Allahabad High Court
Swami Sadguru Sharnanand Ji Mahraj vs Hari Kumar And Others on 28 May, 2013
Equivalent citations: AIR 2014 (NOC) 177 (ALL.), 2013 (6) ALJ 395
Author: Pankaj Mithal
Bench: Pankaj Mithal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Reserved. A.F.R. Case :- CIVIL REVISION No. - 553 of 2012 Petitioner :- Swami Sadguru Sharnanand Ji Mahraj Respondent :- Hari Kumar And Others Petitioner Counsel :- M.K. Gupta,Deo Dayal Respondent Counsel :- Rajendra Prasad Singh Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal,J.
The present revision is an outcome of the third suit in connection with the Mahantship of the Math Garhwa Ghat of "Sant Mat" Samprdaya, Varanasi.
The litigation in connection with the properties and Mahantship of the Math started in the year 1951 and is still continuing despite an elaborate and comprehensive decision of the Supreme Court in the first round of litigation arising with the institution of Original Suit No.469 of 1951.
The plaintiff/respondents in continuation of the earlier litigation instituted Original Suit No.1098 of 2010 Hari Kumar and others Vs. Devnath Yadav alias Mahant Swami Sharnanand Ji Mahraj primarily for a decree of declaration that the aforesaid Devnath Yadav and all persons claiming through him are not entitle to hold the office of Mahant of the aforesaid Math as he was not a Sanyasi/Chela who was ever installed as Mahant.
The defendant/revisionist in the said suit filed application (Paper No.64 Ga) under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint on two grounds: (1) that there is no cause of action to the plaintiff/respondents for the suit; and (2) that the suit is barred by limitation.
The aforesaid application has been rejected by the order impugned dated 17.9.2012.
Thus, in the present revision impugning the above order, the only question which deserves consideration is whether the court below is justified in rejecting the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. so as to permit the suit to proceed on merits or whether the plaint of the aforesaid suit is liable to be rejected under the aforesaid provision.
In order to appreciate the controversy it is important to narrate in brief the history relating to the past litigation of the aforesaid Math which is more elaborately contained in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1980 SC 707 Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir.
The Garhwa Ghat Math was founded in the year 1925 by one Swami Sarupanand Paramhans, a disciple of Swami Advaitanand. He preached the tenets and precepts of "Sant Mat" Sampradaya. He inducted Baikunth Singh, father of Krishna Singh as his Chela and named him Swami Atmavivekanand. Swami Sarupanand took Samadi in 1936 at Meerut and Baikunth Singh alias Swami Atmavivekanand succeeded him as Mahant. He died on 23rd August, 1948 and was succeeded by the disciple Mathura Ahir alias Swami Harsewanand.
Swami Sarupanand was endowed land and building by his followers and in the due course several properties were purchased which all were recognised as the properties of the Math. One of the properties, house No.C-77-33 situate in Mohalla Jagatganj, Varanasi was in possession of Avadesh Narain and others. Therefore, Mathura Ahir alias Swami Harsewanand the then Mahant of the Math brought Original Suit No.469 of 1951 for their ejectment. The said suit was later on converted into a title suit and Krishna Singh, was impleaded as one of the defendants as the occupants claimed that they are in permissive possession of it through Krishna Singh, the then Mahant of the Math. Thus, the Krishna Singh was set up as the Mahant of the Math as against Swami Harsewanand. The suit was decreed and the decree was finally upheld by the Supreme Court vide judgment and order dated 21.12.1979 reported as above.
In the aforesaid suit two of the relevant points which arose were whether the Mathura Ahir alias Swami Harsewanand was the Chela of Baikunth Singh alias Swami Atmavivekanand and was entitle to succeed to the properties left behind by him in preference to his son Krishna Singh and whether the aforesaid house was a Math property. The Apex Court affirmed the findings of the court below that the two houses at Varanasi including the suit house were purchased by Baikunth Singh alias Swami Atmavivekanand out of the offerings made by his disciples and therefore were Math properties. It was further held that Mathura Ahir alias Swami Harsewanand was validly initiated as Chela of Baikunth Singh alias Swami Atmavivekanand and succeeded him as Mahant of Garhwa Ghat Math according to tenets of the "Sant Mat" Sampradaya. The defendants of the suit including Krishna Singh were held to be rank trespassers. One Raghunath alias Swami Harshankaranand was recognised as defacto Mahant of the Math on the death of Mathura Ahir alias Swami Harsewanand to participate in the appeal for preservation of its properties.
