be refunded and on receipt of such notice the petitioner will make payment within three months from the date of receipt of such notice.
34. After going through the pleadings, documents and the order of the learned Single Judge, and in view of our findings in WA No. 2116 of 1998, we are in full agreement with the findings of the learned Single Judge. The appeal grounds are not strong enough to persuade us to take a different view in the matter. The appeal is therefore liable to be dismissed as devoid of merits.
35. In the result, the writ appeals covered by WA Nos. 2116 of 1998, 264 and 1151 of 1999 are dismissed by confirming the judgments of the learned Single Judge in WP Nos. 17129 of 1988, 12087 and 1242 of 1989 respectively. Each party to bear its own costs.