The aforesaid decree of ejectment passed in the suit was put in execution through Execution No.18 of 1960 which remained pending during continuation of the suit by way of appeal in the Supreme Court. On the decision of the Supreme Court, aforesaid Krishna Singh instituted Suit No.153 of 1980 and got the execution stayed which gave rise to proceedings for contempt before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court vide judgment and order dated 7.9.1981 held that the order of the Civil Judge allowing application for stay of execution was a nullity and violative of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The explanation of the Civil Judge was called for and he was directed to transfer possession of the property from Krishna Singh and others to the decree holder Raghunath alias Swami Harshankaranand and to report its compliance. The Court also observed that it is very doubtful if Krishna Singh who was held to be a rank trespasser in the earlier litigation has any locus to bring and maintain Original Suit No.153 of 1980 but left that aspect of the matter to be decided by the trial court after framing a preliminary issue on that point.
Thereafter Krishna Singh got the plaint of the suit amended and after a good rally of litigation on the amendment itself it was set at rest with the dismissal of the writ petition challenging the amendment. Thereafter some more amendments in the plaint were sought by Krishna Singh and the matter once again came up before the High Court by means of Writ Petition No.46291 of 2000 whereupon the High Court vide judgment and order dated 15.5.2002 directed for quashing of the entire proceedings of the Original Suit No.153 of 1980 as in the meantime Raghunath alias Swami Harshankaranand had died and the Court was of the opinion that no declaration regarding his status can be granted behind his back more particularly when the Supreme Court vide order dated 10.8.1981 in a civil appeal arising from the above suit had directed that the suit shall be confined to the status of Raghunath alias Swami Harshankaranand as Mahant of the Math.
In Special Leave Petition against the above order of the High Court, as one Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand had in the meantime succeeded to Mahantship of the Math, the Apex Court vide order dated 25.8.2010 without touching the order of the High Court dated 15.5.2002 disposed of the Special Leave Petition with liberty to the plaintiffs of the said suit to bring about a fresh suit against Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand.
It is in context of the above observation of the Supreme Court that the successors of Krishna Singh have instituted the present suit No.1098 of 2010 questioning the appointment of Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand as the Mahant wherein the impugned order has been passed.
It is in this background, the court has been called upon to answer as to whether the instant suit is barred by any statute and bad for lack of cause of action.
I had heard Sri M.K.Gupta, learned counsel for the defendant/revisionist Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand and Sri Naveen Sinha, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ashok Srivastava for the plaintiff/respondents both of whom agreed for final decision of the revision at the admission stage on the basis of the material forming part of the revision.
Sri M.K. Gupta had made two submissions. The first is that the plaintiffs who are successors of Krishna Singh have no locus or any cause of action to maintain the suit as in the previous round of litigation Krishna Singh had categorically pleaded that no such Math as claimed exists and, as such, they cannot be followers of the "Sant Mat" Sampradaya having any interest in the Math. Secondly, as per the admitted case in the plaint, Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand is continuing as Mahant since 1983 and, therefore, the suit is patently barred by limitation as provided under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
Sri Naveen Sinha had supported the decision of the court below and had submitted that there is no bar in law for seeking the relief about the status of any person though the Specific Relief Act, 1963 may only provide for issuing declaration regarding personal status of the person so seeking the relief. According to him the plaintiff/respondents all though have been concious of their rights and have taken adequate steps to challenge the appointment of Mahant of the Math without any negligence, delay or laches. Non suiting of the plaintiff/respondents on the ground of limitation would be too harsh rendering them remedy-less despite specific observation of the Supreme Court to bring about a fresh suit. In short, his submission is that the plaint is not liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. and the suit cannot be dismissed as barred by time or for want of cause of action.
Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code provides for rejection of the plaint at the very outset in certain contingencies in order to curtail malicious and vexatious litigations. Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. reads as under:
"11. Rejection of plaint The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:--
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9;
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff."
According to above provision, a plaint can be rejected if on the plain reading of the averments made in the plaint itself;
(1)it does not discloses a cause of action;
(2)the relief claimed is undervalued and is not corrected despite opportunity;
(3)the relief though properly valued but the plaint is insufficiently stamped and the deficiency is not made good inspite of time allowed for the purpose;
(4)the suit appears to be barred by any statute;
(5)where it is not filed in duplicate; and (6)where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9 of Order VII C.P.C. i.e. with regard to the procedure as to the admission of the plaint.
The grounds enumerated for rejection of the plaint above are not exhaustive and the court may reject a plaint if it finds other defects in it such as where it is not signed by the plaintiff or the person authorised by him or where it does not discloses a clear right to sue.
In the instant case, the court is concerned only with two of the grounds for the rejection of the plaint, namely, whether the suit from the statement in the plaint is barred by any statute or fails to disclose a cause of action or a right to sue. The other grounds for rejection of the plaint are not relevant and material.
I first take up the first ground referred to above i.e. whether the plaint of the suit is barred by any statute viz. the Limitation Act and for that it is necessary to consider the nature of the suit.
Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 empowers the court to declare the status or right of any person. It reads as follows:
"34. Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right - Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interest to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief:
Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
Explanation. - A trustee of property is a "person interested to deny" a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee."
Declaration is to announce an opinion to elucidate what before was uncertain or doubtful. It is only an acceptance of a legal character which exists and does not create new rights or legal status in a person.
Therefore, any person who is in doubt about his legal character or to any right to any property can seek to clear that doubt by bringing a suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. It gives a remedy to a person against all those who claim adverse interest to his own.
The word 'legal character' used in Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act means legal status and it is not that the legal character must be in regard to certain property. The right claimed by the adversary which may hinder the legal status or exercise of right of a person is good enough to bring a suit for declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
The plaint of the suit prays for the following reliefs:
"44. That the plaintiffs therefore prays for the following reliefs:-
(A) By passing a decree for declaration -
(i)It be declared that the Defendant Devnath Yadav alias Sarnanand s/o Late Raghubeer R/o Village Saraya Post - Dhanapur, Tehsil - Sakaldiha, District - Chandauli at present Garhwa Ghat Village Ramna, District Varanasi is neither a virakt Sanyasi of Sant Mat Sampraday of Garhwa Ghat Math nor has been initiated as Chela nor has been installed as Mahant of Math Garhwa Ghat according to the customs and usages of Sant Mat Sampraday Garhwa Ghat, Varanasi, therefore, is not entitled to hold the office of Mahant in any manner, it also be declared that neither the defendant nor any person claiming through him, or through alleged Harshankranand alias Raghunath s/o Bhola is entitled to become Mahant of Math Garhwa Ghat.
(ii)It be also declared that Devnath Yadav alias alleged Sarnanand has no right to discharge the function of Mahant, and he has no right to take Guru Dakshina from any Grihasth Disciple & make initiation of Chela by giving Guru Diksha (Guru Mantra) and has no right to nominate his successor mahant and to manage the properties of 'Sant Mat Sampraday' of Garhwa Ghat Math.
Relief valued at Rs.5050000 Court fee paid Rs.200/-
(B) By passing a decree for mandatory injunction to dissolve any committee appointed by defendant (Devnath Yadav Alias alleged Sarananand s/o Late Raghubeer) or Raghunath alias alleged Harshankaranand s/o Bhola for management and control of Math and its property be dissolve and be further pleased to direct for constituting a for electing a new Msathadhipati from amongst the followers of Shri Shri 108 Swami Swarupanand Maharaj Ji, Swami Atma Vivekanand Maharaj Ji and Mathura Ahir alias Harsewanand. To appoint the plaintiff No.1 as Manager/Administrator of Math Garhwa Ghat to look after affairs/interest of the Math properties or to make a scheme for the management of the said math.
Valuation of this relief is included in relief No.(A) Court fee paid Rs.500/-
(D) Cost of the suit be awarded against defendant.
(E) The Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass any other decree to which the plaintiffs may be found entitled under the circumstances of the case."
On a reading of the plaint in entirety and the relief claimed therein, the suit purports to seek a declaration that Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand is not the Mahant of Garhwa Ghat Math, Varanasi of "Sant Mat" Samprdaya and as such no person claiming through him is entitle to hold office of the Mahant in any manner. It rather impliedly seeks declaration of plaintiff No.1 as Mahant and his appointment as Manager/Administrator of the Math.
The suit as such is essentially for a declaration.
The period of limitation for different types of suits has been provided vide Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act as is contained in the Schedule. The Schedule to Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act in part III provides the period for institution of suits relating to declaration. It contains Articles 56 to 58 which are as under:
PART III - SUITS RELATING TO DECLARATION Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
56. To declare the forgery of an instrument issued or registered.
57. To obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place.
58. To obtain any other declaration.
Three years Three years Three years When the issue or registration becomes known to the plaintiff.
When the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff.
When the right to sue first accrues.
The suit regarding status of a person is not covered by either Article 56 or 57 and, therefore, Article 58 has to be applied for determining the limitation for instituting a suit regarding the legal status of a person. The limitation provided therein is three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. In other words, the period of limitation for a suit falling under Article 58 of the Schedule to 3(j) of the Limitation Act is three years to be counted from the date "when the right to suit first accrues".
The plaint of the suit in question which has been filed as Annexure- 6 to the stay application vide paragraph 14 clearly states that the previous Mahant of the Math Raghunath alias alleged Swami Harshankaranand son of Bhola died on 22.2.1983 and that he was allegedly succeeded by Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand. It further in paragraph 41 states ".....the cause of action further arose when the defendant Devnath alias Sharnanand s/o Late Raghubeer claimed himself to be the Mahant of Math Garhwa Ghat on 9.5.1983 and continued........."
It means that the plaintiff/respondents accept that Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand succeeded as Mahant on the death of previous Mahant Raghunath alias Swami Harshankaranand on 22.2.1983 with effect from 9.5.1983 and this fact was within their knowledge from day one.
In view of the above clear averments made in the plaint, the right to sue and to claim any relief of the nature as claimed in the suit first arose and accrued to the plaintiff/respondents, if any, on either 22.2.1983 or 9.5.1983. Therefore, the limitation for instituting the present suit would be reckoned latest with effect from 9.5.1983 when the right to sue for declaration first accrued.
As explained in the earlier part, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC provides that a plaint of a suit is liable to be rejected where the suit appears to be barred by any law. It is settled that for the above purpose the court is enjoin upon to consider only the plaint allegations and the documents, if any, filed along with the same and not the written statement.
The averments made in the plaint as high-lightened above relating to accrual of right to sue demonstrates that the cause of action for the suit first arose as far back as in May, 1983 therefore, the limitation for filing the present suit as to the status of Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand expired in the year 1986. Therefore, the suit from the statement made in the plaint itself appears to be barred by Article 58 of the Schedule to Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act.
Thus, the plaint cannot escape rejection under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. but for exemption from limitation if established from the plaint in accordance with Order VII Rule 6 C.P.C.
Order VII Rule 6 CPC provides that a plaint which is filed after the expiry of the period prescribed for instituting a suit shall show the ground upon which exemption from limitation, if any, is claimed.
In the instant case, the plaint purports to seek exemption from the limitation on the basis of the order of the Supreme Court dated 25.8.2010 which permits filing of fresh suit.
The contention is that the cause of action continued subsequently also and it finally arose on 25.8.2010 when the Supreme Court disposed of Civil Appeal No.5550 of 2002 permitting the plaintiff/respondents to institute a fresh suit raising all points of law against Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand.
The order of Supreme Court aforesaid is reproduced herein below:
"Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
Delay in filing substitution application is condoned. Applications for substitution are allowed. This appeal, by Special Leave, has been filed against the impugned judgment of the High Court of Allahabad dated 15.5.2002. By the impugned judgment the High Court has directed dismissal of the suit because the original defendant Harshankaranand had died during the pendency of the suit. We are of the opinion that the plaintiff can file afresh suit by raising all points of law against Devnath alias Sarnanand-respondent No.1 and, if such a suit is filed, the same will be heard and decided expeditiously in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs."
The aforesaid order was passed in civil appeal arising from the decision of the High Court dated 15.5.2002 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.46291 of 2002 whereby the High Court directed for quashing the entire proceedings of Original Suit No.153 of 1980 wherein the status of the then Mahant of the Math Raghunath @ Swami Harshankaranand was questioned. The Supreme Court without disturbing the judgment and order of the High Court which directed for quashing of the plaint, observed that the plaintiff/respondents can file a fresh suit against Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand and if it is so filed it will be heard and decided in accordance with law. The Apex Court in permitting the filing of such a suit had nowhere observed or directed to ignore the law of limitation rather the direction was to decide the suit in accordance with law which obviously meant decision of all issues arising therein on merits and as per the procedure prescribed in law for deciding the suit. The direction to decide the suit, if filed, in accordance with law clearly permits the suit to take its own course and that no aspect which was relevant be ignored or left out from being considered. Thus, the observation of the Supreme Court permitting filing of afresh suit does not extend the period of limitation or give the plaintiff/respondents either a fresh cause of action or any latitude to calculate the limitation of the suit from the date of the decision of the Supreme Court as against statutory provision providing for reckoning the limitation from the date on which the right to sue first accrued. It does not even mandates that the court should ignore the limitation or any bar in the institution of the said suit.
The submission that the rejection of the plaint outright on the ground of limitation or that the suit is barred by statute would render the plaintiff/respondents remedy-less and that would be very harsh is also of no substance.
The law of limitation is founded on public policy and is based upon the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" which means that it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation. The idea behind it is that every legal remedy must come to an end after a fixed period of time as it is pointless to keep it alive indefinitely. In short, the law of limitation envisages to fix a life span of a litigation.
It is well recognised that for every wrong there is an appropriate remedy. The wrong complained herein is in allowing Devnath Yadav alias Swami Sharnanand to be the Mahant of the Math. The plaintiff/respondents had a remedy to challenge it but the challenge had to be made as provided in law. The law provides for limitation of three years from the date when the right to sue first arose. The plaintiff/respondents not having availed the remedy so available within the time prescribed can not at the end of the day blame the system for rendering them to be without remedy. The plaintiff/respondents were actually not remedy-less but they allowed the remedy available to them to slip out of the hand.
This apart, the direction of the Court to institute afresh suit does not mean that the limitation for institution of the suit stands extended. Any inference to this effect would amount to legalising and enacting a new law of limitation which I am afraid to say is not the job of the court. In Rajendra Singh and others Vs. Santa Singh and others AIR 1973 SC 2537 their Lordships of the Supreme Court pronounced that "Court of Justice can not legislate and reconstruct law contained in a statute or introduce exceptions...........". It further observed that "Even hard circumstances of a case do not justify the adoption of such a course" i.e. to say to legislate or reconstruct a statutory provision.
It may somewhat be true that to some extent fixation of period of limitation in some cases may be arbitrary and may frequently result in hardship but in construing the provisions of limitation, equitable considerations are out of place and strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide.
In Damodaran Pillai and others Vs. South Indian Bank Ltd. AIR 2005 SC 3460 it was thus observed "Hardship or injustice may be relevant consideration in applying principles of interpretation of statute, but cannot be a ground for extending the period of limitation.".
In Padmasundara Rao and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others AIR 2002 SC 1334 a five Judges Bench of their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate. The Court cannot supply casus omissus unless there is a case of clear necessity and reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. In the said case, on the above principle, their Lordships refused to extend the limitation of three years for issuing declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act even though the Court earlier had quashed the notification under Section 6 of the Act and had directed for issuing a fresh one and in the meantime the limitation expired.
In view of the above discussion, the suit is patently barred by limitation and it is not saved even under Order VII Rule 6 C.P.C.
In addition to the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. which provides for the rejection of the plaint where the suit is barred by any statute, Section 3 of the Limitation Act mandates that every suit instituted after the prescribed period shall be dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence . In other words, a Court is obliged to dismiss a suit on the ground of limitation even if no plea has been raised that it is barred by limitation provided on the face of the pleadings the Court comes to the conclusion that the suit is beyond time and has not been instituted within the limitation prescribed.
Section 3 of the Limitation Act reads as under:
"3. Bar of Limitation. (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (2) ...................................................................."
Section 3 of the Limitation Act is peremptory and it casts a duty upon the Court not to proceed with the suit, if on the face of the pleadings it is found to be presented beyond the period of limitation prescribed as has been laid down by Privy Council of Five Judges in Maqbool Ahmad and others Vs. Omkar Narain Pratap Singh and others AIR 1935 Privy Council 85. A three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Mahindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vs. Bhutnath Banerjee AIR 1964 SC 1336 also reiterated the above principal and held that in view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, the court is duty bound not to proceed with the suit if it is made beyond the period of limitation and the court has no other choice.
The position which emerges from the above is that the court is obliged or is under a statutory duty to dismiss a suit which is filed/presented beyond the prescribed period of limitation. No question of condoning the delay in filing the suit arises and no inherent power of the Court can come to the rescue to save the plaint from the period of limitation.
This is so because the object of law of limitation is to discourage continuity of litigation and to burry all accumulated past disputes with the passage of time so that there may be repose, peace and justice.
In N.V.Srinivasa Murthy and others Vs. Mariyamma (Dead) by Proposed LRs and others (2005) 5 SCC 548 and Apex Court on critical examination of the plaint finding that the suit seems clearly barred by law of limitation directed for rejecting the plaint and, at the same time, imposed exemplary cost and went on to observe that an activist Judge is an answer to irresponsible law suits.
In view of the above factual and legal matrix the court below failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it under law by refusing to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act and materially erred in exercise of its jurisdiction in holding the suit to be within time by taking the limitation from the date of decision of the Supreme Court i.e. 25.8.2010 passed in Civil Appeal No.550 of 2002.
Accordingly, the impugned order under dated 17.9.2012 is set aside, the application (paper No.64 Ga) is allowed and the plaint of Original Suit No.1098/2010 Hari Kumar and others Vs. Devnath Yadav @ Mahant Swami Sharnanand Ji Mahraj is rejected on the first point only relieving me of the burden of going into the 2nd aspect of the matter.
The revision is allowed and parties are left to bear their own costs.
Order Date :- 28.5.2013 brizesh